Can Quebec remain traditionalist?

[Gukpard]

The period of Quebecois politics from the mid 1930s until 1959 is known as "the long darkness", when the government was under the influence of Maurice Duplessis who ruled with a strong leash in Quebecois social norms

After Duplessis retired the leash was gone and the province liberalized. This made me come with this question, could Quebec remain traditionalist with a 1900 PoD?

To elaborate more on the idea, the first point is that Maurice Duplessis was corrupt and basically sent the police over and over again against labour strikes (so basically the traditionalist version of the piece of crap crook stereotype). Could another figure lead during this era, someone who keep the same focus in social norms but it is more friendly to democracy, someone who keep better relations with trade unions and thus prevent everything from collapsing after this someone leaves?

Furthermore, it is not needed for Quebec to remain traditionalist all the way into the modern era, the idea is that between the many parties there should be a large one that is quebecois traditionalist and that having these views remain popular and from time to time someone with these ideals get elected.

 

[Deleted member 169412]

Sauvé doesn't die after Duplessis and makes some concessions? From what I remember Sauvé was less hardline than Duplessis and if he'd lived longer he could have made some concessions while still keeping integralism popular in Quebec.

The problem for Canada, especially as it becomes more liberal (assuming that isn't butterflied away) is reconciling its own liberalism with what's basically a Catholic theocracy. Roncalli v. Duplessis showed that Ottawa and Montreal had completely different views on religious tolerance and I could imagine those differences becoming more profound as the sixties roll around.

 

[overoceans]

The problem for Canada, especially as it becomes more liberal (assuming that isn't butterflied away) is reconciling its own liberalism with what's basically a Catholic theocracy. Roncalli v. Duplessis showed that Ottawa and Montreal had completely different views on religious tolerance and I could imagine those differences becoming more profound as the sixties roll around.

Just for clarification, but Roncarelli vs. Duplessis wasn't about religious freedom per se, but whether Duplessis as premier had the right to revoke a liquor license. Though, yeah, the immediate issue, ie. Roncarelli raising bail for JW jailbirds, certainly illustrated the sectarian tendencies of various levels of government in Quebec.

As for the thread topic, I was originally gonna say an elongated Darkness was ridiculous, but then again, Jim Crow survived in the USA until the 1960s, and Ireland's ban on contraceptives lasted until the 1980s, with their ban on abortion being repealed only a year or so ago.

 

[Gukpard]

The problem for Canada, especially as it becomes more liberal (assuming that isn't butterflied away) is reconciling its own liberalism with what's basically a Catholic theocracy. Roncalli v. Duplessis showed that Ottawa and Montreal had completely different views on religious tolerance and I could imagine those differences becoming more profound as the sixties roll around.

Quebec can break away from Canada in this TL if needed.

 

[Dan1988]

The period of Quebecois politics from the mid 1930s until 1959 is known as "the long darkness", when the government was under the influence of Maurice Duplessis who ruled with a strong leash in Quebecois social norms

Hence an alternative English translation that, while less poetic, captures the same sentiment (the "Blackout").

After Duplessis retired the leash was gone and the province liberalized. This made me come with this question, could Quebec remain traditionalist with a 1900 PoD?

The problem is that, whatever the clerical nationalist elites believed, ordinary people did not necessarily follow them to the letter. It only really selectively listened to them when convenient and ignored them otherwise. Furthermore, while Quebec was the province with a French-Canadian majority, it should be remembered that up until 1960 Quebec saw itself as part of a wider French-Canadian nation, stretching as far west as communities in Alberta and as far south as the United States (New England and the Midwest in particulra), and the nation was always perpetually under siege. This is where the concept of survivance (survival) comes in because the threat was very real on both sides of the border that they might be forced to give up their identity and all that it entailed. (Which, BTW, does not necessarily sit well with how, much like the rest of Canada, it was Quebec's Liberal Party that did most of the governing - even if, to be sure, some of them like Taschereau were pretty conservative; Duplessis' two Premierships were just basically blips in that.)

Now, could the clerical nationalists have better negotiated the place of, say, industrialization in Quebec? Yes - we already have precedent in that when it came to immigration to the United States; originally heavily criticized by clerical nationalists as an abandonment of the sacred mission to remain farmers ("where God meant them to be" ) by pursuing vain materialist objectives, the nationalists eventually came to an acceptance of it as an extension of French Canada's supposed divine mission to be pure, authentic examples of Christianity to the Western Hemisphere. However, at the same time, we should also remember that as soon as French-Canadians realize their traditional institutions have failed them (the Sentinelle affair is one key turning point here, where events in the US changed the course of Quebec history), they will seek to have a change in their situation and demand equity at all levels to make Canada live up to its obligations in the BNA Act and after. We forget now, but at one point the labor movement (though the Quebec branches of the Canadian affiliates of the AFL and CIO) was a big deal during the interwar period in Quebec, this despite the lack of decent industrialization until the Depression. We also forget that liberalism in Quebec never really "died" in the 19th century; it just continued through other means. Had he been more decisive, Adélard Godbout's wartime Premiership would have been more than just a blip in that period, but could have been the Quiet Revolution several decades early. Even if - in pre-1900 - Honoré Mercier made some concessions to reality and allowed French-Canadian participation in industrialization, that would have been enough to stall the traditionalist path and shifted it towards other means - more like Europe, IMO, and/or even Quebec's interpretation of Comtean positivism as well understood elsewhere in Latin America (though probably not as racist as Mexico's científicos).

The point I'm making here is that Quebec's clerical-nationalist path was not as certain as it's often made out to be; behind the façade was a lot of discontent and selective interpretation of what they were being told from above. Once the contradictions are put out in the open, then the whole edifice the clerical nationalists built up will start to come down unless they make the concessions to reality. However, at the same time, it cannot be solely a Quebec thing - due to the nature of French-Canadian nationalism at the time, the efforts would have to stretch throughout the whole of Canada. Getting French-Canadian communities in the United States on board, by contrast, will be a lot more difficult unless there's a more conciliatory approach both with the clergy and with the wider American public in New England and the Midwest at large, that one could be good Americans while still be majority French-speaking. The problem here, though, is different from Canada in general and Quebec in particular, where America's own clergy tended to be more conservative and conformist than what even French-Canadians in Quebec would be comfortable with, because certain views that sought to reconcile the Catholic Church with American norms and expectations were already marked out as heretical. Considering how migration from Quebec to New England, in particular, would be going on regardless, until industrialization goes full steam ahead, that is going to be a big problem - accentuated still further by the Red Scares and anti-foreign bigotry/prejudice as a result of World War I, the October Revolution, and the resurrection of the KKK.

 

[Gukpard]

Hence an alternative English translation that, while less poetic, captures the same sentiment (the "Blackout").


The problem is that, whatever the clerical nationalist elites believed, ordinary people did not necessarily follow them to the letter. It only really selectively listened to them when convenient and ignored them otherwise. Furthermore, while Quebec was the province with a French-Canadian majority, it should be remembered that up until 1960 Quebec saw itself as part of a wider French-Canadian nation, stretching as far west as communities in Alberta and as far south as the United States (New England and the Midwest in particulra), and the nation was always perpetually under siege. This is where the concept of survivance (survival) comes in because the threat was very real on both sides of the border that they might be forced to give up their identity and all that it entailed. (Which, BTW, does not necessarily sit well with how, much like the rest of Canada, it was Quebec's Liberal Party that did most of the governing - even if, to be sure, some of them like Taschereau were pretty conservative; Duplessis' two Premierships were just basically blips in that.)

Now, could the clerical nationalists have better negotiated the place of, say, industrialization in Quebec? Yes - we already have precedent in that when it came to immigration to the United States; originally heavily criticized by clerical nationalists as an abandonment of the sacred mission to remain farmers ("where God meant them to be" ) by pursuing vain materialist objectives, the nationalists eventually came to an acceptance of it as an extension of French Canada's supposed divine mission to be pure, authentic examples of Christianity to the Western Hemisphere. However, at the same time, we should also remember that as soon as French-Canadians realize their traditional institutions have failed them (the Sentinelle affair is one key turning point here, where events in the US changed the course of Quebec history), they will seek to have a change in their situation and demand equity at all levels to make Canada live up to its obligations in the BNA Act and after. We forget now, but at one point the labor movement (though the Quebec branches of the Canadian affiliates of the AFL and CIO) was a big deal during the interwar period in Quebec, this despite the lack of decent industrialization until the Depression. We also forget that liberalism in Quebec never really "died" in the 19th century; it just continued through other means. Had he been more decisive, Adélard Godbout's wartime Premiership would have been more than just a blip in that period, but could have been the Quiet Revolution several decades early. Even if - in pre-1900 - Honoré Mercier made some concessions to reality and allowed French-Canadian participation in industrialization, that would have been enough to stall the traditionalist path and shifted it towards other means - more like Europe, IMO, and/or even Quebec's interpretation of Comtean positivism as well understood elsewhere in Latin America (though probably not as racist as Mexico's científicos).

The point I'm making here is that Quebec's clerical-nationalist path was not as certain as it's often made out to be; behind the façade was a lot of discontent and selective interpretation of what they were being told from above. Once the contradictions are put out in the open, then the whole edifice the clerical nationalists built up will start to come down unless they make the concessions to reality. However, at the same time, it cannot be solely a Quebec thing - due to the nature of French-Canadian nationalism at the time, the efforts would have to stretch throughout the whole of Canada. Getting French-Canadian communities in the United States on board, by contrast, will be a lot more difficult unless there's a more conciliatory approach both with the clergy and with the wider American public in New England and the Midwest at large, that one could be good Americans while still be majority French-speaking. The problem here, though, is different from Canada in general and Quebec in particular, where America's own clergy tended to be more conservative and conformist than what even French-Canadians in Quebec would be comfortable with, because certain views that sought to reconcile the Catholic Church with American norms and expectations were already marked out as heretical. Considering how migration from Quebec to New England, in particular, would be going on regardless, until industrialization goes full steam ahead, that is going to be a big problem - accentuated still further by the Red Scares and anti-foreign bigotry/prejudice as a result of World War I, the October Revolution, and the resurrection of the KKK.

Well, you gave a lot of historical context and that is nice.

So, to keep those clerico traditionalists as a viable political force is impossible? They are always going to implode when duplessis is gone?

 

[Gabingston]

Quebec, along with Ireland and Spain is why I don't think Catholic Integralism can work. When you tie the church to a political regime, when the regime either ceases to exist (Franco's Spain) or sees a decline in popularity (pre-1960s Quebec or pre-1980s Ireland), the church tanks hard.

 

[Dan1988]

Well, you gave a lot of historical context and that is nice.

Vous êtes bienvenue. (OK, I know it's not Standard French, but that and its shortened form, last I checked, are pretty widespread .)

So, to keep those clerico traditionalists as a viable political force is impossible? They are always going to implode when duplessis is gone?

I wouldn't necessarily say it's impossible. The main problem, as I see it, is that the clerical nationalists had a utopian vision of French Canada that was out of step with reality, and consequently made many missteps and blunders along the way that could have better facilitated not just a better position for Quebec within Canada, but for French-Canadian communities as a whole (and this global dimension is key to Quebec's pre-1960 history).

To better explain what I mean, let's move away from Canada for a bit and move closer to your own neighborhood. How did conservative forces in Latin America as a whole manage to retain in power for so long, even alongside liberals and later the rise of the labor and socialist movements? By accommodating itself to gradual change, but coopting and accommodating various groups that would have caused trouble so that the basic fundamentals of their systems remained intact. In Mexico, with Juárez and later the hated Porfiriato (hence my quip about the científicos), in Uruguay with José Batlle y Ordóñez (taking it in a more reformist direction), and in Brazil with the advent of the republican movement (yes, I know how uncomfortable it sounds, considering how horrendous the café com leite style of politics was - please bear with me on this!), for example, they found the formula they needed with Auguste Comte and his positivist theories (cf. the late Prof. Howard J. Wiarda, where he devotes an entire chapter about this in his book, The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition), at a critical point in their histories where politics was starting to become stable and they were just starting to industrialize - while the middle classes were starting to demand access to political power (through this, we can also link together, albeit selectively, Argentina with Hipólito Yrigoyen and the UCR). Positivism offered what appeared to be an easy route to modernity without having to deal with a lot of messy steps. As most of us who have even a basic awareness of Latin American history know, the reality was much different than the theory - sometimes dramatically, as was the case with the Mexican Revolution, but even sometimes at a more quiet level as governments quietly tried to wind the project down as not providing the desired results (even if its proponents were still around, although under other labels and even shaping the thinking of generations of Latin Americans throughout the region). But for a moment, it seemed like the wave of the future for Latin America, even if it remained obscure in the United States and in Europe (where we talk instead about Herbert Spencer and Émile Durkheim as the creators of positivism and the discipline of sociology).

Now, had Quebec's clerical nationalists come to a similar conclusion as Mexico and Brazil about the place of positivism, filtered in their own language, as a way to reconcile themselves with industrialization and all that followed (as well as bringing it closer to Rerum novarum's ideals and prescriptions for a more corporatist society), that would have been one way to make them viable. The main problem with the ultramontane view of the world as applied to French Canada, as I see it, was that it failed to really adapt itself to change, seeing any attempt at normalizing the colony (later province) with the rest of Canada as an attack on their very identity as Canadians (and later French-Canadians, as the Anglophone settlers/colonists/etc. soon claimed that identity as their own). While it did serve some importance in the immediate decades after the failure of the 1837-1838 rebellions, a basic problem that emerges (as does many within the Francophonie about defending the anciens régimes) is how to respond to change. Does one try to keep change at a distance, as the Old Order Amish and certain conservative Mennonite communities have done, or does it try to embrace it as long as it controls the direction of change? The latter would signify, if the clerical nationalists were willing to embrace it (and the earlier the better, IMHO), compromising their goals and reconciling themselves with a much wider mission of integrating industrialization and the views of ordinary people with bringing other peoples close to French Canada's understanding. In this way, for example, a lot of the exclusionary and racist language could be tempered towards immigrants and les autres, while continuing to stand up for French-Canadian rights (even if it means having to compromise on basic core ideals to get stuff done). Politically, that means the Conservative Party of Quebec would have to modernize (include dumping Edward Flynn ASAP, once the Tories lose to the PLQ) and move towards a more Italian direction so that it could better connect with ordinary Quebec voters. That could probably help update clerical nationalism and make it more viable and less aloof. The pre-British ancien régime was not going to come back any time soon, but if the clerical nationalists offered more positive, constructive solutions to Quebec's problems than just simply retour à la terre, maybe it could lead somewhere towards making clerical nationalism a viable force and less susceptible to implosion. If they learn from their compromise with regards to accepting French-Canadians in New England as good members of the nation despite betraying their supposed agricultural mission, it would be beneficial to clerical nationalists in the long term.

 

[Gukpard]

In this way, for example, a lot of the exclusionary and racist language could be tempered towards immigrants and les autres, while continuing to stand up for French-Canadian rights (even if it means having to compromise on basic core ideals to get stuff done). Politically, that means the Conservative Party of Quebec would have to modernize (include dumping Edward Flynn ASAP, once the Tories lose to the PLQ) and move towards a more Italian direction so that it could better connect with ordinary Quebec voters. That could probably help update clerical nationalism and make it more viable and less aloof. The pre-British ancien régime was not going to come back any time soon, but if the clerical nationalists offered more positive, constructive solutions to Quebec's problems than just simply retour à la terre, maybe it could lead somewhere towards making clerical nationalism a viable force and less susceptible to implosion. If they learn from their compromise with regards to accepting French-Canadians in New England as good members of the nation despite betraying their supposed agricultural mission, it would be beneficial to clerical nationalists in the long term.

The most important thing here are societal norms, could they be kept better than OTL in this scenario?

And assuming Quebec breaks free during that referendum, would it be able to entrench these norms as part of their national identity?

 

[Deleted member 169412]

Just for clarification, but Roncarelli vs. Duplessis wasn't about religious freedom per se, but whether Duplessis as premier had the right to revoke a liquor license. Though, yeah, the immediate issue, ie. Roncarelli raising bail for JW jailbirds, certainly illustrated the sectarian tendencies of various levels of government in Quebec.

I thought Roncarelli was part of a more general conflict between the Catholic government of Quebec which wanted to crack down on JW's and the federal government who were against Duplessis' integralism.

Quebec can break away from Canada in this TL if needed.

I'd imagine Canada would be pretty happy to see it go.

Quebec, along with Ireland and Spain is why I don't think Catholic Integralism can work. When you tie the church to a political regime, when the regime either ceases to exist (Franco's Spain) or sees a decline in popularity (pre-1960s Quebec or pre-1980s Ireland), the church tanks hard.

A priest I follow on Twitter says that la Grande Noirceur is why he's opposed to integralism. The fact that the Duplessis government supported the Catholic Church and made the state subordinate to the Church meant that when the state was corrupt, that reflected badly on the Church and that when the state eventually fell, that caused problems for the Church.

 

[Dan1988]

The most important thing here are societal norms, could they be kept better than OTL in this scenario?

Well, keeping in mind the Church and the Quebec state (in its various incarnations, even as far back as the British colony of Lower Canada and, before that, the much larger pre-1791 Province of Quebec as a stopgap after New France dissolved) had been linked for a long time, with the latter subordinate to the former, it could be possible if the reformist urge evident elsewhere (cf. Catholic Action groups found everywhere else except North America) cleared immigration. By which I mean some of the later programs that Canada did not introduce until well into the Depression as it built up its social safety net - but which, ultimately, had its genesis in Rerum novarum, the agenda of Dom Luigi Sturzo in Italy, and (most importantly) Bismarck's social reforms in Germany. Outside of that, just remember French-Canadians do not necessarily behave in the same manner the priests, nationalist intellectuals, etc. would like. So societal norms would be very flexible and negotiable on a pragmatic basis, honored only in the breach of them.

Another thing that came to my mind - Quebec pre-1960 had all the hallmarks of a pillarized corporatist society (not integralist - remember, the Liberal Party was in power in Quebec throughout much of the 20th century, and hence - while keeping to its own beat - was ultimately not too different from Canada's other provincial governments, apart from the much smaller state because the different religious communities, Catholic and Protestant, handled much of the social safety net and other functions that we consider today essential to the modern state); this society, while not using terms like sphere sovereignty, pillarization, and the like, would be one much like what the Dutch and Belgians would find very familiar. Seen from that perspective, and keeping in mind trends in North America at the time (not to mention in the UK itself), Quebec looks somewhat different from the traditional narrative in French-Canadian history (but not too different!), so the challenge here is to embrace that and "Americanize" (or, rather, "Canadianize") it. Even that could accommodate the Red/Radical Toryism evident elsewhere in Canada (basically a Canadianized version of "wet" One Nation Toryism in the UK).

 

[paddbear]

Following, following and thinking about my growing up in the Montérégie in the 1960s/1970s.

 

[overoceans]

I thought Roncarelli was part of a more general conflict between the Catholic government of Quebec which wanted to crack down on JW's and the federal government who were against Duplessis' integralism.

Well, it's kinda like asking "Was the US Civil War fought over slavery?" Technically no, it was fought over the South's right to secede, but slavery was the reason they were seceding, and the war resulted in slavery being abolished.

And as far as Roncarelli goes, I don't believe it was the federal government that took Duplessis to court, but Roncarelli himself, supported by a team of left-wing lawyers headed by F.R. Scott. I suppose it's possible that the judges who ruled for Roncarelli were hostile toward Duplessis' reactionary Catholicism, but religious freedom wasn't the issue directly bring decided.