Yes, yes, I know that few things like the British Baltic Plan (a British naval incursion in the Baltic Sea during World War One) and Operation Sealion (German invasion of England in World War Two) are considered ASB by almost all alternative historians.
If you want to read and discuss a serious effort to describe a non-ASBish alternative scenario about a British Baltic Plan accomplished, then you are welcome!
A little background
British Baltic Plan was conceived in the end of 1907 by admiral Sir John Fisher, who became First Lord of the Sea immediately after the beginning of the World War One. In 1907 Germany appeared for the first time to British eyes as a potential enemy because of the first accomplishment of its huge new naval program. A naval war between the two European powers appeared possible and British Admiralty had to make a plan to win the war. The imaginative admiral Fisher conceived a “knock-out plan” aimed at a quick defeat of Germany: a landing in Pomerania (Eastern Germany) after a massive British naval incursion in the Baltic Sea, through the Danish Belts and/or the Sound (between Sweden and Denmark). In 1907 many weapons of the XX Century had already to be tested: there was few or no experience at all with torpedoes, mines, new long range guns, submarines and airplanes. The original Baltic Plan was a typical XIX Century plan, an incursion of surface vessels in closed waters. The experience of 1914 warfare changed little those assumptions. During the battles of Heligoland, Coronel, Falkland, new weapons (mines, submarines, airplanes) proved less effective than expected (Heligoland) or were not used by both parties (Coronel and Falkland, open sea battles fought by cruisers). Thus the idea of a new Baltic Plan emerged again in Fisher’s mind in the end of 1914 as a method to outmaneuver the stalemate in the Western Front. A new class of fast battlecruisers (Glorious class) and a new fleet of nearly 600 transports and escort vessels would have forced the Belts and supported a Russian landing in Pomerania. British would have provided the naval firepower and sea dominance. Russians would have provided bases closer to the target and all the manpower. The plan was discussed for months. Fisher supported it, Churchill supported it only in principle, Navy secretary Oliver didn’t want it, the more prudent admiral Jellicoe feared it, the foreign minister Grey didn’t supported it for diplomatic reasons (Denmark and Sweden could have joined Germany), until a decision was taken: give the priority to the assault of the Dardanelles, against Turkey. Fisher resigned after the first failures in the Dardanelles campaign. After Dardanelles the British Admiralty became more and more aware of the mines and torpedoes. Then the Baltic Project was archived, but remains in general Royal Navy strategic concept. An incursion in the Baltic was considered as a third step in a three phases strategy (as Churchill wrote in his “The World Crisis 1911-1918”):
1. Clearance of the outer seas
2. The blocking of the German High Seas Fleet
3. Entry in the Baltic
In 1914 British forces had already accomplished their first mission, but they never accomplished the second. They never achieved a complete superiority over the High Seas Fleet until the surrender of Germany. Thus the Admiralty never took into consideration the accomplishment of the third phase of its strategy in OTL.
Two possible PODs
There were at least two possibilities for a British forcing of the Baltic, no possibilities at all for the accomplishment of the original Baltic Plan of 1907.
While a landing in Pomerania was always nearly impossible (support lines too long, German coastal defenses too strong, sub-water weapons too dangerous for a prolonged operation) an all-naval operation was feasible. Light ships could reach the Baltic in 12 hours, be supplied at sea, engage a battle and the be supplied in Russian naval bases. Capital ships didn’t need to be supplied at sea, they could reach the Baltic, fight a battle and be supplied in Russian naval bases. For an eventual second phase of the operation, the Russian Baltic Fleet could have provided support.
I found at least two opportunities for a British incursion in the Baltic.
The first and easier to spot was in June 1916: if the British won a decisive naval victory at Jutland, they could have achieved a decisive naval superiority in the North Sea, the pre-condition for the entry in the Baltic. But in OTL the British never achieved a complete victory (or a victory at all), then they couldn’t force the Belts, fearing a new HSF sortie in North Sea, behind their lines. The possibility of a sudden British entry in the Baltic was clear and present in Russian’s mind on June 1st, when false reports of a British decisive victory against the Germans at Jutland induced the Russian Naval Command to ready the Baltic Fleet for a sortie. After new reports revealed the indecisive result of the battle, Russian Naval Command came back to the defensive.
The second and less known opportunity was in October 11th – 20th 1917: in those nine days the Grand Fleet did achieve a complete superiority in the North Sea without fighting. In those nine days the British naval forces could have blocked the High Seas Fleet in its bases and forced the Belts without fearing a strike in the back. Why? Because, for the first time since 1914, the Germans splitted their High Seas Fleet in two squadrons, sending the first (with 9 modern battleships and 1 battlecruiser) in the Gulf of Riga and keeping the second (9 modern battleships, 5 old battleships, and 4 battlecruisers) in Kiel, ready to intervene in the North Sea. Only a segment of the Grand Fleet could have achieved a complete superiority in North Sea, blocking the High Seas Fleet. Thus giving an opportunity for an entry in the Baltic of a mixed force of battlecruisers and fast battleships, ready to fight and win a battle with any of the two German squadrons.
The Russians, invaded by Germans and attacked in the Gulf of Riga, very close to their capital, actually asked for a British incursion. Navy secretary Oliver rejected their request: the weather was very bad, then light units, minesweepers, carriers and supply vessels couldn’t take the action. And Oliver, personally, was a strong opponent of the Baltic Plan since 1914.
What if the weather was fine? What if more aggressive decision makers (like admiral David Beatty, premier David Lloyd George and Churchill, who was minister of munitions at time) could have prevailed over the “doves”?
to be continued
If you want to read and discuss a serious effort to describe a non-ASBish alternative scenario about a British Baltic Plan accomplished, then you are welcome!
A little background
British Baltic Plan was conceived in the end of 1907 by admiral Sir John Fisher, who became First Lord of the Sea immediately after the beginning of the World War One. In 1907 Germany appeared for the first time to British eyes as a potential enemy because of the first accomplishment of its huge new naval program. A naval war between the two European powers appeared possible and British Admiralty had to make a plan to win the war. The imaginative admiral Fisher conceived a “knock-out plan” aimed at a quick defeat of Germany: a landing in Pomerania (Eastern Germany) after a massive British naval incursion in the Baltic Sea, through the Danish Belts and/or the Sound (between Sweden and Denmark). In 1907 many weapons of the XX Century had already to be tested: there was few or no experience at all with torpedoes, mines, new long range guns, submarines and airplanes. The original Baltic Plan was a typical XIX Century plan, an incursion of surface vessels in closed waters. The experience of 1914 warfare changed little those assumptions. During the battles of Heligoland, Coronel, Falkland, new weapons (mines, submarines, airplanes) proved less effective than expected (Heligoland) or were not used by both parties (Coronel and Falkland, open sea battles fought by cruisers). Thus the idea of a new Baltic Plan emerged again in Fisher’s mind in the end of 1914 as a method to outmaneuver the stalemate in the Western Front. A new class of fast battlecruisers (Glorious class) and a new fleet of nearly 600 transports and escort vessels would have forced the Belts and supported a Russian landing in Pomerania. British would have provided the naval firepower and sea dominance. Russians would have provided bases closer to the target and all the manpower. The plan was discussed for months. Fisher supported it, Churchill supported it only in principle, Navy secretary Oliver didn’t want it, the more prudent admiral Jellicoe feared it, the foreign minister Grey didn’t supported it for diplomatic reasons (Denmark and Sweden could have joined Germany), until a decision was taken: give the priority to the assault of the Dardanelles, against Turkey. Fisher resigned after the first failures in the Dardanelles campaign. After Dardanelles the British Admiralty became more and more aware of the mines and torpedoes. Then the Baltic Project was archived, but remains in general Royal Navy strategic concept. An incursion in the Baltic was considered as a third step in a three phases strategy (as Churchill wrote in his “The World Crisis 1911-1918”):
1. Clearance of the outer seas
2. The blocking of the German High Seas Fleet
3. Entry in the Baltic
In 1914 British forces had already accomplished their first mission, but they never accomplished the second. They never achieved a complete superiority over the High Seas Fleet until the surrender of Germany. Thus the Admiralty never took into consideration the accomplishment of the third phase of its strategy in OTL.
Two possible PODs
There were at least two possibilities for a British forcing of the Baltic, no possibilities at all for the accomplishment of the original Baltic Plan of 1907.
While a landing in Pomerania was always nearly impossible (support lines too long, German coastal defenses too strong, sub-water weapons too dangerous for a prolonged operation) an all-naval operation was feasible. Light ships could reach the Baltic in 12 hours, be supplied at sea, engage a battle and the be supplied in Russian naval bases. Capital ships didn’t need to be supplied at sea, they could reach the Baltic, fight a battle and be supplied in Russian naval bases. For an eventual second phase of the operation, the Russian Baltic Fleet could have provided support.
I found at least two opportunities for a British incursion in the Baltic.
The first and easier to spot was in June 1916: if the British won a decisive naval victory at Jutland, they could have achieved a decisive naval superiority in the North Sea, the pre-condition for the entry in the Baltic. But in OTL the British never achieved a complete victory (or a victory at all), then they couldn’t force the Belts, fearing a new HSF sortie in North Sea, behind their lines. The possibility of a sudden British entry in the Baltic was clear and present in Russian’s mind on June 1st, when false reports of a British decisive victory against the Germans at Jutland induced the Russian Naval Command to ready the Baltic Fleet for a sortie. After new reports revealed the indecisive result of the battle, Russian Naval Command came back to the defensive.
The second and less known opportunity was in October 11th – 20th 1917: in those nine days the Grand Fleet did achieve a complete superiority in the North Sea without fighting. In those nine days the British naval forces could have blocked the High Seas Fleet in its bases and forced the Belts without fearing a strike in the back. Why? Because, for the first time since 1914, the Germans splitted their High Seas Fleet in two squadrons, sending the first (with 9 modern battleships and 1 battlecruiser) in the Gulf of Riga and keeping the second (9 modern battleships, 5 old battleships, and 4 battlecruisers) in Kiel, ready to intervene in the North Sea. Only a segment of the Grand Fleet could have achieved a complete superiority in North Sea, blocking the High Seas Fleet. Thus giving an opportunity for an entry in the Baltic of a mixed force of battlecruisers and fast battleships, ready to fight and win a battle with any of the two German squadrons.
The Russians, invaded by Germans and attacked in the Gulf of Riga, very close to their capital, actually asked for a British incursion. Navy secretary Oliver rejected their request: the weather was very bad, then light units, minesweepers, carriers and supply vessels couldn’t take the action. And Oliver, personally, was a strong opponent of the Baltic Plan since 1914.
What if the weather was fine? What if more aggressive decision makers (like admiral David Beatty, premier David Lloyd George and Churchill, who was minister of munitions at time) could have prevailed over the “doves”?
to be continued
