April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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I'll be interested to see what happens to the Korean laborers once the island is captured.

My first answer was

"Their food and pay would improve"

But then i got thinking - the Japanese did use Koreans for security jobs (POW guards etc) in rear areas so how trusted would they be by the Commonwealth forces?
 
Before one talks about how much better the Korean laborers would be treated, how many of them will still be alive? One possible scenario is the Japanese using them along the lines of a Soviet penal unit...

I'm reminded of something from the last series of TL-191 books talking about what it would take to win from the viewpoint of Irving Morrell...whoever could do two big things at once would end up the winner...

In this instance, Christmas Island and Guadalcanal will be going down at approximately the same time. Seems to me by mid-August 1943, both the USN and RN will have enough force in their respective areas to make life very hazardous for the IJN.
 
Kudo's and Koreans

First I want to thank Zheng He for this time line - masterful. I think we can use some historical guidelines in regards to the fate of the Korean laborers. IIRC, there were a number of Korean laborers on Guadacanal and they had a generally mixed to unhappy fate. To start with it was tough for the marines to tell Korean laborers in Japanese uniforms from Japanese troops so quite a few turned into collateral damage. The ones that fled into the jungle were no better supplied than the Japanese survivors and reinforcements who were in bad shape by the time they evacuated. On the other hand, the marines held on partly because they ate Japanese supplies. This island is smaller and easier to occupy so while the collateral damage problem still exists the Korean survival rate is likely to be higher.
 
Interesting questions, I'm glad you guys brought them up because mentioning the Korean laborers was a bit of a throw away line. They were employed throughout the Japanese Empire as construction troops.

From the research I did today there is no cookie cutter answer. Some Korean laborers were there against their will and they surrendered quite readily if given the opportunity. Other were volunteers (probably needed jobs) who fought alongside the Japanese troops. Many whether they were volunteers or forced, ended up as collateral damage.

Apparently some of the rear area Korean soldiers who served under the Japanese were quite nasty. One survivor of the Bataan Death March said the Korean guards were worse than the Japanese guards.
 

Riain

Banned
Did any turn on the Japanese troops when they were losing battles? If it was reasonably common then that is a course of action open to them to get better treatment from the ausies.
 
Did any turn on the Japanese troops when they were losing battles? If it was reasonably common then that is a course of action open to them to get better treatment from the ausies.

Not sure but apparently if the Japanese found them suspect they would just kill them. They killed 5000 on Tinian prior to the invasion.
 
1100 Hours, 2 July 1942, Kilindini, East Africa – On the other side of the Indian Ocean, another major operation was in the offing. Recent operations by Japanese submarines and auxiliary cruisers off East Africa and ongoing concerns about the potential for German raiders to operate in the region prompted the Chiefs of Staff in London to order Somerville to secure the rest of Madagascar. Particularly since a number of senior leaders in London, including the Prime Minister suspected the Japanese were using remote coves and anchorages in Madagascar far from the British base at Diego Suarez to replenish submarines and surface raiders. The Chiefs of Staff also wanted this operation wrapped up before September so the small number of landing craft needed for the operation could be transferred to Burma.

Fortunately this mission, dubbed OPERATION STREAMLINE JANE did not require a significant diversion of assets meaning Somerville was happy to leave in the hands of his capable deputy, Vice Admiral Willis in Kilindini.

Willis had suspected for some weeks that he was going to be called upon to do something like this so it was fairly easy to put things in motion. Willis planned to use the mobility offered by his fleet combined with the Vichy forces’ lack of air cover to conduct a multi-axis attack at four points around the island. First the 29th Infantry Brigade and the 7th South African Motorized Brigade would breakout from Diego Suarez and move south toward the center of the island. This operation would be combined with three separate amphibious assaults:

· Force B1, Kilindini, East Africa - HMS Royal Sovereign, HMS Griffin, HMS Decoy, HMAS Vampire landing the 22nd East African Brigade Group (King’s African Rifles) at Mahajanga in northwestern Madagascar.

· Force B2, Durban, South Africa - HMS Dauntless, HMS Caledon, HMS Panther, HMS Paladin landing the 27th North Rhodesian Infantry Brigade at Toliara in southwestern Madagascar.

· Force B3, Port Louis, Mauritius - HMS Devonshire, HMS Duncan, HMS Albatross, HMS Inconstant, HMS Active landing No. 5 Royal Marine Commando and one company of King’s African Rifles at Tamatave in eastern Madagascar.

The warships and the transports departed their respective ports throughout the day on 2 July with landing operations due to commence at dawn on 5 July. Willis was concerned about the lack of air cover, particularly for the southern landing at Toliara. South African Beauforts , Marylands, and Ju-86s operating out of Diego Suarez would be able to provide air support for operations in the northern half of the island and the seaplane tender HMS Albatross was to setup a seaplane base at Tamatave once the Marines captured the port. Willis had requested the use of HMS Hermes but was turned down since she was already slated for duty in the Mediterranean. Contingency plans were made to fly in RAF Lysanders for close support duty as soon as an airfield was captured near Toliara.
 
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0900 Hours, 2 July 1942, Colombo Harbor, Ceylon – Following the departure of most of the Eastern Fleet’s carriers, Colombo was still a busy place. Convoys were constantly coming and going and now preparations for OPERATION YULETIDE were in full swing.

Cute - but Allied security officers would scream bloody murder at a code name that was such an obvious clue to its meaning. Allied code names were nearly always completely random. TORCH and BODYGUARD were among the very few exceptions, and in both cases the "clue" was really an inside joke. (Applying a torch to the tail of the Desert Fox, protecting truth with a "bodyguard of lies".)

Pick any random word - GLAMOUR, BOXTOP, CAPSULE, BLUEBELL, HONEYCOMB, WOODCOCK, RUGBY - as long as it has no association with the actual operation, location, or activity.
 
One survivor of the Bataan Death March said the Korean guards were worse than the Japanese guards.

I heard the same thing about Taiwanese guards. The source was an American married to an ethnic-mainland Taiwanese woman, who'd heard it from his in-laws.

It should be noted that the mainland Chinese who came over with Chiang in 1948 regarded the Taiwanese as collaborators with Japan, i.e. traitors. This was especially true regarding the Taiwanese "elite", who had been Japanese officials and even army officers. The mainlanders took over Taiwan in 1948, and ran things to suit themselves, so relations between the two communities were very hostile for a long time, and what people would believe was affected, I suspect. Still could be true. The Japanese military was a hierarchy of brutality, and those near the bottom would pass it on to those at the bottom, i.e. PoWs.

John Derbyshire quoted a survivor of the Nanking Massacre to similar effect. (He lived in Hong Kong for years, speaks Chinese, married a Chinese woman, and has traveled there several times.) Supposedly, the Manchurian and Chinese auxiliary troops were worse than the Japanese themselves. I don't recall whether Koreans were mentioned.
 
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Cute - but Allied security officers would scream bloody murder at a code name that was such an obvious clue to its meaning. Allied code names were nearly always completely random. TORCH and BODYGUARD were among the very few exceptions, and in both cases the "clue" was really an inside joke. (Applying a torch to the tail of the Desert Fox, protecting truth with a "bodyguard of lies".)

Pick any random word - GLAMOUR, BOXTOP, CAPSULE, BLUEBELL, HONEYCOMB, WOODCOCK, RUGBY - as long as it has no association with the actual operation, location, or activity.

Good point, changed to OPERATION TIDERACE, the OTL operation to re-take Singapore.
 
I heard the same thing about Taiwanese guards. The source was an American married to an ethnic-mainland Taiwanese woman, who'd heard it from his in-laws.

It should be noted that the mainland Chinese who came over with Chiang in 1948 regarded the Taiwanese as collaborators with Japan, i.e. traitors. This was especially true regarding the Taiwanese "elite", who had been Japanese officials and even army officers. The mainlanders took over Taiwan in 1948, and ran things to suit themselves, so relations between the two communities were very hostile for a long time, and what people would believe was affected, I suspect. Still could be true. The Japanese military was a hierarchy of brutality, and those near the bottom would pass it on to those at the bottom, i.e. PoWs.

John Derbyshire quoted a survivor of the Nanking Massacre to similar effect. (He lived in Hong Kong for years, speaks Chinese, married a Chinese woman, and has traveled there several times.) Supposedly, the Manchurian and Chinese auxiliary troops were worse than the Japanese themselves. I don't recall whether Koreans were mentioned.

Just in reading background on this issue, apparently a number of Koreans even graduated from the Japanese Army's Academy and served the Japanese as loyal officers. According to the wiki page, the first six chiefs of the ROK Army were Japanese Academy grads.

WRT to the "Taiwanese" isn't one of their recent presidents the first ethnically Taiwanese president? Please correct me if I am wrong.
 
1600 Hours, 3 July 1942, Campbell Bay, Great Nicobar Island – The Dutch submarine O-23 on patrol in the northern end of the Strait of Malacca had patiently tracked the Japanese convoy from Sabang to Great Nicobar Island where the cargo ships were clearly unloading troops and equipment. The destroyers patrolling outside of Campbell Bay and the cruiser floatplanes overhead prevent Lieutenant Commander Albertus Valkenburg from maneuvering for a shot. He would try again after dark and failing that he would settle into an ambush position and snorkel and wait for the Japanese to come to him. He also needed to make a sighting report. The Japanese were not known to have a presence on Great Nicobar Island. That had apparently changed.
 
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1700 Hours, 3 July 1942,Port T, Addu Atoll – The flow of forces to the Cocos Islands continued with the departure of the submarine depot ship HMS Lucia from Port T escorted by the Indian escort sloop HMIS Hindustan and the corvette/minesweeper HMIS Bengal. Also going to the Cocos Islands were the submarines HMS Truant and HMS Trusty, currently in port Colombo. With the decreased threat of Japanese offensive action, Port T was no longer as important as it was three months ago so Somerville was shifting some of the base’s support capacity to more forward locations. The Indian escort highlighted the growing role the maturing Indian military was playing throughout the theater of operations.
 
1700 Hours, 3 July 1942,Port T, Addu Atoll – The flow of forces to the Cocos Islands continued with the departure of the submarine depot ship HMS Lucia from Port T escorted by the Indian escort sloop HMIS Hindustan and the corvette/minesweeper HMIS Bengal. Also going to the Cocos Islands were the submarines HMS Truant and HMS Trusty, currently in port Colombo. With the decreased threat of Japanese offensive action, Port T was no longer as important as it was three months ago so Somerville was shifting some of the base’s support capacity to more forward locations. The Indian escort highlighted the growing role the maturing Indian military was playing throughout the theater of operations.
Sniff.... still no Canadians....
 
2000 Hours, 3 July 1942, China Bay Airfield, Ceylon – The sighting report of the Japanese convoy at Port Blair from O-23 had been passed to No. 222 Group’s bomber squadrons at China Bay two hours earlier. Since combat operations wound down in early June the units had been occupied with the routine of training flights, maintaining their aircraft and flying occasional patrols over the Bay of Bengal.

The main question that occupied the minds of the squadron commanders and pilots was should they fly a mission based on O-23’s sighting report or should they send a reconnaissance flight first and wait for additional information? The problem was that nobody knew when the convoy at Great Nicobar would depart and they were concerned that a reconnaissance flight might alert the enemy to an upcoming attack so ultimately the squadron commanders requested permission from Air Vice Marshal D’Albiac to attack the enemy convoy based on O-23’s sighting report.

D’Albiac agreed and the maintenance personnel with the help of the excited air crews began to prepare the bombers while the commanders and senior pilots planned the mission. The attack force would consist of 10 Hudsons from No. 62 Squadron and 10 Wellingtons from No. 215 Squadron. All of the Hudsons had been converted to the strafer configuration and the crews were excited to test their modified aircraft out prior to their deployment to the Cocos Islands.
 
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