Our whole argument (Or at least mine) assumes that Saphroneth's insane plan of bombarding US cities comes to pass. In that case the gloves come off.
Anglo-American War in 1895
- Thread starter loneranger
- Start date
Our whole argument (Or at least mine) assumes that Saphroneth's insane plan of bombarding US cities comes to pass. In that case the gloves come off.
you need to read more about the US Army in World War I.... it took a year for the US Army to raise 2 million men and if the war had gone until 1919 it would have had 4 million. Sure, training took time, there were equipment shortages, but eventually they were overcome. Granted the Anglo-French helped with that, but only to speed up the process. The US could have (and was in the process of doing so) the ability to fully equip its own forces by year 2.
As to its combat record... read this book
http://www.amazon.com/The-Doughboys-America-First-World/dp/B008SMGGV4
and this one
http://www.amazon.com/1918-Decision...6444&sr=1-8&keywords=trevor+dupuy+world+war+I
but most definitely this one (which is a really good read too)
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2684859-the-doughboys-the-story-of-the-aef-1917-1918
bottom line, the US Army did very well indeed in its combat record doing as well as the BEF and French in spite of having less combat support. They were considered shock troops by the Germans, who rated them as highly as the ANZACs and Canadians... which is nothing to be ashamed of at all.
in a previous post, regarding this very topic in other thread, I noted that the US mobilized a million men for the Civil War, and 4 million for World War I... as 1895 is roughly half way between the two, a figure of 2 million is a fair guess as to what the US could raise in two years.
The US wouldn't invade Canada with its 125,000 regulars and militia. It would fight a war of skirmishes and defend until the mass army was raised, trained, equipped and deployed. It was experimenting (and had purchased a few) with the Maxim gun, and was certainly capable of building all that was needed. It had developed light artillery, and within a couple of years would have all it needed there as well. It didn't take but 5 years to modernize its coastal defenses and naval artillery from a standing start in peacetime. Wartime urgency would decrease that markedly as it always does.
So yes indeed, a War between the British Empire and the United States is a high risk proposition for a status quo power like the British Empire.
very bad for business, after all the British are the biggest investor (still are for that matter)in the United States, and the British are the biggest trading partner of the US.
Not impossible of course, as the Germans and French were major trading partners with each other in 1870 and 1914 and we all know how that turned out, but it does make it so that serious thinking about the costs would happen over something that is not really in the British vital interest and only somewhat in the US vital interest
Is there anyone who could have been president at that time, who would have been insane enough to want a war with the UK, or a similar alternate PM on the right side of the pond?
TFSmith121
Banned
No.
No.
Grover Cleveland or Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, architect of "splendid isolation"?
Suicidal insanity notwithstanding, these are not the individuals to gin up a pointless war between two countries that are among each others' largest trading partners over the borders of British Guiana.
Best,
No.
Grover Cleveland or Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, architect of "splendid isolation"?
Suicidal insanity notwithstanding, these are not the individuals to gin up a pointless war between two countries that are among each others' largest trading partners over the borders of British Guiana.
Best,
It was also not British policy to shell cities of Great Powers over colonial disputes. A British PM who suggested shelling Boston over a dispute in Venezuela is going to be gone the next day. It it decides to fight a colonial war over Venezuela it sends a fleet there not off the US Eastern Seaboard to shell US cities.
One thing, how long could this war be building up? If it's a few weeks or couple of months, Britain would win without doubt at sea, while the US could push in to eastern Canada, up to the area of Sherbrook but they will not be able to reach Montreal let alone Ottawa. Too much effort for too little gain.
One thing, that come up with this type of TL/question, is that many forget what will happen on the south and west coast. Blockade is the way to go, to start with. New York is a given, but most don't know that the second biggest port, in the whole US, was Galveston. Take them both out and the US is in a world of hurt, and this doesn't even take in to account New Orleans/Mobile or San Francisco. Control of the main rivers is also a must. control the Mississippi, Potomac, Delaware, Ohio and Hudson and the US is Royally F*cked.
This does not mean a great loss of life, it's just that the UK can cut off many parts of the US from each other.
And this is just for starters.
I should add that one great site to go to, if a TL is forth coming is, www.fortwiki.com
One thing, that come up with this type of TL/question, is that many forget what will happen on the south and west coast. Blockade is the way to go, to start with. New York is a given, but most don't know that the second biggest port, in the whole US, was Galveston. Take them both out and the US is in a world of hurt, and this doesn't even take in to account New Orleans/Mobile or San Francisco. Control of the main rivers is also a must. control the Mississippi, Potomac, Delaware, Ohio and Hudson and the US is Royally F*cked.
This does not mean a great loss of life, it's just that the UK can cut off many parts of the US from each other.
And this is just for starters.
I should add that one great site to go to, if a TL is forth coming is, www.fortwiki.com
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Saphroneth
Banned
Why do you say it's "Saphroneth's insane plan" - given that:
1) The more usual approach taken in history was to bombard the forts and then threaten the city.
2) The more usual result was that the city surrendered.
It's not insane, because it matches with actual OTL policy - for example, the Dardanelles campaign was explicitly an attempt (in WW1!) to run the guns protecting Istanbul (Konstantinyye) and then force the surrender of the Ottoman Empire by threatening it.
And it's not mine, because that was actual OTL tactical thinking. It's why shore defences exist.
To put it another way. Let's say that New York has no defences. (Not OTL, but this is me trying to make a point.)
The British Royal Navy sails into the harbour and demands that New York surrender.
What happens then?
The answer is that either New York surrenders or it does not.
If New York does surrender, everything's fine.
If it does not, however, there's scope for a bombardment - and it would not be viewed as excessive.
Now, let's ask that again.
Let's say that New Orleans has no defences. (Not OTL, but this is me trying to make a point.)
The US Navy sails into the harbour and demands that New Orleans surrender.
What happens then?
The answer is that either New Orleans surrenders or it does not.
If New Orleans does surrender, everything's fine. (OTL.)
If it does not, however, there's scope for a bombardment - and it would not be viewed as excessive.
So - what makes New Orleans (1862) different from New York (1895)?
The answer is that New York may well have better defences. I don't know because I'm not actually aware if the Endicott programme has been put into action and completed by this point - if it has then the Eastern Seaboard will take careful, meticulous planning and considerable amphibious support to attack (and only one port at a time).
If it hasn't, then the surrender of most important cities can probably be forced with ease.
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Very much right, and OTL New Orleans didn't have any defences anyway. They were all taken out of commission by 1868 and new one were started in 1893 (I think) which means they would not be finished, by '95.
RodentRevolution
Banned
Which is possibly the origin of the much expressed phrase among US planners who looked into war in Canada "They cannot defend it, we cannot hold it."
The zergling rush approach might take at least a few of those cities but holding on to them afterwards would have been...a mite tricky.
http://www.cmhg.gc.ca/cmh/page-507-eng.asp
Again, this supposed conflict is about as likely as the Axis entering Cairo in 1942, but nonetheless: it is not because of the British Army presence in North America. The US had no interest in a war with Britain; Britain had no interest in a war with the United States. This cartoon from the day sort of sums up what was going on:
Who's missing in the picture?
Best,
Of yes but I think every sane person in this thread has noted how the British and Americans cut a deal. The point of the deal though was it cost the British nothing...there was a reason for that.
Saphroneth
Banned
The point of my bringing up New Orleans is that the US Navy in the ACW did exactly what I picture the RN actually doing in a war like this - run the guns out and demand the city surrender.
unprincipled peter
Donor
galveston,
my point was that it would take years (not the months some here would have us believe) for the US to build up to full strength, during which time Britain would fortify Canada.
Shelling the cities: if the war escalates, that's what would happen. Britain wouldn't have to invade. they can shut off US shipping to a significant degree, fortify Canada, and harrass the coast until the US says 'you can have Venezuela'. Many people are arguing the US has the upper hand, easily. in 1895, that's not the case.
my point was that it would take years (not the months some here would have us believe) for the US to build up to full strength, during which time Britain would fortify Canada.
Shelling the cities: if the war escalates, that's what would happen. Britain wouldn't have to invade. they can shut off US shipping to a significant degree, fortify Canada, and harrass the coast until the US says 'you can have Venezuela'. Many people are arguing the US has the upper hand, easily. in 1895, that's not the case.
Saphroneth
Banned
For political and philosophical reasons (cf. Third Amendment) the US has tended to believe that standing armies are a bad idea.
While the country was largely rural and armies could be forged from recruits given a few months and a stiffening of Regulars (cf. Second Amendment) then this was fine - it worked easily well enough for the US to defend itself, the Regulars could handle the never-numerous Indian tribes, and the US saved quite a lot of money from what amounted to a policy of deliberate neglect.
However, as technology advanced, the US did find itself lagging rather badly behind. Weapons like the Columbiads and Ordnance rifles of the ACW were somewhat behind the cutting edge, it was made clear that you need the modern weapons to arm your entire planned strength rather than just the regulars, and the navy fell quite a long way behind.
The story of the late 1880s and the 1890s (and to some extent the 1900s) for the US are a story of awakening to this vulnerability - that it now took longer to build an army and that armies and fleets now moved faster, and in particular that large naval cannon now took months to produce. Each.
The US stepped up and produced a modern arms industry, a modern and expanding navy, and an army of a much more sensible size as well as modernizing the National Guard. But it took a long time, because the US pretty much had to develop the skills required from the ground up.
I do not belittle the achievement when I say it is spectacular - greater in many ways than the Meiji modernization, and done with the muscle of a large civilian economy to back it.
But it was necessary for the US to be a military power as well as an economic one. You can't leave building a military until after the enemy has invaded - or, if you do, you end up doing extremely poorly. At best you end up like the Union in the ACW, blessed with an opponent also scrambling to come up with military might; at worst, you end up even worse off than France in the Franco-Prussian War, because France at least had most of the enemy army tied up for several months besieging the remnants of the French regular army.
The difference in time between an army coming over a land border and coming over a sea border is a month or two at most - potentially even just two weeks. This is not enough time to produce a military from almost nothing - if it were then WW1 would look very different, and no nation would have bothered with standing armies or trained reservists.
While the country was largely rural and armies could be forged from recruits given a few months and a stiffening of Regulars (cf. Second Amendment) then this was fine - it worked easily well enough for the US to defend itself, the Regulars could handle the never-numerous Indian tribes, and the US saved quite a lot of money from what amounted to a policy of deliberate neglect.
However, as technology advanced, the US did find itself lagging rather badly behind. Weapons like the Columbiads and Ordnance rifles of the ACW were somewhat behind the cutting edge, it was made clear that you need the modern weapons to arm your entire planned strength rather than just the regulars, and the navy fell quite a long way behind.
The story of the late 1880s and the 1890s (and to some extent the 1900s) for the US are a story of awakening to this vulnerability - that it now took longer to build an army and that armies and fleets now moved faster, and in particular that large naval cannon now took months to produce. Each.
The US stepped up and produced a modern arms industry, a modern and expanding navy, and an army of a much more sensible size as well as modernizing the National Guard. But it took a long time, because the US pretty much had to develop the skills required from the ground up.
I do not belittle the achievement when I say it is spectacular - greater in many ways than the Meiji modernization, and done with the muscle of a large civilian economy to back it.
But it was necessary for the US to be a military power as well as an economic one. You can't leave building a military until after the enemy has invaded - or, if you do, you end up doing extremely poorly. At best you end up like the Union in the ACW, blessed with an opponent also scrambling to come up with military might; at worst, you end up even worse off than France in the Franco-Prussian War, because France at least had most of the enemy army tied up for several months besieging the remnants of the French regular army.
The difference in time between an army coming over a land border and coming over a sea border is a month or two at most - potentially even just two weeks. This is not enough time to produce a military from almost nothing - if it were then WW1 would look very different, and no nation would have bothered with standing armies or trained reservists.
Again very much right. Another thing to weigh up is, what are going to arm the US force with?
In 1892 the US Army started to issued with the Springfield 1892 which was a model based on the Krag-Jorgansen bolt action rifle. AFAIK not all units did not recive them until 1896. This leaves the malita with the old Springfield 'Trapdoor' 1873 model. There is no way that the men using them could stand up to the Lee-Metford. Even in the US-Spainish war the US were still using mussel loading cannon, lets leave it there.
Endorse this - Stallings is a really good read, with stuff that gets left out elsewhere, such as the black troops (who served alongside the French).
No fan of Wilson, either.
Saphroneth
Banned
This may be mildly OT, but this seems to resonate. Found it in a blog post from a while ago:
It doesn't need full strength to beat Canada. The US population is ten times that of Canada and GB can not supply a huge army through Halifax. It doesn't take years to train an army capable of beating an enemy that it outnumbers by more than 3:1, months are fine.
That said GB would never get into a total war over Venezuela which it would have to fight if it shelled US cities. The US during this time period fought a war over the supposed sinking of a warship and a proposed defensive treaty with Mexico . If it mobilizes over a sinking of a warship how do you think it would react to the shelling of its cities?
This is Pearl Harbor on crack. At least Pearl Harbor was a military target, Boston and New York are not. Men would be lining up around blocks to volunteer if GB did something that stupid. Is GB really willing to fight a total war over Venezuela? Particularly when it can avoid the cost in treasure and blood by simply sending a fleet to protect it? Why? How could the PM possibly justify the expense? A PM insane enough to propose it would be out the next day.
There are ten Americans for every Canadian and you can't supply a huge army just with Halifax. If it shells US cities the US goes into total war mode and invades Canada. It doesn't take years to train an army, particularly if you are going to quickly outnumber your opponent 3:1 or more. Canada would fall and a lot of British soldiers would go back in body bags, All this for Venezuela? Why?
Saphroneth
Banned
Give me an example of a US army division deployed to the front lines within less than six months of mobilization at any time between 1880 and 1940, please.
Then let me know how long you're imagining giving your troops training.
If you're suggesting sending huge numbers of Americans to attack with barely any training it's going to make the Somme (fought by units with a full year of training) look un-bloody. There are going to be vast numbers of US casualties if you just charge over the border.
It's worth considering that in the 1890s the British can sail right up to Montreal and Quebec City. So unless the Americans can take both within a month or two then the British have their already formed Regular Army units arriving there.
If you think the US can train troops sufficiently in a month that they can advance upon and take machine gun armed defensive positions, that's your opinion. But it is not supported by any realistic mobilization curve.
So - please, some hard data. Assuming both sides decide that military action is going to take place at roughly the same time, how long will your hypothetical US formations spend training?
We can then compare it to OTL in the Spanish American War, and also look at how long the British took to put forces in South Africa in the Boer War, and see how fast the Americans have to advance to get to Quebec first.
Oh - and to answer your rhetoric.
For the same reason the US are fighting.
The US does not get a pass on this kind of matter. A crisis is when both sides suggest military force; a war is when neither side backs down. If there's a war then, ipso facto, the US has also decided Venezuela is worth a fight.
But the US actions you suggest might actually mean that the US comes across as the aggressor. No-one would believe that the US just happened to be able to put together a massive army off the cuff in a month - they'll see it as a US plot to annex Canada.
(And credit the British with the intelligence to reinforce Canada at the same time as they ask for the surrender of US cities.)
...actually, that's another question I'll need you to answer. If the RN neutralizes the guns of New York and demands their surrender, would New York surrender or not?
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Saphroneth
Banned
To add to the matter of mobilization.
There is a reason why armies in the Eurasian continent, who felt they might suffer from urgent need for military defence, did what they did to allow fast mobilization.
That is, they formed regular units (standing army) and reserves (mobilized at need) with the latter formed of people who had done a full year or so of military service and training and then been released back into civilian life.
That's not what I'm talking about when I talk about the time it takes to mobilize US units. In effect, the regulars are "free" and the National Guard are the reserves - though the National Guard are not as well trained as contemporary European reserves since there was no compulsion to show up for training, and in practice the National Guard would be roughly half "reserve quality" and half "Volunteers". (Better numbers appreciated.)
What I mean when I talk about the time to mobilize units is:
1) The time taken to form a large army containing Regular units, as opposed to an army formed entirely of Regular units.
2) The time taken to train entirely new volunteers, people who've never been trained before.
3) The time to get these units to their place of battle.
This takes a long time. The UK deployed regulars, territorials and reserves to the continent in 1914 and started forming new units, but they didn't come on stream until late 1915. (Britain is an appropriate comparison since, like the US, it does not have compulsory peacetime service - so not everyone is a reservist.)
The clincher is - if the US can form effective army units in almost no time from people who've never been trained in their life, why did everyone else have this elaborate system of reserves?
(I'm afraid I also do have a data request. How much in the way of coastal defence is the US reserving? It has to reserve some, it can't throw the entire army into Canada, because otherwise the British could simply sail right up the Potomac.) The requirements for fort garrisons can actually be quite substantial.
There is a reason why armies in the Eurasian continent, who felt they might suffer from urgent need for military defence, did what they did to allow fast mobilization.
That is, they formed regular units (standing army) and reserves (mobilized at need) with the latter formed of people who had done a full year or so of military service and training and then been released back into civilian life.
That's not what I'm talking about when I talk about the time it takes to mobilize US units. In effect, the regulars are "free" and the National Guard are the reserves - though the National Guard are not as well trained as contemporary European reserves since there was no compulsion to show up for training, and in practice the National Guard would be roughly half "reserve quality" and half "Volunteers". (Better numbers appreciated.)
What I mean when I talk about the time to mobilize units is:
1) The time taken to form a large army containing Regular units, as opposed to an army formed entirely of Regular units.
2) The time taken to train entirely new volunteers, people who've never been trained before.
3) The time to get these units to their place of battle.
This takes a long time. The UK deployed regulars, territorials and reserves to the continent in 1914 and started forming new units, but they didn't come on stream until late 1915. (Britain is an appropriate comparison since, like the US, it does not have compulsory peacetime service - so not everyone is a reservist.)
The clincher is - if the US can form effective army units in almost no time from people who've never been trained in their life, why did everyone else have this elaborate system of reserves?
(I'm afraid I also do have a data request. How much in the way of coastal defence is the US reserving? It has to reserve some, it can't throw the entire army into Canada, because otherwise the British could simply sail right up the Potomac.) The requirements for fort garrisons can actually be quite substantial.