I got interested in designing a World War One strategic naval wargame - something playable in about 4-5 hours not including setup, but despite being quickly playable, had high piece density (all battleships and armored cruisers and all theatres of war are represented, with the game running from 1914 to 1919). The draft of game is completed for the solitare testing phase - I think I'm in the ball park even for the benchmark timeframe.
What I found difficult to address was the actual naval strategy should be for the Central Powers., In other games on this period, I noticed the same problem - the CP naval war is really spinning wheels in the mud. Sure, there's all sorts of operations in the North Sea fishing for a naval victory, but was this actually a strategy, or the lack of one? That got me thinking about what alternatives the CP navies had. I fishing around, I noticed that in the age of sail second-rate navies such as Spain's performed very useful functions, not as a fleet in the Mahanian sense of go-pound-on-the-enemy-fleet, but getting the silver and gold from the Empire to Spain through seas dominated by the British. That got me thinking of a strategy to contesting the Entente blockade as it existed (not as it was fantasized by the German naval command before the war). A strategy that focused on using naval power to influence the neutral powers and provide trade despite the blockade. I hashed out the following theoretical piece in order to nail down what the game would be about.
First Principles.
Germany is a land power. The purpose of the German navy is to enhance Germany’s land power in a continental war and maximize its potential for continental victory.
Germany is not a sea power. Achieving victory at sea while being defeated on land is meaningless to Germany. Neither domination of the seas nor a decisive battle to eliminate the enemy battle fleet are prerequisites to Germany’s exercise of sea power.
The German navy’s organisation, (force structure, strategy, operations) stems from the methods naval power enhances land power:
(a) Land power requires robust economy, and Germany needs overseas trade to maximize its economic potential. The German navy must maintain overseas trade despite an enemy blockade; either indirectly via neutral hulls or directly using Central Powers merchant shipping.
(b) By employing combined arms warfare at sea – surface, submarines, mining, air, intelligence, landing forces - to cause disproportionately greater resources of the enemy coalition to become invested into a naval campaign.
(c) To influence neutral opinion to the favour of Germany. To gain neutral support both through the manner of the navy’s conduct as well to encourage neutral defiance an Entente blockade; victories near neutral shores to promote Entente vulnerability. Strong squadrons to demonstrate Entente domination is contested, propaganda against the invasive qualities of the blockade to promote neutral defiance.
(d) To protect Germany’s coasts and internal communications in the Baltic, mainly using light forces and older capital units unable to execute more important missions.
Trade Objectives.
The navy’s ultimate purpose is to ensure trade. Under wartime conditions, the bulk of trade will come through neutral ports, while the cargoes carried on Central Power hulls would only represent a small fraction of peacetime levels. However, by concentrating on the import of ‘precious commodities’, this would allow the relatively small amount of direct trade to have a far greater impact that mere volume would suggest.
Precious commodities are those that energize the war economies of the Central Powers to a degree disproportionate to their actual shipping weight; nitrates for explosives and agriculture, machine oils for lubricants, rare metals, oil and gasoline, rubber, concentrated fodder, diary, meat, etc. They are commodities that the Central Powers will have trouble replacing without overseas trade, and have a large impact on the economy despite small volumes.
Overriding Importance of Nitrates: Chile, at the far south western tip of South America, is particularly important to the Central Powers war effort because of, notwithstanding home production, the need for about 200,000 tons of nitrates per year, of which only perhaps ¼ of that total may arrive in Europe on neutral hulls. A potential trade route for nitrates would be Chile to California via neutral hull, overland by rail to the US east coast, loaded there aboard German shipping and (eventually) broken out into the Atlantic and escorted to Norway by German warships.
Because a trade strategy relies on US neutrality in order to function, all aspects of German naval operations, and especially unrestricted submarine warfare, are to be considered subordinate to the priority of US neutrality. US neutrality should see Germany able to import about one fifth to one quarter of peacetime level through the neutral powers. Active measures by the German navy to disrupt Entente blockading forces will increase trade by encouraging neutrals to both defy the blockade as well as increase their leverage in bilateral negotiations. Disrupting blockading forces will increase trade opportunities.
Central Powers commercial concerns establish during peacetime the trading houses, political and commercial influences, and company interests necessary to allow the competitive purchase of precious commodities in neutral markets during war, as well as the distribution of material seized from Entente vessels on the high seas. Acquired commodities will be shipped to American east coast ports or in some cases Spanish ports using neutral assets. Once loaded onto CP hulls sheltered on the eastern seaboard, the German navy becomes responsible for its subsequent breakout and movement to Europe. Because of the inherent difficulties to Atlantic operations, it may be the case that any given CP merchant ship makes only one or two crossings per year.
Political Considerations.
The attitude of foreign governments influence German naval strategy only insofar as these attitudes impact first principles; the navy’s ability to conduct trade, attrite enemy forces, and divert enemy resources from the continental land campaign.
The war case is against France and Russia. Political factors within such a conflict can be rated in terms of their order of importance:
1. British neutrality.
2. US neutrality.
3. Neutral opinion.
4. Italian belligerence.
5. Austrian belligerence.
6. Ottoman belligerence.
7. Italian neutrality.
8. Japanese neutrality.
Not all of these are likely to occur. For instance, while, British neutrality is the more important political consideration to German naval strategy, British neutrality is much less likely than US neutrality. The same list can be rated in terms of the likelihood of the event occurring:
1. Austrian belligerence.
2. US neutrality.
3. Ottoman belligerence.
4. Neutral opinion.
5. Italian neutrality.
6. Japanese neutrality.
7. Italian belligerence.
8. British neutrality.
Combing these lists creates three separate groupings of political priorities, from most important/likely to the least important/likely;
Group 1 (US Neutrality, Neutral Opinion, Austrian Ally, Ottoman Ally)
The political objectives of Group 1 are those that are both high in importance and likely to occur. They are both the core assumptions and the core conditions to prosecuting a naval war. All are expected, achievable, and mutually compatible.
No naval strategy can be entertained that jeopardizes the possibility of continued US neutrality. US neutrality must be maintained regardless of any other consideration because only US neutrality can permit the German navy overcome its geographical and numerical disadvantages, and contribute positively to Germany’s land power. German naval strategy requires US neutrality as a source of] trade and supply, as a barrier preventing the most effective form of Entente blockade, and to prevent US land power from fatally contributing to the war on land in Europe.
The Triple Entente is a coalition of rivals with a long history of war and mutual distrust. Because the enemy coalition has no common purpose beyond the expectation of victory, the failure to produce such a victory over Germany will cause the collapse of the Triple Entente and a return to the natural state of enmity between its members. US interference to establish peace talks and to limit war aims is therefore within the interests of Germany, because the nature of the Triple Entente cannot admit to their success and the mentality of the American President Wilson cannot admit to their failure. The more the US attempts meditation, the more Germany should accept it, and the deeper the friction between the Triple Entente and the United States shall become. The United States was drawn into war with Great Britain over neutral rights in 1812. The greater the friction between Britain and the US, more likely the US is to express its neutrality in ways favourable to Germany.
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire allies divert enemy naval resources. Because the German navy is superior to either in terms of training and personnel, both allied navies will be more effective at their diversionary mission if German warships are present.
Group 2 (British Neutrality, Italian Ally).
These are important objectives that are unlikely to be achieved. They are also to an extent mutually incompatible, (i.e., an Italian ally against France is likely to jeopardize British neutrality towards Germany).
British neutrality is a paradox; it is the most important political objective for the German navy, it is not likely to occur, and is probably little influenced by German political wooing. So long as the German army intends to invade Belgium at the start of a war with France, British neutrality can never be considered likely. The German navy has little interest in a naval treaty with Britain should British neutrality be pre-ordained to failure because of Belgium.
If, however, Britain and Germany entered into an agreement on Belgium in peacetime, then the likelihood of British neutrality increases. With respect to the question of a naval agreement, the German navy maintains the position that Britain and Germany must address the question of Belgium in relation to British neutrality. Were British neutrality satisfactorily affirmed, and the German army ceased planning to violate Belgian neutrality, then the German navy could agree to a far reaching peacetime naval agreement.
Activities to secure Italian co-belligerence may interfere with attempts to secure British neutrality, since the former must encourage the Italians to reckless behaviour against the friends of the latter. By addressing the question of Belgium and British attitudes in peacetime, which of British neutrality or Italian co-belligerence becomes the priority political objective is resolved. If, as is the more likely scenario, Britain remains distant and elusive and refuses to cooperate upon the question of Belgium, then the British intention is assumed to be to enter a continental war. In this instance Germany must maximize the chances for Italy to join the war as an ally in the same manner the Triple Entente could maximize the participation of Russia; by allowing Italy to use the alliance as a sword in the promotion of purely Italian concerns.
Although unlikely, the possibility of Italian co-belligerence can be influenced. By placing Austrian and German naval forces in the Mediterranean under Italian command in peacetime; to maintain strong German naval forces in theatre in peacetime; to pressure civilian diplomats to more seriously reckon with Italian interests above Austrian or even German interests, so that the Alliance functions more as means for Italy to bring pressure upon France or Britain; to increase Italy’s general sense of importance in alliance discussions by way of increased consultation. Internally, (secretly); to call for Austria to make concessions to Italy’s favor and to more aggressively support purely Italian adventures, such as in the Aegean, with Austro-German naval forces that might embolden Italy into a confrontation with the Entente.
Group 3. (Italian Neutrality, Japanese Neutrality).
Planning against Japan should at least investigate the possibility of neutrality. Pacific colonies unable to divert enemy resources from Europe (i.e., Caroline, Marshall Islands, etc) can be ceded to Japan, or Britain, or the United States, when doing so will enhance relations with the receiving party. If Japanese neutrality could be purchased with Tsingtao, this is desirable and should be planned for. However, Japan will have little incentive to neutrality when it can take what it wishes by force, and by joining the Entente, it increases its influence with Britain. Unless Japanese neutrality is clearly expected, Tsingtao and environs should be returned to China before the European war breaks out, upon the condition that the garrison there can move to Peking on contract to train Chinese military forces, and other like compensation. By this method, it would be hoped to cause Japan to go to war with China, possibly gaining an Asian ally to the Central Powers which sets the Triple Entente and the United States at odds.
If Italy does not declare war for the Central Powers, eventually it may declare war against them. Italian neutrality is desirable, but Germany has little influence over the question, except to work towards an Austro-Italian wartime understanding.
International Law.
The 1907 Hague Convention was inadequate with respect to its usefulness to German naval strategy because it lacked giving the neutrals any teeth to discriminating against those that would seek to violate the principle of absolute freedom of the seas. Germany must therefore seek to revise international law in subsequent sessions as follows;
(1) To create an overseeing ‘neutrality’ board composed of the signatory nations that are neutral in any given conflict, the purpose of which being to identify when and how the warring nations violate international law at sea.
(2) The capacity for the board in (1) above to, still within the bounds of international law, authorize neutral nations to give preferential treatment to warring nations that maintain international law, and discriminatory treatment towards those warring nations that violate the neutral’s rights. For an example, that the warships of a nation at war with a party which had been ruled in violation of the rights of, for instance, Spain, could now be authorized by the neutrality board to coal in Spain once per month instead of once every three months.
(3) That a warring nation being victimized by another’s breach of international law be granted special privileges with respect to counter-blockade and other countermeasures against the violator.
(4) To confirm the status of “East Indiamen” (armed merchant ships) as merchantmen under international law. In particular, to allow military crews and weapons to be added to merchantmen during wartime while not to effect the status of the vessel, provided it engages in no warlike activities.
Naval Theatres.
The North and South Atlantic Oceans.
In the North Atlantic key German and Entente trade routes overlap. Because of the indispensable nature of these trade routes, the North Atlantic is the decisive naval theatre of naval operations. As Germany has no bases in the North Atlantic, and those in the South Atlantic will quickly fall, the German fleet must be equipped and trained to operate in the North Atlantic without possessing a local major base. This is to be done by emphasizing endurance and fleet support, by the use of submarines, and by exploiting the neutrals.
Germany’s trade during a continental war will pass to Europe through the Atlantics. Whether on German or neutral hulls, this will be subject to blockade by Entente patrols; just outside the port of origin in the Americas, and again as ships enter the GIUK gap or English Channel.
The Atlantics are dominated by a large number of neutral countries, the most important being the United States. Despite its numerical superiority, the size of the theatre and the influence of the neutrals will prevent the Entente navies from excluding the Central Powers from the Atlantics. The manner in which the United States exercises its neutrality will dominate the war in the Atlantic; in many cases the more even handed and forceful Washington’s practices, the better it shall be for Germany. While Germany has no fleet bases, it can to an extent tap neutral resources for support of its operations. Some neutrals with sympathetic attitudes, such as Spain, might be cultivated to act in a manner more biased towards Germany. Others, such as Portugal, will cooperate with Great Britain.
Entente blockading forces will be weak in the Americas, because of the distance from Europe and the number of ports to patrol. On the European end, the Denmark Straights can be a difficult area for the Entente to patrol because of its distance and isolation from Entente support bases. The best German trade route is therefore to Norway via the Denmark Straights. Once in Norwegian waters, merchants can offload in ports in northern Norway, or use Norwegian territorial waters to evade the blockade as they run south. German trade, and neutral trade in defiance of the blockade, should tend to run more between September and March, in the poorer weather. Voyages in wartime will take much longer to complete, since much time may be spent waiting the necessary bad weather, or other favourable conditions.
One special squadron for use in North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea operations is the Arctic Squadron. Its responsibilities are supply, ice breaking, intelligence, and the collection and distribution of the meteorological data necessary to better predict weather conditions for operations.
The North Sea
This sea serves little military or economic purpose to the warring parties; neither side requires it for economic purposes and the Entente can exercise a blockade Germany elsewhere. Unlike with the Atlantic or Mediterranean, the Entente has the option to abandon the North Sea without this significantly hindering its war effort. Even presuming that the High Seas Fleet established a numerical superiority by isolating and destroying an entire battle squadron of the Grand Fleet, the Entente still has the numbers in its member navies to make up the ship losses, and can still dominate the Atlantics, while the lack of German bases in the Atlantic still prevents it from exploiting its numerical superiority there. The North Sea therefore holds little to no potential for a strategic decision.
German operations in the North Sea are harassing, to pin enemy forces and inflict attrition; they are diversionary. Lacking strategic importance, the North Sea is a trap upon which the German navy must avoid fixation. It serves as a corridor that the fleet passes to conduct operations further afield; against the enemy coasts or in the Norwegian Sea or Atlantic. Yet, operations in the North Sea will draw Entente forces into the North Sea, away from the Atlantics and Mediterranean and Europe.
Diversionary raids and landings in the North Sea are taken in coordination with events in the Barents Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Operations in the North Sea are often to the purpose of supporting fleet operations outside the North Sea.
The Norwegian Sea
The purpose of operations in the Norwegian Sea is to attack enemy blockade lines, to escort German merchant ships running the GIUK gap to Norway, as a route between Germany and the Atlantic Ocean, and as a holding area for Atlantic support units.
Conditions are favorable for operations in the Norwegian Sea despite the proximity of major British fleet bases at its southern entrance, due to adverse visibility conditions particularily in winter. The best operating conditions are between the months of November and March. Bad weather and poor visibility in the winter months, and large numbers of potential coaling sites and hidden coves scattered throughout the coastal regions of Iceland, Greenland, Norway could allow logistic support of major fleet units. Sea ice covering the Denmark Straight and northern latitudes in the winter months may allow German ice breakers to provide warships a calm “anchorage” for resupply operations which do not rely on neutral consideration.
Scandinavian trade running the GIUK Gap must cross the Barents Sea to reach Norwegian territorial waters, from there either discharging in ports such as Narvik and Bergen, or taking advantage of neutral waters, hugging Norwegian and Swedish territorial waters to reach the Skagerrak. Naval supply ships (perhaps posing as ore carriers bound for Narvik) can use Norwegian coastal waters to skirt the blockade as these run northwards, such that German warships operating in the Norwegian Sea have supply ships available to them from Germany. Like the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea is within wireless range of Germany, meaning that coordination can be taken from Germany between combat forces and supply forces.
Strong British bases sit astride the entrance to the Norwegian Sea. Operating here means that enemy forces might block in the Scotland-Norway for periods of time. Ships moving to and from the Barents may have to wait for long periods for an opportunity to slip past this barrier. Like with a close blockade of Germany, Grand Fleet operations to actively block this gap suffer from the same defects preventing a close blockade of Germany; destroyer escort endurance, the difficulties of a sustained presence on the Norwegian side of the gap, and prolonged vulnerability of blockading forces to submarine, surface and mine attack.
Prewar preparations for operations in the Norwegian Sea include:
(a) Charting coastal regions and monitoring traffic there to the purpose of establishing covert locations for supply and movement in and near neutral territory with low probability of accident or detection.
(b) Acquisition of commercial interests to assist in transshipment of good bounds for Germany. For example, investment in dock frontage in Narvik beyond peacetime requirements, and the creation/expansion of rail lines between ports such as Narvik and Bergen and Swedish ports on the Baltic.
(c) Intelligence penetration of the Norwegian naval command and its operating habits.
(d) Active influence and coercion of Scandinavian neutrals to influence favorable interpretations of neutrality and neutral interests.
(e) Commissioning icebreakers and using these in the Arctic (and Antarctic) regions during peacetime to gain operational experience for wartime operations. The use of same to collect meteorological data for later use.
The Baltic Sea
An inland sea protected from outside intrusion by the control of the Belts by Denmark. Unless the Entente were to attempt a major offensive, this area is important to German strategy mainly as a trade route to Scandinavia. The Baltic Sea is particularly well suited to littoral warfare.
In keeping with principle of diverting disproportionate enemy resources from land warfare, the German navy shall routinely base its capital forces in the Baltic, in peacetime, to the purpose of influencing Russia to expand its own Baltic fleet. In wartime, the modern elements of the fleet shall not often concern themselves with matters in the Baltic. These will usually involve light forces to the purpose of; maintaining communications with Scandinavia; coastal defence; and occasional support of army operations.
Only in the event the Entente launched an offensive to gain access to the Baltic could this become a priority theatre. With the main Danish channel connecting the Baltic to the North Sea being 6nm wide and 30nm miles long, major British fleet operations in the Baltic will have to commence with the violation of Danish neutrality. Given the strength of the defences in the Belts, and being only 30 miles from Kiel, the Grand Fleet must overcome the combination of Danish land based coastal defenses backed by the German navy. If, however, the Grand Fleet did penetrate into the Baltic, the German navy must avoid a fleet clash, instead using littoral warfare methods to attrite the enemy fleet, as the Baltic will have become the area to exercise the prewar strategy of asymmetrical attrition originally envisioned for the North Sea. Fleet operations from Kiel would use an advantageous position for forays against the British sea lines of communication or isolated units. Finally, the Central Powers should look to seize the Belts with an army offensive, simultaneously shutting the enemy fleet in the Baltic for the rest of the war and transforming the balance in North Sea.
A British Baltic offensive, given the dangers inherent to British operations in the Baltic and the political consequences to war war with Denmark, is sufficiently hairbrained that Germany should encourage the attempt in the expectation of an Entente debacle. The disadvantages – difficulties in communications with Scandinavia and interference with fishing – can be mitigated with seaplane scouting, mining, submarines, the use of the North Sea, and convoys. It is probably more desirable that the Danes should not mine the Belts and instead allow belligerent battle fleets to pass in either direction.
Mediterranean Sea
The Mediterranean is unique in that it is the only sea outside Germany containing a major friendly fleet base. It is the home of the two German allies, plus a potential third ally in the Ottoman Empire. Should Italy join the Central Powers, from Italian bases the Alliance naval forces can harass Entente supply routes through the Mediterranean. Alternatively, while seeking a “weak” underbelly, the Entente may be tempted into a pointless side show; a large scale amphibious assault of the Italian peninsula. This would be a ‘best case’ scenario, diverting large enemy land and sea resources into a secondary project with no hope of being decisive.
If as expected Italy is neutral, the Adriatic Sea is well suited for combined arms naval operations (air and sea) and has access to the Mediterranean for occasional raids beyond Oranto. Austrian surface forces will act more aggressively when combined with German forces. A few German ships may enter the Straights of the Dardenelles to influence Turkey opinion. For all these reasons, a strong German squadron composed of older ships is based in Austria-Hungary or Italy prior to a war.
Overseas Empire
The German empire should divert enemy resources away from Europe. German colonies that can draw Entente resources from Europe, or prevent enemy colonial resources from reaching Europe, should be equipped to do so. Colonies that cannot divert significant enemy resources, but can influence neutral opinion, should be earmarked for transfer to the custody of a neutral power rather than be conquered by the enemy. Support from Europe of Germany’s colonies will consist of the occasional supply ship.
Germany is unlikely to conduct major naval operations in the Indian or Pacific Oceans. Small numbers of ships consisting of disguised raiders or light cruisers should operate there, one unit in each sea, more or less continuously, (being replaced when lost or withdrawn). This will tie down disproportionately larger numbers of enemy resources.
Operations.
All operations at sea are undertaken to achieve the goals set out in first principles; to promote friendly trade and prevent enemy trade, to divert or destroy enemy resources, to influence neutral opinion, for coastal defence and Baltic communications.
Fighting a decisive battle has little direct bearing on Germany’s use of naval power. Whether the German navy does or does not engage with its opponents in battle is not decisive to the exercise of trade and commerce warfare strategies necessary to support Germany’s land power. The navy’s missions benefit from victories at sea by making its primary missions easier; successful battles at sea are indirectly advantageous. Decisive battle, while not a primary concern in and of itself, can represent an opportunity to improve Germany’s capacity to execute its primary naval missions.
Germany’s forces in the North Sea have the best logistic support but are in a sea with no strategic usefulness. They are used to divert enemy forces from the other areas. Notwithstanding the Atlantic’s designation as the primary operating theatre, the bulk of German naval forces at any given time will be within the North Sea due to logistic constraints. North Sea operations include limited forays, and the threat of same, to attrite or distract Entente forces. If enemy and friendly deployments cause an opportunity for a major victory in the North Sea, then the North Sea can become the primary theatre while the potential remains.
Logistic constraints will allow for only a portion of the German navy to be deployed outside Europe for short periods. The purpose of Atlantic operations go beyond trade and commerce warfare; they require a battle squadron strong enough to challenge the Entente for Atlantic sea control. Due to the best weather being between September and March, and the amount of coal that will be used up, heavy units can be at sea in substantial numbers for only for three or four months in a year. In off peak seasons, small numbers of raiders will stay out in the Atlantic to assist North Sea operations.. Because of these constraints, from March to August each year, the North Sea is the primary operating arena of the German navy, then from September to March attention shifts into the Atlantic.
Commerce warfare, especially using submarines, can significantly damage the Entente’s war capacity. Commerce warfare in distant waters serves to divert enemy resources and manpower from land war in Europe into naval warfare distant from Europe. In all cases, the requirement to maintain relations with the United States interferes with the exercise of commerce warfare. Submarines will become a more and more important element to commerce warfare strategy as time goes on, but shall always conform to the requirement to maintain the neutrality of the United States. In the event the Triple Entente adapt convoys in the Atlantic, surfacing raiding forces to break up convoys become a crucial part of combined operations. Light cruisers acting in conjunction with submarine forces will also become more important later in a war.
The method of direct trade with the Americas is by way of individual blockade runner or convoy, especially during the winter season when visibility and weather conditions in European waters are the least favourable to the blockading powers. Merchant ships should be heavily armed so that they can resist attempts by Entente forces to seize them,
http://libcudl.colorado.edu/wwi/pdf/i73705962.pdf
German naval forces break enemy blockades at neutral ports as necessary to allow German merchant ships trapped there to escape to sea. German warships also attrite blockading forces guarding the passages to Norway in European waters, to disrupt Entente patrols and allow ships and convoys to break through.
Naval Commands (August, 1914)
Baltic Command
Shore Bombardment Squadron
Kaiser Freidrich III (B)
Kaiser Wilhelm II (B)
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse (B)
Kaiser Barbarossa (B)
Kaiser Karl der Grosse (B)
Brandenburg (B)
Worth (B)
Scouting Group
Gazelle (CL)
Niobe (CL)
Nymphe (CL)
Thetis (CL)
Ariadne (CL)
Amazone (CL)
Medusa (CL)
Hela (CL)
Tasks:
Sea Lines of Communication, Scandinavia.
Coastal Defence, Baltic sea coast.
Bombardment support missions.
Amphibious operations.
Mobilization: Baltic mobilization has no special pre-war steps
The Baltic Command is composed of 2nd rate ships and is assigned only defensive missions. Beyond mining operations with light forces, it will have no offensive tasks without being reinforced. Should a major amphibious operation be contemplated, the necessary units would be made available from the North Sea Command. Because Atlantic operations occur mainly in the winter months, offensive operations in the Baltic will take place mostly in the summer months.
Baltic vs. Atlantic
Heavy attrition may cause a weakening of the High Seas Fleet such that continued Atlantic and North Sea Operations with capital ships may eventually jeapardize the security of the Baltic Sea. If this tipping point is reached, (ie, Germany only has about six dreadnought types remaining operational), then the capital fleet could revert to a fleet in being strategy with Baltic communications and coastal defence as the (reduced) strategic priority.
.
North Sea Command
Battle Squadron.
Kaiser (BB)
Friedrich der Grosse (BB)
Kaiserin (BB)
Prinz Regent Luitpold (BB)
Konig Albert (BB)
Battle Squadron
Heligoland (BB)
Thuringen (BB)
Ostfriesland (BB)
Oldenburg (BB)
Nassau (BB)
Westfalen (BB)
Scouting Squadron
Scharnhorst (AC)
Gneisenau (AC)
Scouting Group
Stettin (CL)
Stuttgart (CL)
Bremen (CL)
Berlin (CL)
Hamburg (CL)
Scouting Group
Frauenlob (CL)
Arkona (CL)
Undine (CL)
Lubeck (CL)
Amphibious Squadron
One infantry division of two brigades, converted ocean liners.
Coastal Artillery Material Reserve.
(disarmed classes)
11” – 40 guns
9.4” – 28 guns
Tasks:
Offensive Operations, North Sea.
Coastal Defence, North Sea.
Support of Baltic Command (April-August)
Support of North Atlantic Command (September-March)
Offensive assignments for the North Sea command include naval sweeps, infantry raids in Great Britain using the Amphibious Squadron, submarine operations, and mining operations. North Sea Command supports the movements of the North Atlantic Command units to and from the Barents Sea by undertaking diversionary operations and by providing direct escort. Defensive assignments are coastal defence, with particular attention paid to supporting submarine activities.
The North Sea Command’s eleven battleships are reinforced by the North Atlantic Command’s capital ships when not on distant station. The battleship force of the North Sea Command (eleven battleships) is strong enough to defeat the British Battle Cruiser Squadron in open battle, even if unsupported.
The Grand Fleet: The primary risk to battleship operations in the North Sea is the possibility that a smaller German battleship squadron could be engaged and destroyed by a much stronger British squadron. Because the North Sea scouting forces are often older and weaker ships, it may often lack the heavy scouting forces that would otherwise serve to warn of approaching danger, meaning that on a number of occasions in a war it will be virtually certain that ten or twelve German dreadnoughts will encounter twenty or even thirty British dreadnoughts.
Tactics must focus, in these inevitable dangerous moments, on preventing the Grand Fleet from deploying its overwelming mass to destructive effect for anything beyond fleeting moments too short in duration for decisive effect. The poor visibility conditions generally found in the North Sea may be of assistance in any given situation. In addition the German navy must use torpedo tactics, evasive battle manoeuvres, alternative return routes (to port), mobile barrier tactics, and smoke, (generators, smoke shells, and to keep stocks of specially treated coal that which generates as much smoke as possible); all this to the purpose of being able to degrade visibility conditions so that the Grand Fleet’s numerical advantage is negated and the High Seas Fleet may escape.
Mobile Barrier Tactics: This would consist of a number of fast minelayers and at least four submarines deployed to the rear of the battleships by perhaps 25nm. If the battle fleet encounters the Grand Fleet, the minelayers lay down a mine field perpendicular to the path of retreat. As the fleet approaches, they will guide the retreating battleships through a gap left in the centre, which is then filled after the fleet passes by. Submarines are stationed around the mine barrier to cover the retreat of the battle force. This will require extensive peacetime training to execute properly in war.
Scouting Operations and Doctrine.
It will often be the case that a North Sea force of ten or fifteen dreadnoughts may face a potentially far strong Grand Fleet of unknown strength, which must be kept at a distance. North Sea operations may often lack the heavy scouting forces (battle cruisers) that can successfully operate independently of the main force. Even when these are present, because the Grand Fleet has a superior battle cruiser squadron, German heavy forces may still be unable to perform a scouting mission. Doctrine therefore de-emphasizes the use of armoured or battle cruisers for distant scouting, and substitutes submarines, aircraft, zeppelins and fast surface forces to act in their place.
Early War.
The North Sea Command will not attempt to directly interfere with the anticipated passage of the British Expeditionary Force to France on account of the difficulties and dangers inherent to operating in the English Channel. Instead, it will attempt to either delay or prevent the dispatch of the BEF to Europe by landing a brigade sized raiding force in the Yarmouth area on the first day of war between Britain and Germany. Once landed, the fleet will not cover the return of the landing force to Germany. Instead, it will seek opportunities within the reaction of the Royal Navy to destroy isolated British naval elements. If possible, the brigade will be withdrawn at night from one or more of the captured ports within two weeks of its original landing, abandoning equipment as necessary. If extraction is not possible, it will fortify itself in the coastal towns and hold out until surrender.
After the Yarmouth Operation is completed, the advance of the German army in France may present an opportunity for the navy to land a brigade or even division sized force on the French coast to seize Calais.
Later Operations.
The Atlantic Command will commence operations in the Atlantic after September 1914 when the weather turns bad. When this occurs, the North Sea command is stripped of forces and reverts to a support role for the Atlantic Command by assisting in the breakout and actively probing around the British Isles. If local conditions are known to be favourable, (because a strong contingent of the Grand Fleet has entered the Atlantic), then much stronger attacks are to be made by the North Sea Command, including more amphibious landings, and even sweeps into the English Channel.
Antwerp
Control of the southern exit to the North Sea can be contested from bases in Belgium and Northern France. This will be particularly important in relation to U-boat operations in the English Channel. Available ports in this area are small, meaning that only destroyer and submarines are eligible for forward deployment. The exception to this rule is the port of Antwerp, which can act as a major forward fleet base for the High Seas Fleet. With Dover only about 5 hours steaming from the Scheldt, heavy raids into the English Channel as far as Portsmouth are possible. This in turn may force the Grand Fleet to base in the English Channel, which would better open the gateway to the Norwegian Sea for Germany.
The ability to use Antwerp depends on the international status of its access route through the neutral Scheldt. Great Britain desires its internationalization in order to send its army directly to Antwerp in case of war. Germany will support Britain in peacetime in order to internationalize the Scheldt because (1) this may improve the chances of a peacetime treaty between Britain and Germany based on Belgium; (2) the British Expeditionary Force is wasted and potentially annihilated if sent to Antwerp instead of France; (3) the precedent which permits the British army to use the Scheldt to go to Antwerp also permits the German navy to use Antwerp as a fleet base against the Channel.
Calais
Aside from Antwerp, the French and Belgian coasts offer no prospect for a major forward fleet base. However, occupation of the coast of France around Calais would allow German coastal batteries to dominate the French side of the Straights of Dover, allowing light forces and submarines unfettered access to raid the English Channel.
If the Scheldt is made an international waterway then Antwerp is well situated geographically and logistically suited to act as a forward fleet base for heavy operations in the English Channel. Such operations would require either Zeppelin or aircraft capable of scouting to 500nm, which would warn of the approach of a British fleet before raiding forces in the Channel would be cut off. If the British Grand Fleet repositions to defend the Channel, then it surrenders its dominant position near the Scotland-Norway blockade line.
The German army war plan calls for a strong advance initially through Belgium into northern France, but then bending southwards away from the coast. The army is to be made aware of the potential to the Calais position, so that in the event the French army eludes destruction, the army may instead plan to seize the Somme river line via Amiens to secure Calais for the duration of the war.
North Atlantic Command
1st Scouting Squadron
Seydlitz (BC)
Moltke (BC)
Goeben (BC)
Von der Tann (BC)
Derrflinger, (BC) - Completing
Konig (BB) - Completing
Markgraf (BB) - Completing
Grosser Kurfurst (BB) - Completing
Kronprinz Wilhelm (BB) – Completing
Lutzow (BC) – Under Construction.
Scouting Squadrons
Rostock (CL)
Karlsruhe (CL)
Kolberg (CL)
Mainz (CL)
Koln (CL)
Augsburg (CL)
Breslau (CL)
Magdeburg (CL)
Strassburg (CL)
Stralssund (CL)
Support Squadrons (Underway Fast Logistics)
Deutschland Class (ACO) x 5
Braunschweig Class (ACO) x 5
Mecklenburg Class (ACO) x 5
North Atlantic Amphibious Squadron.
(One infantry division of two amphibious brigades, plus ocean liners).
Bismarck (converted ocean liner, under construction)
Blockade Squadron (East Indiamen)
Furst Bismarck
Prinz Heinrich
Viktoria Luise Class (x6)
Baden, Bayern, Hindenburg – (under construction, converted from capital ships)
Salamis– (under construction, purchased from Greece, converted from battleship).
Merchant conversions.
(All capable of operating as ACO).
Material Artillery Reserve
(disarmed classes)
3.4” – 330
5.9” – 90
6.7” – 140
Torpedoes - 122
Artic Squadron
Icebreakers for operations in the Barents Sea during winter months.
Entappens
Overseas offices coordinating Central Powers shipping in neutral ports.
Tasks: Offensive Operations in Barents Sea, North Atlantic, South Atlantic: trade support, commerce warfare, submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious landing operations.
Mobilization
The North Atlantic’s mobilization commences weeks before the start of hostilities, with the first stage being when the earmarked troop transports of the amphibious squadrons being ordered to return to Germany, China, or to Africa. Units of the amphibious squadrons all the major liners in the German merchant marine.
A second wave of measures calls for the preparation of amphibious forces for sea, gathering merchant ships to designated friendly and neutral ports, peacetime purchasing coal and other supplies for their holds, and otherwise preparing these for supply operations such that a large material reserve is ready to sail from in neutral ports when required. Supply ships with reserve ammunition, (hidden to avoid classification as military vessel) and other supplies depart Germany for the Americas, to wait there for later use.
If war is imminent warships and troop transports depart to their war stations.
War Deployments.
The bulk of the Atlantic Command mobilizes in the North Sea, attached to the North Sea Command. From September to March, in the winter months it will conduct operations in the Barents Sea and Atlantic Ocean, with the bulk of the command returning to the North Sea Command for the summer months. The Atlantic Command’s distant operations are seasonal, peaking in the winter, diminishing in the summer.
During the pre-war mobilization, light cruisers Rostock, Karlsruhe, one AP (fast liner) with one embarked infantry battalion, one minelayer (merchant conversion), and three supply ships, will take up station in the North Atlantic. At the commencement of hostilities this force will commence operations against enemy ports, vulnerable infrastructure, and shipping.
Blockade Squadrons: East Indiamen of the blockade squadrons will trade with the Americas between September and March, often operating independently or in small groups. Some merchant converts will be converted to disguised Q-ships and others to disguised raiders. Disguised raiders operate against commerce in distant seas while Q-ships are heavily armed and armoured (using material from disarmed classes), intended to destroy blockading AMC’s which attempt to stop and search them.
Artic Squadron: Icebreakers of the Arctic Squadron operate in the winter months in the ice fields of the northern Barents Sea. Their operations are coordinated with the fleet through wireless from Germany and agents in neutral Norway and Danish territories. They allow access to pack ice for supply operations and provide supply, intelligence and weather data collection and distribution. Their defence against attack is poor weather, the large size of the Barents Sea, and their ability to recede into the pack ice where enemy warships cannot follow.
Amphibious Squadron: Two naval brigades are available for use in amphibious operations. Normally, only one or two battalions will be at sea at once, with one battalion commencing the war in the Atlantic Ocean. Embarked infantry use war mobilized liners for transport.
Objectives to Atlantic Operations.
The heavy elements of the fleet, including battleships and battle cruisers, have a political mission. They are intended as a direct challenge to the Entente for control of the Atlantic. By contesting control and winning naval victories, this will encourage neutral opinion to resist the blockade. Capital ships are necessary for this mission because only these convey the sense of challenge necessary to excite neutral opinion. The strength of the challenge – a full battle squadron – shall cause the neutrals to hold their breath, each victory loosening the impression of Entente domination, each defeat a setback to neutral opinion.
The composition of the Atlantic squadron, (4 battleships and 5 battle cruisers, plus light cruisers and fast support), will allow it to defeat any Entente scouting squadron it encounters. In particular, a challenge from the British Battle Cruiser Squadron when operating alone is highly desirable. Only a large detachment of the Grand Fleet with the most modern battleships, backed by Battle Cruiser Squadron, might by chance run down the Atlantic Squadron with enough force to destroy it. If such an encounter occurs and the squadron cannot escape, the battleships will sacrifice themselves to allow the escape of the rest of the fleet. However, the detachment of a fleet strong enough to threaten the Atlantic squadron will also leave the remaining British forces in the North Sea vulnerable to a union of the German fleets and an immediate advance upon Scapa Flow. By dividing the Grand Fleet between theatres, the British would also create an opportunity for their own spectacular defeat was well as one for defeating the detached German squadron.
The Atlantic squadron will test various Entente strong points with amphibious landings, undertake commerce warfare, (both at sea and by attacking ports), mine warfare, and break the blockade to allow CP merchantment to cross between Europe and the Americas.
Initial Major Operation.
The 1st Scouting Squadron will break into the Barents Sea and Atlantic after September 1914. Because the Konig Class will not yet be ready, Kaiser Class battleships will detach from the North Sea Command in substitution, (and the Konig Class will join the North Sea command after they work up).
Battlecruisers: Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Moltke, Goeben, Von der Tann
Battleships: Friedrich der Grosse, Kaiser, Kaiserin, Konig Albert.
Light Cruisers: Breslau, Magdeburg, Strassburg, Stralssund
Support Ships: 15 colliers of the converted Mecklenburg, Braunschweig and Deutchland Classes. Supply ships stationed in neutral ports in the Americas during the pre-war crisis.
Operation.
Then, the 1st Scouting Squadron with support force attached will break into the Barents Sea during a period of bad weather. It will operate in the Atlantic for a period of about 60-90 days, then return to Germany.
Subsequent Atlantic Operations.
Weaker forces (cruisers, submarines, solo capital ship sorties, commerce raiders) will continuously operate in the Atlantic continuously. Stronger forces will sortie only irregularily. A wartime program of extended range 6” gun light cruisers and submarines will take on a larger role in the Atlantic as the war progresses and losses among capital ships mount.
Mediterranean Command (Pola).
3rd Battle Squadron
Posen (BB)
Rheinland (BB)
Scouting Group
Roon (AC)
Yorck (AC)
Muchen (CL)
Danzig (CL)
Flotilla: ½
Submarines: 4
Zeppelin Base
Tasks: Coastal defence, submarine warfare, alliance support, offensive sweeps.
Assuming Italy does not enter the war, the Mediterranean Command will be based at Pola in Austria-Hungary, with perhaps one capital unit detached to Constantinople. It is tasked to coordinate with the Austrian fleet in operations in the Adriatic and Mediterreanean Seas.
The Adriatic is long and narrow, and the weather is often calm. These are generally better conditions for aerial scouting than found in the North Sea. Two Zeppelin bases will be constructed pre-war, one in Italy, one in Austria, so that Zeppelin support can be used for scouting in advance of the fleet. Zeppelins will fly back and forth between the North and Adriatic Seas to support various offensives. The shape of the Adriatic facilitates Zeppelin reconnaissance, which in turn will allow offensive sweeps beyond the Straights of Otranto and into the Mediterranean. With proper aerial support, Austrian fleet raids can take place as far as Malta or the Aegean.
Far Sea Command.
South Atlantic Squadron (Duala, Camaroons)
Blucher (AC) (F)
Dresden (CL)
Cap Trafalgar (AP)
Blucher (AP)
Naval Infantry Battalion
Far Eastern Command (Tsingtao, China)
Prinz Adalbert (AC)
Friedrich Karl (AC)
Emden (CL)
Nurnburg (CL)
Prinz Eitel Friedrich (AP)
Princess Alice (AP)
Naval Infantry Battalion
Station Ships:
Dresden (CL): East Indies
Konigsberg (CL): East Africa
South Atlantic Squadron: Mobilizes to a remote location during a crisis. There is no pre-existing intention to merge it with the North Atlantic squadron when this sorties later, but the surviving units of the South Atlantic Squadron can retire to Germany early in 1915 in coordination with the Atlantic Squadron’s operations. When the squadron retires (or is eliminated) a replacement light cruiser or disguised raider will be dispatched to the South Atlantic to resume operations, so that throughout the war the Entente must guard the South Atlantic Ocean with strong forces.
The Far East Squadron will commence operations in the direction of Australia, using the amphibious battalion to make landings at western towns such as Broome or Darwin, thereby causing ANZAC forces to concentrate on home defence in 1914. Upon exhaustion of its ammunition and coal supplies, the armoured cruisers and infantry of the Far East Squadron will lay up in East Africa, joining the campaign there. The light cruisers will continue with commerce operations in the Indian Ocean until sunk, exhaustion too causes them to lay up in East Africa, or they accumulate enough coal to return to Germany after a successful raid.
Like the South Atlantic, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans the German navy will keep one warship or disguised raider on station to force the Entente to commit large forces to these defences.
Station Ships: The light cruisers on station in East Africa, the Pacific Ocean and East Indies will conduct commerce warfare until sunk, joining other squadrons, or returning to Germany.
Building Programmes
Battlecruisers
Lutzow – Completed as battlecruiser
Hindenburg – Completed as armed merchant or fast supply ship.
Mackensen and Yorck Classes – Cancelled with resources diverted to light cruiser construction.
Battleships
Konig Class– Completed as battleships.
Baden, Bayern – Completed as armed merchant or fast supply ships.
Sachsen, Wurttemberg –Cancelled with resources diverted to light cruiser construction.
Armored Cruisers
If surviving, converted to East Indiamen or fast supply ships as war losses as necessary.
Light Cruisers
High priority. Improved Wiesbadens with better Atlantic endurance (expanded to 7,000 or 8,000 tons). Intended to operate in squadrons of 4-8.
Destroyers/Torpedo Boats:
Low priority. Limited construction to partly offset attrition.
Submarines
High priority.
Aircraft.
A ‘Gotha’ type long range reconnaissance aircraft with a search radius of 500nm.
What I found difficult to address was the actual naval strategy should be for the Central Powers., In other games on this period, I noticed the same problem - the CP naval war is really spinning wheels in the mud. Sure, there's all sorts of operations in the North Sea fishing for a naval victory, but was this actually a strategy, or the lack of one? That got me thinking about what alternatives the CP navies had. I fishing around, I noticed that in the age of sail second-rate navies such as Spain's performed very useful functions, not as a fleet in the Mahanian sense of go-pound-on-the-enemy-fleet, but getting the silver and gold from the Empire to Spain through seas dominated by the British. That got me thinking of a strategy to contesting the Entente blockade as it existed (not as it was fantasized by the German naval command before the war). A strategy that focused on using naval power to influence the neutral powers and provide trade despite the blockade. I hashed out the following theoretical piece in order to nail down what the game would be about.
First Principles.
Germany is a land power. The purpose of the German navy is to enhance Germany’s land power in a continental war and maximize its potential for continental victory.
Germany is not a sea power. Achieving victory at sea while being defeated on land is meaningless to Germany. Neither domination of the seas nor a decisive battle to eliminate the enemy battle fleet are prerequisites to Germany’s exercise of sea power.
The German navy’s organisation, (force structure, strategy, operations) stems from the methods naval power enhances land power:
(a) Land power requires robust economy, and Germany needs overseas trade to maximize its economic potential. The German navy must maintain overseas trade despite an enemy blockade; either indirectly via neutral hulls or directly using Central Powers merchant shipping.
(b) By employing combined arms warfare at sea – surface, submarines, mining, air, intelligence, landing forces - to cause disproportionately greater resources of the enemy coalition to become invested into a naval campaign.
(c) To influence neutral opinion to the favour of Germany. To gain neutral support both through the manner of the navy’s conduct as well to encourage neutral defiance an Entente blockade; victories near neutral shores to promote Entente vulnerability. Strong squadrons to demonstrate Entente domination is contested, propaganda against the invasive qualities of the blockade to promote neutral defiance.
(d) To protect Germany’s coasts and internal communications in the Baltic, mainly using light forces and older capital units unable to execute more important missions.
Trade Objectives.
The navy’s ultimate purpose is to ensure trade. Under wartime conditions, the bulk of trade will come through neutral ports, while the cargoes carried on Central Power hulls would only represent a small fraction of peacetime levels. However, by concentrating on the import of ‘precious commodities’, this would allow the relatively small amount of direct trade to have a far greater impact that mere volume would suggest.
Precious commodities are those that energize the war economies of the Central Powers to a degree disproportionate to their actual shipping weight; nitrates for explosives and agriculture, machine oils for lubricants, rare metals, oil and gasoline, rubber, concentrated fodder, diary, meat, etc. They are commodities that the Central Powers will have trouble replacing without overseas trade, and have a large impact on the economy despite small volumes.
Overriding Importance of Nitrates: Chile, at the far south western tip of South America, is particularly important to the Central Powers war effort because of, notwithstanding home production, the need for about 200,000 tons of nitrates per year, of which only perhaps ¼ of that total may arrive in Europe on neutral hulls. A potential trade route for nitrates would be Chile to California via neutral hull, overland by rail to the US east coast, loaded there aboard German shipping and (eventually) broken out into the Atlantic and escorted to Norway by German warships.
Because a trade strategy relies on US neutrality in order to function, all aspects of German naval operations, and especially unrestricted submarine warfare, are to be considered subordinate to the priority of US neutrality. US neutrality should see Germany able to import about one fifth to one quarter of peacetime level through the neutral powers. Active measures by the German navy to disrupt Entente blockading forces will increase trade by encouraging neutrals to both defy the blockade as well as increase their leverage in bilateral negotiations. Disrupting blockading forces will increase trade opportunities.
Central Powers commercial concerns establish during peacetime the trading houses, political and commercial influences, and company interests necessary to allow the competitive purchase of precious commodities in neutral markets during war, as well as the distribution of material seized from Entente vessels on the high seas. Acquired commodities will be shipped to American east coast ports or in some cases Spanish ports using neutral assets. Once loaded onto CP hulls sheltered on the eastern seaboard, the German navy becomes responsible for its subsequent breakout and movement to Europe. Because of the inherent difficulties to Atlantic operations, it may be the case that any given CP merchant ship makes only one or two crossings per year.
Political Considerations.
The attitude of foreign governments influence German naval strategy only insofar as these attitudes impact first principles; the navy’s ability to conduct trade, attrite enemy forces, and divert enemy resources from the continental land campaign.
The war case is against France and Russia. Political factors within such a conflict can be rated in terms of their order of importance:
1. British neutrality.
2. US neutrality.
3. Neutral opinion.
4. Italian belligerence.
5. Austrian belligerence.
6. Ottoman belligerence.
7. Italian neutrality.
8. Japanese neutrality.
Not all of these are likely to occur. For instance, while, British neutrality is the more important political consideration to German naval strategy, British neutrality is much less likely than US neutrality. The same list can be rated in terms of the likelihood of the event occurring:
1. Austrian belligerence.
2. US neutrality.
3. Ottoman belligerence.
4. Neutral opinion.
5. Italian neutrality.
6. Japanese neutrality.
7. Italian belligerence.
8. British neutrality.
Combing these lists creates three separate groupings of political priorities, from most important/likely to the least important/likely;
Group 1 (US Neutrality, Neutral Opinion, Austrian Ally, Ottoman Ally)
The political objectives of Group 1 are those that are both high in importance and likely to occur. They are both the core assumptions and the core conditions to prosecuting a naval war. All are expected, achievable, and mutually compatible.
No naval strategy can be entertained that jeopardizes the possibility of continued US neutrality. US neutrality must be maintained regardless of any other consideration because only US neutrality can permit the German navy overcome its geographical and numerical disadvantages, and contribute positively to Germany’s land power. German naval strategy requires US neutrality as a source of] trade and supply, as a barrier preventing the most effective form of Entente blockade, and to prevent US land power from fatally contributing to the war on land in Europe.
The Triple Entente is a coalition of rivals with a long history of war and mutual distrust. Because the enemy coalition has no common purpose beyond the expectation of victory, the failure to produce such a victory over Germany will cause the collapse of the Triple Entente and a return to the natural state of enmity between its members. US interference to establish peace talks and to limit war aims is therefore within the interests of Germany, because the nature of the Triple Entente cannot admit to their success and the mentality of the American President Wilson cannot admit to their failure. The more the US attempts meditation, the more Germany should accept it, and the deeper the friction between the Triple Entente and the United States shall become. The United States was drawn into war with Great Britain over neutral rights in 1812. The greater the friction between Britain and the US, more likely the US is to express its neutrality in ways favourable to Germany.
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire allies divert enemy naval resources. Because the German navy is superior to either in terms of training and personnel, both allied navies will be more effective at their diversionary mission if German warships are present.
Group 2 (British Neutrality, Italian Ally).
These are important objectives that are unlikely to be achieved. They are also to an extent mutually incompatible, (i.e., an Italian ally against France is likely to jeopardize British neutrality towards Germany).
British neutrality is a paradox; it is the most important political objective for the German navy, it is not likely to occur, and is probably little influenced by German political wooing. So long as the German army intends to invade Belgium at the start of a war with France, British neutrality can never be considered likely. The German navy has little interest in a naval treaty with Britain should British neutrality be pre-ordained to failure because of Belgium.
If, however, Britain and Germany entered into an agreement on Belgium in peacetime, then the likelihood of British neutrality increases. With respect to the question of a naval agreement, the German navy maintains the position that Britain and Germany must address the question of Belgium in relation to British neutrality. Were British neutrality satisfactorily affirmed, and the German army ceased planning to violate Belgian neutrality, then the German navy could agree to a far reaching peacetime naval agreement.
Activities to secure Italian co-belligerence may interfere with attempts to secure British neutrality, since the former must encourage the Italians to reckless behaviour against the friends of the latter. By addressing the question of Belgium and British attitudes in peacetime, which of British neutrality or Italian co-belligerence becomes the priority political objective is resolved. If, as is the more likely scenario, Britain remains distant and elusive and refuses to cooperate upon the question of Belgium, then the British intention is assumed to be to enter a continental war. In this instance Germany must maximize the chances for Italy to join the war as an ally in the same manner the Triple Entente could maximize the participation of Russia; by allowing Italy to use the alliance as a sword in the promotion of purely Italian concerns.
Although unlikely, the possibility of Italian co-belligerence can be influenced. By placing Austrian and German naval forces in the Mediterranean under Italian command in peacetime; to maintain strong German naval forces in theatre in peacetime; to pressure civilian diplomats to more seriously reckon with Italian interests above Austrian or even German interests, so that the Alliance functions more as means for Italy to bring pressure upon France or Britain; to increase Italy’s general sense of importance in alliance discussions by way of increased consultation. Internally, (secretly); to call for Austria to make concessions to Italy’s favor and to more aggressively support purely Italian adventures, such as in the Aegean, with Austro-German naval forces that might embolden Italy into a confrontation with the Entente.
Group 3. (Italian Neutrality, Japanese Neutrality).
Planning against Japan should at least investigate the possibility of neutrality. Pacific colonies unable to divert enemy resources from Europe (i.e., Caroline, Marshall Islands, etc) can be ceded to Japan, or Britain, or the United States, when doing so will enhance relations with the receiving party. If Japanese neutrality could be purchased with Tsingtao, this is desirable and should be planned for. However, Japan will have little incentive to neutrality when it can take what it wishes by force, and by joining the Entente, it increases its influence with Britain. Unless Japanese neutrality is clearly expected, Tsingtao and environs should be returned to China before the European war breaks out, upon the condition that the garrison there can move to Peking on contract to train Chinese military forces, and other like compensation. By this method, it would be hoped to cause Japan to go to war with China, possibly gaining an Asian ally to the Central Powers which sets the Triple Entente and the United States at odds.
If Italy does not declare war for the Central Powers, eventually it may declare war against them. Italian neutrality is desirable, but Germany has little influence over the question, except to work towards an Austro-Italian wartime understanding.
International Law.
The 1907 Hague Convention was inadequate with respect to its usefulness to German naval strategy because it lacked giving the neutrals any teeth to discriminating against those that would seek to violate the principle of absolute freedom of the seas. Germany must therefore seek to revise international law in subsequent sessions as follows;
(1) To create an overseeing ‘neutrality’ board composed of the signatory nations that are neutral in any given conflict, the purpose of which being to identify when and how the warring nations violate international law at sea.
(2) The capacity for the board in (1) above to, still within the bounds of international law, authorize neutral nations to give preferential treatment to warring nations that maintain international law, and discriminatory treatment towards those warring nations that violate the neutral’s rights. For an example, that the warships of a nation at war with a party which had been ruled in violation of the rights of, for instance, Spain, could now be authorized by the neutrality board to coal in Spain once per month instead of once every three months.
(3) That a warring nation being victimized by another’s breach of international law be granted special privileges with respect to counter-blockade and other countermeasures against the violator.
(4) To confirm the status of “East Indiamen” (armed merchant ships) as merchantmen under international law. In particular, to allow military crews and weapons to be added to merchantmen during wartime while not to effect the status of the vessel, provided it engages in no warlike activities.
Naval Theatres.
The North and South Atlantic Oceans.
In the North Atlantic key German and Entente trade routes overlap. Because of the indispensable nature of these trade routes, the North Atlantic is the decisive naval theatre of naval operations. As Germany has no bases in the North Atlantic, and those in the South Atlantic will quickly fall, the German fleet must be equipped and trained to operate in the North Atlantic without possessing a local major base. This is to be done by emphasizing endurance and fleet support, by the use of submarines, and by exploiting the neutrals.
Germany’s trade during a continental war will pass to Europe through the Atlantics. Whether on German or neutral hulls, this will be subject to blockade by Entente patrols; just outside the port of origin in the Americas, and again as ships enter the GIUK gap or English Channel.
The Atlantics are dominated by a large number of neutral countries, the most important being the United States. Despite its numerical superiority, the size of the theatre and the influence of the neutrals will prevent the Entente navies from excluding the Central Powers from the Atlantics. The manner in which the United States exercises its neutrality will dominate the war in the Atlantic; in many cases the more even handed and forceful Washington’s practices, the better it shall be for Germany. While Germany has no fleet bases, it can to an extent tap neutral resources for support of its operations. Some neutrals with sympathetic attitudes, such as Spain, might be cultivated to act in a manner more biased towards Germany. Others, such as Portugal, will cooperate with Great Britain.
Entente blockading forces will be weak in the Americas, because of the distance from Europe and the number of ports to patrol. On the European end, the Denmark Straights can be a difficult area for the Entente to patrol because of its distance and isolation from Entente support bases. The best German trade route is therefore to Norway via the Denmark Straights. Once in Norwegian waters, merchants can offload in ports in northern Norway, or use Norwegian territorial waters to evade the blockade as they run south. German trade, and neutral trade in defiance of the blockade, should tend to run more between September and March, in the poorer weather. Voyages in wartime will take much longer to complete, since much time may be spent waiting the necessary bad weather, or other favourable conditions.
One special squadron for use in North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea operations is the Arctic Squadron. Its responsibilities are supply, ice breaking, intelligence, and the collection and distribution of the meteorological data necessary to better predict weather conditions for operations.
The North Sea
This sea serves little military or economic purpose to the warring parties; neither side requires it for economic purposes and the Entente can exercise a blockade Germany elsewhere. Unlike with the Atlantic or Mediterranean, the Entente has the option to abandon the North Sea without this significantly hindering its war effort. Even presuming that the High Seas Fleet established a numerical superiority by isolating and destroying an entire battle squadron of the Grand Fleet, the Entente still has the numbers in its member navies to make up the ship losses, and can still dominate the Atlantics, while the lack of German bases in the Atlantic still prevents it from exploiting its numerical superiority there. The North Sea therefore holds little to no potential for a strategic decision.
German operations in the North Sea are harassing, to pin enemy forces and inflict attrition; they are diversionary. Lacking strategic importance, the North Sea is a trap upon which the German navy must avoid fixation. It serves as a corridor that the fleet passes to conduct operations further afield; against the enemy coasts or in the Norwegian Sea or Atlantic. Yet, operations in the North Sea will draw Entente forces into the North Sea, away from the Atlantics and Mediterranean and Europe.
Diversionary raids and landings in the North Sea are taken in coordination with events in the Barents Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Operations in the North Sea are often to the purpose of supporting fleet operations outside the North Sea.
The Norwegian Sea
The purpose of operations in the Norwegian Sea is to attack enemy blockade lines, to escort German merchant ships running the GIUK gap to Norway, as a route between Germany and the Atlantic Ocean, and as a holding area for Atlantic support units.
Conditions are favorable for operations in the Norwegian Sea despite the proximity of major British fleet bases at its southern entrance, due to adverse visibility conditions particularily in winter. The best operating conditions are between the months of November and March. Bad weather and poor visibility in the winter months, and large numbers of potential coaling sites and hidden coves scattered throughout the coastal regions of Iceland, Greenland, Norway could allow logistic support of major fleet units. Sea ice covering the Denmark Straight and northern latitudes in the winter months may allow German ice breakers to provide warships a calm “anchorage” for resupply operations which do not rely on neutral consideration.
Scandinavian trade running the GIUK Gap must cross the Barents Sea to reach Norwegian territorial waters, from there either discharging in ports such as Narvik and Bergen, or taking advantage of neutral waters, hugging Norwegian and Swedish territorial waters to reach the Skagerrak. Naval supply ships (perhaps posing as ore carriers bound for Narvik) can use Norwegian coastal waters to skirt the blockade as these run northwards, such that German warships operating in the Norwegian Sea have supply ships available to them from Germany. Like the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea is within wireless range of Germany, meaning that coordination can be taken from Germany between combat forces and supply forces.
Strong British bases sit astride the entrance to the Norwegian Sea. Operating here means that enemy forces might block in the Scotland-Norway for periods of time. Ships moving to and from the Barents may have to wait for long periods for an opportunity to slip past this barrier. Like with a close blockade of Germany, Grand Fleet operations to actively block this gap suffer from the same defects preventing a close blockade of Germany; destroyer escort endurance, the difficulties of a sustained presence on the Norwegian side of the gap, and prolonged vulnerability of blockading forces to submarine, surface and mine attack.
Prewar preparations for operations in the Norwegian Sea include:
(a) Charting coastal regions and monitoring traffic there to the purpose of establishing covert locations for supply and movement in and near neutral territory with low probability of accident or detection.
(b) Acquisition of commercial interests to assist in transshipment of good bounds for Germany. For example, investment in dock frontage in Narvik beyond peacetime requirements, and the creation/expansion of rail lines between ports such as Narvik and Bergen and Swedish ports on the Baltic.
(c) Intelligence penetration of the Norwegian naval command and its operating habits.
(d) Active influence and coercion of Scandinavian neutrals to influence favorable interpretations of neutrality and neutral interests.
(e) Commissioning icebreakers and using these in the Arctic (and Antarctic) regions during peacetime to gain operational experience for wartime operations. The use of same to collect meteorological data for later use.
The Baltic Sea
An inland sea protected from outside intrusion by the control of the Belts by Denmark. Unless the Entente were to attempt a major offensive, this area is important to German strategy mainly as a trade route to Scandinavia. The Baltic Sea is particularly well suited to littoral warfare.
In keeping with principle of diverting disproportionate enemy resources from land warfare, the German navy shall routinely base its capital forces in the Baltic, in peacetime, to the purpose of influencing Russia to expand its own Baltic fleet. In wartime, the modern elements of the fleet shall not often concern themselves with matters in the Baltic. These will usually involve light forces to the purpose of; maintaining communications with Scandinavia; coastal defence; and occasional support of army operations.
Only in the event the Entente launched an offensive to gain access to the Baltic could this become a priority theatre. With the main Danish channel connecting the Baltic to the North Sea being 6nm wide and 30nm miles long, major British fleet operations in the Baltic will have to commence with the violation of Danish neutrality. Given the strength of the defences in the Belts, and being only 30 miles from Kiel, the Grand Fleet must overcome the combination of Danish land based coastal defenses backed by the German navy. If, however, the Grand Fleet did penetrate into the Baltic, the German navy must avoid a fleet clash, instead using littoral warfare methods to attrite the enemy fleet, as the Baltic will have become the area to exercise the prewar strategy of asymmetrical attrition originally envisioned for the North Sea. Fleet operations from Kiel would use an advantageous position for forays against the British sea lines of communication or isolated units. Finally, the Central Powers should look to seize the Belts with an army offensive, simultaneously shutting the enemy fleet in the Baltic for the rest of the war and transforming the balance in North Sea.
A British Baltic offensive, given the dangers inherent to British operations in the Baltic and the political consequences to war war with Denmark, is sufficiently hairbrained that Germany should encourage the attempt in the expectation of an Entente debacle. The disadvantages – difficulties in communications with Scandinavia and interference with fishing – can be mitigated with seaplane scouting, mining, submarines, the use of the North Sea, and convoys. It is probably more desirable that the Danes should not mine the Belts and instead allow belligerent battle fleets to pass in either direction.
Mediterranean Sea
The Mediterranean is unique in that it is the only sea outside Germany containing a major friendly fleet base. It is the home of the two German allies, plus a potential third ally in the Ottoman Empire. Should Italy join the Central Powers, from Italian bases the Alliance naval forces can harass Entente supply routes through the Mediterranean. Alternatively, while seeking a “weak” underbelly, the Entente may be tempted into a pointless side show; a large scale amphibious assault of the Italian peninsula. This would be a ‘best case’ scenario, diverting large enemy land and sea resources into a secondary project with no hope of being decisive.
If as expected Italy is neutral, the Adriatic Sea is well suited for combined arms naval operations (air and sea) and has access to the Mediterranean for occasional raids beyond Oranto. Austrian surface forces will act more aggressively when combined with German forces. A few German ships may enter the Straights of the Dardenelles to influence Turkey opinion. For all these reasons, a strong German squadron composed of older ships is based in Austria-Hungary or Italy prior to a war.
Overseas Empire
The German empire should divert enemy resources away from Europe. German colonies that can draw Entente resources from Europe, or prevent enemy colonial resources from reaching Europe, should be equipped to do so. Colonies that cannot divert significant enemy resources, but can influence neutral opinion, should be earmarked for transfer to the custody of a neutral power rather than be conquered by the enemy. Support from Europe of Germany’s colonies will consist of the occasional supply ship.
Germany is unlikely to conduct major naval operations in the Indian or Pacific Oceans. Small numbers of ships consisting of disguised raiders or light cruisers should operate there, one unit in each sea, more or less continuously, (being replaced when lost or withdrawn). This will tie down disproportionately larger numbers of enemy resources.
Operations.
All operations at sea are undertaken to achieve the goals set out in first principles; to promote friendly trade and prevent enemy trade, to divert or destroy enemy resources, to influence neutral opinion, for coastal defence and Baltic communications.
Fighting a decisive battle has little direct bearing on Germany’s use of naval power. Whether the German navy does or does not engage with its opponents in battle is not decisive to the exercise of trade and commerce warfare strategies necessary to support Germany’s land power. The navy’s missions benefit from victories at sea by making its primary missions easier; successful battles at sea are indirectly advantageous. Decisive battle, while not a primary concern in and of itself, can represent an opportunity to improve Germany’s capacity to execute its primary naval missions.
Germany’s forces in the North Sea have the best logistic support but are in a sea with no strategic usefulness. They are used to divert enemy forces from the other areas. Notwithstanding the Atlantic’s designation as the primary operating theatre, the bulk of German naval forces at any given time will be within the North Sea due to logistic constraints. North Sea operations include limited forays, and the threat of same, to attrite or distract Entente forces. If enemy and friendly deployments cause an opportunity for a major victory in the North Sea, then the North Sea can become the primary theatre while the potential remains.
Logistic constraints will allow for only a portion of the German navy to be deployed outside Europe for short periods. The purpose of Atlantic operations go beyond trade and commerce warfare; they require a battle squadron strong enough to challenge the Entente for Atlantic sea control. Due to the best weather being between September and March, and the amount of coal that will be used up, heavy units can be at sea in substantial numbers for only for three or four months in a year. In off peak seasons, small numbers of raiders will stay out in the Atlantic to assist North Sea operations.. Because of these constraints, from March to August each year, the North Sea is the primary operating arena of the German navy, then from September to March attention shifts into the Atlantic.
Commerce warfare, especially using submarines, can significantly damage the Entente’s war capacity. Commerce warfare in distant waters serves to divert enemy resources and manpower from land war in Europe into naval warfare distant from Europe. In all cases, the requirement to maintain relations with the United States interferes with the exercise of commerce warfare. Submarines will become a more and more important element to commerce warfare strategy as time goes on, but shall always conform to the requirement to maintain the neutrality of the United States. In the event the Triple Entente adapt convoys in the Atlantic, surfacing raiding forces to break up convoys become a crucial part of combined operations. Light cruisers acting in conjunction with submarine forces will also become more important later in a war.
The method of direct trade with the Americas is by way of individual blockade runner or convoy, especially during the winter season when visibility and weather conditions in European waters are the least favourable to the blockading powers. Merchant ships should be heavily armed so that they can resist attempts by Entente forces to seize them,
http://libcudl.colorado.edu/wwi/pdf/i73705962.pdf
German naval forces break enemy blockades at neutral ports as necessary to allow German merchant ships trapped there to escape to sea. German warships also attrite blockading forces guarding the passages to Norway in European waters, to disrupt Entente patrols and allow ships and convoys to break through.
Naval Commands (August, 1914)
Baltic Command
Shore Bombardment Squadron
Kaiser Freidrich III (B)
Kaiser Wilhelm II (B)
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse (B)
Kaiser Barbarossa (B)
Kaiser Karl der Grosse (B)
Brandenburg (B)
Worth (B)
Scouting Group
Gazelle (CL)
Niobe (CL)
Nymphe (CL)
Thetis (CL)
Ariadne (CL)
Amazone (CL)
Medusa (CL)
Hela (CL)
Tasks:
Sea Lines of Communication, Scandinavia.
Coastal Defence, Baltic sea coast.
Bombardment support missions.
Amphibious operations.
Mobilization: Baltic mobilization has no special pre-war steps
The Baltic Command is composed of 2nd rate ships and is assigned only defensive missions. Beyond mining operations with light forces, it will have no offensive tasks without being reinforced. Should a major amphibious operation be contemplated, the necessary units would be made available from the North Sea Command. Because Atlantic operations occur mainly in the winter months, offensive operations in the Baltic will take place mostly in the summer months.
Baltic vs. Atlantic
Heavy attrition may cause a weakening of the High Seas Fleet such that continued Atlantic and North Sea Operations with capital ships may eventually jeapardize the security of the Baltic Sea. If this tipping point is reached, (ie, Germany only has about six dreadnought types remaining operational), then the capital fleet could revert to a fleet in being strategy with Baltic communications and coastal defence as the (reduced) strategic priority.
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North Sea Command
Battle Squadron.
Kaiser (BB)
Friedrich der Grosse (BB)
Kaiserin (BB)
Prinz Regent Luitpold (BB)
Konig Albert (BB)
Battle Squadron
Heligoland (BB)
Thuringen (BB)
Ostfriesland (BB)
Oldenburg (BB)
Nassau (BB)
Westfalen (BB)
Scouting Squadron
Scharnhorst (AC)
Gneisenau (AC)
Scouting Group
Stettin (CL)
Stuttgart (CL)
Bremen (CL)
Berlin (CL)
Hamburg (CL)
Scouting Group
Frauenlob (CL)
Arkona (CL)
Undine (CL)
Lubeck (CL)
Amphibious Squadron
One infantry division of two brigades, converted ocean liners.
Coastal Artillery Material Reserve.
(disarmed classes)
11” – 40 guns
9.4” – 28 guns
Tasks:
Offensive Operations, North Sea.
Coastal Defence, North Sea.
Support of Baltic Command (April-August)
Support of North Atlantic Command (September-March)
Offensive assignments for the North Sea command include naval sweeps, infantry raids in Great Britain using the Amphibious Squadron, submarine operations, and mining operations. North Sea Command supports the movements of the North Atlantic Command units to and from the Barents Sea by undertaking diversionary operations and by providing direct escort. Defensive assignments are coastal defence, with particular attention paid to supporting submarine activities.
The North Sea Command’s eleven battleships are reinforced by the North Atlantic Command’s capital ships when not on distant station. The battleship force of the North Sea Command (eleven battleships) is strong enough to defeat the British Battle Cruiser Squadron in open battle, even if unsupported.
The Grand Fleet: The primary risk to battleship operations in the North Sea is the possibility that a smaller German battleship squadron could be engaged and destroyed by a much stronger British squadron. Because the North Sea scouting forces are often older and weaker ships, it may often lack the heavy scouting forces that would otherwise serve to warn of approaching danger, meaning that on a number of occasions in a war it will be virtually certain that ten or twelve German dreadnoughts will encounter twenty or even thirty British dreadnoughts.
Tactics must focus, in these inevitable dangerous moments, on preventing the Grand Fleet from deploying its overwelming mass to destructive effect for anything beyond fleeting moments too short in duration for decisive effect. The poor visibility conditions generally found in the North Sea may be of assistance in any given situation. In addition the German navy must use torpedo tactics, evasive battle manoeuvres, alternative return routes (to port), mobile barrier tactics, and smoke, (generators, smoke shells, and to keep stocks of specially treated coal that which generates as much smoke as possible); all this to the purpose of being able to degrade visibility conditions so that the Grand Fleet’s numerical advantage is negated and the High Seas Fleet may escape.
Mobile Barrier Tactics: This would consist of a number of fast minelayers and at least four submarines deployed to the rear of the battleships by perhaps 25nm. If the battle fleet encounters the Grand Fleet, the minelayers lay down a mine field perpendicular to the path of retreat. As the fleet approaches, they will guide the retreating battleships through a gap left in the centre, which is then filled after the fleet passes by. Submarines are stationed around the mine barrier to cover the retreat of the battle force. This will require extensive peacetime training to execute properly in war.
Scouting Operations and Doctrine.
It will often be the case that a North Sea force of ten or fifteen dreadnoughts may face a potentially far strong Grand Fleet of unknown strength, which must be kept at a distance. North Sea operations may often lack the heavy scouting forces (battle cruisers) that can successfully operate independently of the main force. Even when these are present, because the Grand Fleet has a superior battle cruiser squadron, German heavy forces may still be unable to perform a scouting mission. Doctrine therefore de-emphasizes the use of armoured or battle cruisers for distant scouting, and substitutes submarines, aircraft, zeppelins and fast surface forces to act in their place.
Early War.
The North Sea Command will not attempt to directly interfere with the anticipated passage of the British Expeditionary Force to France on account of the difficulties and dangers inherent to operating in the English Channel. Instead, it will attempt to either delay or prevent the dispatch of the BEF to Europe by landing a brigade sized raiding force in the Yarmouth area on the first day of war between Britain and Germany. Once landed, the fleet will not cover the return of the landing force to Germany. Instead, it will seek opportunities within the reaction of the Royal Navy to destroy isolated British naval elements. If possible, the brigade will be withdrawn at night from one or more of the captured ports within two weeks of its original landing, abandoning equipment as necessary. If extraction is not possible, it will fortify itself in the coastal towns and hold out until surrender.
After the Yarmouth Operation is completed, the advance of the German army in France may present an opportunity for the navy to land a brigade or even division sized force on the French coast to seize Calais.
Later Operations.
The Atlantic Command will commence operations in the Atlantic after September 1914 when the weather turns bad. When this occurs, the North Sea command is stripped of forces and reverts to a support role for the Atlantic Command by assisting in the breakout and actively probing around the British Isles. If local conditions are known to be favourable, (because a strong contingent of the Grand Fleet has entered the Atlantic), then much stronger attacks are to be made by the North Sea Command, including more amphibious landings, and even sweeps into the English Channel.
Antwerp
Control of the southern exit to the North Sea can be contested from bases in Belgium and Northern France. This will be particularly important in relation to U-boat operations in the English Channel. Available ports in this area are small, meaning that only destroyer and submarines are eligible for forward deployment. The exception to this rule is the port of Antwerp, which can act as a major forward fleet base for the High Seas Fleet. With Dover only about 5 hours steaming from the Scheldt, heavy raids into the English Channel as far as Portsmouth are possible. This in turn may force the Grand Fleet to base in the English Channel, which would better open the gateway to the Norwegian Sea for Germany.
The ability to use Antwerp depends on the international status of its access route through the neutral Scheldt. Great Britain desires its internationalization in order to send its army directly to Antwerp in case of war. Germany will support Britain in peacetime in order to internationalize the Scheldt because (1) this may improve the chances of a peacetime treaty between Britain and Germany based on Belgium; (2) the British Expeditionary Force is wasted and potentially annihilated if sent to Antwerp instead of France; (3) the precedent which permits the British army to use the Scheldt to go to Antwerp also permits the German navy to use Antwerp as a fleet base against the Channel.
Calais
Aside from Antwerp, the French and Belgian coasts offer no prospect for a major forward fleet base. However, occupation of the coast of France around Calais would allow German coastal batteries to dominate the French side of the Straights of Dover, allowing light forces and submarines unfettered access to raid the English Channel.
If the Scheldt is made an international waterway then Antwerp is well situated geographically and logistically suited to act as a forward fleet base for heavy operations in the English Channel. Such operations would require either Zeppelin or aircraft capable of scouting to 500nm, which would warn of the approach of a British fleet before raiding forces in the Channel would be cut off. If the British Grand Fleet repositions to defend the Channel, then it surrenders its dominant position near the Scotland-Norway blockade line.
The German army war plan calls for a strong advance initially through Belgium into northern France, but then bending southwards away from the coast. The army is to be made aware of the potential to the Calais position, so that in the event the French army eludes destruction, the army may instead plan to seize the Somme river line via Amiens to secure Calais for the duration of the war.
North Atlantic Command
1st Scouting Squadron
Seydlitz (BC)
Moltke (BC)
Goeben (BC)
Von der Tann (BC)
Derrflinger, (BC) - Completing
Konig (BB) - Completing
Markgraf (BB) - Completing
Grosser Kurfurst (BB) - Completing
Kronprinz Wilhelm (BB) – Completing
Lutzow (BC) – Under Construction.
Scouting Squadrons
Rostock (CL)
Karlsruhe (CL)
Kolberg (CL)
Mainz (CL)
Koln (CL)
Augsburg (CL)
Breslau (CL)
Magdeburg (CL)
Strassburg (CL)
Stralssund (CL)
Support Squadrons (Underway Fast Logistics)
Deutschland Class (ACO) x 5
Braunschweig Class (ACO) x 5
Mecklenburg Class (ACO) x 5
North Atlantic Amphibious Squadron.
(One infantry division of two amphibious brigades, plus ocean liners).
Bismarck (converted ocean liner, under construction)
Blockade Squadron (East Indiamen)
Furst Bismarck
Prinz Heinrich
Viktoria Luise Class (x6)
Baden, Bayern, Hindenburg – (under construction, converted from capital ships)
Salamis– (under construction, purchased from Greece, converted from battleship).
Merchant conversions.
(All capable of operating as ACO).
Material Artillery Reserve
(disarmed classes)
3.4” – 330
5.9” – 90
6.7” – 140
Torpedoes - 122
Artic Squadron
Icebreakers for operations in the Barents Sea during winter months.
Entappens
Overseas offices coordinating Central Powers shipping in neutral ports.
Tasks: Offensive Operations in Barents Sea, North Atlantic, South Atlantic: trade support, commerce warfare, submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious landing operations.
Mobilization
The North Atlantic’s mobilization commences weeks before the start of hostilities, with the first stage being when the earmarked troop transports of the amphibious squadrons being ordered to return to Germany, China, or to Africa. Units of the amphibious squadrons all the major liners in the German merchant marine.
A second wave of measures calls for the preparation of amphibious forces for sea, gathering merchant ships to designated friendly and neutral ports, peacetime purchasing coal and other supplies for their holds, and otherwise preparing these for supply operations such that a large material reserve is ready to sail from in neutral ports when required. Supply ships with reserve ammunition, (hidden to avoid classification as military vessel) and other supplies depart Germany for the Americas, to wait there for later use.
If war is imminent warships and troop transports depart to their war stations.
War Deployments.
The bulk of the Atlantic Command mobilizes in the North Sea, attached to the North Sea Command. From September to March, in the winter months it will conduct operations in the Barents Sea and Atlantic Ocean, with the bulk of the command returning to the North Sea Command for the summer months. The Atlantic Command’s distant operations are seasonal, peaking in the winter, diminishing in the summer.
During the pre-war mobilization, light cruisers Rostock, Karlsruhe, one AP (fast liner) with one embarked infantry battalion, one minelayer (merchant conversion), and three supply ships, will take up station in the North Atlantic. At the commencement of hostilities this force will commence operations against enemy ports, vulnerable infrastructure, and shipping.
Blockade Squadrons: East Indiamen of the blockade squadrons will trade with the Americas between September and March, often operating independently or in small groups. Some merchant converts will be converted to disguised Q-ships and others to disguised raiders. Disguised raiders operate against commerce in distant seas while Q-ships are heavily armed and armoured (using material from disarmed classes), intended to destroy blockading AMC’s which attempt to stop and search them.
Artic Squadron: Icebreakers of the Arctic Squadron operate in the winter months in the ice fields of the northern Barents Sea. Their operations are coordinated with the fleet through wireless from Germany and agents in neutral Norway and Danish territories. They allow access to pack ice for supply operations and provide supply, intelligence and weather data collection and distribution. Their defence against attack is poor weather, the large size of the Barents Sea, and their ability to recede into the pack ice where enemy warships cannot follow.
Amphibious Squadron: Two naval brigades are available for use in amphibious operations. Normally, only one or two battalions will be at sea at once, with one battalion commencing the war in the Atlantic Ocean. Embarked infantry use war mobilized liners for transport.
Objectives to Atlantic Operations.
The heavy elements of the fleet, including battleships and battle cruisers, have a political mission. They are intended as a direct challenge to the Entente for control of the Atlantic. By contesting control and winning naval victories, this will encourage neutral opinion to resist the blockade. Capital ships are necessary for this mission because only these convey the sense of challenge necessary to excite neutral opinion. The strength of the challenge – a full battle squadron – shall cause the neutrals to hold their breath, each victory loosening the impression of Entente domination, each defeat a setback to neutral opinion.
The composition of the Atlantic squadron, (4 battleships and 5 battle cruisers, plus light cruisers and fast support), will allow it to defeat any Entente scouting squadron it encounters. In particular, a challenge from the British Battle Cruiser Squadron when operating alone is highly desirable. Only a large detachment of the Grand Fleet with the most modern battleships, backed by Battle Cruiser Squadron, might by chance run down the Atlantic Squadron with enough force to destroy it. If such an encounter occurs and the squadron cannot escape, the battleships will sacrifice themselves to allow the escape of the rest of the fleet. However, the detachment of a fleet strong enough to threaten the Atlantic squadron will also leave the remaining British forces in the North Sea vulnerable to a union of the German fleets and an immediate advance upon Scapa Flow. By dividing the Grand Fleet between theatres, the British would also create an opportunity for their own spectacular defeat was well as one for defeating the detached German squadron.
The Atlantic squadron will test various Entente strong points with amphibious landings, undertake commerce warfare, (both at sea and by attacking ports), mine warfare, and break the blockade to allow CP merchantment to cross between Europe and the Americas.
Initial Major Operation.
The 1st Scouting Squadron will break into the Barents Sea and Atlantic after September 1914. Because the Konig Class will not yet be ready, Kaiser Class battleships will detach from the North Sea Command in substitution, (and the Konig Class will join the North Sea command after they work up).
Battlecruisers: Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Moltke, Goeben, Von der Tann
Battleships: Friedrich der Grosse, Kaiser, Kaiserin, Konig Albert.
Light Cruisers: Breslau, Magdeburg, Strassburg, Stralssund
Support Ships: 15 colliers of the converted Mecklenburg, Braunschweig and Deutchland Classes. Supply ships stationed in neutral ports in the Americas during the pre-war crisis.
Operation.
Then, the 1st Scouting Squadron with support force attached will break into the Barents Sea during a period of bad weather. It will operate in the Atlantic for a period of about 60-90 days, then return to Germany.
Subsequent Atlantic Operations.
Weaker forces (cruisers, submarines, solo capital ship sorties, commerce raiders) will continuously operate in the Atlantic continuously. Stronger forces will sortie only irregularily. A wartime program of extended range 6” gun light cruisers and submarines will take on a larger role in the Atlantic as the war progresses and losses among capital ships mount.
Mediterranean Command (Pola).
3rd Battle Squadron
Posen (BB)
Rheinland (BB)
Scouting Group
Roon (AC)
Yorck (AC)
Muchen (CL)
Danzig (CL)
Flotilla: ½
Submarines: 4
Zeppelin Base
Tasks: Coastal defence, submarine warfare, alliance support, offensive sweeps.
Assuming Italy does not enter the war, the Mediterranean Command will be based at Pola in Austria-Hungary, with perhaps one capital unit detached to Constantinople. It is tasked to coordinate with the Austrian fleet in operations in the Adriatic and Mediterreanean Seas.
The Adriatic is long and narrow, and the weather is often calm. These are generally better conditions for aerial scouting than found in the North Sea. Two Zeppelin bases will be constructed pre-war, one in Italy, one in Austria, so that Zeppelin support can be used for scouting in advance of the fleet. Zeppelins will fly back and forth between the North and Adriatic Seas to support various offensives. The shape of the Adriatic facilitates Zeppelin reconnaissance, which in turn will allow offensive sweeps beyond the Straights of Otranto and into the Mediterranean. With proper aerial support, Austrian fleet raids can take place as far as Malta or the Aegean.
Far Sea Command.
South Atlantic Squadron (Duala, Camaroons)
Blucher (AC) (F)
Dresden (CL)
Cap Trafalgar (AP)
Blucher (AP)
Naval Infantry Battalion
Far Eastern Command (Tsingtao, China)
Prinz Adalbert (AC)
Friedrich Karl (AC)
Emden (CL)
Nurnburg (CL)
Prinz Eitel Friedrich (AP)
Princess Alice (AP)
Naval Infantry Battalion
Station Ships:
Dresden (CL): East Indies
Konigsberg (CL): East Africa
South Atlantic Squadron: Mobilizes to a remote location during a crisis. There is no pre-existing intention to merge it with the North Atlantic squadron when this sorties later, but the surviving units of the South Atlantic Squadron can retire to Germany early in 1915 in coordination with the Atlantic Squadron’s operations. When the squadron retires (or is eliminated) a replacement light cruiser or disguised raider will be dispatched to the South Atlantic to resume operations, so that throughout the war the Entente must guard the South Atlantic Ocean with strong forces.
The Far East Squadron will commence operations in the direction of Australia, using the amphibious battalion to make landings at western towns such as Broome or Darwin, thereby causing ANZAC forces to concentrate on home defence in 1914. Upon exhaustion of its ammunition and coal supplies, the armoured cruisers and infantry of the Far East Squadron will lay up in East Africa, joining the campaign there. The light cruisers will continue with commerce operations in the Indian Ocean until sunk, exhaustion too causes them to lay up in East Africa, or they accumulate enough coal to return to Germany after a successful raid.
Like the South Atlantic, in the Indian and Pacific Oceans the German navy will keep one warship or disguised raider on station to force the Entente to commit large forces to these defences.
Station Ships: The light cruisers on station in East Africa, the Pacific Ocean and East Indies will conduct commerce warfare until sunk, joining other squadrons, or returning to Germany.
Building Programmes
Battlecruisers
Lutzow – Completed as battlecruiser
Hindenburg – Completed as armed merchant or fast supply ship.
Mackensen and Yorck Classes – Cancelled with resources diverted to light cruiser construction.
Battleships
Konig Class– Completed as battleships.
Baden, Bayern – Completed as armed merchant or fast supply ships.
Sachsen, Wurttemberg –Cancelled with resources diverted to light cruiser construction.
Armored Cruisers
If surviving, converted to East Indiamen or fast supply ships as war losses as necessary.
Light Cruisers
High priority. Improved Wiesbadens with better Atlantic endurance (expanded to 7,000 or 8,000 tons). Intended to operate in squadrons of 4-8.
Destroyers/Torpedo Boats:
Low priority. Limited construction to partly offset attrition.
Submarines
High priority.
Aircraft.
A ‘Gotha’ type long range reconnaissance aircraft with a search radius of 500nm.
