An AH Battle: An Alternate Battle of the Denmark Straight - (Operation Rheinübung) 1942.

1. Prologue
Part One: Prologue.

Greetings All

This is the Battle Chapter for Operation Rheinubung from Book Two of my Nieustralis AH which I am working on. Since a number of people have expressed interest after posting the MFK -Hitlers FAA Thread, MFK Thread, I thought I'd just chuck this in as a stand-alone thread for your amusement and comment. As always, I welcome all feedback to make my efforts better! ;)

To put some of the changed participants details in order, ITTL the Tirpitz became a total constructive loss after the Kiel raid in December 1939, making its 15-inch turrets available. Damaged in the Norway operation the Scharnhorst has been up gunned, replacing its 11-inch guns with three twin turrets fitted with the larger caliber. This and other events mean that Operation Rheinubung commences about a week later than IOTL.

Secondly and far more significantly was that the RN immediate postwar construction plans are radically different from IOTL, affecting the cruiser builds and new battleships of the interwar period. As a result of the flawed attempts to produce a satisfactory new 16-inch gun for the Rodney class to be built, Treasury prohibited expenditure on developing new gunnery systems and adopted a set of strict standard armament calibers in the name of "austerity'.' While widely recognized as a thinly disguised cost cutting measure in an atmosphere of disarmament, the RN was forced to conform and adopt a set standard of., 4, 4.5, 6, 7.5 and 15-inch family of weapons. This meant that ITTL there was no development of the 5.25, 8, 14, and 16-inch weapons which would distinctly alter the appearance of many of the interwar RN classes, including the Treaty cruisers, though it would develop an effective triple turret layout (no 70-degree elevation though). Thus, the County, Duke classes were all armed with three or four 7.5-inch triple turrets all on a modified Hawkins class hull (another budgetary cutback). Below is an example of the 1928 Norfolk armed with nine (3x3) 7.5-inch guns, this policy produced ITTL.

7.5-inch County Class.png


This also impacted the British Battle ships of the period. Firstly, all would be armed with the Mk-1, and later Mk-2 versions of this excellent 15-inch weapon. The decision not to proceed significantly altered the eventual redesign of the Rodney class, and the two ships would be a more traditional three triple turret layout as shown below.

hms-rodney-1939-battleship.jpg


When refitted in 1938-40 HMS hood would have its mixed secondary armament of 5.5 and 4-inch replaced with the twenty (10x2) 4.5-inch BD mounts shown below.

Hood 1940 rebuild with 4.5-inch.jpg


These same parameters and Treasury penny-pinching would be reflected in the later KGV and POW designs. The first two, KGV and DOY, would be completed with ten (2x3, 2x2) 15-inch guns in four turrets to utilize the turrets still available from the Glorious carrier conversions, and 16 (8x2) 4.5-inch guns as shown below.

DOY 1939.jpg


The final four battleships constructed for the RN, POW, Anson, Howe, and Vanguard settled on a three-turret arrangement of nine (3x3)15-inch guns with a super firing
layout for the later three vessels, otherwise unchanged secondary armament.

POW 40.jpg


The aviation facilities later would be removed or not installed in the later versions as shown in the last ship Vanguard below. (Note: with the Glorious turrets used in KGV and POW, the Vanguard was not completed as a separate design ITTL.

Late War POW with no AC fittings..jpg


Sister ship to the POW involved in the battle this is a photo of the late-war Anson with 9x15-inch and its aircraft facilities removed to make way for increased short-range AA armament.

So that just summarizes the main changes that affect the RN ships involved in this battle chapter. I hope you enjoy the offering to follow and look forward to your remarks. Enjoy T.
 
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2. Preliminaries
Part Two - Preliminaries

CHAPTER SIXTY-SEVEN Operation Rheinübung

Initially, German planning for this operation envisaged its conduct to be commenced as early as April 1941. This timeframe was initially due to a delay imposed by the decision to up-gun the Scharnhorst before its inclusion. The original construction plans incorporated scope to replace the initially fitted 28cm main armament with the larger 38cm caliber guns. The success of the RN Operation Chastise, attacking the battleship Tirpitz whilst fitting out in Wilhelmshaven in 1939, resulted in its hull being a total constructive loss. However, at the time only two of the 38cm turrets had been fitted, and only one of those was damaged in the raid. The availability of these guns, along with the severe damage to the Scharnhorst's 28cm gunned Caeser turret during the 1940 Norway operations, meant the armament was available and the decision was made to fully rearm the ship with six 38cm main guns.

Though planned for, this reconstruction did not proceed as smoothly as intended, with the lightened Tirpitz turrets still heavier than the original design. Though hastily lightened further, it was still found that the added weight forward created issues with the amount of water being shipped over the bows in any seaway. Plans to address this by lengthening the bow by 10m to increase buoyancy were shelved due to Hitler's increasing impatience with Kriegsmarine delays and the work completed with the ship commencing gunnery trials in the Baltic in February 1941. Though successful these still revealed issues in those sheltered waters. That this would be a major factor in heavy seas for operations in the North Atlantic in winter was recognized and the vessel was hastily refitted with raised strakes on the bow to address this, causing further delays. The Scharnhorst was finally available to join the Bismarck for operational deployment during April and included in the final operational plans at that point.

The post-war opinion is divided on this operation. Some see it as the best attempt of the outnumbered German Navy to inflict considerable damage on the Royal Navy and the British convoy system; others consider it a 'Death-Ride' in keeping with the Nazi mentality. Anecdotal evidence from Admiral Lutjen's flag lieutenant, who survived the operation, and private correspondence to his family before departure, indicated that the Admiral was from the beginning stressed by the fundamental and conflicting incompatibilities of the operations intentions he was given. On the one hand was driven by Hitler's obvious intent to defeat and damage the prestige of the RN, whilst at the same time countervailing this was the Fuehrer's reluctance to accept any form of risk or loss by the Kreigsmarine necessary to achieve such a result. With the disparity of relative force levels involved, the struggle to balance these factors undoubtedly influenced key decisions in the tactical conduct of the battle that was to result.

The basics of the operation itself were simple. The Kriegsmarine had four heavy surface units available: the battleships Bismarck and Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and the carrier Graf Zeppelin. Several destroyers would accompany the heavy ships for the first part of the operation, but these lacked the range to be employed in the Atlantic and would return to Norway. The preparations for the operation itself had been carried out in great secrecy; the heavy units had slipped out of port and up the coast of Norway as far as Bergen under cover of cloud and poor weather and had managed to concentrate in the fjord without having been spotted by the RAF.

Sadly, all that careful forethought was wasted. The codebreakers at Bletchley Park had given the Admiralty news that German heavy ships were heading up the Norwegian coast, and confirmation that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at least were involved was confirmed by a member of the Norwegian resistance. As a result, although they didn't all go to sea, the units of the Home Fleet were put at four hours of readiness for steam. The Prince of Wales was hurried out of her hull cleaning in dry dock, and all boiler cleaning was cancelled. The old battleships Barham and Ramillies were ordered to join two of the most valuable northern convoys; their slow speed made them unlikely to be useful in a chase while putting them in front of a potential breakout meant they might be able to intercept.

The main force of the Home Fleet was the fleet carriers Illustrious and Formidable, and the recently returned from the Mediterranean carrier Glorious, her planned refit rushed to completion in light of the Bismarck's sailing. A third carrier, HMNS Australi, was in transit to Belfast for a scheduled boiler clean hastily reversed course to join the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow. Supporting the carrier force was the surface element of the battleships King George V (KGV), Prince of Wales (POW), and the battlecruiser Hood deployed at Scapa Flow. Also available in event of a successful breakout, was the battleship Rodney and carrier Nieuw Zeeland of Force H located at Gibraltar. Several cruisers were also available. Coastal command was also put on alert, both to try and keep the German ships under surveillance in Norway, and then to hopefully track and attack them if they ventured out. In addition, two other carriers were put on readiness to join the Home Fleet; the light carriers HMS Colossus and HMS Ocean, currently at Liverpool having just escorted in a convoy, and HMS Glorious, despite lack of work up time after its long delayed recent refit.

The operation aimed to cause as much damage and disruption to the British convoys as possible, then slip back home. The fleet would then be a constant threat to a repeat foray and would require the Royal Navy to keep heavy units tied up in Scapa Flow as a response. This would then make them vulnerable to a heavy air raid on the base itself (provisionally planned for the autumn). The start of the operation would be the breakout from Norway. The ships would be covered for the first part of their trip by land-based Luftwaffe fighters, allowing them to proceed without having to worry about the Graf Zeppelin flying off aircraft. As this was going on, high-level Luftwaffe reconnaissance planes would check Scapa Flow. If the British Home Fleet was still an anchor, then the Graf Zeppelin would conduct an air strike on the base (aided by Norwegian-based bombers) as a distraction, and would then retreat to Norway, allowing the surface units to slip past to the north before the British discovered them. If the Home Fleet heavy units were at sea (especially the carriers), then the Graf Zeppelin would accompany the surface force to provide air cover and a strike capability against the Royal Navy. While the carrier could only launch a small strike, it was thought this would be adequate against the biggest threat to the breakout, patrolling Royal Navy cruisers.

While the Luftwaffe kept up a constant air patrol over the fjord to discourage the RAF, a reconnaissance Whirlwind managed to get over the ships and get a set of photographs. The results concerned the Royal Navy; they had assumed this was one or two of the German heavy ships aiming to slip out to raid, not all four. The disposition of the Home Fleet was therefore split into four parts.

First, the hastily available carrier Glorious and the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, along with some destroyers, would cover the Denmark straight between Iceland and the Greenland ice barrier. The cruisers would be deployed to the east of the carrier to protect her if they ran into the German ships without warning. Second, the light carrier Colossus and her escorts would cover a light cruiser force consisting of Galatea, Aurora, Kenya, and Neptune between Scotland and the Faroes. The most likely route between the Orkneys and Iceland would be covered by the largest element of the Home Fleet, the three fleet carriers, now that Australia had rejoined, with the battleships Prince of Wales and KGV, and the battlecruiser Hood. This force could also reinforce either the northern or the southern force if the Germans used one of those routes. Finally, the battleship Nelson would remain at Scapa to block the escape route. They would be joined by the light carrier Ocean as soon as she arrived (she was currently escorting a convoy). The biggest worry was the weather. Poor weather, not uncommon at this time of year, could allow the German force to slip past, or catch one of the light carriers by surprise. The risk was, it was felt, worth taking, as such a powerful force could not be allowed to break free into the Atlantic convoy lanes.

In addition to the naval forces, Coastal Command was also put on alert and asked to add its reconnaissance planes to the search north of Scotland, In particular, the A/S-radar-equipped Stirling’s. There were only a small number of these available, and so far, they had been kept busy on the convoy routes looking for and keeping down submarines. It was hoped their range and radar would allow them to spot the raiding force even in bad weather. For the next few days, the convoys would have to take the risk of less air cover. While the chances of them being intercepted by the German carrier was of course a risk (the RN knew, from its own experience of intercepting Kondor’s and Albatrosses, how vulnerable a large plane could be to fighters), the hope was that the radar would allow discovery at sufficient range to keep safely back and in range of cloud cover. Finally, a squadron of Sea Lance torpedo planes, nominally based in East Anglia in case of an attempted invasion, were put on alert to move to Scotland at short notice to provide a strike capability off Scotland in case the German fleet attempted to slip by closer to land.
 
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T2, Whilst your alt battleships seem reasonable I do have issue with your cruisers design. Are both the Admiralty and the RCNC all drinking lead paint! There is no way the RTN would except anything less than 8" guns on a Heavy cruiser unless the relevant Naval Treaties forbade them. There is no way Politically it would be accepted that the RN would not match the armament of their peer opponents. Also any Cruiser design would have two turrets forward and on turret aft, as in the OTL York class, The RN Chase their enemies not run away!! PM me if you wish as I would not want to derail one of your excellent stories.
 
T2, Whilst your alt battleships seem reasonable I do have issue with your cruisers design. Are both the Admiralty and the RCNC all drinking lead paint! There is no way the RTN would except anything less than 8" guns on a Heavy cruiser unless the relevant Naval Treaties forbade them. There is no way Politically it would be accepted that the RN would not match the armament of their peer opponents. Also any Cruiser design would have two turrets forward and on turret aft, as in the OTL York class, The RN Chase their enemies not run away!! PM me if you wish as I would not want to derail one of your excellent stories.
ITTL the policy was introduced into UK politics leading up to the the WNT negotiations at a time of great internal domestic division. The no more war lobby was very strong, with war weariness and realization of the great cost economically of WW1. In this situation the politics were demanding increased social policies, reduced spending on all aspects of the military. This was the time of the Geddes cuts, mass disposal of the WW1 dreadnaughts etc. The RN was not getting any of its G3 battleships plans met and was forced to face massive downsizing. In this general atmosphere of austerity, they had no leg to stand on against his atmosphere domestically. Here the basic failure and inadequacy of the new 16-inch gun being trialed as a replacement for the existing excellent Mk-1 15-inch was grabbed as another rod to beat the back of military spending. Though shallow it triggered this penny-pinching response in domestic politics that further impacted RN budgets. Like so many things in politics it might not be rational, but it didn't stop it being used as a cause Celebre to push the various social spending alternative agendas. With the scrapping of many WW1 armored cruisers the justification of cost saving, the 'don't waste money on developing new weapons, when you have so many of the existing 7.5-inch guns to use' drum was beaten vigorously, ending in this result. Just when the 7.5-inch Hawkins were being used by the USN to set the 8-inch gun size for the WNT limit, the RN lost funding support to proceed. Faced with this what they did do was push a triple turret development to try off set this.

I don't mind in the slightest your vigorous disagreement and happy for you to offer counter argument please. It's just that you strongly state 'there's no way' but I can't help but beg to differ. There was a deeply divided and fracture domestic polity, look at the rapid three elections in four years. The Geddes cuts for example were part of the drive for public economy and retrenchment in UK government expenditure and an endemic feature of the recommendations involving defense spending cuts. When you think that all the RN 'fleet modernization program', the G3, J3 designs etc. got chucked in the trash, this was a modest bitter pill to swallow in comparison. Saying 'there's no way' in the face of that kind of politically driven 'volte-face', IMO makes the caliber restrictions small change in that environment. It won't be the first time a shallow and short-term issue is grabbed and used to be instrumental in unpalatable changes.
 
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To answer sonofpegasus here are the Duke class plan and pics I couldn't load onto the conversation. Enjoy! T

Duke class Plan.jpg


Duke class.jpg
HMS Antrim 1943

Duke-class bow shot.jpg
Bowshot HMS Montrose in the Pacific 1944, showing the triple 7.5-inch in place of the twin 8-inch IOTL.

Enjoy T
 
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yorkplan.jpg
York Class
images
Cavendish (Hawkins) Class
The York's were slightly smaller than the Hawkins class and carried three twin eight inch gun turrets, so getting two forward and one aft triple sixes should be possible for the RN design team, As long as the principle dimensions of the Hawkins class are kept the internal spaces can be massaged for the new layout. The principle reason why the guns on the Hawkins class were so spread out was to avoid blast injuries to the crews of the 7.5 guns in their open shield mounts. Turrets can be much closer together and even overlap in super firing mounts. If you can ditch the 12 Yarrow Boilers used in the Hawkins and replace them with the eight number 3 drum Admiralty boilers used in the Counties and later classes then internal space is freed up to ease the internal layout constraints.
The Hull lines of the York class are a bit finer than those of the Cavendish/Hawkins and therefore there should be a reasonable chance of accommodating two turrets forward.
 
yorkplan.jpg
York Class
images
Cavendish (Hawkins) Class
The York's were slightly smaller than the Hawkins class and carried three twin eight inch gun turrets, so getting two forward and one aft triple sixes should be possible for the RN design team, As long as the principle dimensions of the Hawkins class are kept the internal spaces can be massaged for the new layout. The principle reason why the guns on the Hawkins class were so spread out was to avoid blast injuries to the crews of the 7.5 guns in their open shield mounts. Turrets can be much closer together and even overlap in super firing mounts. If you can ditch the 12 Yarrow Boilers used in the Hawkins and replace them with the eight number 3 drum Admiralty boilers used in the Counties and later classes then internal space is freed up to ease the internal layout constraints.
The Hull lines of the York class are a bit finer than those of the Cavendish/Hawkins and therefore there should be a reasonable chance of accommodating two turrets forward.
Yep, just a question of how much leeway would they get before getting the kybosh on it as being a 'new' design. Underlying this for me is that the Hawkin's were still essentially a 10,000-ton hull, whilst the Yorks are basically 15+% lighter. Here DNC is trying to run with the maximum hull size they can and adapt I think (Note ITTL they will get three six-gun 7.5-inch York analogs.) Note the new Duke and Surrey (York) class also also 6-8 years down thtrack so the impact of the no-more war lobby is slightly less allowing more leeway from the late 20s.
 
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3. Breaking Out
Part 3

At 2100 on the 25th of April, Operation Rheinübung began.

Admiral Lutjens's fleet had first headed north towards Trondheim. Reports from the Luftwaffe had indicated that the Home Fleet seemed to not be in Scapa, so he intended to keep his carrier with him. Shortly before dawn, the destroyers accompanying the force were detached to Trondheim, having an insufficient range to accompany the heavy ships. He intended to take the ships out through the Denmark Straight, rather than through the Iceland/Faeroes gap, as he felt this would be too heavily patrolled by British aircraft. By midnight on the 26th, the ships had turned west to head directly for the Straight.

Meanwhile, the British had confirmation that the force had sailed; reconnaissance over the fjord had shown the absence of the heavy ships, and it was assumed that a breakout into the convoy lanes was intended. However, until more was known about what route the German fleet would take. Admiral Tovey, though CinC of the Home Fleet, was an acknowledged proponent of the principle of being a "sea-going" admiral, despite pressure from above and the disadvantages of being away from command centres. He believed that this was one element in maintaining morale in the fleet, by sharing the privations and dangers of his men. He was however equally a believer in not micro-managing his subordinates and for this reason, he elected to fly his flag in overall command from the carrier Formidable and remain with the carrier element of the fleet. Vice Admiral Holland, a noted gunnery opponent would fly his flag from the Hood and have complete autonomy on the employment of the Battleship element. With these arrangements in place, Tovey decided there was no reason to otherwise change the disposition of his ships. The ships had left the fjord before a strike on them could be arranged; the weather in Norway had delayed the possibility until it was too late. He had therefore had his fleet carriers to cover the capital ships and be ready to move north or south if the German fleet didn't take the central passage into the Atlantic. In case the Germans slipped past them in bad weather, the Force H element was ordered to leave Gibraltar and sail north to take up a blocking position.

The weather on the 27th was poor, and as the British ships took up station only the ASV-equipped planes were of any use, and searches from the fleet carriers and Coastal Command found nothing. The situation was of course the same for the Germans; with no ASV-equipped planes, they were operating without any aerial reconnaissance at all. The German ships were not spotted until late in the evening, and not by an aircraft but by the radar of HMS Suffolk, on patrol in Denmark straight. The large echoes on the radar set could hardly be anything other than the German force that was expected, and the cruiser radioed a sighting report even as she retired westward, keeping the enemy under contact by radar.

The cruiser had also been spotted by the German radar, and although the one, smaller echo could have been anything, the fact that it was retreating at 27 knots to keep the distance between them indicated a warship of some sort. Meanwhile, Coastal Command on Iceland was asked to send out a radar-equipped Stirling to confirm the sighting; this was done at 0100, and an hour later confirmation was received. Four large echoes (assumed to be capital ships) heading west out of the Denmark Straight. Whilst closely following the developing situation, Tovey now felt free to release Holland's capital ships to independently close on the enemy location, whilst allowing the carrier option of long-distance attack to close more slowly. Despite awareness of Hood's lesser battlecruiser armor, Tovey concluded that in the company of the two better-protected and more modern KGV class vessels, still presented an adequate force to counter the German battleships' large-shell gunfire. Ultimately, Tovey did not give any orders to Holland on the conduct of the surface action, later saying "I did not feel such interference with a senior officer of his experience was justified." It was apparent at this stage that though the possibility that the Scharnhorst had been rearmed was known in Naval Intelligence, lacking confirmation this had not been conveyed to fleet command. All the flag officers involved at this point believed that only the Bismark possessed equal caliber armament to the British vessels.

While a night strike from the nearest carrier, HMS Glorious, was a tentative possibility, the continued poor weather and the indications that it would continue to deteriorate, made the attempt difficult. With the enemy now under observation, Tovey decided to have the carrier retire west to keep the range open (she was around 120 miles from the German fleet), in preparation for a dawn strike, when the weather might not be better but at least they would have daylight.

Lutjens had no night strike capability at all (the planes carried by the Graf Zeppelin were modified He113 fighters and Ju187 dive bombers), so the only option seemed to be to cripple or sink the cruiser tracking them at first light, and then search for any other ships in front of him. If the cruiser was alone, he still felt he had a good chance of breaking out before other ships could intercept his force.

The strike from HMS Glorious was spotted on deck well before dawn on the 28th. The Admiralty was still uncertain as to the number of planes that the German carrier could handle. Intelligence had given the ship's displacement over 25,000 tons, at least the same as a British fleet carrier. They estimated she could be carrying up to 60 - 80 planes, probably split evenly between dive bombers and fighters (no sign had ever been found of a carrier-operable torpedo plane). Glorious was carrying 18 TBD, 18 DB, and 20 fighters. The fleet carriers and the battleships had altered course to close during the night, but they would not be in a position to send off a strike until possibly the mid-afternoon, but the general sea state, and predicted poor weather, was introducing a degree of uncertainty into calculations. The decision was made to have Glorious attack the carrier, as without air support it would be relatively easy to hunt down the rest of the German force. With luck, Glorious would hit the carrier before she got her strike off.

At 0530 despite steadily deteriorating weather, the Glorious started to fly off her planes fearing that further delays could make this impossible. Given the circumstances and the unknown quantity of aircraft on the German carrier, it was a maximum strength strike in two waves. First, eighteen SeaLance armed with torpedoes, escorted by six Goshawks, then the second strike of eighteen Cormorants with another six Goshawks. The remaining eight Goshawks would be retained for defense.

Meanwhile, Lutjens was still only aware of the cruiser loitering at the edge of his radar range. During the night, it had been decided to send out an air search at first light, to sweep in front of the ships. While the weather was still poor, he needed to know if there were any British ships apart from the cruiser close to him. The Graf Zeppelin was carrying 20 He113 and 24 Ju187. The Ju187 with its improved range over its predecessor and had a secondary function as a search plane, and twelve would be flown off to start the search as soon as it was light. The other twelve would attack and sink the cruiser, whose shadowing was beginning to annoy the German Admiral. As a result, the German planes would have cleared their carrier by the time the FAA strike arrived.
 
So Hood should survive as the Germans have their fire split between 3 capital ships, and Hood had been rebuilt, so will have machinery in better nick and armour reinforcements.
 
So Hood should survive as the Germans have their fire split between 3 capital ships, and Hood had been rebuilt, so will have machinery in better nick and armour reinforcements.
'Should' is such a subjective adjective in the AU Genre, isn't it? ;)
 
4. The Carrier Exchanges.
Part Four

The first ship to be subject to air attack that morning was the cruiser HMS Suffolk. The weather was clearer in this area, although the German ships were not quite visible over the horizon, and the ship was at action stations at dawn. Radar emissions from the German ships made it possible they had been spotted, and the intelligence reports indicated that there may be a carrier with the group. If so, it was going to get interesting when the sun rose.

At 0600 the cruiser saw the black dots of a flight of Stukas heading for them. The ship worked up to full speed and puffs of AA fire started to pockmark the sky around the dive bombers as they moved into their attack formation. As soon as the planes turned over into their dives, the close-range AA joined in as well. Despite the lack of fighter cover, the Stukas did not escape without loss; two of them were shot down by the cruiser. This did not stop them from getting three hits on the ship with 500kg bombs. The first hit just aft of the bridge, wrecking the main director and causing splinters killing and wounding many of the men on the bridge, including Rear Admiral Wake-Walker, commander of the 1st Cruiser Squadron of Norfolk and Suffolk, and penetrating deeper to put the forward boiler room out of action. The second hit further aft, destroying the aircraft hangar and killing many of the crews serving the AA weapons, although fortunately none of the splinters from the bomb caused serious damage to the machinery space below. The third struck her on X turret, destroying the turret and causing additional damage to the engine room forward of the turret. Prompt action to flood the aft magazine prevented an explosion, but the ship was on fire and temporarily out of control and not under power.

While the attack on the Suffolk was taking place, the German ship's radar reported the echo of the first strike from Glorious, her torpedo planes. These were escorted by six fighters, who moved to intercept the four He113s that were the German CAP. As the fighters wove into a dogfight, the torpedo planes moved into attack formation. It was only when they dropped their torpedoes that things went badly wrong. To achieve maximum damage, the torpedoes were using the magnetic duplex fuse. When the torpedoes hit the rough water of the Denmark Strait, instead of heading for the carrier they exploded on contact with the water. Only two torpedoes were launched successfully, and the carrier managed to avoid both of them. The shooting down of two He113s and damaging one more for the loss of one Goshawk hardly compensated for this, especially as two of the torpedo planes were lost to AA fire.

By now, it was obvious to Lutjens that a British carrier was in the area. Since his force was now located, the direction the British planes had come from was passed to his scouting force. It did not take long for one of the Ju187s to spot the Glorious and her two escorting destroyers. While that plane dodged in and out of clouds to avoid the attention of defending fighters, and a second plane was sent to join her as a back- up, the remaining scout planes were recalled. They would hopefully be recovered after the second British strike, already visible on the radar screens, had been fought off.

All the available fighters had been launched, seventeen He113s. Facing them were the 18 dive bombers and their escort of six Goshawks. While the Goshawks did their best to keep the fighters off the dive bombers, it was almost impossible, and as a result, the attack was severely disrupted, with five of the Cormorants and four of the Goshawks being shot down for the loss of two He113's. Only eight planes managed to attack the carrier, and the need to keep dodging the fighters and the AA fire from all four of the German heavy ships meant that only one hit was achieved on the Graf Zeppelin. The 1,000lb bomb penetrated her flight deck well forward, wrecking her forward elevator and causing serious damage to the forward part of the hanger. Luckily for the ship, all her planes were in the air, and as a result, there were no large amounts of inflammable material or fuel to spread the blaze. However, the thick plume of smoke towering in the sky over the ship did little to reassure the worried pilots, who were wondering if they would have anywhere to land shortly. Even as the last of the British aircraft headed back to their carrier, the damage-control parties were racing to bring the fire under control.

It seemed that the Graf Zeppelin was a lucky ship. While it took some time to get the (thankfully minor) fire under control, the position of the hole in the deck was far enough forward that planes could still land, although moving them around to allow more to land was a complex undertaking, especially as it was necessary to strike the dive bombers below to rearm them - a strike on the now-located British carrier was urgently needed, and being pushed by the Admiral.

While this was happening, Lutjens was deciding on the course of action for his force. He needed to sink, or at least incapacitate, whatever carrier was out there, or his heavy ships would be attacked before they could break clear into the Atlantic. The question was, should he scatter the ships now, and leave the carrier on her own, or should they remain together until the carrier was dispatched? In the end, he decided to detach the Prinz Eugene to finish the damaged cruiser to remove the possibility of further pursuit whilst the other vessels were to remain together for the time being. Being aware of Hitler's general dissatisfaction with the Kreigsmarine performance in the war to date, he felt that any victory over RN forces represented money in the bank as far as political capital was concerned for the service.

This decision was, however, to seal the fate of the Suffolk. Despite the delay in the arrival of the Prinz Eugene, she was heavily damaged and had cross-connected her remaining boiler and engine rooms and was limping Northwest at low speed, hoping to close the icepack where she was likely to find fog to hide in. If the German ships had acted as a group at that point, they may likely have ultimately avoided the fate that would await them. Drawn North away from the encroaching British forces Prinz Eugenes' pursuit and sinking of the Suffolk in isolation would subsequently result in her being the only vessel to return to Norwegian waters. During the next three hours, the Prinz Eugene would close to within gunnery range and engage the struggling Suffolk. Despite being hit twice by the Suffolk's guns firing under local control it was ultimately a one-sided action. Guns silenced and burning fiercely the Suffolk would eventually roll over and sink after being hit over twenty times. The German vessel would linger and eventually recover 138 of the crew from the freezing waters. But the result of this lonely struggle was to leave her separated by over 100 miles from the subsequent actions and near the edge of the icecap whilst the rest of the German force was heading south.

On Glorious, there was consternation as to the problems with the torpedoes, and the resulting survival of the German carrier. While a bomb hit had been reported, it was not clear if this would be enough to cripple her or even stop her from attacking them. So, while she recovered her planes, the carrier and her escorts turned south to open the distance on the closing threat, hoping to draw the German fleet after them.

It was still only 0900, and even though the British force was indeed drawing the Germans towards approaching Fleet units, it would be a few hours before the fleet carriers could launch. The information as to the torpedo problems had already been passed on, and preparations were underway on Glorious for a second strike, using the contact fuse on the torpedoes. The Germans were now being tailed by a radar-equipped Stirling out of Iceland, and the carrier air commander was sure he could get off a strike before the German carrier, even if the damage done wasn't enough to stop her flying off aircraft.

This estimate was quite accurate; it had taken the Graf Zeppelin well over an hour to get the fire under control and land her planes, and by the time the fire was out two hours had passed. Under normal circumstances, this would have given the Glorious ample time to rearm, refuel, and get a second strike on the way before the German carrier could respond. However, something was to happen which made this impossible.

At 0955, a lookout on the Glorious yelled a warning as he saw four torpedo tracks heading for the port side of the carrier.

Almost immediately the carrier swung hard to port to try and comb the tracks, an emergency action which was hardly appreciated by the crews trying to attach torpedoes onto planes. The carrier nearly managed to evade; one of the torpedoes missed by a matter of feet, watched by the men on the AA guns with a sort of horrified fascination as the white wake passed close down the port side, but the next stuck within a few feet of the bow, creating a hole and twisting it aside and causing Glorious to slow and swing sharply into the path of the remaining two torpedoes. The third hit the old carrier about 1/3 of the way down her hull and detonated. The shock caused chaos in the hangar, many crewmen being injured as they and the equipment were thrown around - the attack had been so unexpected there hadn't been time for any of them to prepare for the impact. The final fish stuck the very stern of the vessel and failed to detonate. But in a cruel stroke of luck, it physically hit the outer propeller shaft, badly deforming it and causing significant flooding, and forcing it to be shut down as the vibration worsened the damage. The carrier slowed drastically to prevent more damage due to the flow of water into the gaping holes, rapidly becoming almost stationary and taking on a list that increased to 15 degrees.

Meanwhile, the carrier's two escort destroyers were attacking the underwater contact which they hoped was the submarine, which had given herself away by the torpedo attack. No one was sure how a U-boat had slipped in so close with the carrier moving at speed, but it was later assumed this was some expert German planning to aid the breakout (in fact, as came out after the war, it was pure chance - the U-boat was on anti-convoy work, and had stumbled upon the carrier and found itself in a position to attack - just good luck, at least from the German point of view). While the damage control parties on the carrier worked to shore up bulkheads and bring the flooding under control, the ocean heaved in white columns as the two destroyers enthusiastically depth-charged their contact. Some 30 minutes later, they were rewarded by a thick film of oil on the water, and debris floating on the surface

After an hour, the Glorious was barely able to resume her now-limping course south at some five knots. Despite the best efforts of her engineers and counter flooding, the carrier still had a list of some eleven degrees, which was going to make flying off of aircraft almost impossible. The carrier's air staff were hopeful that the damage to the Graf Zeppelin had been enough to put her out of action (although the thick cloud cover had allowed the shadowing planes to stay safe, the carrier's radar made it clear that they were under observation). By now with the submarine attack on the Glorious, and a brief message from the Suffolk before contact was lost, it was realized that the situation of the British Force was now very poor. Unable to send up aircraft, Glorious altered course southwest, and Norfolk was ordered to close whilst efforts were made to allow the carrier to be brought under the fleet carriers CAP.

The fleet carriers were making their preparations for a strike. Unless there was a drastic change in course by the enemy, they expected to launch around 1200 and hit the Germans about an hour later. Indeed, such a change, and a dispersal of the German fleet into individual raiding units were being suggested and discussed on the Bismarck at that very moment. However, Lutjens had decided he wanted the British carrier sunk or put out of action before he did so. It was anecdotally reported later that by achieving this and the sinking of the Suffolk he may have intended to break off the attempt to break into the Atlantic. At 1130 the Glorious spotted a large radar return closing from the North. It looked like whatever damage had been done to the Graf Zeppelin, it had not been enough to prevent her from launching an air strike. It had made taking off difficult; the shortening of the take-off area meant that the Ju187s were only carrying 250kg bombs, but this was considered adequate to sink or cripple a carrier. The take-off had been difficult - two Ju187s and a He113 had floundered on takeoff, but the rest of the carrier planes were heading for the Glorious, the Graf Zeppelin's captain had decided to use all his available planes on the strike. Twenty Ju87s and fourteen He113's were closing the British force.

The Glorious currently had twelve Goshawks available but no attempt to take off from a carrier with an eleven-degree list had been attempted before. Nevertheless, the pilots were prepared to take the chance. However, only two of the first five fighters successfully got off into the air before further attempts were cancelled. The pilots of all three of those failing lost their lives and were subsequently decorated posthumously. While this was happening, a flight of eight more Goshawks was on its way from the fleet carriers, who had vectored in their CAP. However, they wouldn't arrive until the strike had reached the Glorious.

With two fighters in the air, the carrier and her escorts prepared for the attack; the two escort destroyers to either side of her, and the cruiser Norfolk (who had closed the carrier during the morning once the torpedo attack had been reported) astern of her. With the torpedo damage having opened her hull the carrier and minimal speed meant she could do little to evade the dive bombers once they were into their attack runs.

The first contact was made by fighters. The British had two airborne which were rapidly overcome by the escorting He113s. Free of interference the dive-bombers had closed and attacked the carrier. The undisrupted Ju187s turned and fell into the attack in groups of three, into a ferocious AA barrage from the British ships. A barrage heavy enough to shoot down two of them, and damage another so badly it had no hope of attacking. The dive bombers were following their orders, which were to sink the carrier and ignore any other ships until this was done. This they did with commendable dedication and accuracy. After six of the first twelve bombs hit the old carrier. it was obvious that there was little point in further prosecuting attacks on the doomed vessel. The remaining aircraft would target the now wildly maneuvering Norfolk but succeeded in scoring only a single hit forward of her A turret. Of the bombs hitting the Glorious, two exploded in her hangar, destroying many of the aircraft there and starting a major fire (although the RN doctrine of not having fuel or explosives in the hangar limited the intensity). Two more went through the flight and hangar decks, exploding in her machinery spaces, and causing damage to the temporary work holding back the water from the torpedo damage, whilst the final hits near the bow simply worsened the flooding in that region. Listing further and subject to uncontrolled flooding and burning the order was rapidly given to abandon ship. As the German aircraft withdrew the escorts approached the stationary wreck and recovered as many crew as possible as the fire worsened and the list increased. Finally, shortly after 1430 the Glorious capsized and sank, taking over 200 crew with her.

Meanwhile, and sadly just too late to stop the attack, the CAP from the fleet carriers had arrived. This was completely unexpected by the Germans, and as a result, they shot down four He113s and three Ju187s before the German planes could disengage to the north. They stayed circling the burning carrier in case another attack emerged; the British overestimate of the planes on the Graf Zeppelin and made them think she would have enough planes available for a second strike.

The maneuvers of the two forces during the morning - the German fleet heading south, the British force heading northwest - had now brought them only 120 miles apart, and while the dive bombers had been closing on the Glorious, the three carriers of the home fleet had been launching their first strike despite the steadily deteriorating weather conditions and spotting the second ready to launch. Even before the last of the Ju187s was retiring from the attack, nearly 70 aircraft were getting into formation and heading north, a second equally powerful strike being prepared on the carrier decks.

To the north, Lutjens was happy about the results of the strike. With the British carrier almost certainly sinking and the destruction of the shadowing British cruiser he now was considering his next option. His ships now seemed poised to break out into the convoy lanes, but it was obvious that the RN was well aware of the location of his force. Was it worth the risk to continue with the operation as planned, and considering the RN losses should he quit whilst he was ahead? It was a shame that the Graf Zeppelins air group had been ruined by the effort, but that was why she was there, and now his powerful battleships could do what they had been designed for. Once the carrier had recovered her planes, he would split his force, leaving the Prinz Eugen to rendezvous with the carrier to withdraw, while the Bismark and Scharnhorst went on to sink record numbers of British merchantmen.

Unfortunately, this plan came apart even as the Graf Zeppelin was landing on her planes. A large echo was picked up from the south - obviously another British strike. The damage to her flight deck and poor conditions made the landing on a slow process, and the fighters were ordered to intercept the inbound strike rather than try to land. This was a tactic of desperation; many of the planes were low on ammunition after their previous combat and despite their endurance, intercepting and engaging the new attackers would likely mean they had to ditch due to lack of fuel. Nevertheless, all ten remaining fighters turned south as ordered joining the six originally retained as CAP.

The inbound attack was intercepted some 10 miles from the German ships (while the Graf Zeppelin had radar, the Germans had not developed anything like the FAA's techniques of combat management, and the fighters were simply sent in the direction of the strike). The Seabattle were already losing altitude for their torpedo attacks. However, the fighters sent with them outnumbered the defenders, and as the He113s started an attack on the torpedo planes they were intercepted and kept away from the attack planes by a dozen Goshawks. The six of the CAP at altitude similarly engaged the approaching dive bombing Cormorants and were engaged by the Dragonflies off Australia. The subsequent confused melee at height largely negated the CAP with only a single Cormorant being lost as the dive bombers commenced their attack.

The first planes to attack the carrier were the Cormorants. The Graf Zeppelin was in the middle of the heavy ships, who were adding their firepower to hers, but the AA, while heavy, was not of the intensity that an RN force was used to putting up. All eighteen of the planes were tasked to attack the carrier, to put her out of commission and ideally sunk before the second strike arrived, and only one of the planes was shot down by the defenses. As the planes levelled off into their escape, the carrier was reeling from four 1,000lb bomb hits.

Unlike the RN and the USN, the German navy had not fully appreciated what a fire hazard a carrier was. The precautions and protection against avgas fires were thus less. In addition, she had managed to strike all nine of her returning dive bombers below. As the attack had been at a fairly short range, this meant she had nine partly fueled potential bombs in her hangar. All four of the bombs had penetrated her flight deck easily. Two had exploded in the hangar itself, causing major fires; the other two had sliced through the hangar floor and exploded lower in the ship. Shock damage cut power in the vessel, and serious machinery damage due to the bomb hits caused the ship to slew to a halt.

Smoke was already billowing from the ship as the dive-bombers made their escape, and it was only minutes before many secondary explosions shook her as partly-fueled planes in her hangar exploded like small bombs, causing additional fires and decimating the damage control parties trying to bring the original ones under control. As they watched pieces of the flight deck hurled into the air, the torpedo planes were certain that this carrier at least wouldn't be launching any more strikes today.

The orders to the first strike were to make certain of the carrier, they did have a problem, in that the carrier was supported by both capital ships on either beam, making her quite a difficult target for a torpedo run. Attempts to mount a hammer and anvil-style attack by the raid leader resulted in each arm receiving some considerable attention from these ships. Showing considerable dedication each arm of twelve of the Seabattle curved into an attack entering the flak envelope of the Bismark while the remaining nine fell subject to the Scharnhorst's attention.

Whilst taking violent evasive actions against the aircraft heading their ships managed to down a single aircraft of each wing but were unable to prevent the attack of the remaining torpedo planes. A single torpedo dropped by damaged Seabattle was avoided by the Scharnhorst but the Graf Zeppelin almost stopped now and could do little to evade the remaining attacks. It was a textbook example of how to torpedo a with five of the torpedoes hitting the helpless carrier. Such damage was beyond the capabilities of her TDS, and rapidly let in so much water that in minutes the ship had developed a list of over 20 degrees, and made it impossible to restore power. As a result, the fires and petrol burning in the hangar (and already starting to leak down deeper into the ship) were uncontrollable, and as yet more explosions rocked the ship the captain had no choice but to give the order to abandon.

The whole attack had barely taken 15 minutes, and as the aircraft headed south, the German force was left trying to recover from the loss of its carrier, and only the increasingly poor conditions prevented further damage. Without any destroyers present, with the absence of Prinz Eugen, both capital ships came close enough to launch their boats to try and pick up survivors, but the heat from the burning carrier and heavy seas made it difficult to get close enough for effective rescue work. Less than half an hour after the attack, with the Graf Zeppelin capsizing into the North Atlantic amid clouds of black smoke and steam, the Bismarck's radar picked up another large echo of aircraft heading towards them from the south.

The second wave of aircraft had no difficulty in finding the German force despite the thickening and lowering cloud - the pillar of smoke sent up by the Graf Zeppelin could be seen for some distance, but from the start, the steadily worsening weather, with the tops of the waves beneath being blown into spray, would severely impact of the effectiveness of the attack. With no enemy fighters to worry about (the remaining He113s who had survived had been forced to ditch as they ran out of fuel), they could take their time to make a deliberate attack. With the carrier gone, their orders were to damage and slow the two capital ships so they would not be able to evade the British force. Both were still undamaged and fully under control from the first strike. The attempts to combine the torpedo and dive bomber attacks would be hampered by the conditions. With the cloud layer now down to 8,000 feet, the Cormorants had to close with the ships and only had a relatively brief diving time to acquire the target. This affected the accuracy of the attacks, and only three hits, two on Bismarck and one on the Scharnhorst, none of them significant, would be acquired. The hammer and anvil torpedo attacks mounted from two directions would also be less than effective with those from across the steeply quartering seas being largely negated. At least two torpedoes broke up upon impact with the seas, and others ran deep, with at least one fish being noted to pass completely under each of the German Capital ships. Those from the other arm proved more effective and in the absence of fighter cover and with the quantity of attacking aircraft it was simply impossible to avoid all the tracks. Two of the aerial missiles struck Bismarck on the port side, one on the armor belt and one forward and she was forced to slow to counter the inflow of water. Likewise, Scharnhorst was also struck twice, one failing to detonate, and the second though causing several hundred tons of water to enter, was largely contained by the ship's TDS.

By the conclusion of the attack, the AA defense had downed some five FAA aircraft and left a number damaged to struggle back towards their carriers. Considering the scale of the attack the overall result was disappointing. Neither of the German ships, despite damage to the ship's hulls, was in danger of sinking, and despite their reduced speed, both could be considered largely operational as the planes turned to fly back to the carriers, now some 90 miles to the southwest to report.

For those on the bridges of the German vessels recovering their feet after the impacts, the next action was to assess the resultant damage. Counting their blessings that the rough sea had caused a problem as the torpedoes dropped. Two of them broached and failed in the rough water and of the remaining seven only two hit the huge battleship. Bismarck had a very deep TDS, and while she was slowed slightly by the underwater damage and started to lose fuel oil from a ruptured tank, no major damage was done.

On the Bismarck, Lutjens was reviewing his options. With the reduced speed of both vessels and even if rejoined by Prinz Eugene it was unlikely that the force would be effective in its role to disrupt allied convoys. There was always the possibility that the cruiser on its own might break free into the convoy lanes. However, a cruiser alone was not enough to seriously inconvenience the Royal Navy; most of the important convoys were now escorted by a light carrier or a heavy cruiser or battleship which would require the presence of a capital ship to handle. With the loss of Graf Zeppelin, he now lacked a method of dealing with what was a second carrier force at sea. His planes had already sunk one (judging from their reports). With the weather worsening, (the weather had deteriorated since the captain of the Graf Zeppelin had been worried about getting his planes off and back again), the same would surely apply to the British carriers. In the end, the decision was obvious, and the two ships turned north and reduced their speed to 22 knots to minimize further flooding. It was 1445 on the 28th of April, a day that would be remembered in the German Navy.
 
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I hope you detail what the various FAA aircraft are in the introduction to your next chapter.
Probably not. The whole lead up to those goes back to the RN/RAF war of 1932 concept from the WHW timelines as well as my own Nieustralis AU links. Book One of that is over 250,000 words and nearly 50 chapters, (down to the last one being worked on and I hope to eBook it before the end of the year.) To put it simply it diverges far too far from a single battle chapter thread for your pleasure. Going into those details which are earlier established doesn't really work in this context. Sorry. T

As an alternative I'd really strongly recommend you read Astrodragons 'The Whale has Wings' trilogy. A truly outstanding AU trilogy which details the RN getting control back of its FAA in the early 30s. Fascinating and complete, it delves down into the aircraft issues really well if that's you interest, but a thoroughly absorbing and complete work. T 👍
 
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5.A Grim and Storm lashed Clash.
Part Five

Back at the British force, the carriers were still landing their planes (a process slowed by the now rough seas and increasingly fraught with danger), losing two and their crew in the process, when the aircraft shadowing aircraft reported two heavy ships altering direction. This posed Admiral Holland a problem. With the opposing force now obviously abandoning the push south should he maneuver his force to stay away from the German ships and arrange another strike that day? The carriers, escorted by the cruiser Edinburgh and three destroyers, remained available to conduct further attacks on the German ships, but whether these would be effective given conditions was now doubtful, and if they worsened then there was the danger that contact could be lost. The heavy seas were already limiting the ability of his own four destroyers to keep up and after a brief signal exchange with Tovey over options it was decided for the carriers, with their escorts, would drop back to keep about 80 miles from the Bismarck, while readying a full strike if the conditions improved. His force, the KGV, Prince of Wales, Hood now less than 60 miles from his opponents would intercept the Germans. The carriers would intervene if permitted, although given current conditions this did not appear likely in the short term. It was felt that the opportunity to destroy the German vessels should not be missed and that his force possessed sufficient superiority to finish the job by themselves. He wasn't too concerned about the weather unless it worsened into a full storm.

The three capital ships turned northwest, cutting the corner to the Germans' reported location, and increased speed to 26 knots slowly leaving their struggling escorts behind in the increasingly rough seas. Battle ensigns snapping in the growing westerly wind, and now regularly beginning to ship green water over their bow, they were guided by the plane still shadowing the Bismarck, the two forces were rapidly closing. At just before 1400 Hood sighted smoke ahead on the horizon to the north, confirming the ship's identity at 15nmi (27 km). All British ships involved were already prepared and at action stations, the only thing remaining was to see what the surface action would bring. Holland had been informed by Tovey that the carriers could be ready to launch in about half an hour, but given the deteriorating weather, the situation would wait to depend on the result of the upcoming surface action.

Though unexpected, the German force had been already alerted to the British presence through their hydrophone equipment and picked up the smoke and masts of the British ships 10 minutes later approaching from his stern quarter. The rough seas in the Strait kept the British destroyers' role to a minimum leaving them too far behind the German force to reach the battle. Both groups of ships were in line ahead, Bismarck leading the German Force and Hood the British ships. Increasing speed to 28 knots Holland's tactics as discussed on TBS shortly before the engagement commenced was to close the range rapidly to avoid an engagement where her thin deck protection would make her vulnerable, with the Hood and KGV to concentrate on the Bismarck, whilst POW engaged the Scharnhorst. The seas running from the west, Lutjens increased the forces' speed to 28knots and altered course east to take the seas on his stern and provide a more stable gunnery platform, in effect obliquely crossing the bows of the closing British. Visibility was moderate given the conditions, making things a little difficult for the men manning the optical rangefinders, but the radar sets on both forces were giving him accurate ranges at this stage. A sighting report was sent off and seeing no other option at his point Bismarck opened fire at a range of 24,200m (26,500 yards), with the Hood replying almost immediately.

Holland was a gunnery expert and well aware of the danger posed by Hood's thinner deck armor, which offered weaker protection despite the post-Jutland modifications, against vertical plunging fire at longer ranges. His decision to reduce the range as quickly as possible dictated that he accepts closing at an angle that placed the German ships forward of his ships, which meant that only half (15 of the 27) British heavy guns could train, matching the full broadside weight of the German force available, and presented the Germans with a bigger target than necessary.

The Germans also had the weather gauge, meaning that the British ships were quartering across the wind, with spray drenching the lenses of the directors and offering a less stable firing platform. Holland had his following ships close to Hood, conforming to Hood's movements instead of varying course and speed, which made it easier for the Germans to find the range of both British ships.

The Germans individually engaged their opposite target, and both rapidly gained the range. The Bismarck achieved a straddle on the Hood with its third salvo and gained a hit aft of its funnels which appeared to start a fierce fire with its fourth. At this point, the range had dropped to 10-12nmi (19-22,000m) as Holland was to give his final order to turn to starboard to open the arc of all weapons. At 15:00, just as Hood was commencing the turn Bismarck's fifth salvo hit. Two of the shells landed short, striking the water close to the ship, but at least one of the 38 cm armor-piercing shells struck Hood and penetrated her thin deck armor. This shell appeared to reach Hood's rear magazine detonating 112 t (110 long tons) of ammunition and propellant. The massive explosion broke the back of the ship between the main mast and the rear funnel; the forward section continued to move forward briefly before the in-rushing water caused the bow to rise into the air at a steep angle. The stern also rose as water rushed into the ripped-open compartments. In only eight minutes of firing, Hood had disappeared, taking all but three of her crew of 1,419 men with her. The three survivors would be recovered from a raft by the destroyer Nubian belatedly reaching the scene of the sinking later that afternoon. Though firing eight half-salvos (alternate barrels each turret) and achieving a straddle with the seventh, no hits were achieved by the Hood in the brief exchange before sinking.

The effect of this was to temporarily disorganize the remaining British pair, with the KGV forced to make an emergency swing to port to avoid the sinking wreckage of the Hood, whilst the POW tightened the arc of the original turn to pass the site to starboard. It would be some minutes before both ships steadied down in formation after the shock of this sudden destruction and Captain Wilfred Patterson, commander of the KGV and next senior officer took control of the action. This temporarily affected accuracy and interrupted gunnery before both British ships resumed the exchange. This is not to imply that the British ships had been ineffective at this point. Both had achieved several straddles and registered a single hit on their opponent each. KGV had scored a hit forward of Anton turret and the POW destroyed a secondary mount on the Scharnhorst. But at this point, the action settled down to a two-on-two engagement with the opponents paralleling each other at approximately 11nmi (20,000M). As all this was happening the Scharnhorst was demonstrating a similarly high level of skill, Straddling the KGV with her 4th salvo, before hitting, once with her fifth and twice rapidly with her sixth salvo. With the loss of the Hood, Bismarck now switched targets and commenced to exchange fire with the until now un-engaged POW.

At this point, the battle became a pounding match, one with the German ships now outgunned 14 heavy guns to 19, though the British initially thought that only Bismarck had guns of similar caliber. Aside from armament, the German ships showed the usual ability of a German heavy ship to absorb damage. Many of those involved later would liken this phase of the battle to two dogs in a pit fight, with neither prepared to release its grip once it had sunk its fangs into the other. As for the next 50 minutes, the heavy 15" shells on both sides inflicted an increasing toll of damage as hits mounted. Soon all ships had fires raging and superstructure riddled as the effectiveness of each slowly but steadily was eroded. The first significant impact occurred when a near miss on the Scharnhorst stern exacerbated the existing damage to the propeller forcing it to shut down and reducing the Scharnhorst's speed to 20 knots and Bismarck reduced speed to match. A short time later KGV already ablaze from a previous hit that had struck the hanger abreast the funnel and ignited the aviation fuel present, received a second hit from the Scharnhorst in close proximity which collapsed the forward funnel over the earlier hit and severely restricted the draft for the forward boilers reducing speed to 22 knots and forcing POW to conform. Both sides were also losing combat power. Bismarck's Bruno turret roof was penetrated by a round, killing those inside whilst only effective flash protection prevented the magazine from detonating. Similarly, the Y turret of POW was jammed and inoperative after a hit on the center barrel displaced that gun from its trunnion and dismounted the turret from its ring, killing or injuring the majority of its crew. The engagement seemed to hang in the balance needing only a single crippling hit either way, with the German forces hoping to hold on till the poor light of the early sunset in bad weather offered the chance of breaking contact. Then the final unexpected factor made its unannounced arrival known to both the pre-occupied parties.

On 22 April 1941, Rodney which was shortly to transfer to Boston for repairs and a refit was released for transit with two destroyers from Force H. Due to the possibility of a German breakout, her movement was delayed and shifted north to Halifax to be available to cover mid-Atlantic convoy movements if required. After confirmation of the German Force, Rodney was ordered by the Admiralty to close on that location to participate in the hunt. Closing at her maximum speed of twenty-six knots and despite the risk of running its bunkers dry the Rodney had achieved a position just under the horizon, about 25 nmi (46 km) away as Admiral Holland opened the action. Because of radio silence, neither party was aware of the proximity of Rodney approaching from the south until it opened fire. Cutting corners and risking damage to the engines of the ship the Rodney was able to close to the point of opening fire on the trailing Scharnhorst at 17:12 at a range of 16nmi (26,000m).

The speed of both the engaged forces had by this stage been reduced to about 20 knots due to accumulating damage. The towering shell splashes of Rodney's opening salvo forced realization on Lutjens that the situation had changed again and trying to save what he could was now his only option. Ordering Scharnhorst to disengage north he reversed course in the Bismarck, turning towards KGV and POW to interpose her and cover the withdrawal. Now the target of fire of three capital vessels as the range shortened, Bismarck rapidly began to be struck numerous times, losing Anton and Dora turrets in quick succession. With both her radar and range finders out of action, Caeser turret continued to fire under local control, scoring one final hit on POW By 18:11, all four of Bismarck's main battery turrets were out of action, allowing KGV and POW to close to around 9,000 yds (8,100 m) with impunity to fire her guns into Bismarck's riddled and burning superstructure. During this period, Rodney had swept past these combatants and continued to engage with its forward guns the fleeing Scharnhorst. The two other battleships, having reduced their German opponent to shambles, aflame from stem to stern, ceased fire though the Germans refused to surrender. The ship was settling by the stern due to uncontrolled flooding and had taken on a 20-degree list to port by 20:00. By that time, Darkness had largely set in as the belatedly arriving British destroyers closed on the stationary vessel, lit only by the burning wreck. The two British battleships had fired some 700 large-caliber shells at Bismarck scoring over 40 hits.

At around this time, First Officer Hans Oels, the senior surviving officer, issued the order to abandon ship. With the intercom system broken he sent messengers to confirm the order to abandon as the crew began to appear on the wave-swept deck. Observing this Garland and Eskimo closed and began to rescue survivors in severe conditions. It is estimated that around 800 of the Bismarck's, 2000-man crew entered the rough Atlantic waters, and in an astonishing display of seamanship, these two vessels eventually recovered some 311 Bismarck sailors in the fire-lit darkness before finally departing. Having done what, they could and fearing the increased risk of U-boat attack the two destroyers drew off and Garland fired three torpedoes into the stationary vessel's port side. With the superstructure still burning as she submerged, Bismarck slowly rolled over and disappeared beneath the surface at 21:40.

As this was occurring Scharnhorst turned north and attempting to escape worked up to 22 knots, but Rodney with the speed advantage swept past the dying fight and steadily closed the distance, engaging with her forward guns. With only her after turret bearing the Scharnhorst still nevertheless continued to display outstanding gunnery and would eventually score three hits on the closing Rodney including one on her bridge which would kill and injure many of the staff, including her captain. Nevertheless, Rodney soon began hitting regularly adding to the already considerable damage to the German ship. At 17:51 one of Rodney's 15-inch (38cm) shells struck Scharnhorst's rear gun turret. The shell penetrated the barbette and jammed the turret's training gears, dismounting a barrel and putting it out of action, and made it impossible to effectively engage Rodney whilst trying to escape. At around 18:00, the fatal blow was delivered when another shell struck the ship, passed through the thin upper belt armor, and exploded in the number 1 boiler room. It caused significant damage to the ship's propulsion system and slowed the ship to 8 knots (15 km/h; 9.2 mph). Briefly, the Scharnhorst turned to port to attempt to engage with the sole working forward turret, but a flurry of hits silenced this after just a few inaccurate shots. By 18:55 the Rodney had closed to less than 5nmi and silenced all return fire. In scenes remarkably similar to those playing out to the south, Scharnhorst's superstructure was heavily ablaze and only differed from Bismarck in continuing to erratically maintain way at low speed. With the arrival of the destroyers Tartar and Arunta on the scene, they were ordered to sink the Scharnhorst. Tartar launched two torpedoes, both of which struck, and at 19:45, the ship went down by the bow, with her propellers still slowly turning. British ships began searching for survivors, but after recovering 138 survivors of the crew of 1,968, were ordered away to escort the withdrawal of the Rodney, even though voices could still be heard calling for help from the darkness. This was to mark to end of the surface action phase of the battle. As with Bismarck the Scharnhorst had also received over 40 large caliber hits and both vessels had exhibited remarkable resilience and fought outstandingly to the last against the odds.

Having achieved victory, the British force was now facing its own issues. To arrive at the action, Rodney had run its bunkers down to critical levels and had less than 5% remaining after the battle. This required its immediate detachment to Iceland with an escort. Despite cruising at the minimum speed, it would barely reach the port and upon arriving at Reykjavik would be found to have less than 40 tons remaining, a testament to the long high-speed run undertaken to reach the action. Meanwhile, both KGV and POW had taken over 20 hits each and were severely damaged. Though under power and capable of maneuver and whilst not in danger of sinking, each now had only a single operational turret and no functioning radar. With a slightly better fuel situation but many casualties on board, they had to be released to return to Britain along with the damaged Norfolk, for repairs. This meant Tovey only had the available four carriers (Nieuw Zeeland had by this stage joined up with the Home Fleet Carriers), cruisers Edinborough, Dorsetshire, and their escorts to locate the missing Prinz Eugene. Deploying these as two groups they continued north to try and establish contact with the missing cruiser, heading into increasingly atrocious conditions limiting the carriers' ability to operate aircraft.

While the battleships had been completing the destruction of the Bismarck and Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen had time to close with the edge of the icepack to use this and its accompanying fickle weather of fog and limited visibility to break contact. Combined with a series of North Atlantic storms that would roll in from the artic, it would enable the cruiser to escape and eventually reach the shelter of air cover from Norway in some five days, despite the efforts of the Home Fleet to prevent this. These vessels' best efforts (five aircraft would eventually be lost conducting search operations) would only briefly locate Prinz Eugene once during a short break in the weather. The hurried strike mounted was badly disrupted by the conditions with most of the aircraft failing to find the target. Only a single flight of eight 500lb bomb-armed Dragonfly's acting in their dive bomber role from Nieuw Zeeland found her and mounted an attack, which would strike the fleeing ship twice. Unfortunately, the resulting damage did not affect the engines or maneuverability of the ship, and contact was again lost as it disappeared into the next storm front. One of the two hits rendered Prinz Eugene rear turrets inoperable but in a cruel twist of fate the second burst in a compartment holding recovered survivors from the Suffolk, killing 30 of them. With no further contact, Prinz Eugen reached the haven of Altenford in Norway on 3 May and her arrival marked the conclusion of Operation Rheinübung.

(One more post to come.)
 
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6. Aftermath and Legacy.
Part Six

Though the immediate effects of the operation have concluded the long-term results would be both significant and enduring. For the Germans, Hitler when told of the result of Operation Rheinübung, and the loss of the Bismarck, flies into one of his increasingly common rages. As a result, Raeder would be forced to resign, and Admiral Doenitz, head of the U-boatwaffe, is appointed to head the Kreigsmarine as his successor. From this point on the only future surface operations against shipping in the Atlantic would be conducted by the few remaining auxiliary raiders.

The naval war from now on will be conducted with the highest emphasis on the U-boats. Hitler orders them to be given priority in construction (a rather redundant command, as this is already happening in the shipyards); the light destroyers and escorts will stay operational to protect the coastal operations and the vital links to Scandinavia. Goering manages to gloss over the recent poor performance of the Luftwaffe by pointing out that it is now obvious planes are far superior to ships, and if the Kriegsmarine had only further built up its proper naval air arm before the war (hypocritically ignoring the fact that he had been one of the largest limiting factors in causing this). Having used this justification, Doenitz and Wever, as head of the MFK, were able to man oeuvre Goering's support to finalize the completion of the several incomplete hulls (Werner Voss, Lutzow and Seydlitz) as aircraft carriers. With collaboration from Wever, this could be achieved without impacting on submarine expansion plans, and augment the capabilities of the few remaining surface vessels. This was a form of Pyrrhic victory for the Kreigsmarine, in that the incomplete vessels would at least be available for surface operations rather than broken up as initially threatened during Hitler's tirade. With Goering's complicity an uneasy inter-service compromise would be eventually reached, and while final authority for carrier operations would remain under MFK control, other naval aircraft now being fully available to support Luftwaffe taskings if possible, though the operational deployment of the carrier remained in the navy purview. Though never quite as functional as a fully operational carriers, being completed with a wooden flight deck, these austere additions nonetheless would be capable of conducting flight operations from 1942. Used in that role to provide localized aircover and support, despite these limitations they would play a significant role in supporting Kreigsmarine operations in the Arctic and Baltic late in the war.

Prinz Eugen is ordered back to Germany to undergo repairs and lauded as the ghost of the North by Goebbels propaganda department. Considered hereafter a 'lucky ship' she, joined by the sole remaining large surface assets (the three carriers upon completion and the light cruiser Nurnberg) are the remaining modern large vessels of the Kreigsmarine. Both cruisers would survive the war and eventually be sunk as test vessels at Bikini Atoll as part of the American Post-war Atom Bomb tests. Upon completion of repairs Prinz Eugene would be based in northern waters until 1943 and, together played brief but significant roles in the capture of Murmansk. Predominantly moving between secure anchorages in Norwegian waters prior to that she was subjected to no less than three large bomber command raids she but escaped significant damage. After successful participation in Operation Silver Gull, the capture of Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula in 1943, while transiting back to Germany in company with the withdrawing carriers, she was struck by a single torpedo fired from the British submarine, and subsequent mining, but was still able to reach port. After finally being released from dry dock repairs in early 1944 she would operate for the rest of the war in the waters of the Baltic. Heavily involved in supporting Wehrmacht defensive operations and the evacuation of Prussia and the Baltic States during the Russian Advances late in the war. She would eventually sail to Copenhagen with the surviving major surface vessels in the Baltic for internment and subsequently be handed over to the Allies after VE day.

For the British, the aftermath of the operation was also had a profound effect, both strategic and institutionally. In the shorter term, the impact of the destruction of the Hood, an iconic symbol of RN prestige during the pre-war period, along with the loss of both Glorious and Suffolk prompted a degree of analysis into the conduct of the operation that verged on blame searching. Despite the distinct advantage in force levels deployed the shock of the loss of such an emblematic warship, destroyed so suddenly with the loss of more than 1,400 of her crew, along with the other losses and subsequent escape of the Prinz Eugene, represented a blow to the pride and professionalism of the service.

A British board of inquiry quickly convened to investigate the loss of the Hood and Admiral Hollands' conduct of that engagement. The subsequent report examined the vulnerabilities of other large British warships still in service in light of the probable causes of the explosion. It concluded that a 15-inch (380 mm) shell from Bismarck caused the explosion of Hood's aft ammunition magazines. This led to refitting some older British warships with increased protection for their ammunition magazines and some other related improvements. It also drew many parallels between Holland's actions in this battle and those of the opening stages of the battle cruiser actions at the Battle of Jutland. From his actions, it seems clear that Holland felt he had to engage Bismarck immediately. Holland, like Beatty, possessed superiority in the number of heavy ships. Yet in this action, his employment of these numbers was encumbered by known inferiority in the armor effectiveness of the Hood. Moreover, as with Beatty's deployment at Jutland, Holland attacked while German units were well before the beam to close quickly to minimize this inferiority. As a result, Holland's ships could not use their aft turrets until the final turn just before Hood was sunk. Likewise, Holland placed the older and vulnerable Hood ahead of the better armored and more modern vessels. While failing to find blame in these command decisions, these actions were nevertheless considered contributory to the loss of the Hood. Given the prestige that the iconic Hood represented, what could not be presented was the discussion of the continued employment of such vessels in capital ship actions in light of their demonstrated vulnerability. In contrast, the loss of both the Glorious and Suffolk were both largely attributed to the fortunes of war, with no blame being attributed by the investigation.

A review was conducted into the overall conduct of operations to identify areas for improvement. That the rearmament of Scharnhorst was unknown to any of the flag officers afloat was and the failure to convey that intelligence promptly was one identified failing. The impact of the severe weather was established as a factor that limited the numeric advantages of the RN response, particularly the aviation and destroyer elements involved. The fact that much of the later phases of the battle were conducted in consistent Force 5 to Force 8 conditions, restricted both the ability of the carrier forces to operate aircraft and denied effective employment of destroyer forces in their traditional role of surface attack. The initial submarine attack on Glorious was attributed to the fortunes of war, and its subsequent loss and that of the Suffolk were attributed to the increased dangers of naval aviation. This finding would lead to the accelerated installation of additional short-range air defense on RN vessels. The final finding caused the RN to make a concerted effort to round up the network of German supply ships deployed to refuel and support operations in the Atlantic. In just subsequent weeks, 7 of the 9 supply ships assigned to Operation Rheinübung would be accounted for, with serious consequences for future surface operations of the German Auxiliaries.

The other finding of the review was to highlight the reality that, despite the increased capabilities of modern aircraft and carriers, the effective operation of naval aviation was still subject to the impact of weather and extreme climactic conditions. Simply put, if the conditions were bad enough that the carrier aircraft could not be launched, then any advantages offered by carrier aviation were effectively nullified. In light of this, there still existed a requirement for the navy to retain major capital ships capable of conducting offensive operations in such events. This conclusion was of small consolation to the battleship lobby after the loss of the Hood.

That the general tenor of this review was initially punitive was implicit in the findings of the actions of Captain Patterson of the Rodney. Had he not been killed in action the revelation that consideration was given he be censured for hazarding his command in allowing it to reach such a critical fuel state. Upon learning this John Tovey, Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was appalled at this criticism. A row ensued between Tovey and his superior, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound over this revelation and the general tenor of the Admiralty response to date. Tovey stated that the officers (Holland and Patterson) had acted correctly, displaying the situational independence expected of RN commanders in times of war, and such efforts to effectively close and engage the German ships were not endangering their ships needlessly. Furthermore, had actions been taken as implied, Tovey stated he would have felt free to resign his position and appear at any court-martial as 'defendant's friend' and defense witness. In the absence of a clear finding of fault from the review no more was heard of the proposal.

The net result was that Operation Rheinübung was a failure that essentially removed the Kriegsmarine as a Strategic element in the Atlantic Theatre. Although the Germans scored a propaganda success by sinking "The Mighty Hood", this was more than countervailed by the loss of all the Kriegsmarine's capital ships, and subsequent restrictions placed upon its deployments. No merchant ships were sunk or even sighted by the German heavy surface units during the operation and Allied convoys were not seriously disrupted and no diminution of supplies to Britain resulted. The Kriegsmarine, though able to later conduct operations to some strategic success in arctic waters, was never again able to mount a major surface operation against Allied supply routes in the North Atlantic; henceforth its only effective weapon was the U-boat campaign. For the British, the major strategic gain which was to be vital later in the war was to release the requirement for the RN to maintain large forces of capital vessels for employment in the Atlantic. The freeing of such units to be available for subsequent operations in the Mediterranean and against the Japanese was a major gain. It allowed for an allocation and level of force concentration to conduct offensive activities in the future which otherwise would not have been possible.

Afterword

Well, that concludes the narrative part of the battle chapter and I hope you enjoyed it. I plan to warm up Photoshop and come back in due course to add a table, couple of maps as well as piccies, so watch this space. As always feedback is always welcome, if not actioned, but the main thing is I hope you enjoyed the efforts and that maybe you can contribut your own thoughts and efforts in the future. Look forward to hearing from you, Regards and Enjoy! Tangles.
 
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Never thought I’d see the day when Rodney outruns Scharnhorst (admittedly in a damaged state). Especially when she isn’t in an admiral class incarnation.
 
Never thought I’d see the day when Rodney outruns Scharnhorst (admittedly in a damaged state). Especially when she isn’t in an admiral class incarnation.
I enjoyed it.
Who'd have imagined a scenario where Rodney managed to chase down another ship?
See ships plan in the prologue, part one. ITTL the 16-inch gun was so poor they didn't arm the Rodney class with it. With treasury restrictions and the older 15-inchmodels both R & N got whole new design different build as shown. With a that layout and engines and the new pair could top out at 26knots, not 23 as IOTL. I did try to indicate things were different without going into all the nitty-gritty of the TL changes by its inclusion there, but in cutting down the picture I cropped out that the redesign had four screws not the two of the original. Sorry T.
 
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