AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
To answer a couple of points, RR ITTL are working like beasts on Merlin development, very much as it OTL, they are also working with Power Jets Ld on that other imortant project. So with the Fairey Monarch engine as the AM go to big engine the Griffon though production ready is not being pushed into production yet because as of now it is only the Spitfire Mark IV design that uses it and that aircraft has been passed by due to the improved other marks and production requirements. Hence my use of the term 'dormant', it is there ready to go when needed but production resources at this time are considered better used elsewhere.
The MkVIII tropical version actual has a little more weight forward and less of a CoG problem (very marginal difference). Performance and engine installation much as OTL. ITL the AM have got preparation for overseas use sorted, even Tomahawks are arriving at squadrons ready to go!!!
The MkVIII tropical version actual has a little more weight forward and less of a CoG problem (very marginal difference). Performance and engine installation much as OTL. ITL the AM have got preparation for overseas use sorted, even Tomahawks are arriving at squadrons ready to go!!!
12.22 Home defence or offence.
Sir Peter at the AM made a point of trying to regularly attend the meetings Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS had with his senior commanders. Today the meeting was with Sir Keith Parks AOC Fighter Command.
The first order of business was a quick resume of the current situation.
After the trials of last summer one task for Sir Keith Park’s on becoming SAOC, had been to rebuild Fighter Command and that process was on going. Looking at the current Order of Battle Fighter Command was to have sixty five day fighter Squadrons spread around the five fighter Groups. Currently those sixty five squadrons were composed of six squadrons flying Reapers or Beaufighters. No less than fifty squadrons were now flying spitfires the majority of them already flying Spitfire Mk III’s. The remaining Mk II’s were being held as reserves until production permitted their replacement with Mk III’s. Of the remaining nine squadrons two were flying Defiants and seven were still flying Hurricanes. All these squadrons were currently in the Northern Groups of Fighter Command and were in the process of converting onto the Spitfire Mk III. All squadrons would have completed this by Easter.
The Night fighter force now stood at twenty squadrons, Ten of Beaufighters and ten of the slightly smaller Reapers. The effectiveness of this force had risen greatly since the first days of the blitz. Additionally two squadrons of Havoc intruder aircraft were now operational. However despite the forces best efforts they had yet to inflicting unsustainable losses on the Luftwaffe night time bombers. In the first couple of months of nineteen forty one the number of sorties made by the RAF night fighters had risen to nearly two thousand and this was resulting in around ten percent of the enemy night bombing aircraft being engaged by a night fighter and statistically half of those aircraft fired at crashed after the attack. How many of the aircraft engaged actually made it back to their bases on the continent and how may were subsequently written of was an unknown factor. Whilst a one in ten chance of being attacked was probably sufficient to be very bad for the moral of the German bomber crews a loss rate of around five percent would be considered sustainable by the RAF. Since November the Luftwaffe had lost over three hundred bombers to the RAF night-fighters. Added to this was the increasing success of the intruder aircraft. Sir Keith Park was getting more and more frustrated by the Governments prohibition of AI/RDF equipped aircraft flying in enemy airspace. So the Havoc aircraft were hobbled in their pursuit of the bombers around the Luftwaffe bases by their need to rely on visual target acquisition. Despite this limitation their success were rising and their harassment by strafing and bombing the Luftwaffe airfields was by all indications having some effect. This success did however come at a cost in both aircrew and aircraft.
Thirty one Havocs had had there glazed nose removed and a solid nose similar to that of the Bristol Bisley fitted only in this case it contained four twenty millimetre cannons as well as four point three-o-three inch machine guns. This conversion permitted the aircraft to keep their bomb bays whereas those conversions that kept the glazed nose had their cannons in a belly pack that masked the bomb bay.
Sir Keith had suggested that all the Douglas Havoc aircraft available should be given the solid intruder nose style conversion.
The discussion had then turned to the New Hawker Tornado. The first Tornado squadrons were being formed around a nucleolus of experienced pilots poached from other squadrons and the balance being selected newly qualified pilots in their first active posting. There was much debate on where the Tornado squadrons fitted within Fighter Command. Currently Sir Keith despite mounting political pressure was keeping a tight rein on his pilots whilst resisting calls for offensive action. Until the end of winter and it became clear whether the Luftwaffe was again going to pursue a daylight campaign the consensus at the AM was that Fighter Command aircraft and pilots should not be frittered on inconsequential forays into the continent. The first Six tornado squadrons would be used to replace those squadrons currently flying Beaufighters or Gloster Reapers.
For offensive action Sir Hugh and Sir Peter had turned to the interdiction of shipping as requested by the Government. Anti shipping strikes were really the remit of Maritime Command, the problem here was that Maritime Commands resources were perforce by necessity concentrated on the Convoy battles in the Atlantic or containing the German surface units. In Mid February Maritime Command had been reorganised with an additional Group, Number Nineteen, being slotted in between Fifteen and Sixteen Group to take responsibility for covering the Bay of Biscay and the seas south of Ireland in the Western Approaches. This new Group required Maritime Strike aircraft to attack the U-boats now transiting the Bay, often with heavy fighter escort.
This left precious little strike capability for Sixteen Group who had responsibility for the Narrow seas and the southern portion of the North Sea. To provide an anti-shipping strike capability in this area Number Two Group of Bomber Command had been assigned the task. Co-ordinating daylight attacks on shipping and fighter escort from Fighter Command had not been satisfactorily achieved. So the decision had been made that Fighter Command’s six heavy fighter Squadrons would be re-tasked to take over anti shipping strike duties within Sixteen Groups area. Sir Keith and his staff were suggesting that the new Tornado might be just the aircraft to provide close escort and flak suppression for these daylight anti shipping sorties. Sir Keith had remarked that it was a pity that the Mark V Spitfire was not yet available as that would have the range to supply top cover for the strike aircraft. The knowing look that passed between Sir Peter and Sir Hugh went mostly unnoticed by the others attending the meeting.
In line with the above, the discussion had then transited onto the fact that currently there were two types of Beaufighter flying. Fighter Command were using the Bristol Hercules engine version as both a heavy fighter and as a night-fighter whilst Maritime Command were just starting to use the Alvis Pelides engine version as a shipping strike aircraft. One reason for this divide was that Maritime Command already used the Alvis engine version of the Hampden as a torpedo strike aircraft and this made it easier for their ground staff where squadrons or stations had a mixture of the two aircraft types
The question the AM had to resolve was whether the six Squadrons of heavy fighters from Fighter Command should remain under that command or be transferred on-bloc to Maritime Command.
Sir Keith Park had argued successfully that for command unity where the heavy fighters working on maritime interdiction of heavily defended shipping would require large escorts having all units within the same command structure would make planning and coordination much simpler and probably more importantly much reduce the command reaction time.
On the political front from the point of view of Sir Peter at the AM and Sir Hugh as CAS this policy would enable them to counter any claims that Fighter Command was lacking offensive spirit and was a purely passive and defensive command.
With the expansion of the RAF now happening apace decisions needed to be made as to where these resources were to be allocated. For instance if Fighter Command was to take on an Offensive role and carry out strikes against enemy targets on the continent should it be allocated more resources and squadrons to achieve this without diluting its defensive capabilities. Sir Keith Parks was of the opinion that these resources should be allocated to a different command, that combined Bombers, Fighters and other aircraft in a unified effort.
The lessons learnt from the few ‘Circus’ operations that had so far been run had only served to illustrate the problems of cross command coordination needed to ensure that bombers and fighters were in the right place at the right time and actually knew their part in the planned action. With the possibility of being able to provide long range fighter escort missions in the reasonably near future when the Spitfire Mark V became operational these matters were now taking on considerable importance.
The single seat version of the Gloster Reaper was more manoeuvrable in the fighter role than the Beaufighter and was faster as well, however the Beaufighter could carry more fuel and ordinance in the strike fighter role. There was much discussion as to whether the Reaper should remain in production as the new single engine aircraft coming into service could carry the same cannon armament just as far and fast. In the two seat role was the Reaper just too small? With the Beaufighter and soon the Mosquito competing in the same roles could resources be better spent on other aircraft.
Sir Peter at the AM made a point of trying to regularly attend the meetings Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS had with his senior commanders. Today the meeting was with Sir Keith Parks AOC Fighter Command.
The first order of business was a quick resume of the current situation.
After the trials of last summer one task for Sir Keith Park’s on becoming SAOC, had been to rebuild Fighter Command and that process was on going. Looking at the current Order of Battle Fighter Command was to have sixty five day fighter Squadrons spread around the five fighter Groups. Currently those sixty five squadrons were composed of six squadrons flying Reapers or Beaufighters. No less than fifty squadrons were now flying spitfires the majority of them already flying Spitfire Mk III’s. The remaining Mk II’s were being held as reserves until production permitted their replacement with Mk III’s. Of the remaining nine squadrons two were flying Defiants and seven were still flying Hurricanes. All these squadrons were currently in the Northern Groups of Fighter Command and were in the process of converting onto the Spitfire Mk III. All squadrons would have completed this by Easter.
The Night fighter force now stood at twenty squadrons, Ten of Beaufighters and ten of the slightly smaller Reapers. The effectiveness of this force had risen greatly since the first days of the blitz. Additionally two squadrons of Havoc intruder aircraft were now operational. However despite the forces best efforts they had yet to inflicting unsustainable losses on the Luftwaffe night time bombers. In the first couple of months of nineteen forty one the number of sorties made by the RAF night fighters had risen to nearly two thousand and this was resulting in around ten percent of the enemy night bombing aircraft being engaged by a night fighter and statistically half of those aircraft fired at crashed after the attack. How many of the aircraft engaged actually made it back to their bases on the continent and how may were subsequently written of was an unknown factor. Whilst a one in ten chance of being attacked was probably sufficient to be very bad for the moral of the German bomber crews a loss rate of around five percent would be considered sustainable by the RAF. Since November the Luftwaffe had lost over three hundred bombers to the RAF night-fighters. Added to this was the increasing success of the intruder aircraft. Sir Keith Park was getting more and more frustrated by the Governments prohibition of AI/RDF equipped aircraft flying in enemy airspace. So the Havoc aircraft were hobbled in their pursuit of the bombers around the Luftwaffe bases by their need to rely on visual target acquisition. Despite this limitation their success were rising and their harassment by strafing and bombing the Luftwaffe airfields was by all indications having some effect. This success did however come at a cost in both aircrew and aircraft.
Thirty one Havocs had had there glazed nose removed and a solid nose similar to that of the Bristol Bisley fitted only in this case it contained four twenty millimetre cannons as well as four point three-o-three inch machine guns. This conversion permitted the aircraft to keep their bomb bays whereas those conversions that kept the glazed nose had their cannons in a belly pack that masked the bomb bay.
Sir Keith had suggested that all the Douglas Havoc aircraft available should be given the solid intruder nose style conversion.
The discussion had then turned to the New Hawker Tornado. The first Tornado squadrons were being formed around a nucleolus of experienced pilots poached from other squadrons and the balance being selected newly qualified pilots in their first active posting. There was much debate on where the Tornado squadrons fitted within Fighter Command. Currently Sir Keith despite mounting political pressure was keeping a tight rein on his pilots whilst resisting calls for offensive action. Until the end of winter and it became clear whether the Luftwaffe was again going to pursue a daylight campaign the consensus at the AM was that Fighter Command aircraft and pilots should not be frittered on inconsequential forays into the continent. The first Six tornado squadrons would be used to replace those squadrons currently flying Beaufighters or Gloster Reapers.
For offensive action Sir Hugh and Sir Peter had turned to the interdiction of shipping as requested by the Government. Anti shipping strikes were really the remit of Maritime Command, the problem here was that Maritime Commands resources were perforce by necessity concentrated on the Convoy battles in the Atlantic or containing the German surface units. In Mid February Maritime Command had been reorganised with an additional Group, Number Nineteen, being slotted in between Fifteen and Sixteen Group to take responsibility for covering the Bay of Biscay and the seas south of Ireland in the Western Approaches. This new Group required Maritime Strike aircraft to attack the U-boats now transiting the Bay, often with heavy fighter escort.
This left precious little strike capability for Sixteen Group who had responsibility for the Narrow seas and the southern portion of the North Sea. To provide an anti-shipping strike capability in this area Number Two Group of Bomber Command had been assigned the task. Co-ordinating daylight attacks on shipping and fighter escort from Fighter Command had not been satisfactorily achieved. So the decision had been made that Fighter Command’s six heavy fighter Squadrons would be re-tasked to take over anti shipping strike duties within Sixteen Groups area. Sir Keith and his staff were suggesting that the new Tornado might be just the aircraft to provide close escort and flak suppression for these daylight anti shipping sorties. Sir Keith had remarked that it was a pity that the Mark V Spitfire was not yet available as that would have the range to supply top cover for the strike aircraft. The knowing look that passed between Sir Peter and Sir Hugh went mostly unnoticed by the others attending the meeting.
In line with the above, the discussion had then transited onto the fact that currently there were two types of Beaufighter flying. Fighter Command were using the Bristol Hercules engine version as both a heavy fighter and as a night-fighter whilst Maritime Command were just starting to use the Alvis Pelides engine version as a shipping strike aircraft. One reason for this divide was that Maritime Command already used the Alvis engine version of the Hampden as a torpedo strike aircraft and this made it easier for their ground staff where squadrons or stations had a mixture of the two aircraft types
The question the AM had to resolve was whether the six Squadrons of heavy fighters from Fighter Command should remain under that command or be transferred on-bloc to Maritime Command.
Sir Keith Park had argued successfully that for command unity where the heavy fighters working on maritime interdiction of heavily defended shipping would require large escorts having all units within the same command structure would make planning and coordination much simpler and probably more importantly much reduce the command reaction time.
On the political front from the point of view of Sir Peter at the AM and Sir Hugh as CAS this policy would enable them to counter any claims that Fighter Command was lacking offensive spirit and was a purely passive and defensive command.
With the expansion of the RAF now happening apace decisions needed to be made as to where these resources were to be allocated. For instance if Fighter Command was to take on an Offensive role and carry out strikes against enemy targets on the continent should it be allocated more resources and squadrons to achieve this without diluting its defensive capabilities. Sir Keith Parks was of the opinion that these resources should be allocated to a different command, that combined Bombers, Fighters and other aircraft in a unified effort.
The lessons learnt from the few ‘Circus’ operations that had so far been run had only served to illustrate the problems of cross command coordination needed to ensure that bombers and fighters were in the right place at the right time and actually knew their part in the planned action. With the possibility of being able to provide long range fighter escort missions in the reasonably near future when the Spitfire Mark V became operational these matters were now taking on considerable importance.
The single seat version of the Gloster Reaper was more manoeuvrable in the fighter role than the Beaufighter and was faster as well, however the Beaufighter could carry more fuel and ordinance in the strike fighter role. There was much discussion as to whether the Reaper should remain in production as the new single engine aircraft coming into service could carry the same cannon armament just as far and fast. In the two seat role was the Reaper just too small? With the Beaufighter and soon the Mosquito competing in the same roles could resources be better spent on other aircraft.
With men and planes not being wasted on Circus missions, lower losses in the BoB (sea-rescue, more spitfires etc), and more training units the RAF must be a lot better off in terms of air crew compared to OTL.
Interesting comment about Park thinking resources should go to a new command that combines different aircraft types. Earlier cooperation/training together can only lead to the RAF being more effective later on.
Interesting comment about Park thinking resources should go to a new command that combines different aircraft types. Earlier cooperation/training together can only lead to the RAF being more effective later on.
Yeah the Circus missions and their related ones were a big aircraft and manpower drain for little return and they failed in their strategic goal of pulling German aircraft back from the Eastern Front.
It seems the Reaper's time in the sun is coming to an end, but they could be deployed elsewhere, I hear the Far East is calling out for more modern aircraft...
RE The Tornado, is it similar to the OTL one but with a better engine? or is it a different beast because if its the Tornado/Typhoon, then the RAF have gotten a decent low level aircraft but one thats rubbish at altitude.
It seems the Reaper's time in the sun is coming to an end, but they could be deployed elsewhere, I hear the Far East is calling out for more modern aircraft...
RE The Tornado, is it similar to the OTL one but with a better engine? or is it a different beast because if its the Tornado/Typhoon, then the RAF have gotten a decent low level aircraft but one thats rubbish at altitude.
12.22 Home defence or offence
For info, the RAF museum will be doing a crowdcast presentation on the 25th June at 12.30 titled 'The controversy and cost of Rhubarb sorties'
www.crowdcast.io
RAF Museum Archivist Gary Haines explores the controversy and the cost of the RAF’s ‘Rhubarb’ sorties
Circumstances permitting, this lecture will be live-streamed from the RAF Museum, London.
This free lecture is part of the RAF Museum's Research Lecture Programme. If you'd like to support the RAF Museum, you can make a donation at: https://support.rafmuseum.org/Donate-Now
TALK OUTLINE
On 12 January 1941 Willie McKnight a 21 year old Canadian Ace with 17 confirmed victories was shot down while strafing troops on the ground in trenches near the beaches of Gravelines in Northern France. This followed a successful attack on an E boat as part of a Rhubarb operation.
Unlike the defensive fighter operations of the Battle of Britain, ‘Rhubarbs’ were offensive operations, designed to harass the enemy, target key areas and disrupt Germany’s infrastructure in occupied territories. The plan to fly in bad weather with poor visibility was conceived with the thought that it would reduce the chance of enemy fighter interception. However, there was the ever-present danger of anti-aircraft fire and the cost paid in terms of aircraft and experienced pilots was high.
The first Rhubarb patrol took place on the 20 December 1940 and between this date and 13 June 1941, MRAF Sir Sholoto Douglas recalled that 149 Rhubarb patrols were launched. This involved some 336 sorties and argues that these patrols gave ‘valuable experience alike for pilots, operational commanders, and the staffs of the formations-concerned’. It is then admitted that in these sorties seven enemy aircraft were destroyed for the loss of eight RAF pilots.
This paper will look at the organisation and planning of this controversial strategy and the personal cost via an examination of the RAF Museum’s archives and memoirs of those who took part.
In theory, this will also be available to watch again later.
The controversy and cost of Rhubarb sorties - Crowdcast
RAF Museum Archivist Gary Haines explores the controversy and the cost of the RAF’s ‘Rhubarb’ sorties
RAF Museum Archivist Gary Haines explores the controversy and the cost of the RAF’s ‘Rhubarb’ sorties
Circumstances permitting, this lecture will be live-streamed from the RAF Museum, London.
This free lecture is part of the RAF Museum's Research Lecture Programme. If you'd like to support the RAF Museum, you can make a donation at: https://support.rafmuseum.org/Donate-Now
TALK OUTLINE
On 12 January 1941 Willie McKnight a 21 year old Canadian Ace with 17 confirmed victories was shot down while strafing troops on the ground in trenches near the beaches of Gravelines in Northern France. This followed a successful attack on an E boat as part of a Rhubarb operation.
Unlike the defensive fighter operations of the Battle of Britain, ‘Rhubarbs’ were offensive operations, designed to harass the enemy, target key areas and disrupt Germany’s infrastructure in occupied territories. The plan to fly in bad weather with poor visibility was conceived with the thought that it would reduce the chance of enemy fighter interception. However, there was the ever-present danger of anti-aircraft fire and the cost paid in terms of aircraft and experienced pilots was high.
The first Rhubarb patrol took place on the 20 December 1940 and between this date and 13 June 1941, MRAF Sir Sholoto Douglas recalled that 149 Rhubarb patrols were launched. This involved some 336 sorties and argues that these patrols gave ‘valuable experience alike for pilots, operational commanders, and the staffs of the formations-concerned’. It is then admitted that in these sorties seven enemy aircraft were destroyed for the loss of eight RAF pilots.
This paper will look at the organisation and planning of this controversial strategy and the personal cost via an examination of the RAF Museum’s archives and memoirs of those who took part.
In theory, this will also be available to watch again later.
In this TL the Tornado has the as of March 1941 the Fairey Monarch H24 engine giving 2350hp with a single speed two stage supercharger on each side of the H. It also has three bladed counter rotating propellers.
That is why this aircraft will carry the nick name the double stacked beast!
That is why this aircraft will carry the nick name the double stacked beast!
Have now caught up with all of this majestic timeline
One continuity note however - The Gneisenau was noted as sunk in the Norwegian campaign yet she reappears in the recent Kriegsmarine sallies forth chapter??
Not quite as sunk as we thought?
One continuity note however - The Gneisenau was noted as sunk in the Norwegian campaign yet she reappears in the recent Kriegsmarine sallies forth chapter??
Not quite as sunk as we thought?
'Whilst both the damaged German warships eventually made it into Narvik fiord. later intelligence from Norwegian sources confirmed that Gneisenheau was a constructive total loss and was stripped of equipment to make Sharnhorst sea worthy enough to work her way back to Kiel for full repairs. The important event as far as Sir Phillip was concerned was the safe return of eighteen invaluable combat experienced pilots who would form the core of their squadrons as they were brought up to strength in the coming weeks. The saving of the Hurricanes was a bonus and would provide the aircraft for another squadron or OTU.'
from chapter 8.1 'Recouping'
Can't imagine that Norwegian resistance would have missed the hulk of a dirty great battlecruiser sitting in the fjord. in OTL they still have wrecks of the German destroyers visible to this day and have only recently finished cutting up the wreck of the Murmansk. Maybe replace her with Scheer or Lutzow, although they were slower than the twins
from chapter 8.1 'Recouping'
Can't imagine that Norwegian resistance would have missed the hulk of a dirty great battlecruiser sitting in the fjord. in OTL they still have wrecks of the German destroyers visible to this day and have only recently finished cutting up the wreck of the Murmansk. Maybe replace her with Scheer or Lutzow, although they were slower than the twins
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MY Bad I had forgotten that and will need to do a rewrite. Thanks for the catch,
The recent thread hiatus regarding the fact that I had sunk the Gneisenau back in Chapter 8.1 then resurrected her in chapter 12.19 this really shows the problem I have with a TL I did not plan or draught out fully. I think that I may have gone beyond my pay grade.
To sort out the structural inconsistencies would require a major if not complete rewrite.
I am looking at what needs to be done.
A rewrite of Chapter 12.19 is possible, Just make single ship sorties the norm for the Kreigsmarine at this time. It does make Scharnhorst turning back more plausible so there is that option, or I might sketch out a revised chapter and see how it works, by doing what I should have done in the first place and substitute the Prince Eugen for the Gneisenau that chapter can modified quite easily.
That then leaves The Kreigsmarine with Bismarck ready for operations in April. Scharnhorst refitting and ready in April. Prince Eugen in dock for repairs ready mid summer. Tirpitz working up and operational in mid summer.
The choice for the Kreigsmarine ITTl, is do they sortie, Scharnhorst and Bismarck together, or wait a couple of months or more and have both Tirpitz and Prince Eugen available. That becomes an interesting choice. If there was a particularly high value convoy in mid Atlantic or other reason then the on mass sortie could be viable. The long summer nights in the Arctic could of cause be a disadvantage if you are trying to evade your enemies.
i will have a long hard think about what is the most realistick action by the Germans taking into account all other theatres and future operations,
To sort out the structural inconsistencies would require a major if not complete rewrite.
I am looking at what needs to be done.
A rewrite of Chapter 12.19 is possible, Just make single ship sorties the norm for the Kreigsmarine at this time. It does make Scharnhorst turning back more plausible so there is that option, or I might sketch out a revised chapter and see how it works, by doing what I should have done in the first place and substitute the Prince Eugen for the Gneisenau that chapter can modified quite easily.
That then leaves The Kreigsmarine with Bismarck ready for operations in April. Scharnhorst refitting and ready in April. Prince Eugen in dock for repairs ready mid summer. Tirpitz working up and operational in mid summer.
The choice for the Kreigsmarine ITTl, is do they sortie, Scharnhorst and Bismarck together, or wait a couple of months or more and have both Tirpitz and Prince Eugen available. That becomes an interesting choice. If there was a particularly high value convoy in mid Atlantic or other reason then the on mass sortie could be viable. The long summer nights in the Arctic could of cause be a disadvantage if you are trying to evade your enemies.
i will have a long hard think about what is the most realistick action by the Germans taking into account all other theatres and future operations,
12.19 The Kreigsmarine sally forth
Chapter 12.19 Rewrite.
Below is a quick rewrite of chapter 12.19 to get rid of the anomaly of a ship I had already sunk miraculously sailing again!
comments please as to whether this works or not.
12.19 The Kreigsmarine sally forth
Looking back on the recent events in the North Atlantic and the current state of affairs with the availability of safe havens in France the Admiralty were revising their strategic dispositions to counter and contain the Kreigsmarine’s major surface units.
With the evidence showing that in all likelihood the German heavy cruiser Hipper was a constructive total loss and that it would take months to clear and repair the dock in which she lay the Admiralties attention and perforce that of Maritime Command now turned to the problem of containing and hopefully destroying the remaining major surface units of the Kreigsmarine. These ships were now posing a serious problem and threat. As with the Bismarck now operational and the Tirpitz working up, as well as it becoming apparent that Scharnhorst had completed her repairs it would not be to long before it was theoretically possible for the Germans to send a flotilla into the Atlantic consisting of two fast fifteen inch gunned battleships, two eleven inch gunned Battle Cruisers and an eight inch gunned heavy cruiser.
If all these ships combined in a sortie at once they would form a force that would be difficult to counter. Even if the Admiralty was able to get, The Hood, Renown, Repulse and the newly commissioned battleship King George the Fifth together as a division they would be hard pressed until further support could arrive. The second of the KG V class was due to commission before Easter and hopefully this would ease the situation. The one advantage the RN truly had was the Fleet carriers and the FAA, air attack could degrade the fighting qualities of the German ships prior to and engagement and therefore ensure that the RN was fighting at advantage. Of course to attack your enemy you first had to know where they were. Signals and secret intelligence could often tell you were your enemy had been and might even tell you where they could be going but to know where your enemy actually was accurately enough to enable an attack to be launched in reality required someone to get their mark one eyeball onto the target. This was the main task of the RN’s cruiser screen and the FAA out in the open ocean though that was not the case in the North Sea.
In what were called the Narrow Seas it was however to the RAF and principally Maritime Command that the Navy was looking too in order to contain and track the German heavy units. This of course was easier said than done but so far the combined efforts of the two services had enabled them to keep a fairly reliable plot of the location of all the German Navies major units. Sober thinkers in both the Admiralty and the RAF were well aware that by bad luck or subterfuge some but hopefully not all the German ships might evade their watchers and sortie to the open Ocean. Containing a single heavy cruiser had proved difficult enough and the fact that the Hipper had made it to Brest unmolested had been a very sanguine experience for the British.
Therefore the news in early February that the Scharnhaust and Prince Eugen had been spotted transiting the Skagerrak and that neither Maritime Command or The PRU aircraft had spotted them in any Norwegian fiord or port caused grave concern. Royal Navy units had been immediately sent to reinforce the cruisers patrolling the waters north of Iceland. Also Maritime Command had increased its patrol activity pushing aircraft and crews to the limit of their endurance. The fist break for the British came on the second of February when a Stirling LRMPA picked up two large ships heading south west less than thirty miles from the RN cruiser patrol line. Despite a delay by the Stirling aircrafts crew in realising that the ASV target they had was tracking south west and not maintaining the patrol line of the two cruisers they were expecting to find, eventually as they approached the two ships they were fired on and when they sent an indignant radio message about the cruisers aircraft identification skills only to be told that the cruisers had yet to see or hear any aircraft that day due to heavy rainsqualls all round them that the penny dropped that these were in fact two enemy warships. Due to the weather conditions producing poor visibility and skilful use of their own radars the two German battle cruisers had managed to hide in the rain squalls and evade the patrolling RN cruisers. Now it became a stern chase with the British cruisers striving to close the distance and maintain contact with the German ships whilst the Stirling sent messages to all who could hear as to what was heading their way. To the South HMS Ramalies was ordered to remain with her Convoy HX 106 for the time being but as a caution the convoy course was altered to take them on a more easterly course away from the surface threat.
Admiral Lutjens was now in a difficult position the presence of the aircraft meant that he had lost the cloak of anominity in the vast expanse of the Ocean and with at least two RN eight inch gunned cruisers in close proximity he was being forced to steam at high speed that was consuming fuel at a very high rate and straining the ships machinery. Lurjen’s could choose to turn and confront the British cruisers before they were reinforced by other RN ships. For this to succeed the Germans who had the advantage of heavier armament but slightly inferior speed would need to cripple both the British cruisers without taking serious damage themselves. The alternative for Lutjen’s was to try to slip the chase in the dark of the night whilst using the poor weather conditions to his advantage.
Later that day a patrol aircraft based in New Foundland reported a tanker of Cape Farewell that did not respond satisfactorily to the aircrafts challenge. Whilst the patrol aircraft kept in contact with the tanker using its ASV set the nearest available RN units were sent to investigate. Despite being unable to keep an aircraft in continuous contact with the tanker the LRPA were able to track her sufficiently and regain contact soon enough to guide an RN Cruiser to within RDF range on the morning of the third of February. The tanker had initially tried to bluff it out by broadcasting ‘RRR’ continually at full power on her radio. The Cruiser Captain was not fooled and as a warning shot landed close, to the German tanker Schlettstadt, she hove to and fired scuttling charges. Before she sank she sent a brief coded message warning the two German ships of her demise along with the fuel she carried.
The Radio rooms on both German warships had picked up the message from the Schlettstadt and this now added to Lutjen’s dilemma, with his fuel replenishment ship lost and his approximate location known, with two British cruisers still in close proximity, although they had lost contact during the night, his primary objective of commerce raiding was compromised. In addition yet another message had been received from the Prince Eugen informing the Admiral that the ship was having a recurrence of the problems with the high pressure steam tubes. Therefore in compliance with his orders not to risk his ships unnecessarily Lutjens gave instructions for the ships to turn their bows to the north east. The first task was to either evade or destroy the two RN cruisers shadowing him. Here the British Cruisers took a page out of the Germans play book and as soon as their surface search RDF indicated ships steaming towards them they split up and used the frequent rain squalls to disengage. Both ships did not avoid damage but by broadcasting their position and the new course off the two German ships they had accomplished their primary task.
The evasion of the RN by Scharnhorst and Prince Eugen entered the legends of the Kreigsmarine and cemented their reputation as lucky ships. Despite the best efforts of Maritime Command the German ships were able to break contact and it was not until some days later that a PRU spitfire managed to photograph the two German ships being refuelled in and replenished by an Altmark class tanker in Kaa Fiord Northern Norway.
Now the problem for the British was would the two ships stay there to provide a fleet in being and threaten another breakout for the Atlantic. Would the other German heavy ships come and join them.
Was it possible to attack these warships so far north? All that could be done in the short term was keep as tight a watch on them as the weather permitted. The navy had requested the RAF to plan to bomb the ships if possible whilst the RN started panning a strike by their fleet carriers.
The British would not have long to wait for an answer as within days the anchorage was empty. Both warships headed south and as they past the south western tip of the Lofoten islands Prince Eugen was struck by a single torpedo from a salvo fired by an RN submarine that had been stationed there to cover the Vest Fiord and the port of Narvick. Despite considerable flooding prince Eugen was able to steam onto Trondhiem where temporary repairs were carried out before she followed her consort back to Kiel for permanent repairs.
The mayhem that these two German warships could have caused if they had got in amongst the Atlantic convoys had sent shivers down the spines of all concerned in the Admiralty, RAF and Government in Britain.
Upon his return to the UK Sir Hugh had been embroiled in the aftermath of these events. The navy view was that it had been a very close run thing and now were calling for even more of the RAF’s resources being devoted to the Maritime war.
The success of the attack on the Hipper was causing the RAF to seriously consider if an all out attack on the major German naval dockyards might be a viable way of curtailing the effectiveness of the U-boats and restraining, if not eliminating the threat the Kriegsmarine’e heavy warships.
With the current escort capabilities a daylight raid was out of the question so the decision was whether or not a night raid was practical and if the inevitable cost in aircrews and aircraft would be justified. To help with making this decision Sir Peter had instigated an investigation into defining some of the important factors that had to be fulfilled to make an attack on any of the major German Naval Dockyards viable.
These included the type of target that could be bombed.
The density of such targets with the target area.
The ease with which the designated targets could be identified at night.
Whether the selected targets were actually vulnerable to the ordinance that the RAF could place on target.
The level of opposition expected both in AAA and night fighters.
Whether a single target should be hit and the further locations hit in sequence or whether this was a one time operation and a number of locations had to be hit simultaneously.
Could Bomber Command launch sufficient sorties to hit multiple targets or would this dispersal of effort make all the attacks ineffectual.
However much effort was put into resolving these questions the answers could not be obtained overnight so in tandem another plan was being pursued as a means of constraining and curtailing the ability of the Kriegsmarine to conduct another major sortie.
To this end the efforts to track down any more remaining German supply ships at large in the oceans of the world were redoubled. Also the mine laying operations of both the RN and the RAF were being reassessed and redirected accordingly.
Below is a quick rewrite of chapter 12.19 to get rid of the anomaly of a ship I had already sunk miraculously sailing again!
comments please as to whether this works or not.
12.19 The Kreigsmarine sally forth
Looking back on the recent events in the North Atlantic and the current state of affairs with the availability of safe havens in France the Admiralty were revising their strategic dispositions to counter and contain the Kreigsmarine’s major surface units.
With the evidence showing that in all likelihood the German heavy cruiser Hipper was a constructive total loss and that it would take months to clear and repair the dock in which she lay the Admiralties attention and perforce that of Maritime Command now turned to the problem of containing and hopefully destroying the remaining major surface units of the Kreigsmarine. These ships were now posing a serious problem and threat. As with the Bismarck now operational and the Tirpitz working up, as well as it becoming apparent that Scharnhorst had completed her repairs it would not be to long before it was theoretically possible for the Germans to send a flotilla into the Atlantic consisting of two fast fifteen inch gunned battleships, two eleven inch gunned Battle Cruisers and an eight inch gunned heavy cruiser.
If all these ships combined in a sortie at once they would form a force that would be difficult to counter. Even if the Admiralty was able to get, The Hood, Renown, Repulse and the newly commissioned battleship King George the Fifth together as a division they would be hard pressed until further support could arrive. The second of the KG V class was due to commission before Easter and hopefully this would ease the situation. The one advantage the RN truly had was the Fleet carriers and the FAA, air attack could degrade the fighting qualities of the German ships prior to and engagement and therefore ensure that the RN was fighting at advantage. Of course to attack your enemy you first had to know where they were. Signals and secret intelligence could often tell you were your enemy had been and might even tell you where they could be going but to know where your enemy actually was accurately enough to enable an attack to be launched in reality required someone to get their mark one eyeball onto the target. This was the main task of the RN’s cruiser screen and the FAA out in the open ocean though that was not the case in the North Sea.
In what were called the Narrow Seas it was however to the RAF and principally Maritime Command that the Navy was looking too in order to contain and track the German heavy units. This of course was easier said than done but so far the combined efforts of the two services had enabled them to keep a fairly reliable plot of the location of all the German Navies major units. Sober thinkers in both the Admiralty and the RAF were well aware that by bad luck or subterfuge some but hopefully not all the German ships might evade their watchers and sortie to the open Ocean. Containing a single heavy cruiser had proved difficult enough and the fact that the Hipper had made it to Brest unmolested had been a very sanguine experience for the British.
Therefore the news in early February that the Scharnhaust and Prince Eugen had been spotted transiting the Skagerrak and that neither Maritime Command or The PRU aircraft had spotted them in any Norwegian fiord or port caused grave concern. Royal Navy units had been immediately sent to reinforce the cruisers patrolling the waters north of Iceland. Also Maritime Command had increased its patrol activity pushing aircraft and crews to the limit of their endurance. The fist break for the British came on the second of February when a Stirling LRMPA picked up two large ships heading south west less than thirty miles from the RN cruiser patrol line. Despite a delay by the Stirling aircrafts crew in realising that the ASV target they had was tracking south west and not maintaining the patrol line of the two cruisers they were expecting to find, eventually as they approached the two ships they were fired on and when they sent an indignant radio message about the cruisers aircraft identification skills only to be told that the cruisers had yet to see or hear any aircraft that day due to heavy rainsqualls all round them that the penny dropped that these were in fact two enemy warships. Due to the weather conditions producing poor visibility and skilful use of their own radars the two German battle cruisers had managed to hide in the rain squalls and evade the patrolling RN cruisers. Now it became a stern chase with the British cruisers striving to close the distance and maintain contact with the German ships whilst the Stirling sent messages to all who could hear as to what was heading their way. To the South HMS Ramalies was ordered to remain with her Convoy HX 106 for the time being but as a caution the convoy course was altered to take them on a more easterly course away from the surface threat.
Admiral Lutjens was now in a difficult position the presence of the aircraft meant that he had lost the cloak of anominity in the vast expanse of the Ocean and with at least two RN eight inch gunned cruisers in close proximity he was being forced to steam at high speed that was consuming fuel at a very high rate and straining the ships machinery. Lurjen’s could choose to turn and confront the British cruisers before they were reinforced by other RN ships. For this to succeed the Germans who had the advantage of heavier armament but slightly inferior speed would need to cripple both the British cruisers without taking serious damage themselves. The alternative for Lutjen’s was to try to slip the chase in the dark of the night whilst using the poor weather conditions to his advantage.
Later that day a patrol aircraft based in New Foundland reported a tanker of Cape Farewell that did not respond satisfactorily to the aircrafts challenge. Whilst the patrol aircraft kept in contact with the tanker using its ASV set the nearest available RN units were sent to investigate. Despite being unable to keep an aircraft in continuous contact with the tanker the LRPA were able to track her sufficiently and regain contact soon enough to guide an RN Cruiser to within RDF range on the morning of the third of February. The tanker had initially tried to bluff it out by broadcasting ‘RRR’ continually at full power on her radio. The Cruiser Captain was not fooled and as a warning shot landed close, to the German tanker Schlettstadt, she hove to and fired scuttling charges. Before she sank she sent a brief coded message warning the two German ships of her demise along with the fuel she carried.
The Radio rooms on both German warships had picked up the message from the Schlettstadt and this now added to Lutjen’s dilemma, with his fuel replenishment ship lost and his approximate location known, with two British cruisers still in close proximity, although they had lost contact during the night, his primary objective of commerce raiding was compromised. In addition yet another message had been received from the Prince Eugen informing the Admiral that the ship was having a recurrence of the problems with the high pressure steam tubes. Therefore in compliance with his orders not to risk his ships unnecessarily Lutjens gave instructions for the ships to turn their bows to the north east. The first task was to either evade or destroy the two RN cruisers shadowing him. Here the British Cruisers took a page out of the Germans play book and as soon as their surface search RDF indicated ships steaming towards them they split up and used the frequent rain squalls to disengage. Both ships did not avoid damage but by broadcasting their position and the new course off the two German ships they had accomplished their primary task.
The evasion of the RN by Scharnhorst and Prince Eugen entered the legends of the Kreigsmarine and cemented their reputation as lucky ships. Despite the best efforts of Maritime Command the German ships were able to break contact and it was not until some days later that a PRU spitfire managed to photograph the two German ships being refuelled in and replenished by an Altmark class tanker in Kaa Fiord Northern Norway.
Now the problem for the British was would the two ships stay there to provide a fleet in being and threaten another breakout for the Atlantic. Would the other German heavy ships come and join them.
Was it possible to attack these warships so far north? All that could be done in the short term was keep as tight a watch on them as the weather permitted. The navy had requested the RAF to plan to bomb the ships if possible whilst the RN started panning a strike by their fleet carriers.
The British would not have long to wait for an answer as within days the anchorage was empty. Both warships headed south and as they past the south western tip of the Lofoten islands Prince Eugen was struck by a single torpedo from a salvo fired by an RN submarine that had been stationed there to cover the Vest Fiord and the port of Narvick. Despite considerable flooding prince Eugen was able to steam onto Trondhiem where temporary repairs were carried out before she followed her consort back to Kiel for permanent repairs.
The mayhem that these two German warships could have caused if they had got in amongst the Atlantic convoys had sent shivers down the spines of all concerned in the Admiralty, RAF and Government in Britain.
Upon his return to the UK Sir Hugh had been embroiled in the aftermath of these events. The navy view was that it had been a very close run thing and now were calling for even more of the RAF’s resources being devoted to the Maritime war.
The success of the attack on the Hipper was causing the RAF to seriously consider if an all out attack on the major German naval dockyards might be a viable way of curtailing the effectiveness of the U-boats and restraining, if not eliminating the threat the Kriegsmarine’e heavy warships.
With the current escort capabilities a daylight raid was out of the question so the decision was whether or not a night raid was practical and if the inevitable cost in aircrews and aircraft would be justified. To help with making this decision Sir Peter had instigated an investigation into defining some of the important factors that had to be fulfilled to make an attack on any of the major German Naval Dockyards viable.
These included the type of target that could be bombed.
The density of such targets with the target area.
The ease with which the designated targets could be identified at night.
Whether the selected targets were actually vulnerable to the ordinance that the RAF could place on target.
The level of opposition expected both in AAA and night fighters.
Whether a single target should be hit and the further locations hit in sequence or whether this was a one time operation and a number of locations had to be hit simultaneously.
Could Bomber Command launch sufficient sorties to hit multiple targets or would this dispersal of effort make all the attacks ineffectual.
However much effort was put into resolving these questions the answers could not be obtained overnight so in tandem another plan was being pursued as a means of constraining and curtailing the ability of the Kriegsmarine to conduct another major sortie.
To this end the efforts to track down any more remaining German supply ships at large in the oceans of the world were redoubled. Also the mine laying operations of both the RN and the RAF were being reassessed and redirected accordingly.
This needs changing to one battle cruiser.
If they had managed to avoid contact with the RN ships, how would they know they were heavy cruisers? Also a couple typos as well:
Lutjen’s
Started planning
PTL. Thank you for the comments and observations, the rewrite was quick and dirty to see if you all thought it still stood up as plausible or does it need a complete replacement chapter. Judging by the lack of comment so far I take it that a fully edited version would be acceptable.
In the scope of 130-odd pages, mislaying a single battlecruiser is very understandable - frankly I'm impressed there isn't more. Keep up the good work SOP!