AHC Britian and France join the ACW
- Thread starter 606jae
- Start date
only one person even attempted to answer the challenge to get them in and going to a near total war mentality that suggestion was the murder of queen Victoria and then union being blamed not a single remaining post of 2 pages plus attempted to answer the challenge. of course it would be difficult and extremely unlikely thus the challenge aspect.
TFSmith121
Banned
The problem is that as you acknowledge, there's
The problem is that as you acknowledge, there's no rational reason for Britain and France to intervene overtly in the conflict; by its very nature, it's a question that can only be answered in the negative.
Again, neither power had anything to gain by doing so, in 1862 or at any other time...
Best,
The problem is that as you acknowledge, there's no rational reason for Britain and France to intervene overtly in the conflict; by its very nature, it's a question that can only be answered in the negative.
Again, neither power had anything to gain by doing so, in 1862 or at any other time...
Best,
did you look at a maritime chart? Those are substantially different than google maps in that they show water depth, known obstacles, sand banks etc. While there will be some differences in a current one compared to 1861, the general topography of the river and said obstacles will be very similar
TFSmith121
Banned
Beyond that, there's the minor point the people who
Beyond that, there's the minor point the people who maintain the aids to navigation (bouys, lighthouses, dredged channels, etc.) ALL work for the United States.
And as far as the defenses of Delaware Bay go, it's worth looking at some actual sources.
The Department of Pennsylvania was created as a military department (in other words, a theater-level command) on April 27, 1861, with headquarters (variously) at Baltimore and then Philadelphia; the initial commanding general was Major General (PA) Robert Patterson; he was relieved by Major General John A. Dix in 1861; the department as such was disestablished in 1862 and then re-established in 1864; in the interim, however, Pennsylvania was split into smaller commands, namely at Philadelphia (Delaware Bay) and, at times, southeastern (Department of the Susquehanna) and southwestern (Department of the Monanghela).
After Dix, the troops in the state (regulars, USVs, and militia) were (variously) commanded by generals George Cadwalader and John F. Reynolds. On December 31, 1861, active duty strength in Pennsylvania was listed at 5,200 (not including militia).
Forts Mifflin and Delaware were garrisoned in April, 1861 (Delaware initially with a 50-man regular battery), and the regulars were reinforced throughout the war by a mix of long-service US Volunteers (400 men by April, 1862, regulars and USVs) and both Delaware and Pennsylvania militia, as well as militia units federalized from other states as short-service; the Ten Gun Battery and supporting works were built to support Fort Delaware as well. By March, 1862, the garrison included 47 RA, and a battalion of four batteries of USV (PA) artillery (including both heavy – 1st Pennsylvania Marine and Fortification Artillery - and light artillerymen, under Lt. Col. Delavan D. Perkins, a regular, manning 53 guns, rising to 76 guns by February, 1863; later 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery) to an aggregate of ~400 to ~750; battery commanders included captains Stanislaw Mlotkowski, John J. Young, John J. Stevenson, and Franz von Schilling; added a battalion of Delaware USV infantry (detached from 5th Delaware, Col. Henry S. McComb) that brought the garrison up to ~900 and then ~1,200 in 1863.
Officers assigned to command the works and improve them during the war included Perkins, Robert C. Buchanan, Albin Schoepf, and Daniel Tyler, among others. Here's Perkins' entry in in Cullum:
Delavan D. Perkins
Military History. — Cadet at the Military Academy, July 1, 1845, to July 1, 1849, when he was graduated and promoted in the Army to Bvt. Second Lieut., 2d Artillery, July 1, 1849.
Served: in garrison at Ft. Monroe, Va., 1849‑50; at the Military (Second Lieut., 4th Artillery, Mar. 31, 1850) Academy, as Asst. Professor of Mathematics, Sep. 1, 1850, to Apr. 1, (First Lieut., 4th Artillery, May 27, 1854) 1856; in garrison at Ft. Hamilton, N. Y., 1856; in Florida Hostilities against the Seminole Indians, 1856‑57; on frontier duty at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 1857, 1858, in quelling Kansas disturbances, — on Utah Expedition, 1858‑60, being engaged with Hostile Indians in Kirby Valley in Skirmishes, Aug. 11 and Sep. 6, 1860; on leave of absence, 1860‑61; and in garrison at Ft. Washington, Md., 1861.
Served during the Rebellion of the Seceding States, 1861‑65: in
(Captain, 16th Infantry, May 14, 1861: Declined)
(Captain, 4th Artillery, May 17, 1861)
Operations on Upper Potomac, and in Shenandoah Valley, June 7, 1861,
(Major, Staff — Additional Aide-de‑Camp, Nov. 18, 1861) to Nov. 21, 1862; Asst. Inspector of 12th Army Corps, with the rank of Lieut.‑Colonel, Aug. 20, 1862, to Apr. 11, 1863; in command of Ft. Delaware, and in charge of Prisoners of War confined there, Nov. 21, 1862, to Mar. 16, 1863; as Assistant to the Provost Marshal of the State of Connecticut, Apr. 25, 1863, to July 7, 1864; and as Assistant in the (Major, Staff — Asst. Adjutant-General, June 1, 1864) Adjutant-General's Office at Washington, D. C., July 7, 1864, to Jan. 6, 1865. Died, Jan. 6, 1865, at Washington, D. C.: Aged 38.
Not exactly a slouch; USMA, artillery specialist, active service in the field, assigned to mutiple harbor defense posts, professor of mathematics at USMA, line and staff duties, and only 38 in 1865, so he's 35 or so in 1862. Presumably he can do as well as George Armistead did at Fort McHenry in 1814.
The Philadelphia Navy Yard PNY had a guard ship assigned immediately in 1861 (the side-wheel gunboat USS Princeton was the first) and guardboats (generally armed steam tugs, revenue cutters, etc.) attached to the Navy Yard were routinely assigned to the fort and lower bay for picket duty. At least two such vessels were assigned at any one time during the course of the war. PNY’s commandants during the war included Samuel F. Du Pont and C.K. Stribling, among others; also, not exactly slouches.
Sources for all of the above are the Official Records, as presented for free and searchable by Cornell, here:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/index.html
Nice summary of the troops stationed at Fort Delaware historically during the war (obviously, not a conflict where there was much of a maritime threat, so that woud change in the event of a threat of European intervention); even so, worth noting are the numbers of regulars on station:
http://www.fortdelaware.org/union%20units.htm
Entirely separate from the United States Volunteers raised in Pennsylvania in 1861-65 (and for that matter, the Pennsylvania Reserve Division organized under state authority in 1861 but transferred to the US for active service, or the USCT units raised in Pennsylvania from 1863 onwards) the state of Pennsylvania routinely raised state militia units, for state and at time, federal service, during the war as well. Philadelphia, because of the size, wealth, and age of the city, had a long militia tradition which included the maintenance of some seven regiments of infantry and artillery, which formed a nominal state militia division in the city (and, obviously, capable of being deployed into the field in southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and/or Maryland, as necessary).
Philadelphia in the Civil War, by Frank H. Taylor, goes into a significant amount of detail, and is available on-line for free:
https://archive.org/details/cu31924028861842
The two largest such mobilizations were in 1862 and 1863, respectively, in response to the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns. The 1862 mobilization, ordered initially by Gov. Curtin, certainly provides an example of what the state could do, essentially under its own authority and largely its own resources, early in the war.
http://www.pa-roots.com/pacw/1862militia/index.html
It is worth noting that with roughly ten days’ notice in September, 1862, a force of some 40,000 men were organized and in the field, with 25,000 in the southeastern part of the state of Pennsylvania, and another 15,000 in the southwestern part. These troops were organized into 25 regiments of infantry, two separate battalions and 27 companies of infantry, five companies (batteries) of artillery, and 12 companies (troops) of cavalry.
So, presumably in the event of the balloon going up in the winter of 1861-62, along with whatever elements of the USN and USRCS, and US regular/USV force of some 527,000, that Washington might decide to detach to defend the nation's second largest city and largest shipbuilding center, there's the minor point that:
a) there's a functioning military headquarters/theater command, and with existing fixed defenses with an active garrison (and this, historically, was a secondary theater in the conflict that was fought), and with arsenals and armories within the region to be defended;
b) there's a functioning naval inshore defense headquarters command, and within shipyards and a shore establishment within the region to be defended;
c) there's a functioning Pennsylvania STATE level military headquarters and command structure that, historically, maintained several thousand 1st line reserves in the region (which presumably would train as heavy artillery, rather than infantry, in the event of a maritime threat) and and was able to mobilize some 25,000 1st and 2nd lines reserves in 1862 when actually tested (and one can, presumably, add Delaware and New Jersey's state-level resources to the mix).
And, of course, Philadelphia (and by extension, Wilmington, Chester, and Camden, much less Eleutherian Mills) are nicely connected by railroad, canals, telegraphs, and all the other C3I elements of an industrial region in the mid-Nineteenth Century.
Minor elements, of course, but the examples of Baltimore in 1814 and/or Petropavlovsk in 1854, Taganrog in 1855, and the Taku Forts in 1859 all come to mind.
Best,
Beyond that, there's the minor point the people who maintain the aids to navigation (bouys, lighthouses, dredged channels, etc.) ALL work for the United States.
And as far as the defenses of Delaware Bay go, it's worth looking at some actual sources.
The Department of Pennsylvania was created as a military department (in other words, a theater-level command) on April 27, 1861, with headquarters (variously) at Baltimore and then Philadelphia; the initial commanding general was Major General (PA) Robert Patterson; he was relieved by Major General John A. Dix in 1861; the department as such was disestablished in 1862 and then re-established in 1864; in the interim, however, Pennsylvania was split into smaller commands, namely at Philadelphia (Delaware Bay) and, at times, southeastern (Department of the Susquehanna) and southwestern (Department of the Monanghela).
After Dix, the troops in the state (regulars, USVs, and militia) were (variously) commanded by generals George Cadwalader and John F. Reynolds. On December 31, 1861, active duty strength in Pennsylvania was listed at 5,200 (not including militia).
Forts Mifflin and Delaware were garrisoned in April, 1861 (Delaware initially with a 50-man regular battery), and the regulars were reinforced throughout the war by a mix of long-service US Volunteers (400 men by April, 1862, regulars and USVs) and both Delaware and Pennsylvania militia, as well as militia units federalized from other states as short-service; the Ten Gun Battery and supporting works were built to support Fort Delaware as well. By March, 1862, the garrison included 47 RA, and a battalion of four batteries of USV (PA) artillery (including both heavy – 1st Pennsylvania Marine and Fortification Artillery - and light artillerymen, under Lt. Col. Delavan D. Perkins, a regular, manning 53 guns, rising to 76 guns by February, 1863; later 3rd Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery) to an aggregate of ~400 to ~750; battery commanders included captains Stanislaw Mlotkowski, John J. Young, John J. Stevenson, and Franz von Schilling; added a battalion of Delaware USV infantry (detached from 5th Delaware, Col. Henry S. McComb) that brought the garrison up to ~900 and then ~1,200 in 1863.
Officers assigned to command the works and improve them during the war included Perkins, Robert C. Buchanan, Albin Schoepf, and Daniel Tyler, among others. Here's Perkins' entry in in Cullum:
Delavan D. Perkins
Military History. — Cadet at the Military Academy, July 1, 1845, to July 1, 1849, when he was graduated and promoted in the Army to Bvt. Second Lieut., 2d Artillery, July 1, 1849.
Served: in garrison at Ft. Monroe, Va., 1849‑50; at the Military (Second Lieut., 4th Artillery, Mar. 31, 1850) Academy, as Asst. Professor of Mathematics, Sep. 1, 1850, to Apr. 1, (First Lieut., 4th Artillery, May 27, 1854) 1856; in garrison at Ft. Hamilton, N. Y., 1856; in Florida Hostilities against the Seminole Indians, 1856‑57; on frontier duty at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 1857, 1858, in quelling Kansas disturbances, — on Utah Expedition, 1858‑60, being engaged with Hostile Indians in Kirby Valley in Skirmishes, Aug. 11 and Sep. 6, 1860; on leave of absence, 1860‑61; and in garrison at Ft. Washington, Md., 1861.
Served during the Rebellion of the Seceding States, 1861‑65: in
(Captain, 16th Infantry, May 14, 1861: Declined)
(Captain, 4th Artillery, May 17, 1861)
Operations on Upper Potomac, and in Shenandoah Valley, June 7, 1861,
(Major, Staff — Additional Aide-de‑Camp, Nov. 18, 1861) to Nov. 21, 1862; Asst. Inspector of 12th Army Corps, with the rank of Lieut.‑Colonel, Aug. 20, 1862, to Apr. 11, 1863; in command of Ft. Delaware, and in charge of Prisoners of War confined there, Nov. 21, 1862, to Mar. 16, 1863; as Assistant to the Provost Marshal of the State of Connecticut, Apr. 25, 1863, to July 7, 1864; and as Assistant in the (Major, Staff — Asst. Adjutant-General, June 1, 1864) Adjutant-General's Office at Washington, D. C., July 7, 1864, to Jan. 6, 1865. Died, Jan. 6, 1865, at Washington, D. C.: Aged 38.
Not exactly a slouch; USMA, artillery specialist, active service in the field, assigned to mutiple harbor defense posts, professor of mathematics at USMA, line and staff duties, and only 38 in 1865, so he's 35 or so in 1862. Presumably he can do as well as George Armistead did at Fort McHenry in 1814.
The Philadelphia Navy Yard PNY had a guard ship assigned immediately in 1861 (the side-wheel gunboat USS Princeton was the first) and guardboats (generally armed steam tugs, revenue cutters, etc.) attached to the Navy Yard were routinely assigned to the fort and lower bay for picket duty. At least two such vessels were assigned at any one time during the course of the war. PNY’s commandants during the war included Samuel F. Du Pont and C.K. Stribling, among others; also, not exactly slouches.
Sources for all of the above are the Official Records, as presented for free and searchable by Cornell, here:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/index.html
Nice summary of the troops stationed at Fort Delaware historically during the war (obviously, not a conflict where there was much of a maritime threat, so that woud change in the event of a threat of European intervention); even so, worth noting are the numbers of regulars on station:
http://www.fortdelaware.org/union%20units.htm
Entirely separate from the United States Volunteers raised in Pennsylvania in 1861-65 (and for that matter, the Pennsylvania Reserve Division organized under state authority in 1861 but transferred to the US for active service, or the USCT units raised in Pennsylvania from 1863 onwards) the state of Pennsylvania routinely raised state militia units, for state and at time, federal service, during the war as well. Philadelphia, because of the size, wealth, and age of the city, had a long militia tradition which included the maintenance of some seven regiments of infantry and artillery, which formed a nominal state militia division in the city (and, obviously, capable of being deployed into the field in southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and/or Maryland, as necessary).
Philadelphia in the Civil War, by Frank H. Taylor, goes into a significant amount of detail, and is available on-line for free:
https://archive.org/details/cu31924028861842
The two largest such mobilizations were in 1862 and 1863, respectively, in response to the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns. The 1862 mobilization, ordered initially by Gov. Curtin, certainly provides an example of what the state could do, essentially under its own authority and largely its own resources, early in the war.
http://www.pa-roots.com/pacw/1862militia/index.html
It is worth noting that with roughly ten days’ notice in September, 1862, a force of some 40,000 men were organized and in the field, with 25,000 in the southeastern part of the state of Pennsylvania, and another 15,000 in the southwestern part. These troops were organized into 25 regiments of infantry, two separate battalions and 27 companies of infantry, five companies (batteries) of artillery, and 12 companies (troops) of cavalry.
So, presumably in the event of the balloon going up in the winter of 1861-62, along with whatever elements of the USN and USRCS, and US regular/USV force of some 527,000, that Washington might decide to detach to defend the nation's second largest city and largest shipbuilding center, there's the minor point that:
a) there's a functioning military headquarters/theater command, and with existing fixed defenses with an active garrison (and this, historically, was a secondary theater in the conflict that was fought), and with arsenals and armories within the region to be defended;
b) there's a functioning naval inshore defense headquarters command, and within shipyards and a shore establishment within the region to be defended;
c) there's a functioning Pennsylvania STATE level military headquarters and command structure that, historically, maintained several thousand 1st line reserves in the region (which presumably would train as heavy artillery, rather than infantry, in the event of a maritime threat) and and was able to mobilize some 25,000 1st and 2nd lines reserves in 1862 when actually tested (and one can, presumably, add Delaware and New Jersey's state-level resources to the mix).
And, of course, Philadelphia (and by extension, Wilmington, Chester, and Camden, much less Eleutherian Mills
) are nicely connected by railroad, canals, telegraphs, and all the other C3I elements of an industrial region in the mid-Nineteenth Century.Minor elements, of course, but the examples of Baltimore in 1814 and/or Petropavlovsk in 1854, Taganrog in 1855, and the Taku Forts in 1859 all come to mind.
Best,
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whenever one wishes to be an armchair admiral, it is very important to actually take a look at the map of the actual area being discussed
not google maps, but a terrain map, because waterways have terrain... be it shallows, channels, obstructions or the like, very important to know how much actual navigable water there is to work with
here is an actual maritime chart of the Delaware River approaches to Philadelphia. Note the narrow channel in 2016 and consider that it was much narrower and shallower in the 1860s (before steam dredging was normal)
http://nauticalchartsonline.com/chart/zoom?chart=12311
cool website by the way, it has all kinds of charts. Of course if you actually want to use them for sailing or yachting you would want to buy a real one
http://nauticalchartsonline.com/charts/NOAA/Atlantic-Coast?gclid=CJ2s3bresswCFZA2aQod0OgBNw
keep in mind that all harbors and channels are going to be narrower and shallower in the 1860s than they are now
not google maps, but a terrain map, because waterways have terrain... be it shallows, channels, obstructions or the like, very important to know how much actual navigable water there is to work with
here is an actual maritime chart of the Delaware River approaches to Philadelphia. Note the narrow channel in 2016 and consider that it was much narrower and shallower in the 1860s (before steam dredging was normal)
http://nauticalchartsonline.com/chart/zoom?chart=12311
cool website by the way, it has all kinds of charts. Of course if you actually want to use them for sailing or yachting you would want to buy a real one
http://nauticalchartsonline.com/charts/NOAA/Atlantic-Coast?gclid=CJ2s3bresswCFZA2aQod0OgBNw
keep in mind that all harbors and channels are going to be narrower and shallower in the 1860s than they are now
TFSmith121
Banned
Good points.
Good points, and useful links.
My suggestion that those trying to come up with AH "what ifs" use Google maps is more a) it actually gives you mileage from Point A to Point B, and b) the "terrain" view on the maps are very helpful and include topo lines; its not hachures.
Interestingly enough, if one uses the "terrain" or "satellite" views, the shoals are actually named and show up in the satellite imagery; it's not exactly NRO-quality, but the resolution is enough that the shallows usually show up pretty well.
Plus, of course, anyone can - or at least, should be able to - find Google.
Best,
Good points, and useful links.
My suggestion that those trying to come up with AH "what ifs" use Google maps is more a) it actually gives you mileage from Point A to Point B, and b) the "terrain" view on the maps are very helpful and include topo lines; its not hachures.
Interestingly enough, if one uses the "terrain" or "satellite" views, the shoals are actually named and show up in the satellite imagery; it's not exactly NRO-quality, but the resolution is enough that the shallows usually show up pretty well.
Plus, of course, anyone can - or at least, should be able to - find Google.
Best,
frlmerrin
Banned
As it happens I had a quick look at a chart for the upper river this morning. It was not really necessary as there is A MAJOR NAVAL YARD even further up river so getting to Brandywine creek is not an issue. Up the creek a chart will not help you
however if it is not navigable by a long boat or a gig what use is it to a powder mill? They need somewhere with a large hydraulic jump at one end (to drive a mill) and a slow moving river to take out the barrels at the other. The large hydraulic jumps are probably the reason for the dams.We're kinda getting derailed here
The question was not if one particular powder mill would make a good target but in the grand scheme of thing if UK/France would intervene.
Now we've relatively ruled out a direct intervention/invasion on a grand scale as both power have other shit to sort out at the moment. However, more material, advisors and engineers might be useful to either side.
It might even tip the balance for a stalemate.
What would they have to gain? Well, instead of one big proto-power, you get two broken hunks. One of which is your staunch ally since you saved it and the other one can be pressured through blockade. Then you can force unequal treaties on the US as "punishment" or something like that. That's on top of other considerations: if France can put the US out of the war relatively quick, maybe it can hope for some CSA reinforcement in Mexico. Carving a sphere of influence there would have great benefits.
The question was not if one particular powder mill would make a good target but in the grand scheme of thing if UK/France would intervene.
Now we've relatively ruled out a direct intervention/invasion on a grand scale as both power have other shit to sort out at the moment. However, more material, advisors and engineers might be useful to either side.
It might even tip the balance for a stalemate.
What would they have to gain? Well, instead of one big proto-power, you get two broken hunks. One of which is your staunch ally since you saved it and the other one can be pressured through blockade. Then you can force unequal treaties on the US as "punishment" or something like that. That's on top of other considerations: if France can put the US out of the war relatively quick, maybe it can hope for some CSA reinforcement in Mexico. Carving a sphere of influence there would have great benefits.
Not to the world, just to the British to keep the money flowing back and forth. And very good response. The famine thing I said was a bit of hyperbole. The poor would indeed get a bit less food, but hunger was no stander to Britain's working class.
frlmerrin
Banned
Mmm. Rob is usually very good on issues of fact so I am puzzled by this. It is a pitty he has apparently been driven off from this board by the inappropriate behaviours exhibited by some, otherwise we could ask him. Can you please link me to the posts where he discussed this matter? I think I need to investigate. I really hope it wasn't that endless argument with TFSmith121 about weapons numbers? I was really hoping they could reconcile the actual numbers of weapons with the numbers purchased but half way through it was clear that was not going to happen and I lost the will to live. So I left the site for a few months. Anywho let us see if we can resolve the differences between Rob's number for Confederate Enfields and the commonly accepted one?
frlmerrin
Banned
We're kinda getting derailed here
The question was not if one particular powder mill would make a good target but in the grand scheme of thing if UK/France would intervene.
Now we've relatively ruled out a direct intervention/invasion on a grand scale as both power have other shit to sort out at the moment. However, more material, advisors and engineers might be useful to either side.
It might even tip the balance for a stalemate.
What would they have to gain? Well, instead of one big proto-power, you get two broken hunks. One of which is your staunch ally since you saved it and the other one can be pressured through blockade. Then you can force unequal treaties on the US as "punishment" or something like that. That's on top of other considerations: if France can put the US out of the war relatively quick, maybe it can hope for some CSA reinforcement in Mexico. Carving a sphere of influence there would have great benefits.
This is a high Victorian Anglo-Union war thread this one went quite well almost two pages on subject before past issues from past arguments intruded to bring it down. They usually depart from subject after just a few posts.
Saphroneth
Banned
This is a further look by 67th at the powder mill issue - nicely sourced, I might add.
http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/fort-delaware-and-defence-of-delaware.html
Anyway - as to the Enfield numbers.
Here's one case:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9197755&postcount=11
And the other.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8412306&postcount=47
Unfortunately neither has a cited source. I rather wish I had Arming the Union - it might shed some light on this, since I'm fairly sure that's where he got the 436,000 figure from.
And to veer wildly back to the OP:
Outrage on the high seas is what I'd consider the "default" method of getting the British into the war. You could probably manage the same with the French - no regular mail steamers for the French at the time, sadly, but I could see a special mail service from Mexico (with CS diplomats on board) being stopped by a gung-ho captain and Napoleon deciding to count it as an act of war.
It wouldn't take much for Napoleon III to have a significant adverse effect on the US war effort - the French navy is a distinct second to the RN but is still the second most powerful fleet on earth, and quite frankly could potentially threaten Washington! (Devastation, Lave, Tonnante, Congreve and Foudroyante are all still active, with shallow draught, and the Palaestro class of four becomes active in late 1862 to supplement them.)
Naval support also has the bonus that it doesn't distract from Mexico much, and a French blockade could potentially make a tidy packet (as well as shutting off British weapons to the Union, because the Brits won't want to risk going through the active blockade.)
http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/fort-delaware-and-defence-of-delaware.html
Anyway - as to the Enfield numbers.
Here's one case:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=9197755&postcount=11
And the other.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8412306&postcount=47
Unfortunately neither has a cited source. I rather wish I had Arming the Union - it might shed some light on this, since I'm fairly sure that's where he got the 436,000 figure from.
And to veer wildly back to the OP:
Outrage on the high seas is what I'd consider the "default" method of getting the British into the war. You could probably manage the same with the French - no regular mail steamers for the French at the time, sadly, but I could see a special mail service from Mexico (with CS diplomats on board) being stopped by a gung-ho captain and Napoleon deciding to count it as an act of war.
It wouldn't take much for Napoleon III to have a significant adverse effect on the US war effort - the French navy is a distinct second to the RN but is still the second most powerful fleet on earth, and quite frankly could potentially threaten Washington! (Devastation, Lave, Tonnante, Congreve and Foudroyante are all still active, with shallow draught, and the Palaestro class of four becomes active in late 1862 to supplement them.)
Naval support also has the bonus that it doesn't distract from Mexico much, and a French blockade could potentially make a tidy packet (as well as shutting off British weapons to the Union, because the Brits won't want to risk going through the active blockade.)
Ahh, total war. If we are on that subject, let us check out, again, trade. The Copperheads were rather thick on the ground in the Midwest. Isolationism that might explain why they later had the highest percentage of the population as members of the Klan during their second incarnation. Besides how in the South the amount of African-Americans excluded from membership would skew the results a bit. If the British don't go total war invasion wise, then the Midwest could be a real problem for the Union government as their livelihoods suffer. Though you might get more support for the war in New York, if the Irish find British gunboats bombarding their homes. Would lead to awkwardness with both sides supporting the independence of portions of the other.
Saphroneth
Banned
Honestly I don't think the British would bombard New York (as opposed to the forts) unless New York had already refused to surrender when confronted with the guns of a fleet that had forced the forts out of the battle or run past them - it makes more sense for the British to just neutralize the outer forts and set up a blockade, though they might also hit New York Naval Yards I suppose. (That would be a rather short and ignominious Monitor Versus Warrior battle - Warrior lobs a dozen shells at the place Monitor is being built.)
OTL they didn't bombard cities in the Black or Baltic seas.
OTL they didn't bombard cities in the Black or Baltic seas.
Looking at colonial tactics of the time, what they probably do is try to force a treaty through gunboat diplomacy.
Put some artillery in front of the city, say "sign or we shoot", the US replies "no we won't", the allies start bombing a couple targets and if that doesn't work establish a beach head.
That's more or less what they did in China and what the French did in Tourane in 1859. Sure it didn't work that well in Tourane but a beach head in North America has the advantage of not being hunting ground for malaria and yellow fever.
Such a beach head, with a few thousand people (2000 in Tourane) has the great advantage of being cheap since it's not focused on offensive, while immobilising ennemy troups.
Multiply those by a few, which is easy since the allies have full naval superiority and are just on the other side of the Atlantic and you have the US having to guard a lot of potential abcess while waging a war against the CSA. That's exactly the tactic used in Indochina with a diversion in Saigon when Tourane turned into a stalemate.
That also means limited civilian casualties which would be very important since we'd be attacking white people and not some sleepy, lazy civilisation awaiting the West to be revived and to allow christianity to prosper (according to OTL propaganda of course).
That said, I'm sure the allies could conjure some nice propaganda. Defense of Canada for the Brits, protection of the grandson of France in Lousiana for France.
I really don't believe in total war in such a context. It's wasteful and the same objectives can be achieved way more easily through other way (blockade+military support)
Saphroneth
Banned
It's also probably worth noting that the OTL capture of New Orleans was almost exactly along the lines of "ships sail into harbour, run out guns" - but, again, I don't think the British would bother capturing New York. Blockade's just cheaper.
(Same for the French, who don't even need to commit a major land army of any sort - the British are sort of forced to by the Canadian border.)
(Same for the French, who don't even need to commit a major land army of any sort - the British are sort of forced to by the Canadian border.)
frlmerrin
Banned
I agree that RN would not be likely to capture NYC but I am reasonably sure they would pillage the navy yard and the docks and all the warehouses there in. Then they would take the booty away in any Union merchant ship they could find. They might even charter the neutral ships in port for that purpose. The RN would then destroy all of the warehouses and goods as they withdrew or if the Union tried to use troops to stop the pillage. They might even send lobsters to burn down a few public buildings into the bargain.
They might do this more than once.
They might do this more than once.
frlmerrin
Banned
We're kinda getting derailed here
Now we've relatively ruled out a direct intervention/invasion on a grand scale as both power have other shit to sort out at the moment. However, more material, advisors and engineers might be useful to either side.
It might even tip the balance for a stalemate.
You might have ruled out a direct intervention - the rest of us hold different views. In the event of war over the Trent outrage the British will be up for fisticuffs and they will obliterate the USN tooty sweety in the blink of an eye, think Death Stars against cuddly toys!
There will be a blockade of the north and the Union economy will collapse like a blowup Abraham Lincoln with the stopper removed. Financial houses and manufacturing companies alike will fall.
The coastal cities of the Union will burn like Lewes on Guy Fawkes night.
The poor, poorly equipped, even more poorly armed Union soldiers sent north to fight the British in the snow and ice will die in droves from cold, hunger, disease and being asked to attack well prepared positions defended by men with modern weapons that totally outrange their own pitifully primitive muskets, rifles and Napoleons.
Envigorated by their recent victories in the Crimea, India, China, Lagos, Aoteroa and Japan British morale will be unbreakable.
In the south brave volunteers will find an invigorated CSA being supplied with modern guns and rifle-muskets. How will they advance against such an enemy?
Question: what do you mean by stalemate? If the Union are kept out of BNA it is a British victory. If the Confederacy exists it is a Confederate victory. What does stalemate look like?