AHC Britian and France join the ACW

[EnglishCanuck]

Boom.

Shameless self plug aside, the Trent affair was rather serious OTL, a more onerous British ultimatum or more provocations which would prevent either government backing down would have caused some rupture in diplomatic relations, perhaps enough to lead to British support/recognition of the CSA in retaliation.

France was already mucking about in the New World (Napoleon III thumbing his nose at the Monroe Doctrine by attempting regime change in Mexico) and was rather covertly supporting the CSA already (shipbuilding by Arman and loans via Enlarger) and twice attempted to get the CSA recognized in 1862 and 1863, and had already stated he would follow the British lead on the issue.

Had Britain and France recognized the CSA the US had threatened to declare war on anyone who did, well they either have to do so or back down and look like fools on the international stage.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

These threads somehow devolve into Brtiain and France and CSA vs USA, Germany (which gets unified by Prussia) and Russia.

Yeah I get confused by that.

 

[frlmerrin]

Though, that said, the British simply refusing to sell arms to the Union more or less cripples their ability to raise the large armies of 1862-3 even more than it would do so to the CSA (436,000 Enfield rifles went to the North, only about 80,000 South) and a blockade of the North would be ruinous on their ability to prosecute the war.

Saphroneth,

Where did you get your figures for the Enfields from? The numbers you have for the Union seem about right but the figure of 80,000 is far short of the commonly quoted figure of 300,000+ for the CSA. Given that the purchasing agents of the CSA and the individual states were active in Britain long before the Union decided to procure foreign rifles 80,000 seems very low. If one also notes that the Confederates managed to buy almost all of the No 1 Enfields available whilst the Union had to make do with No 2s, well it is hard to imagine there were only 80,000 No 1s available.

 

[TFSmith121]

Neither power had anything to gain by doing so...

most pods that get the Europeans in the war in support of the CSA would not be enough for them to throw their full weight into the war the challenge is to come up with a (semi)plausible in which both not only join but go into a near total war mentality.

Neither power had anything to gain by doing so, in 1862 or at any other time...

Britain, along with having spent a lot of blood and treasure in the Russian war and the Indian mutiny in the previous decade, had much more important things to deal with in Europe, the Med, and points east.

France, having been abandoned by the British in the Mexican adventure, was trying to come back after their defeat at Puebla in 1862, cement some sort of alliance with the Austrians, and generally had equally more important things to deal with the in Europe, the Med, and points east.

There was nothing in the western hemisphere - including the poverty-stricken, desolate, and underpopulated expanse of that ramshackle collection of colonies called British North America - worth the life or limb of one British soldier. Likewise, however many sous the 2nd Empire was willing to invest in a wars doomed to failure at the time, at least Mexico offered (if one was willing to self-delude oneself enough) the possibility of strategic depth, an ally, and - possibly - an alliance with the Austrians.

France allying with the rebels against the US offered zilch.

The other reality is that "total war" was not something mid-century European maritime or hybrid powers engaged in; for obvious reasons, unlike the Prussians, the British and French both had to spend money on their fleets.

And as useful as said fleets were for keeping the sea lanes of the eastern Atlantic and western Mediterranean open, the brutal strategic relaity was that - as no one less that Palmerston himself said, when facing the prospect of intervention in a continental war in the 1860s:

"...Ships sailing on the sea cannot stop armies on land, and to have attempted to stop the progress of an army by sending a fleet to the Baltic would have been attempting to do that which it was not possible to accomplish. If England could have sent an army, and although we all know how admirable that army is on the peace establishment, we must acknowledge that we have no means of sending out a force at all equal to cope with the 300,000 or 400,000 men whom the 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 of Germany could have pitted against us, and that such an attempt would only have insured a disgraceful discomfiture—not to the army, indeed, but to the Government which sent out an inferior force and expected it to cope successfully with a force so vastly superior..."

One would expect the same opinion is true if the word "Baltic" is changed to "St. Lawrence," and, of course, if 300,000 or 400,000 men were enough to deter the British army in 1864, presumably 500,000 to 800,000 would have been enough in 1862.

Same for the French, of course, whose largest expeditionary force in Mexico in this period amounted to 36,000 French troops and less than 9,000 European mercenaries.

So, good luck.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

Yeah, but that's not what either power would be wanting. The British and French didn't try to annex Russia during the Crimean War.

so what are they trying for then? The French are trying to make the Monroe Doctrine go away, which was originally suggested by the British to the United States as a joint declaration, and is in fact initially in effect because of the Royal Navy when it mattered most (when the Spanish colonies were breaking away). Why? Because the British Empire and its commerce benefited hugely by having unrestricted trade with independent Latin American states, including Mexico. It is in the interests of the British Empire for the Monroe Doctrine to remain in effect, or something very much like it and most definitely not in its interests for the the Europeans to go into Latin America and start creating colonies again.

So so pretty serious obstacles to overcome right there in terms of Anglo-French cooperation.

What do the British want? An apology for their flag and 'neutral rights' (which they historically overlooked whenever they needed to) getting stepped on. Short of major events (which any timeline that is reasonable calls for) happening elsewhere, or Harry Harrison striking down the British government with insanity, that isn't enough to risk losing Canada and spending millions in treasure and probably tens of thousands of lives for.

Especially since the US and British have already on two other occasions negotiated their way out of far more serious concerns (the Oregon Border being a big one, and of course the Pig War issue which was about the border once again)

Now there are some in the British government who wouldn't mind seeing the Yankees humbled and the United States come apart, but enough to justify war?

The "Trent Outrage War" should instead be called "The Trent incident causes insanity in the British government, possibly too much ergot mold somewhere"

 

[galveston bay]

Saphroneth,

Where did you get your figures for the Enfields from? The numbers you have for the Union seem about right but the figure of 80,000 is far short of the commonly quoted figure of 300,000+ for the CSA. Given that the purchasing agents of the CSA and the individual states were active in Britain long before the Union decided to procure foreign rifles 80,000 seems very low. If one also notes that the Confederates managed to buy almost all of the No 1 Enfields available whilst the Union had to make do with No 2s, well it is hard to imagine there were only 80,000 No 1s available.

I too am curious, this site lists a total of 900,000 British 1853 Pattern Lee Enfields

http://www.civilwarwiki.net/wiki/Table_of_Civil_War_Era_Small_Arms

in fact it lists practically all weapons. The flaw in the chart is that it doesn't list how many per year and you have to click on links to find out who bought them.

This one states 350,000 Lee Enfields to the South

http://www.guns.com/2013/02/23/guns-of-the-confederate-grunt-1863/

and these from some pretty serious gun nuts (we have a lot of those in my part of the country). They look into these things like a sports fan looks into sports statistics. So I suspect they are probably right on the money

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, others will summon up Tiger and Wraithverge and

Paging TFSmith ...

Well, others will summon up Tiger and Wraithverge and the rest of the Queen's Own Royal Multiple Personalities Regiment, so it seems only appropriate.

Interesting how the default for some here is to go to someone permabanned for slavery apologism as a useful source of information.

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

Saphroneth,

Where did you get your figures for the Enfields from? The numbers you have for the Union seem about right but the figure of 80,000 is far short of the commonly quoted figure of 300,000+ for the CSA. Given that the purchasing agents of the CSA and the individual states were active in Britain long before the Union decided to procure foreign rifles 80,000 seems very low. If one also notes that the Confederates managed to buy almost all of the No 1 Enfields available whilst the Union had to make do with No 2s, well it is hard to imagine there were only 80,000 No 1s available.

Via RobCraufurd, I'm afraid. I'm not sure his source - could be Arming the Union, and I don't have it.
But don't forget both the effect of captures by the CSA, and that 300,000 rifles would (absent any breakage, of course) provide for the entire CSA field armies with some left over. Since they fought to get their hands on the Enfields, I suspect they didn't have that many. (Austrian or French rifles making the balance.)

There's other possibilities, too - such as many of the Enfields being shipped to both sides as "hardware" (which could add another couple of hundred thousand to the grand total). But that's speculation.

 

[Lord High Executioner]

Interesting how the default for some here is to go to someone permabanned for slavery apologism as a useful source of information.

I am not entirely convinced that

the DuPont powder works are actually right up against a navigable river without extensive defences.

is not a claim that someone well versed in the geography, economy, statistics etc. of mid-nineteenth century United States
should, if it is inaccurate or irrelevant, be able to refute without resorting to reminding people that the well is poisoned.

 

[The Professor]

I am not entirely convinced that

is not a claim that someone well versed in the geography, economy, statistics etc. of mid-nineteenth century United States
should, if it is inaccurate or irrelevant, be able to refute without resorting to reminding people that the well is poisoned.

Are you saying that we shouldn't allow someone's personal opinion to bias against their facts if they happen to correct about something not related to that opinion?

Check the fact yes, but not automatically assume it is wrong unless they have been wrong about that same thing before.

 

[Saphroneth]

The DuPont mills are just north of Wilmington, Delaware, which is a port city (now, not then, though the river was navigable), and the Trent Affair-era hydrography report noted that:

Christiana creek is narrow but is navigable for gunboats and
steamers of 10 feet draft at low water, or of 17 feet draft at tide
time up to the town of Wilimgton. The powder mills would seem to stand
about 2 miles to the north-east of the town, on the Brandywine creek,
and near the river Delaware, as Dupont's landing place is marked on
the chart.

(They also identified the other major powder mill) :

Newhaven is a large manufacturing town of 40,000 inhabitants, on the
west bank of the small river Mill, at about 4 miles from its outlet
into the sound. Its trade in shipping is small as it has a bar
harbour, and a vessel of 12 feet draft only can go up to the town at
tide time. At low water a gunboat of 12 feet draft could not go nearer
than two and a half miles.

A few miles above the town are Hassard's gunpowder mills, which, with
Wilmington on the Delaware, are the two chief powder mills in the
Federal States. Boats can go up the river to the mills. The only
defence at Newhaven is Fort Hale; it is an earthwork, and not strong.

 

[Clandango]

Problem with the suggestion earlier that a cotton famine would cause unrest that involved war with the U.S. For starters, the British already had plenty of cotton stockpiled and I do not believe they liked having Southerners pretending to be gentlemen trying to blackmail them. And then there was all the support for Lincoln in British cities. And of course, the one thing more important to the British than a cotton famine.

Actual famine. I believe the Americans went from providing a quarter to providing half of the grain for Britain when they had bad harvests. They even provided shipments of grain for the cities. Though that did cause some awkwardness when the first shipments where auctioned off by the Local authorities, who then put the money into a poor fund or something. Anyways, rebellion is a bad thing to go supporting. Especially if it is for against one of the main countries you invested your money in, all so an expansionist region that kept breaking treaties and regulations about slavery could be free. Ahhh, and the South did have a cartel going, so as to not make cotton priced to low.

 

[Saphroneth]

The grain argument is a reason to avoid tension, but not a reason to shrink from war - basically, the reason for the large portion of grain supply coming from the US is that it's cheap not that there's a need. (The food used to go to the South, and it actually caused a depression of prices compared to the pre-war period.)

Here's the cascading chain of "why Britain won't have an actual famine":


1) If there is a blockade but no Embargo Act or refusal to sell to the British.
There will be no noticeable disruption to trade patterns - grain is not contraband.

2) If there is a refusal to sell to the British but no Embargo Act.
The British will buy from elsewhere, the world market price will go up a little, and the people selling their grain to the British will buy American instead. (They may even buy American and sell it on to the British - at a profit, of course!)

3) If there is an Embargo Act preventing the grain from being sold.
The British will buy from elsewhere, and other nations will be a little hungrier. Not much , though, because the British (and others) will diversify commodities and sources, substituting brown bread for white, buying more beans and less grain, and so on.
BUT
The US now has a vast chunk of its grain grown-for-export which it cannot sell. What do they do?

A) The US buys up the grain and has it plowed back into the fields or stockpiled.
Costly, especially for a nation which was already in serious financial straits OTL.
B) The US does not buy up the grain, and the farmers feed it to cattle.
This is a massive loss on the deal, and will likely cause widespread resentment among farmers at the Embargo Act ruining their livelihoods.
C) The US does not buy up the grain, and the farmers smuggle it somewhere it can be sold.
It's back on the world market, meaning we're basically back to (2).

The idea that US grain was the only thing preventing world hunger is a little unlikely in my opinion, and it seems more likely that the British will buy food from others (at higher prices) than just starve - especially since, OTL, the British went to war with a major provider of food to them in 1854. Russia.

Net result on British finances is that the average person is paying a little more for their food, but the average textile worker is back in work and as such quite a bit better off.


Same applies to France, but they were less of a "buy food from elsewhere" nation and would have a larger textile "boost" to their public opinion.


As to the cotton famine - it was an argument used OTL as a reason for intervention. By itself, it was not considered strong enough for intervention (either in Britain or France) but it was considered significant. (The project to grow cotton in India led to the interesting result that "Surat" became slang for "substandard", as it took some years to get up to the same quality of the CSA cotton.)

 

[Lord High Executioner]

Are you saying that we shouldn't allow someone's personal opinion to bias against their facts if they happen to correct about something not related to that opinion?

Check the fact yes, but not automatically assume it is wrong unless they have been wrong about that same thing before.

I think I was trying to say something along those lines.
I got kind of lost in that sentence myself, obviously.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

The Russian navy made a highly publicized visit to New York during the American Civil War. I had the impression that this was the Czar's way of telling the British to back off.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

For a POD, I wonder if having Gladstone being PM at the time would have been enough.

One problem with these scenarios is that Britain and more so France IOTL already gave considerable assistance to the Confederates. The CSA, for example, seemed to have remarkably little problems with selling debt on the European financial markets. Its hard to see what more they could have done.

The US navy would have had to abandon the blockade to fight the British and French navy, but its arguable how effective the blockade really was (the CSA imported lots of war material during its existence). The US federal government would have had to find troops to invade Canada, but historically they kept entire corps employed less than optimally in places such as the Washington garrison, the Army of the James, and the Middle Department and could have used these without touching the three main field armies.

 

[Saphroneth]

The Russian navy made a highly publicized visit to New York during the American Civil War. I had the impression that this was the Czar's way of telling the British to back off.

It's possible, of course, though the timing's wrong for it to be related to Trent (if nothing else the Russians actually sent a message of support to Britain in the Trent, and it's nearly two years later) and it would be a little odd for the Russians to try to tell the British to back off from... not actually doing anything (their default state in the Civil War). Certainly by September 1863 any prospect of intervention is long gone unless the US does something really, really stupid. (Trent Again would do it - not much less would.)


It may actually be more likely that it's related to the ongoing Polish crisis. In the Crimean War, the Russian Navy was rather ignominiously penned up in port and then scuttled (Black Sea fleet) or unable to sally (Baltic fleet). Since the Polish crisis involved the potential threat of war, I suspect part of the idea was getting Russian ships out of their ports so they couldn't be penned up.

They weren't. In 1863, tensions in Europe were rising over Russia's rather bloody suppression of a rebellion in Poland. During the Crimean war, Russia had been forced to scuttle its entire Black Sea fleet rather than take on the British and French navies, and was rather hoping to avoid having to do the same next time round. As such, in the autumn of 1863 they sent squadrons of ships to New York and San Francisco with the intention of using these vessels for commerce raiding in the event of war. Many Northern newspapers, in light of the rather diplomatically isolated position of the country at the time, interpreted this as a Russian gesture of solidarity with the Union and believed that it was intended warn Britain and France against recognising the Confederacy. Unfortunately, this wasn't the case: the myth keeps getting repeated, though, despite Golder first debunking it as long ago as 1915.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...3BnQQ6AEIOzAJ#v=onepage&q=Golder 1915&f=false

(This mentions the Golder article - and the fact that the Russians said it was European concerns. Just thought I'd provide a good citation.)

For a POD, I wonder if having Gladstone being PM at the time would have been enough.

One problem with these scenarios is that Britain and more so France IOTL already gave considerable assistance to the Confederates. The CSA, for example, seemed to have remarkably little problems with selling debt on the European financial markets. Its hard to see what more they could have done.

The US navy would have had to abandon the blockade to fight the British and French navy, but its arguable how effective the blockade really was (the CSA imported lots of war material during its existence). The US federal government would have had to find troops to invade Canada, but historically they kept entire corps employed less than optimally in places such as the Washington garrison, the Army of the James, and the Middle Department and could have used these without touching the three main field armies.

The British also did some extreme stretching of the rules in favour of the US. They turn a blind eye to the US blockade, which was almost certainly unlawful at the time, for example, and let the US coal up in their ports to such an extent they have to impose rules to stop them just recoaling over and over again without ever going home!

 

[frlmerrin]

Check the fact yes, but not automatically assume it is wrong unless they have been wrong about that same thing before.

What of the situation where the poster has not only 'often been wrong about the same thing' over and over again but they have continued to post the errors in thread after thread after thread. What should one do then The Professor?

 

[TFSmith121]

The Eluetherian Mills (DuPont powder works on the Brandywine) is

I am not entirely convinced that

is not a claim that someone well versed in the geography, economy, statistics etc. of mid-nineteenth century United States
should, if it is inaccurate or irrelevant, be able to refute without resorting to reminding people that the well is poisoned.

The Eluetherian Mills (DuPont's historic powder works on the Brandywine) is more than 7 miles by road today from the Delaware River; getting there by ship or boat from the Atlantic requires a 90-mile passage from capes Henlopen and May up Delaware Bay, then up the Delaware River to the confluence of the Delaware with the Christina River, then up the Christina to the confluence with the Brandywine (generally referred to as a creek at this point) through the middle of the city of Wilmington (a city of more than 21,000 in 1860, which - not surprisingly - included multiple bridges over the Brandywine and the Christina) and then up the Brandywine to the Mills themselves, a 200+ acre complex that by 1840 included no less than three dams on Brandywine Creek - so, a little dificult for the good ship Pinafore to steam up the Brandywine or the Christina, much less overland from the Delaware.

Here's Brandywine Creek at Wilmington, for example:



Here's the website for the Hagley Museum on the mill site, which is a national historic site:

http://www.hagley.org/exhibits-powder-yards

There's also the minor problem that Delaware Bay was fortified - Fort Delaware, on Pea Patch Island, is well south of Wilmington, as were the supporting works at what were designated as forts DuPont and Mott after the Civil War.

In addititon, there's the reality that the Philadelphia Navy Yard was just up the river, and quite capable of both building new ships and providing a base to support ships assigned to the defense of the bay, along with - of course - the rest of the Delaware Bay shipbuilding industry, which included such minor firms as Reaney, Son & Archbold (Chester), Neafie, Levy & Co (Philadelphia), William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company (Philadelphia), Birely & Sons (Philadelphia), Hillman & Streaker (Philadelphia), Harlan, Hollingsworth & Co. (Wilmington), and Pusey and Jones (Wilmington), among others.

Philadelphia, of course, was the second largest city in the United States in 1860, with some 565,529 residents, and was heavily industrialized; along with shipbuilding, locomotives and railway equipment, ironworks, etc. it was also home to the Frankford and Schuykill arsenals, while the Phoenix ironworks was all of 28 miles away. Camden, just across the Delaware in New Jersey, had another 14,000, while Chester, between Philadelphia and Wilmington, had another 5,000. Obviously, militia from these communities would be available to help man the defenses of the Bay and the River, alongside the regulars/USVs/and state troops, in rotation, and could be called out en masse in time of crisis (as they were during the Gettysburg Campaign, for example). The militia establishment in Philadelphia, for example, was quite significant and predated the war by decades.

It's also worth noting the outflow of the river creates a near-constant 3 knot outflow current in the Bay, the bay itself is generally shallow, and well provided with rocks and shoals (there wasn't even a 26-foot deep channel from Philadelphia to the Bay until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, and that required significant dredging) and bounded by mudflats and marshes, and the aids to navigation on the river and bay were, of course, built and maintained (or not, in the event of war) by the United States government...

Essentially, an attempt to blockade Delaware Bay in the 1860s (much less an attempt to mount an amphibious operation up the Bay into the River, much less points north or west) is roughly equivalent of trying to blockade and/or attack up the Clyde to get at Glasgow.

And, for what its worth, none of this reality is exactly secret. Anyone who wants to can use Google maps, especially the "terrain" view and the "get directions" applet (complete with modern road mileage) to figure this sort of thing out.

The fact that so many do not, of course, says much.

Best,

 

[frlmerrin]

The Eluetherian Mills (DuPont's historic powder works on the Brandywine) is more than 7 miles by road today from the Delaware River; getting there by ship or boat from the Atlantic requires a 90-mile passage from capes Henlopen and May up Delaware Bay, then up the Delaware River to the confluence of the Delaware with the Christina River, then up the Christina to the confluence with the Brandywine (generally referred to as a creek at this point) through the middle of the city of Wilmington (a city of more than 21,000 in 1860, which - not surprisingly - included multiple bridges over the Brandywine and the Christina) and then up the Brandywine to the Mills themselves, a 200+ acre complex that by 1840 included no less than three dams on Brandywine Creek - so, a little dificult for the good ship Pinafore to steam up the Brandywine or the Christina, much less overland from the Delaware.

Here's Brandywine Creek at Wilmington, for example:



Here's the website for the Hagley Museum on the mill site, which is a national historic site:

http://www.hagley.org/exhibits-powder-yards

There's also the minor problem that Delaware Bay was fortified - Fort Delaware, on Pea Patch Island, is well south of Wilmington, as were the supporting works at what were designated as forts DuPont and Mott after the Civil War.

In addititon, there's the reality that the Philadelphia Navy Yard was just up the river, and quite capable of both building new ships and providing a base to support ships assigned to the defense of the bay, along with - of course - the rest of the Delaware Bay shipbuilding industry, which included such minor firms as Reaney, Son & Archbold (Chester), Neafie, Levy & Co (Philadelphia), William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company (Philadelphia), Birely & Sons (Philadelphia), Hillman & Streaker (Philadelphia), Harlan, Hollingsworth & Co. (Wilmington), and Pusey and Jones (Wilmington), among others.

Philadelphia, of course, was the second largest city in the United States in 1860, with some 565,529 residents, and was heavily industrialized; along with shipbuilding, locomotives and railway equipment, ironworks, etc. it was also home to the Frankford and Schuykill arsenals, while the Phoenix ironworks was all of 28 miles away. Camden, just across the Delaware in New Jersey, had another 14,000, while Chester, between Philadelphia and Wilmington, had another 5,000. Obviously, militia from these communities would be available to help man the defenses of the Bay and the River, alongside the regulars/USVs/and state troops, in rotation, and could be called out en masse in time of crisis (as they were during the Gettysburg Campaign, for example). The militia establishment in Philadelphia, for example, was quite significant and predated the war by decades.

It's also worth noting the outflow of the river creates a near-constant 3 knot outflow current in the Bay, the bay itself is generally shallow, and well provided with rocks and shoals (there wasn't even a 26-foot deep channel from Philadelphia to the Bay until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, and that required significant dredging) and bounded by mudflats and marshes, and the aids to navigation on the river and bay were, of course, built and maintained (or not, in the event of war) by the United States government...

Essentially, an attempt to blockade Delaware Bay in the 1860s (much less an attempt to mount an amphibious operation up the Bay into the River, much less points north or west) is roughly equivalent of trying to blockade and/or attack up the Clyde to get at Glasgow.

And, for what its worth, none of this reality is exactly secret. Anyone who wants to can use Google maps, especially the "terrain" view and the "get directions" applet (complete with modern road mileage) to figure this sort of thing out.

The fact that so many do not, of course, says

So young Merrin was intrigued by all of this information supporting TFSmith121's assertions. However a quick look at Google maps reveals it to be largely fallacious, it made Merrin sad.

Google maps for the present day reveal that the route from the Atlantic passed Cape May and up the Delaware river to the Christina River in Wilmington is broad and accessible to large warships a point proved by TFSmith121 when pointing out there is a USN yard at Philadelphia. So the big RN ships can go and destroy the yard and the other interesting bits of Philadelphia whilst the gunboats and gunvessels move on to the lower Christina (preliminary investigation indicates one bridge higher up than the entrance of Brandywine creek in the 1860s). Then the jolly jack tars leap into the longboats and row the stout lobsters up to the powder works (why have dams below the work site?) possibly towed part way by a splendid little gunboat or two. Consider why build a powder works on a river if you can't move your product down the river in a fairly substantial barge, bigger than a long boat anyway.

The idea of any significant organised militia in the area is extremely unlikely and I am not aware of any evidence for one. Anyway half a dozen boat howitzers would resolve the issue.

As for Fort Delaware

Batttery, garrison and state of completion in 1861 Q4/2 Q1 please TFSmith121? If it is like most of the other Atlantic forts it will be mostly empty and I am betting that at that date the outer works did not exist but I could be wrong?

So scratch one navy yard and associated industrial facilities. BOOM - scratch one powder mill. The ad hoc militia die ignominiously and the boys that won the Crimean war go on to yet another victory with bugger all the USN or Union army can do about it.