Brilliant:
1) Why would the south (pre-1864) make major concessions (and emancipation was a major concession...even in the north it took 2 years to consider it seriously) when they didn't think that they had to? Until 1863, there was a general belief that the war would be won, and that the Union simply wasn't going to prevail. Under such circumstances, emancipation would have been seen as a shameful display of defeatism, and roundly condemned by all involved. This hardly means that the south was concerned only about slavery (as you suggest), but that they didn't feel the need to make concessions without any pressure to do so.
2) I am not sure what you are getting at here, please clarify. You were the one who said that all of states joining the CSA were slave states (correct), but I pointed out that not all slaveholding states joined the CSA, which would suggest that slavery was a necessary, but not sufficient condition.
3) I ask again, PRECISELY what could the southern leaders (if they had been competent enough to bargain, which they weren't) have offered? The midwest had an excellent deal with the north, and in fact had no real basis for any significant trade with the south. The south was almost exclusively export driven, and the primary agricultural goods that they marketed led them to policies completely antithetical to those appealing to the North and the MidWest. There wasn't much basis for a deal to be cut, and the south knew it.
4) No question that you are correct (I cannot imagine anyone voluntarily embracing slavery, but stranger things have happened...well, no, actually they haven't...), but the original point of the discussion wasn't whether blacks were going to support either side (clearly they would support the north), but rather whether racism was confined to one side or another. I believe we probably are in agreement here...
5) Lincoln clearly was not a supporter of slavery, but he also was NOT a supporter of the sort of militant abolitionism that was a driving force behind most of the Radical Republicans. I have no doubt that Lincoln wasn't going to do anything to extend slavery, and even take steps to limit its spread (much of this was going to become extremely difficult in the light of Dred Scot, however...), but there is no evidence to suggest that he was going to take steps to interfere with it where it already existed. In point of fact, Lincoln explicitly rejected this course of action prior to the war, and again after the war began. It wasn't until early 1862 before he seriously considered emancipation as anything other than a wartime expedient...hardly the policy of a rabid abolitionist.
6) Yes, blocking abolitionist activities would have helped, but blocking all sorts of other 'offensive legislation' would have helped as well. Fact is that the south did not wish to build factories and cities (they had some quite lovely ones, in fact...), the south was simply a different sort of culture, one that is quite alien to our modern sensibilities (I must say that I would have found it appalling, but to some, it apparently had some charms...). To adopt the northern industrial ethos was a surrender to them...and there is endless documentation to attest to the fact that this attitude wasn't limited to the planter class. Read letters (I almost said email!) from southern soldiers to their families, these provide incredibly valuable insight into their motivations for fighting (hint, slavery was rarely, if ever mentioned...)
7) Actually slave labor works very well in some environments, particularly those with bad climate, valuable crops, difficult soil and very very little mechanization. It isn't pretty, but it does work. The USSR is a bad example, as it took place AFTER extensive mechanization, which severely undercuts the impact of labor costs. There is little question that within a decade or two slave labor would have become seriously outclassed, if indeed it had not been already, in the first half of the 19th century, the machine was not (yet) supreme.
8) The problem with counterattacks are that it cedes the initiative to the enemy, and Lee always worked hard to PREVENT that from happening. The union's capacity to move troops quickly and attack on many fronts made a counterattack strategy very risky, particularly as the war wore on and the numbers facing the south grew larger and larger. The south enjoyed interior lines, but the distances, decrepitude of their rail net, and generally declining logistics situation made depending upon counterattacks riskier and riskier over time. I don't disagree that this was Lee's preferred tactic, but it wasn't a strategic approach that I believe he favored. Consider that even in 1864 and even in 1865, Lee was constantly trying to DISENGAGE from the AOTP in order to strike offensively at some point away from the Union main axis of attack. These weren't counterattacks, they were separate offensives...