A Shift in Priorities
After Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff had already scorned the demonstration of the so-called “Bremer-Wagen”, an early but very flawed German attempt in tank construction, in March 1917, the failed Entente tank actions near Arras and Juvincourt in April 1917 did mislead the German high command to the believe that the tank was not a decisive weapon and should be neglected.
The prospect of success for the German tank designs that were to be demonstrated and tested near Mainz in mid-May 1917 thus was rather gloomy. The high command was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Max Bauer, originally the specialist for heavy artillery, but now also responsible for resource allocation and cooperation with the home industries. Above all, Bauer had Ludendorff’s ear and was usually able to influence Ludendorff towards the way Bauer saw things. Regarding tanks, Bauer had a negative stance from the start. He knew that the horse supply was going down and was very much interested to get lorries and tractors built that could replace horses as means of traction for the artillery. Tanks would only drain resources away from this, therefore tank construction had to be limited to the minimum, if not to be stifled at all.
Tests on the sandy training ground near Mainz soon showed that the only project that promised some success was the A7V, but even the A7V was not really convincing. The Chief of Field Motor Transport, Colonel Hermann Meyer, was in the meanwhile propagating a far more ambitious project: The Kolossal-Kampfwagen (short: K-Wagen), a monster in the class of 150 metric tons.
To Bauer, all this amounted to waste of resources. The War Ministry was favouring their A7V design, Meyer wanted his K-Wagen. He would have to concede some further design and construction to both, just to placate them. But generally he had already decided to cut this waste as short as possible. Let the specialists toy along with their favourites, but direct almost all resources to really important goals.
This was the state of affairs, when – by chance, during a coffee break – Bauer came into conversation with Joseph Vollmer, the chief constructor of the A7V vehicle.
Vollmer freely admitted that the A7V had been his first attempt in tank construction, and that with the knowledge he had today, he could design far better armoured assault vehicles. He also thought that the K-Wagen was a waste of time, effort and resources and expressed his conviction that small fighting vehicles were best suited for actual combat and the meagre German resource basis.
On this Bauer replied that armoured fighting vehicles must not get in the way of mobility for the field artillery. The field artillery was the most important companion of the infantry, if their guns became immobile for lack of horses, the armoured fighting vehicles alone could decide nothing. Therefore it was better to allocate resources to lorries and tractors instead of tanks.
Vollmer pondered this for some seconds, then he asked: “So, why not put the guns on tracks? Instead of towing them along, let’s install them on the tracked chassis and protect the gun crew by armour plates. – Wouldn’t that be far better then mere traction?”
“And how many of these could be built with the few resources we have? – Consider: The are many thousands of artillery pieces.”
“If we skip K-Wagen and A7V and concentrate on small vehicles that just carry a 7,7 cm cannon with crew and ammunition, several hundreds. We could use the engines of existing passenger cars that have been mothballed for lack of tyres and petrol.”
Bauer hesitated. He had always sought a way to tow the guns into combat. This now was different – not applicable to all field guns in the German inventory, there were just too many of them – but certainly promising for an offensive, which always would have a rather small point of main effort… He also saw the advantage of not having to unlimber the guns under enemy fire; they would be combat ready and protected all the time.
“Let me have your ideas on short notice, with a sketch of a possible vehicle, the resources required and the time to come up with a prototype.”
Vollmer’s new design received the name “Kanonen-Mobil”, short “Kanobil”. It was a 18 metric tons tracked vehicle carrying the proven 7,7 cm canon FK 96 n.A., which was smaller and lighter than the more modern FK 16. The first prototype became ready in August 1917 – and it did convince Bauer, who in turn convinced Ludendorff…
So, when by the end of November 1917, the British ruptured the German front line west of Cambrai with hundreds of their rhomboid tanks, they did not shake the German high command out of a complacency regarding tanks. The news only made Ludendorff nod. Yes, Bauer had been right again. Good that 800 Kanobils were already under construction for the planned German spring offensive. Perhaps another batch should be ordered?
“Have Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer come over.” Ludendorff tasked an aide. “I need to talk to him.”
After Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff had already scorned the demonstration of the so-called “Bremer-Wagen”, an early but very flawed German attempt in tank construction, in March 1917, the failed Entente tank actions near Arras and Juvincourt in April 1917 did mislead the German high command to the believe that the tank was not a decisive weapon and should be neglected.
The prospect of success for the German tank designs that were to be demonstrated and tested near Mainz in mid-May 1917 thus was rather gloomy. The high command was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Max Bauer, originally the specialist for heavy artillery, but now also responsible for resource allocation and cooperation with the home industries. Above all, Bauer had Ludendorff’s ear and was usually able to influence Ludendorff towards the way Bauer saw things. Regarding tanks, Bauer had a negative stance from the start. He knew that the horse supply was going down and was very much interested to get lorries and tractors built that could replace horses as means of traction for the artillery. Tanks would only drain resources away from this, therefore tank construction had to be limited to the minimum, if not to be stifled at all.
Tests on the sandy training ground near Mainz soon showed that the only project that promised some success was the A7V, but even the A7V was not really convincing. The Chief of Field Motor Transport, Colonel Hermann Meyer, was in the meanwhile propagating a far more ambitious project: The Kolossal-Kampfwagen (short: K-Wagen), a monster in the class of 150 metric tons.
To Bauer, all this amounted to waste of resources. The War Ministry was favouring their A7V design, Meyer wanted his K-Wagen. He would have to concede some further design and construction to both, just to placate them. But generally he had already decided to cut this waste as short as possible. Let the specialists toy along with their favourites, but direct almost all resources to really important goals.
This was the state of affairs, when – by chance, during a coffee break – Bauer came into conversation with Joseph Vollmer, the chief constructor of the A7V vehicle.
Vollmer freely admitted that the A7V had been his first attempt in tank construction, and that with the knowledge he had today, he could design far better armoured assault vehicles. He also thought that the K-Wagen was a waste of time, effort and resources and expressed his conviction that small fighting vehicles were best suited for actual combat and the meagre German resource basis.
On this Bauer replied that armoured fighting vehicles must not get in the way of mobility for the field artillery. The field artillery was the most important companion of the infantry, if their guns became immobile for lack of horses, the armoured fighting vehicles alone could decide nothing. Therefore it was better to allocate resources to lorries and tractors instead of tanks.
Vollmer pondered this for some seconds, then he asked: “So, why not put the guns on tracks? Instead of towing them along, let’s install them on the tracked chassis and protect the gun crew by armour plates. – Wouldn’t that be far better then mere traction?”
“And how many of these could be built with the few resources we have? – Consider: The are many thousands of artillery pieces.”
“If we skip K-Wagen and A7V and concentrate on small vehicles that just carry a 7,7 cm cannon with crew and ammunition, several hundreds. We could use the engines of existing passenger cars that have been mothballed for lack of tyres and petrol.”
Bauer hesitated. He had always sought a way to tow the guns into combat. This now was different – not applicable to all field guns in the German inventory, there were just too many of them – but certainly promising for an offensive, which always would have a rather small point of main effort… He also saw the advantage of not having to unlimber the guns under enemy fire; they would be combat ready and protected all the time.
“Let me have your ideas on short notice, with a sketch of a possible vehicle, the resources required and the time to come up with a prototype.”
Vollmer’s new design received the name “Kanonen-Mobil”, short “Kanobil”. It was a 18 metric tons tracked vehicle carrying the proven 7,7 cm canon FK 96 n.A., which was smaller and lighter than the more modern FK 16. The first prototype became ready in August 1917 – and it did convince Bauer, who in turn convinced Ludendorff…
So, when by the end of November 1917, the British ruptured the German front line west of Cambrai with hundreds of their rhomboid tanks, they did not shake the German high command out of a complacency regarding tanks. The news only made Ludendorff nod. Yes, Bauer had been right again. Good that 800 Kanobils were already under construction for the planned German spring offensive. Perhaps another batch should be ordered?
“Have Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer come over.” Ludendorff tasked an aide. “I need to talk to him.”
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