A Brief History of the Levant during the Qyomoa era

[Pempelune]

A Brief History of the Levant during the Qyomoa era
By Agron ASSURACUS, PhD, of the University of Niniveh (1)
Translated by Laslo Chellefs

Introduction to the Middle-East in 850 BC

In 1200 BC, the most destructive event in History unfurled, brought along by a serie of crop failures and the subsequent invasion of the mysterious Sea Peoples. And though the event that would came to be known as the Bronze Age Collapse remains quite mysterious to this day, its consequences are better known.

Chief among them is the deep crisis it caused in the Hittite Empire, in Egypt and in Assyria, the three powers vying for domination of the Near-East: the Hittite Empire itself collapsed, while Assyria and Egypt, weakened, retreated to their respective homeland, thus leaving Syria and Palestine free of external influence for the first time in centuries.

And although the Near-East itself had deeply suffered from the Collapse, as evidenced by the widespread destruction of cities such as Ugarith, Byblos, Ashkelon and Aleppo, the power vacuum it create also gave the numerous peoples of the region, natives or newcomers, the ability to organize themselves freely.

Fig. 1: The southern Levant circa 850 BC

Thus, 400 years later, the Near-East was a mosaic of city-states and statelets: the Philistines, a people suspected to be one of the Sea Peoples, settled in abandonned cities of the southern palestinian coast, forming the 5 city-states Ashkelon, Ashdod, Gaza, Ekron and Gath. Meanwhile, the semitic tribes that came to identify themselves as the "Twelve Tribes of Israel" settled in the depopulated interior of Palestine, forming in northern Palestine the Kingdom of Israel whose rulers were the kings of the House of Omri, and founding there a new capital, Samarie. To their south, the Kingdom of Judah, smaller and less populous, had its capital at Jerusalem, and was ruled by the House of David.

To their east, in Transjordania, emerged the three semitics kingdoms of Ammon, Moab and Edom. By 850 however, with its high population, the Kingdom of Israel had made Judah and Edom vassal-states, and had conquered Moab, though they were faced with heavy resistance by the Moabites.

On the Syrian coastline, the Phoenicians city-states, such as Sidon, Arwad, Tyre or Byblos, which had mysteriously escaped most of the destructions of the Collapse, maintained themselves though they came to be dominated by Tyre, and even began colonizing southern Cyprus.

Fig. 2: The northern Levant circa 850 BC

To the north, in southwestern Anatolia (including the rich region of Cilicia) and northern Syria, the remains of the glorious Hittite people had organized themselves in small city-states such as Carchemish, Que, Gurgum, Bit Adini or Hamath. And although, culturally and historically these states are indeed remnants of the Hittite Empire, they were also multicultural, and along Hittites other peoples prospered, such as the Arameans, which explains how Aramean kings came to dominate most of the southern syro-hittite city-states.

The Arameans themselves were a people which appeared in the Syrian desert during the late Bronze Age, settled in northern Syria and Mesopotamia, and created some kingdoms of their own, such as the powerful Kingdom of Damascus which shared its southern border with the Kingdom of Israel.


1: In order to ease the lecture, and unless stated otherwise, every technical term (such as PhD) or names of places have been translated from the original language (T.N.)

[Please excuse my nonexistent mapmaking skills. I'll try to make some maps of my own when it start really diverging from OTL. Excuse also the language mistakes]

 

[Pempelune]

The Battle of Qarqar and the Sack of Gurgum

To say that the absence of foreign influence was an important condition to the flourishing of independants kingdoms in the Near-East would be an understatement. The Near-East, a region rich in natural resources but also by the number of important trades routes that crossed it, had always been the focus of expansionist politics by the empires of the region, whether Hittite, Assyrian, Egyptian or Babylonian. Thus the Collapse was a breath of fraich air for the peoples of the region. This 400 years respite however would not last anymore. By the 850s, the resurgent Assyrians under Ashurnasirpal II had began expanding to their west, conquering Aramean lands from the Tigris to the Euphrates (among which, the kingdom of Bit Bahiani) and forcing tribute upon the Phoenicians cities. His successor Shalmaneser III marched in war virtually every year, notably reducing the once powerful kingdom of Babylone to vassalage.

Of course, the most well known of his campaigns are in the west. In 856 BC, Shalmaneser III took Til-Barsip, capital city of the Syro-Hittite state of Bit Adini, and made Bit-Adini into a province of the Assyrian Empire, the province of Western Aram. It is hard to stress too much the importance that such a conquest had, symbolically and strategically, for the Assyrian Empire: for the first time since the Collapse, they were on the western side of the Euphrates. This advanced base would then allow them to easily cow the neighboring states of Carchemish, Gurgum, Kummukhi and Kammanu into becoming vassal-states of the Assyrian Empire.

It is important to make a difference between a province of the Assyrian Empire and a vassal-state of the former. While the vassal-state was largely politically independant, it had to pay tribute each year and send soldiers to the Assyrian host. It was thus much preferable than being an Assyrian province, which was led not by a native king but by an Assyrian governor, who not only raised taxes and soldiers for the Assyrian Empire – but was also responsible for the "pacification" of his province, that is, the mass deportation of the natives to other parts of the Empire, in an effort to break the identity of the native people.

Our readers, perhaps thinking this method cruel, might want to know that such a status was only given to states that had not willingly accepted to become vassal-states and had warred against the Assyrian to prevent a conquest, or to vassal-states that had revolted.

Of course, the brutality of the Assyrian Empire was well known at this time, after the brutal former conquest of eastern Aram – the land between Assyria proper and the Euphrates – which had seen the Assyrians destroying any cities that resisted. By 856 BC, the Assyrians were feared in all northern Syria, explaining the bloodless surrender of Carchemish, Gurgum, Kummukhi and Kammanu.


The Assyrians, however, would find that not every levantine states were as easily cowed. In 853 the Assyrians began marching further east, probably looking for another round of conquest in the region before continuing southeast to Phoenicia to raise tribute on the rich cities there. The massive Assyrian army thus left Til-Barsip, and began making impressive shows of force to the remaining independants syro-hittite kingdoms. The attempts were very successful: quickly, the last syro-hittite kingdom not under Assyrian domination was the kingdom of Hamath, the southernmost syro-hittite kingdom.

However, while the Assyrians had been submitting the northern kingdoms, Hamath had had time to raise troops and, more importantly, to secure a coalition with a number of southern kingdoms, notably the Phoenician states of Byblos and Arwad, the powerful Aramean state of Damascus of King Hadadezer, the Kingdom of Israel of King Ahab and the Kingdom of Ammon under King Ba'asa.

Such an alliance was not uncommon in the region: the Assyrian had fought a coalition of Syrian states to conquer Bit-Adini. Shalmaneser III, upon learning of this alliance, prepared for battle and marched southward: the two armies met at Qarqar, north of Hamath in the state of Hatarikka-Luhuti, which has been interpreted by historians has the proof that the coalition was trying to liberate the northern kingdoms. Sadly, little is known of the battle of Qarqar. It had been estimated that the two hosts were of approximately equal strength – around 60 000 men on either side, which still makes it one of the bigger battles of this time period. Perhaps the most surprising is that in accounts of the battle, the two sides presents the battle as a victory. Given, however, that Hamath did not became an Assyrian province or even an Assyrian vassal-state, and that the northern kingdoms remained under Assyrian domination, it is probable that the battle was undecisive. Their way further south blocked, with winter coming, the Assyrian began retreating, as did the coalition which certainly dissolved at that time.

The battle season, however, was not entirely finished. With an army battered but still a formidable force, the Assyrian troops arrived at Til-Barsip. An astounding number of historians have tried to understand exactly what happened in this autumn 853. Sources are conflicting about the real reason of Shalmaneser's infamous siege of Gurgum. The only information found in both accounts is that because of the death of Muwatalli II in 853, a dynastic struggle began in the kingdom of Gurgum, blossoming quickly into a full civil war (1). Because of this, Muwatalli's son and designated successor Halparuntiya II spent the year trying to put down rebellions, and more importantly, did not send soldiers to Shalmaneser's campaigns as was required of him, being an Assyrian vassal.

The accounts then diverge. According to the Kurkh stela erected by Shalmaneser III to celebrate his western campaigns, Halparuntiya II not only refused to send soldiers, he also stopped giving tribute, entering into a full-blown rebellion against the Assyrian Empire.

That Halparuntiya II would have wanted to throw off Assyrian domination is harldy suprising. That he would have done so during a period of instability in his own kingom however is quite suspect. Historians have thus emitted various theories to explain why Shalmaneser moved against Gurgum, the most credible being that he was frustrated by the stalemate and the impossibility the loot the Phoenician cities, and thus decided to loot Gurgum over a pretext.

Whatever the truth be, Shalmaneser III marched his army from Til-Barsip to neighboring Gurgum and besieged the city. Though Shalmaneser makes no mention of this in the Kurkh stela, it is quite probable that Halparuntiya II, upon learning of the coming army, tried to form another coalition to help him, and thus send letters to the other Assyrian vassals, but also to the independant kings in the south, in which he would explain his situation. It is probably from one such letter that King Irhuleni of Hamath learned why the city was attacked by the Assyrians. And although, the coalition scattered and his own armies send home, he didn't send any men to help Halparuntiya II, the importance of Irhuleni in the latter events proves that Halparuntiya's letter made quite an impression on him.

This impression, obviously, would not be enough to stop the Assyrian army from taking Gurgum. After an appaling sack of the city, during which Halparuntiya II was captured, Shalmaneser III returned to Assyria where he publicly flayed the Gurgumite king. The kingdom of Gurgum itself was added to the Assyrian province of Western Aram, the name given to the province created after the conquest of Bit-Adani. The governor used on the population of Gurgum the same technique he had used on the population of Bit-Adani, deporting most of the population to far-away, depopulated places of the Assyrian Empire to replace them with Assyrians. It was, after all, the standard method to quell rebellions in provinces.

1: [POD at long last. In OTL, Shalmaneser simply returned to Assyria, and then spend the rest of his reign submitting the rest of the Levant states].

 

[Zireael]

Ooo, another take on Bronze Age Collapse and its effects? Will be definitely reading!

 

[Donald Reaver]

Ooo, another take on Bronze Age Collapse and its effects? Will be definitely reading!

Seconded, should be good.

 

[Pempelune]

[Thank you for your support guys!]
The First K'enshaa

King Irhuleni of Hamath was, by 852, in a very uncomfortable position. If the coalition that had been formed around him had been successful in preventing outright annexation by the Assyrian Empire, it had not prevented the Assyrian from vassalizing every kingdom north of Hamath. That such a coalition had had time to regroup only because Shalmaneser III was taking his time in the north to strenghten his position there, was probably another reason explaining Irhuleni's worries: should Shalmaneser come back – and that was beyond certain – a coalition would be too slow to form to protect Hamath. By the time any sizable troops could arrive from the south, Hamath would already be looted and burning, and Irhuleni captive and on his way to Assyria.

Of course, Irhuleni could still use the traditionnal way to protect oneself from Assyrian agressions: to submit and become a vassal of the Assyrians. Such a method, however, was much less palatable now.

Indeed, King Irhuleni had learn from Gurgum all there was to know about becoming a vassal of the Assyrian. Though to this day the precious letter from Halparuntiya II has never been found, there is little doubt that in it the king of Gurgum describes his situation in term strongly disapproving the conduct of the Assyrians against one of their own vassal. And though the Gurgumite plea for help was not answered, Irhuleni would not remain idle while waiting for his kingdom to suffer the same fate than his northern neighbor. During the last months of 853, he sent a letter to every king south of Hamath – that is to say, every king not under Assyrian power – asking for a meeting at Hamath, to discuss an anti-Assyrian alliance.

Although the idea of an anti-Assyrian alliance was, as we saw, not new, the idea of a meeting where almost every head of state – or at least their envoys – could meet one another was. Some historians have notably argued that the motivation for demanding a meeting and not just discussing with letters was to have a number of important persons in Hamath at the same place – and as important persons means a lot of guards, the meeting was a way to have an important military force already in Hamath. This argument, however, is quite far-fetched.

In any case, the success of such a new proposal can be partly explained by the swiftness of Pharaoh Osorkon II of Egypt in accepting the meeting proposal, an approval that Irhuleni would quickly and cunningly relay. The support of the only Great Power able to counter Assyria would indeed have convinced most that the proposition was indeed serious. As for Pharaoh Osorkon's approval itself, it can be interpreted as a manifestation of Egypt's will to counter Assyria's worrying ambitions in the region, a region Egypt had taken to consider as its backyard during the Bronze Age, during which Canaan had been a possession of the Egyptian Empire.



And this is how, in spring 852, began in Hamath the incredible gathering of kings that would later come to be known as the First K'enshaa, K'enshaa being aramean for assembly.

It is a credit to King Irhuleni's eloquence, and perhaps also to peer pressure, that every invited king came to the First K'enshaa. The Pharaoh himself sent a talented young man. Most invited kings sent envoys, but some came in person – notably, King Hazadezer of Damascus and King Ahab of Israel.

In stark contrast to later eras, we have little informations on what transpired during the K'enshaa. We know, however, the proposal made by Irhuleni, which was no less new than the K'enshaa itself. Irhuleni, perhaps tired of having to renegociate a coalition every year, was looking for certainties – his treaty, the first of its kind, was a "perpetuous defense coalition": if a member of the coalition was under attack by the Assyrians, the other members had to provide troops to help.

This treaty, that would come to be known as the Q'yomoa ("Pact", in aramean), has been much celebrated as the beginning of a united Levant. This vision, however, is flawed. The treaty did not in any way forbid allied kings to attack one another – indeed, during the 853 BC campaign against Assyria, Israel and Damascus were fighting on their common border – and most importantly, the Levant was not unified in accepting the Q'yomoa. Though every king that had participated in the Qarqar coalition became members of the Q'yomoa, as did Egypt, other kings were more hesitant. Though we have no account of the negociations, the interest of the Q'yomoa for Damascus and Israel was obvious: these two kingdoms were regional powers, and thus did not wanted an ambitious, powerful Assyria to rival them. The benefits for Egypt are less clear, but it is probable that Pharaoh Osorkon II saw the Q'yomoa as the first step toward Egyptian domination of the Levant.

For the Phoenicians city-states, the benefits of the Q'yomoa were quite clear: after all, the dangers of Assyria were well-known, Phoenicia having been made to pay tribute more than once. Worse, the Assyrians had never been so close to Phoenicia, and a successful annexation of Hamath for the Assyrian would probably be the first step toward Assyrian subjugation of Phoenicia. Yet, contrarily to expectations, although Byblos and Arwad, members of the Qarqar coalition, became members of the Q'yomoa, Tyre, the most powerful city of Phoenicia, did not. Perhaps were they hoping that the Q'yomoa could be defeat the Assyrians without their help.

The reasons of the Philistine city-states to refuse the Q'yomoa are better known. Philistia was very close to Egypt, and they feared a resurgent Egypt. As the defensive agreement was arrayed exclusively against Assyria, it would not protect them from Egypt, and was thus useless to them.


The Q'yomoa of 852 was thus no more powerful than the Qarqar coalition – if one omitted the participation of Egypt, which would be foolish. The Q'yomoa was however the assurance that the coalition would not lose members after each war, which prevented the Assyrians from picking on them one by one.

The presence of a strong alliance in the south quikly reached the ears of the vassal kings of Assyria. Their allegiance to Assyria was only nominal and only the fear of retribution kept them from rising in rebellion. The failure of Shalmaneser III to defeat the coalition in 853 had been cause for hope, while the new of the Sack of Gurgum had been met with uneasyness among the vassals, their situation seemingly much more precarious by now that it had been.

Assyrian records of 852 are full of spite against "treasonous Aram". It seems than in the early months of summer, while Shalmaneser III was rallying troops in Assyria for yet another campaign in the west, the vassalized states of Western Aram sent back to the king the heads of the royal envoys asking for men. The Aramean Revolt had begun.

 

[Pempelune]

The Aramean Revolt

At this time it was standard methods, when preparing war against an ennemy, to try to raise rebellions inside one's ennemy's own realm. It seems however, that not only was the Aramean Revolt not the work of the Q'yomoa, it took the allied utterly unprepared. While western Aram erupted in revolt, raising its troops and preparing to march on Til-Barsip, the Q'yomoa hesitated. Now, not every member hesitated – to say this was litteraly godsend for Damascus, Israel, Hamath and Egypt would not be lying. Their army was mustered in record times, and in only a month there was a full joint force going northward. Some others, however, hesitated. Among them, Byblos and Arwad, Edom and Ammon. Those states were anxious to keep the Assyrians north of Hamath and thus protect themselves from the Assyrians – but they thought doubtful the possibility of a decisive victory against the glorious Assyrians. The perpective of a defensive war against Assyria was already frightening, the idea of attacking Assyria was even worse. Perhaps more importantly, the Q'yomoa was clearly a defensive alliance. They were not required to send troops to an offensive war, and they did not.

To say Ahab of Isreal, Hazadezer of Damascus, Osorkon II of Egypt and Irhuleni of Hamath were distraught over this state of things would be lying. The opportunity was golden, that they would need the help of puny, coward Phoenicia seemed unlikely. Thus the combined army crossed at full speed Hatarikka-Luhuti, hoping to join the rebel forces beisieging Til-Barsip, where they hoped to capture the only crossing of the Euphrates still in Assyrian hands. Fortunately, Til Barsip was on the western side of the Euphrates, meaning the allied troops could besiege the city without fear of an Assyrian stealth attack.

Shalmaneser III, however, was no fool, and knew Til-Barsip to be a very strategic position, to hold onto at all cost. Under his command, the defenses of the city had been renovated. The city was thus a true citadel, and would certainly be able to withstand a siege. Worse, Shalmaneser III had not stay idle. The warring season had begun a month ago already, and by the time the allied troops reached the city, Shalmaneser's host was on the move. A week only after the beginning of the siege, scouts spied the Assyrian army on the other side of the Euphrates.

At that point, there was only one possible crossing of the Euphrates for the Assyrian army. Though it wasn't in Til-Barsip itself, it was at the point were Til-Barsip's fortifications were the closest from the river. To forbid passage to the Assyrian army, the allied would thus have to stand between the army and the walls of the city, from which arrows would no doubt rain on them. To let them cross, however, would be relinquishing their main tactical advantage. On January the 5th, 852 BC, under big shields for protection against ennemy arrows, the main part of the allies' army was standing under the walls of Til-Barsip, right in front of the crossing, prepared to stop any Assyrian from crossing the Euphrates.

The task was certainly not easier for the Assyrians. They did not have a monopoly on arrows, and crossing a river is always hard, especially dragging heavy weapons and shields, and trying to protect oneself from arrows that the allies themselves were shooting from their own position. The defenders on the river bank faced not an organized army but isolated soldiers that had managed to cross, and those were sent back quickly into the river. And thus as the day dragged on, and despite the unwithering arrows rain from Til-Barsip, the morale of the allies was high. The Assyrians were still trapped on the other side, slowly crossing only to be killed by the Arameans.

The allies were not surprised to see neither cavalry (for which Assyria was renowned) nor war charriots attempting the crossing. Charriots were too heavy to cross and horses to rare to be wasted, and they would probably only cross when the full bulk of the army was on the other side to protect them.

Perhaps a bit overconfident, the Arameans, once the Assyrian host spied, had called back their scouts. Thus no one saw the slow crossing of the chariots and horses, 5 miles downstream. By midday, a powerful force of horse archers (though quite ineffective at that time: as the rider could not hold the reins and use their bows at the same time, there was two riders on the horse) and more importantly, of heavy 4 horses charriots, powerful troops able to charge and smash ennemy formations.

Fig. 3: Assyrians using inflated sheep skins to transport charriots on the other side of the Euphrates

By the evening, the charriots and cavalry forces had arrived at Til-Barsip, and to the horror of the allies, they were on the western side on the Euphrates. Their charge through the army trapped between the walls and the river was a massacre. No one know which one of the numerous kings – all commanders! - fled first, but quickly the allied army was routed, fleeing Til-Barsip.



This battle of Til-Barsip was a disaster for the allies. Although there had been, all in all, few casualties, the cavalry force that had crossed being not important enough to inflict substantial losses to the allied troops, the Assyrian army had been allowed to cross. Only the slowness of the crossing had prevented Shalmaneser III from pursuing and smashing the fleeing army. Even worse, with the Assyrians now on the western side of the Euphrates, all western Aram was open to attack by the Assyrians. The rebels kings were leaving the unified host by the dozen, running to their cities in the hope of defending it.

On January the 6th, one day after the defeat, King Irhuleni sent messengers to every member of the Q'yomoa not already fighting, and even to non-members. The terror inspired by the Assyrian army was probably palpable in Irhuleni's message, a desperate plea for help. Shalmaneser III, it seems, after the battle of Til-Barsip, had decided to go right to Hamath, to behead the coalition once and for all before destroying his rebellious vassals. What remained of the allied army was fleeing bofore them.

Perhaps the fact that Hamath itself was targeted spurred the rest of the Q'yomoa: an Assyrian Hamath, as said before, was a true nigthmare for them. What is sure is that by January the 10th, the armies of Arwad, Byblos, Edom and Ammon, probably already prepared for a war, were mustered and marching at full speed toward Hamath. It was not a major force, perhaps as much as 10 000, but for these small states those numbers prove they sent everything thay had.

Alerted of these developments, King Irhuleni, given full command of the allied army (much to the displeasure of Pharaoh Osorkon II) since his own city was the one under attack, stopped his army behind the walls of Hamath. The last battle would take place here.

According the later accounts of the battle, Ihrhuleni's forces were outbumbered. Both army were tired from the long march from Til-Barsip, but Shalmaneser III wasted little time. He sent his army into a rapid charge, a tactic used by the Assyrians to surprise their ennemies and send them into a route. The allies, however, were ready for them. Perhaps spurred by Irhuleni's speech that compared the Assyrians to monstrous beasts that would overrun civilization if they were not stopped right there, the army hold. And though they were harassed by the ennemy horse archers, the Assyrians themselves were under a thick arrows rain from the wall of Hamath.

It was the Assyrian cavalry that first noticed the army coming from the east. Under Irhuleni's orders, the last forces of the Q'yomoa had regrouped in the east of Hamath, in order to outflank the Assyrians once the battle started. Quickly the camelry they had brought with them, courtesy of Edom and Ammon, charged into the cavalry and charriots that had hastily regrouped there to stop the coming army. The fight between the camelry and the cavalry was not to the advantage of the former. Slower and less manoeuvrable, the camels were picked on one by one by the Assyrian cavalry. However, in the process, the Assyrians broke formation. When the allied infantry arrived, there was no organized force to stop them. The isolated horse archers were either killed or fled, while the infantry smashed into the eastern flank of the Assyrian army. This opportune arrival raised the morale of the allied army. They began to push on the Assyrian themselves, turning the tide. Taken between two advancing armies, their eastern flank broken and still submitted to heavy arrows rain, the Assyrians broke. What remained of the allies' own charriots began sweeping movements to take as many prisonners as possible. The battle of Hamath was a stunning victory.

Upon hearing this new, in the north, the rebellious kings began to reform an army, marching south to catch the fleeing Assyrians. They met at Aleppo, in Arpad. The battle was anticlimactic. The Assyrians, their morale shattered, did not broke, but Shalmaneser, refusing to be trapped between this northern army and the southern one that was tailing him, declined to offer battle. They continued in an orderly retreat until Til-Barsip, where they crossed the Euphrates. Til-Barsip itself did not surrender, but they were submitted to a 2-month long siege that ended in september with the storming of the city. The Assyrians were well and truly gone from western Aram.

 

[Pempelune]

The Second K'enshaa

852 BC ended with another K'enshaa being called at Hamath. There was, indeed, much to discuss: although the Aramean Revolt had been a great success, it had also revealed dysfunctionnements in the Q'yomoa, severe enough that the Assyrians, even beginning with a very bad tactical position, had managed to almost defeat the Q'yomoa. There was also the question of the newly "liberated" states of the north, and of the former Assyrian province of Western Aram: the old kings of Bit-Adani were all dead.

Quickly, the K'enshaa revealed, among the Q'yomoa states, a divide. Israel, Damascus, Egypt and Hamath thought that the reason the Battle of Til-Barsip had been lost was the absence of Arwad, Byblos, Edom and Ammon of the battlefield. After all, wasn't the battle of Hamath proof enough that a united Q'yomoa was more than able to beat the Assyrians?

Obviously, Byblos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon were not of the same mind. Their troops, they countered, would not have changed a thing in the battle of Til-Barsip: after all, there had been less men fighting at Hamath than there had been at Til-Barsip, because of the rebel Kings' defection. No, it was obvious – in their minds at least – that the whole reason for the defeat was the dangerous way with which Israel, Damascus, Egypt and Hamath had dealt with Assyria. Assyria, with or without western Aram, was strong. Attempting to take territory from them was dangerous, they argued, but attempting to take territory without the help of the whole Q'yomoa was pure folly, Til-Barsip being proof of that. Even worse, they added, by taking such a huge risk they were putting in danger the whole Q'yomoa, because if they were defeated, what remained of the Q'yomoa would ne doubt be unable to defend itself from Assyria.

It is interesting to note that the rhetorical battle that began in this K'enshaa was in many ways a prefiguration to the art of rhetorics that would be developped later, but perhaps is it more interesting to relate the conclusion of the K'enshaa. One could have thought that reconciliating two sides that were increasingly rejecting the fault on one another was impossible. Yet it was. The two sides agreed on one thing: the Q'yomaa had dysfunctionnated, and this failure had almost destroyed it. To amend the Q'yomoa, the Pact, was capital. As the two sides could not agree on what exactly was the problem, they ended up having to compromise: the K'enshaa concluded that the Q'yomoa agreement would now be the following, as translated from the original text:

"May the Kings, as brothers, only fight the people of the land of Assur, curses be on them, united as brothers. May the Kings only war the people of the land of Assur, seven and seven curses on them, with the assent of their brothers, in an Assembly of Brothers. The one that would break this Pact, may the brothers unleash war upon him as an oathbreaker, and may he be cursed, seven times and seven times over". The "Assembly of Brothers" being K'enshaa, and the "Pact", Q'yomoa.

Though this would be perhaps cryptic to our modern readers, the meaning was perfectly clear for the 9th century BC kings: not only every Q'yomoa member was required to fight if the Assyrians declared war upon a member, as in the previous agreement, but now a declaration of war by a member of the Q'yomoa could only be declared if the Kings gathered in a K'enshaa approved it, so as to satisfy Byblos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon. It seems that at the beginning those cities wanted the approval of every members to lauch the war, but over the negociations they accepted to have it reduced to the absolute majority - an idea that originated in Arwa - to satisfy Hamath, Damascus and Israel. Finally, any king failing to respect those rules would find himself in a war against the other Q'yomoa members, so as to satisfy Hamath, Damascus, Israel and Egypt.

There has been much debate among historians revolving aroung this new Q'yomoa. Historians have argued that this second K'enshaa is the true birth certificate of the Q'yomoa, as in this version the members relinquish part of their authority, here in foreign politics against Assyria, to the Q'yomoa and its assembly, the K'enshaa. Whether the Q'yomoa was born at that exact moment or not, this second K'enshaa is certainly a major moment in the Q'yomoa history, for the aforementionned reasons but also for other ones.

Although Arwad, Byblos, Edom, Ammon, Hamath, Damascus and Israel, at the end of the negociations had been able to find a compromise, Egypt for one hadn't. The very idea to have to refer to other countries to set its external policy was unacceptable to Pharaoh Osorkon II. That Egypt, a powerful empire in its own right, would have to answer to a K'enshaa and follow its orders was just impossible.

At that point, there was several ways to act for Irhuleni of Hamath, Ahab of Israel and Hazadezer of Damascus. They could either accepts the demands of Bybos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon, but that would mean losing Egypt as a Q'yomoa member. Alternatively, they could accept the conditions of Pharaoh Osorkon II but then Byblos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon would probably leave the Q'yomoa themselves.

In terms of manpower, Egypt certainly was a better ally than Byblos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon, and if the choice had been made solely upon this, it would have been an easy one. There was, however, another parameter to take into consideration: while Byblos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon were willing to compromise, as had been shown earlier, Egypt wasn't. In fact, the attitude of Pharaoh Osorkon II to consider the Q'yomoa not as an alliance between equals but more as a vassals/overlord relation was irksome to the kings. Worse, it was threatening: they didn't want to protect themselves from one power by submitting to another one. It's probably what explains that Egypt left the Q'yomoa at the end of the K'enshaa, while Byblos, Arwad, Edom and Ammon remained members.

The loss of Egypt was a major blow to the Q'yomoa. During the 852 war, it had been the most contributing member of the alliance. However, that loss was somehow compensated by the admition in the alliance of every liberated states: the kings were not eager to return under Assyrian vassalage and Q'yomoa membership was the better way to prevent Shalmaneser III from conquering western Aram again.

As for the province of Western Aram, it became the state of Bit Adani, with his ruler being the husband of one Irhuleni's daughter. As for the kingdom of Gurgum, its eponym capital having been destroyed, it was definitely merged into Bit Adani.

 

[Faeelin]

Huh, this is very interesting. So we're seeing a Levantine confederation?

 

[Pempelune]

Huh, this is very interesting. So we're seeing a Levantine confederation?

[Well, it does seems so! Irhuleni would certainly disagree though: for him it's certainly not a confedaration, but nothing more than an alliance with extended powers because of circumstances.]

Fig. 4: The Levant in 851 BC

 

[Zireael]

Nice map! I can definitely see a new major player shaping up!

However I will admit I don't know much about Assyria and even less about that time period.

 

[Pempelune]

Nice map! I can definitely see a new major player shaping up!

However I will admit I don't know much about Assyria and even less about that time period.

I'll probably make an update about Assyria soon, and their situation is not much different from OTL for now. Thanks about the map... I'm quite happy about the result, since it's my first one (thanks to @B_Munro for his help)

 

[DanMcCollum]

Oh! I'm fascinated by this era of history (and its one that doesn't get a lot of attention on here). Count me as interested!

 

[chr92]

Thanks for this original, interesting and believable tl. looking forward to the next posts.

 

[Jon the Numbat]

This is a very unique take on a time period that isn't explored often here. The Q'yomoa is a fascinating concept and adds a new dynamic to the interaction between the societies within the region. I can't wait to see your ideas on the way this world develops!

 

[Yun-shuno]

Is Qyomoa an OTL concept or word or was it invented for the purposes of this TL?

 

[Pempelune]

Is Qyomoa an OTL concept or word or was it invented for the purposes of this TL?

Q'yomoa is an Aramean word meaning pact, which got applied to this particular alliance. Aramean is the lingua franca in northern syria, and it's started to become the lingua franca of the whole levant.

Oh! I'm fascinated by this era of history (and its one that doesn't get a lot of attention on here). Count me as interested!

Thanks for this original, interesting and believable tl. looking forward to the next posts.

This is a very unique take on a time period that isn't explored often here. The Q'yomoa is a fascinating concept and adds a new dynamic to the interaction between the societies within the region. I can't wait to see your ideas on the way this world develops!

I've got only one thing to answer to this - continue flattering me, I love it
More seriously, the evolution of the region is going to be very hard to portray, what with every particular culture probably mixing it a bit differently than its neighbors. So, ideas and propositions are totaly welcome

***

The Rape of Til-Barsip

The empire of Assyria was, by the reign of Shalmaneser III, a divine monarchy: the king was supposed to be the deputy of Assur on Earth - Assur being the patron-god of Assyria and head of the Assyrian pantheon. A common Assyrian belief was that Assur required his deputy to extend his power on Earth, thus making conquests sacred. This belief was arguably the main drive for the conquests of the Assyrian Empire, which stretched far beyond Assyria proper, to the west up to the Euphrates and as far south as the Persian Gulf, as Babylon and its own empire had been conquered earlier.

More importantly, this doctrine meant that to please Assur, Shalmaneser had to conquer lands for his god. His father Ashurnasirpal II had done this quite well, as he was responsible for Assyria's expansion to the Euphrates. Up 851, Shalmaneser had not, and it is thus no wonder that Shalmaneser's 853 conquest of Western Aram was an object of pride for the monarch, and was celebrated accordingly in Niniveh, the imperial capital. Of course, the Aramean Revolt of 852 and his inability to take back Western Aram made all this vain. Shalmaneser III had been unable to conquer lands for his god, or at least unable to keep them. And although no one said so to his face, it was seen as shameful by the entire empire.

And so, Shalmaneser made the defeat of this new western alliance his biggest priority, far beyond the subjugation of the barbarians of the northern kingdom of Urartu or alleged civil unrest in Babylon. In the spring of 851, while the western kings were still discussing the future of the Q'yomoa, Shalmaneser III was touring his kingdom to levy as much men as possible. Of course, taking so much men for his wars meant that there would be few left during the summer to tend to the fields, but this weakness was seen as a necessary evil that would be far repaid by the riches that would be plundered in the Levant. Beside, if necessary, levantine grain could be easily plundered too.

Such a gambit was not usually necessary: in general, the men were levied after the recolt. Shalmaneser III, however, knew full well that by that time he would have the whole Levant waiting for him on the Euphrates. His earlier crossing tactic would not work now that Til-Barsip was in the hands of the Q'yomoa, and making his full army cross right in front of a waiting army would be asking for a disaster. No, he had to surprise the Q'yomoa, and attacking earlier would do just that.

Thus, while spring was just finishing and the Second K'enshaa just starting to scatter, an Assyrian army marched to the Euphrates.

Shalmaneser III desired to cross, but crossing at Til-Barsip would be folly. The crossing under the city would be under intense watch, and the city probably prepared to repulse an Assyrian army, surprise effect or not. Further north however, the same could not be said. There was a few crossings available, and although those were probably more dangerous than the one at Til-Barsip, especially in spring, they had the massive advantage of not being right under a city from which arrows rained like water. Thus, Shalmaneser went northwest.

Of course, even those northern crossings were watched. Thus, and despite Shalmaneser's best efforts at killing every scouts he spotted, quickly the whole Levant learned that an Assyrian army had once again crossed the Euphrates, not that he would do them much good. They also learned from them the astounding size of the invading army. Most accounts of this period agree to say the Assyrians numbered something between 115 000 and 130 000 men, with some lone accounts talking about as much as 150 000.

Having so big an army on the western side of the Euphrates was somewhat problematic though. While numbers would be useful in a battle, there was no one to fight yet. No one had even assembled armies. And though having his army already west of the Euphrates meant he would not have to attempt a bloody crossing anymore, it also meant that he would be quickly cut off from Mesopotamia and thus from his supply chain. Food could cross the Euphrates by raft but it would take time, besjde this impractical method would be quickly made dangerous by guerilla-type tactics. To feed his humonguous army, he still needed to secure a crossing of the Euphrates, and there was no better place than Til-Barsip.

Thus Shalmaneser headed south. And while the crossing could be secured, he ordered his army to spread. They would live of the land, taking adavantage of the fact that there was no one to stop them yet.

This tactic had some drawbacks though. While no army rose from nowhere to stop him, the peasants fleeing his coming army soon began organizing themselves into war bands that began to harass the Assyrian army, itself too disorganized at this point to be able to force them into any kind of decisive battle. Way to quickly those peasants armies began to use Assyrian weapons plundered on ambushed Assyrian soldiers. They were, however, not much more than a small thorn in Shalmanaser's side. Til-Barsip was not far from their crossing point, and by the time the Assyrians arrived at Til-Barsip the army had taken no significant casualties. Til-Barsip, once again capital of Bit-Adani, was – once again! - besieged, though this time by Assyrians. The city would certainly not surrender quickly and Shalmaneser had not time to waste, but the Assyrians were masters, if only reluctantly, of siege warfare. Quickly a huge ramp was put into construction, under the watchful, desperate eyes of the new king and queen of Bit-Adani, trapped in the city.

Of course, the Assyrian invasion had not fallen into deaf ears. The looting of Western Aram by the Assyrians and the siege of Til-Barsip was quite obviously an act of war from Assyria upon a Q'yomoa member. The entire alliance was thus now at war with Assyria, according to the terms of the treaty. The Q'yomoan answer, however, was slow to come. Like Shalmaneser III had foreseen, there was no army prepared to break the siege, if only because it had not been raised yet. It was quite probable that Til-Barsip would fall before any meaningful army, yet any big enough to battle the Assyrian army, could be assembled. Worse yet, the kings of northwestern Aram, the kings of Kammanu and Kummukhi notably, found that raising troops was considerably harder than it should have been. The Assyrians troops had raided the countryside so well that there was no farmer that had not already left his land, and thus no farmer to call in the army. Most of them were either in surrounding country, where hopefully they would be raised among the other peasants, or were members of one of the war bands that were contributing, in their own way, to the devastation of the countryside – earning them the apt nickname of "Locusts" - and those war bands, though perfectly willing to fight the Assyrians, were not under the authority of the kings, nor anyone's really. This problem, initially restrained to the areas traversed by the Assyrian host, quickly expanded as the general looting of the countryside didn't stop once the siege of Til-Barsip began: indeed, while a portion of the army was required to lay siege to the city, most of the army was not. Shalmaneser III encouraged the rest of the army to raid deeply into Q'yomoa territory, as he understood the difficulties it created to the Q'yiomoa kings and desired to punish the Arameans for their revolt.

These Q'yomoa kings, however, were not staying idle. Armies were levyied, albeit slowly, and by June sizable forces had been assembled in various major cities of the Q'yomoa. The southern members had begun to gather their troops at Hamath, while the the northern had gathered at Zincini, capital of Sama'al, and then as their host had grew larger, had managed to reach Carcemish, a major city and fortress, the key of the region, which was also very close to Til-Barsip. From these positions they began harassing the Assyrians bands ravaging the countryside, in the hope of starving them. It was, however, all in vain. On June the 6th, the monumental ramp constructed by the Assyrians was completed. The city was stormed, its doors opened.

Many accounts, some centuries later, were made of the Rape of Til-Barsip, proving just how traumatic the event was. Shalmaneser, angered by the siege being longer than he had hoped and seeking to make an exemple of the city, had every inhabitants that could not boast an Assyrian origine rounded and pushed into the Euphrates, then showered with arrows. The few who didn't drowned and survived the arrows spread the horrific tale, just like Shalmaneser had intended. The king and the queen of Bit-Adani themselves, along with all their court and every priest that could be find, were crucified and exposed on the walls of the city. And though the cruelty of the Assyrians was proverbial by now, this was on a whole other scale.

 

[Sceonn]

Fear is a useful weapon, but it is double edged and taken too far and it becomes the bane of it's master.

 

[Pempelune]

Fear is a useful weapon, but it is double edged and taken too far and it becomes the bane of it's master.

Well, Shalmaneser definitely should have learned a bit, since the Q'yomoa was created directly because of how violent he was.
Now, to see which edge dominated this time...



The Battle of Nampigi

Though Shalmaneser was undoubtedly a good military commander, it is very doubtful that he foresaw the consequences of the Rape of Til-Barsip. He more likely acted like he did in a desire for revenge, and to instill fear in his ennemies' minds. Though it did work, another emotion accompanied it. To say that there was hatred against the Assyrians after the Rape in the Q'yomoan ranks would be a massive understatement. From the top to the bottom of the hierarchy of the Levantine armies, was directed against the Assyrians a dangerous mix of a desire for vengeance and a fear of what the Assyrians might do to the rest of the region if they were left unchecked.

The kings, united in a war council now that the army of Damascus had joined the northern army at Carcemish (without obstruction by the Assyrians, still occupied by the Rape of Til-Barsip) undoubtedly shared those feelings. They knew, however, that reinforcement, albeit small, were underway, and were probably not very intent on attacking the city. And though most of the soldiers desired ardently an attack, besieging Til-Barsip now would have been a nightmare and attacking the various Assyrian group still raiding the countryside would have been very dangerous, what with an army at Til-Barsip ready to take them from behind as soon as the occasion presented itself.

The Assyrians, however, were not content of staying inside Til-Barsip: the day after the end of the Rape, the Assyrian army left the city. The Levantine kings knew a golden opportunity when they saw one. Though the Assyrian army in itself outnumbered the forces of the Q'yomoa, more than two-third of it was still dispersed in the countryside. Scouts rapports indicated that those battalions had been called back by Shalmaneser, but also that after two month raiding at their pleasure, they were severely disorganized. Whether they would answer Shalmaneser's call itself was not even sure, and it was quite probable they would take time to come. More to the point, the Q'yomoan soldiers themselves were restless, and the kings rightly feared that if they did not attack now, their army might just attack without them, which would certainly be a disaster of the utmost importance. Allohistorians have debated for weeks about how credible it is to have the Levantine army not attack if the Assyrians had refrained from massacring the population of Til-Barsip. We will not discuss this point though, as what interest ourselves here is the real, much more serious History.

Mere minutes after Shalmaneser III had left Til-Barsip with his army, the forces of the Q'yomoa fell on him like a storm. Enraged by the Rape, the Levantine soldiers fought that day with an energy and a courage that would be sung in centuries to come. A battle, however, cannot be won solely by courage. Though the Assyrian soldiers scattered in Syria were not much willing to fight, as the scouts had reported to the kings, their officers, capable men completely loyal to Shalmaneser the deputy of Assur, were willing to fight, and willing to lead their men in long forced march to answer the king's call. When the battle began in the fields outside Nampigi – a city slightly to the south of Til-Barsip – there was significantly more Assyrian raiders in the surrounding area than there had been the night before. Those soldiers gathered into a sizable force and smashed on the rear of the Q'yomoan army. Fatefully, the Q'yomoan, held together by their rage, did not route. Thus the battle continued on for hours, allowing the Assyrian latecomers to get in the fight too. Soon, the entire Q'yomoan army was surrounded. Seeing that there was no hope of escape, a number of soldiers fought to death, including kings like Hazadezer of Damascus and Ahab of Israel. The remainder got captured, although in the confusion ensuing the mass surrender, some managed to flee, the only recorded king having managed to do so being Irhuleni of Hamath.

After the Battle of Nampigi, any organized Q'yomoan resistance to the Assyrians disappeared. Its army was either dead of captured. While the reinforcements waited for by the kings had not fought in the battle, those units never unified to fight the Assyrians. Most rebelled and their soldiers just went back to their home to tend their fields, while some others began behaving like the Aramean "Locusts" that still plagued the region.

Thus, with no army left to fight, Shalmaneser had free reign to subdue the cities of the region, particularly with their kings dead or captured. He splitted his army into numerous smaller forces that he sent besieging the cities. The ultimatum those forces delivered to the population of those cities was clear: should they resist the Assyrians, they would suffer the same fate as Til-Barsip, while if they surrendered peacefully, only the priests and the nobles would be killed.

Most cities, upon hearing this, immediately opened their doors to the Assyrians, thus confirming the success of Shalmaneser's horror policy. Even Hamath, whose king was still alive though hiding himself, decided to surrender itself to the Assyrians. Only some rare cities resisted, the most prominent of those being Samaria, capitale of Israel, whose new king Ahaziah refused to surrender. The city, although quite new and well defended, could not stop the Assyrians, and was quickly stormed, his inhabitants killed or enslaved, the temples of Yahweh and Baal burned with their riches taken away to Assyria, and Ahaziah himself captured alive.

And thus, in less than a month, the whole Q'yomoa to the exception of Byblos, Arwad and Edom was subjugated by the Assyrian Empire. Edom, quite far away, surrendered itself against the promise that it would only become a vassal-state ruled by Kaus-malaka, the king of Edom who had been taken prisonner at the battle of Nampigi, conditions to which the Assyrians agreed.

The region thus secured, Shalmaneser III turned his sight to Phoenicia. It had been his father's habit to threaten the Phoenicians into tribute, but Shalmaneser now had the possibility to directly tax the rich commerce for which the Phoenicians were renowned. He offered to the Phoenicians cities the same choice than he had given to the Q'yomoan cities, to surrender or be destroyed. Only two resisted, Arwad and Tyre.

This choice is to be put into perpective: both Arwad and Tyre had the particularity of being islands, and had a powerful navy. The Assyrians however, with their capture of Phoenicia, also had a navy now. The battle between the two forces never lead to an invasion, though: the Assyrians were no seamen, and thus had to rely on the Phoenicians to man their boats, along with Assyrian troops to ensure the "loyalty" of the Phoenicians sailors. Thus when the naval battle began, as soon as the Assyrian ships were boarded, their crews revolted and sided with the Tyreans and Arwadians. Only a handful of boats escaped, and although the Phoenicians cities would suffer heavy punishments for their sailors' treason, Tyre and Arwad remained safe though utterly unable to do anything to help the mainland.

Shalmaneser began to divide the conquered lands into new Assyrian provinces, while sending to Assyria the numerous kings, queens and high priests captured.

 

[Yun-shuno]

So the Assyrians buttrape every body like they did OTL?

 

[Pempelune]

So the Assyrians buttrape every body like they did OTL?

Well, they tried anyway :v


The Glorious Rebellion

And thus it was that Shalmaneser submitted the whole Q'yomoa to his will, and exerced his vengeance on the conquered peoples. In his rage, however, he had overlooked a crucial thing: his empire, though powerful, was dangerously overstretched. His domination, though complete, was not accepted.

There was no immediate rebellion, though. The defeat of Nampigi had taken a heavy toll on the Levant: there was, according to the stela erected by Shalmaneser to boast of his victory, around 40 000 Q'yaomoan casualties, and around that many prisonners of war, who would later go east, along with Shalmaneser, to be sell on the Assyrian slave markets. It was easy to see how disastrous that was for the Levant. Summer had come, but there was no one to tend to the fields, thus letting the harvest to rot in the fields everywhere in the Levant. What little food had indeed been recolted, along with every reserves in the granaries, went to Assyria to prevent a famine there. The climate of fear instillated by Shalmaneser III and his new governors was enough to keep talks of revolts low... for now. The feeling that the Assyrians were starving the population was shared by the whole population and there are few better incentives for revolts than that. But the battle of Nampigi had had another consequence: most man that had once held power in the Q'yomoan states, be they kings, army officers or priests were either dead or in captivity in Assyria. The country had been literally beheaded, making any revolts much more difficult. This, however, would prove insufficient to keep a lid on a discontentment that was shared not only by the disposessed elites of the Levant, but also by the common people, which was seeing with worry and anger that famine was near. Small rebellion cells formed in every major cities of the region, generally around people that had wielded some form of authority before the conquest – proving, if it was need, that the common people was quite nostalgic of the period – but also, albeit more rarely, around charismatic leaders.

Any revolt, however, was automatically doomed to failure as long as the bulk of the Assyrian army stayed in the Levant to "pacify the region", something that Shalmaneser, anxious of not seeing a repeat of the Aramean Revolt, was determined to see continue.

Shalmaneser III, however, would soon learn that the East, too, required his attention – and his army.

The kingdom of Urartu was a relatively new polity that had arisen recently, north of Assyria. Their power had extended to the point that they now shared their southern border with Assyria, and were quite intent on pushing it to the south. Earlier wars with the Assyrians, however, had shown the superior strength of the Assyrian army. Sadly for Shalmaneser, those defeats had not spelled the end of the Urartian ambitions. But the Assyrians had kept this border manned, making any new attempt dangerous. The Urartians, however, were neither deaf nor blind. To crush the Q'yomoa, Shalmaneser had reduced troops everywhere in the Empire – and that included the northern border. Of course, the Urartians noticed. Weary of stepping in a trap, they prefered not to send their troops immediately – they began with raids on Assyria, small at first but bigger and bigger as the days passed and no hidden Assyrian troops made any efforts at stopping them. Now, such raiding was nothing unusual - which is probably why no words of this reached Shalmaneser III before august. A weeks before he received the message, a full Ururtian army had crossed the border, and was headed straight on Nineveh. It was probable that the Urartians were not looking for outright conquest, but more for the riches of the imperial capital. They began besieging the city, all the while raiding with ardor the countryside.

Meanwhile, in the south, more danger loomed. After the collapse of the Akkadian Empire, long ago, Mesopotamia came to be divided between two nations – the Assyrians in Upper Mesopotamia, and Babylone in Lower Mesopotamia. And though the Assyrians had managed to subdue the Babylonians and conquer Lower Mesopotamia, the Babylonians still saw themselves as a different people and resented the foreign occupation. Thus they revolted often. 851 BC, with its reduced soldiers everywhere in Babylonia, was a perfect occasion for such a rebellion. Quickly all Lower Mesopotamia was set ablaze by the revolt.

Though no records remains of Shalmaneser's reactions to those grim news, we know that he left he Levant in haste, bringing with him around 100 000 soldiers back east, thus leaving only 15 000 to 30 000 troops in the Levant, mainly as garrisons in the cities.

This decrease was significant. But the remaining troops where more than enough to quell a disorganized uprising, and they were proving it by ruthlessly crushing the Arameans Locust that had become the last "armies" still opposing the Assyrians. They proved quite effective at defeating the guerilla tactics the Locusts used on them, in part because of the unsuitable terrain in northern Syria.

Thus, Irhuleni's survival is considered by historians as one of the major reasons the rebellion would not be easily crushed. Irhuleni has been king of Hamath, the city in which, during two years, gathered every influential noble, priest or officer of the Levantine states. He thus enjoyed a very good reputation with most leaders of the rebellion cells scattered in the region. It is probably at his request that the famed "Ghost Q'yomoa" occured. Although it is referred to as a Q'yomoa, the fact that no account tells its location means that it probably was not a massive gathering of rebellion leaders, which would have been incredibly dangerous during the Assyrian occupation, and more of a collection of secret meetings between those leaders.

This Ghost Q'yomoa was central in allowing the rebellion to succeed because it allowed it to be not scattered small uprisings but one massive, coordinated revolt. Perhaps more important, during this Q'yomoa was discuted what exactly would happen if the revolt was successful, and notably, who would succeed the numerous kings dead in the rebellion. Those future kings were generally chosen among those rebellion leaders that could claim to be a part of the old ruling family, by compromising with the other leaders based in the same ex-kingdom. This allowed the various cells to not be rivals of one another, but rather to be all working toward the same goal. The revolt, however, did not take place immediately after the Ghost Q'yomoa, as the rebellion leaders were waiting to learn more about the situation in the east to know if the Assyrians would be able to return quickly or not.

Shalmaneser III, in his march to Nineveh, had brought back to Assyria 100 000 soldiers along with the 40 000 Levantines taken as prisonners of war at Nampigi. He soon understood that those 100 000 soldiers would be more than needed in the various threats to his Empire. By the time those soldiers had been gathered at Til-Barsip, however, more than 2 full weeks had passed, and it took an other one to reach Nineveh, even marching at full speed.

The Urartians were not very experienced at siege warfare. But during the reigns of Shalmaneser and his predecessors, Nineveh, capital of an empire that was growing incredibly quickly, entered itself into massive growth. The city quickly extended beyond its walls, and those kings, more preoccupied by expansion than by defense did not build new walls to protect the city. As a result, the Urartians could not only easily destroy the outer city – but those buildings built along the walls of the city were quickly used by the Urartians to scale the walls at various points. A week before Shalmaneser could arrive in Nineveh, the city fell to the Urartians.

The fall of Nineveh was not the beginning of an Urartian conquest of Assyria – upon his arrival, Shalmaneser was quickly able to retake the city, as the Urartians were more anxious with looting the city and taking the inhabitants as slaves than with defending their prize. But the fall of the imperial capital and its looting was nonetheless a heavy blow to the Assyrians: members of the royal family were taken prisonners, the imperial treasury was looted... Beside, even with Nineveh retaken, Urartian were still heavily raiding Assyria, bringing havoc to the heartland of the empire, from which much of the Assyrian manpower came. This forced Shalmaneser III to dispatch more soldiers that he would like to the defense of Assyria, while he went south to Babylonia to crush the dangerous uprising that was seriously threatening to reestablish a separate Babylonian Empire. All this meant that the 40 000 prisonners brought to Assyria by Shalmanaser found themselves lightly guarded. Although those men were physically weakened by the food privations and the long walk to Nineveh, when the Urartians made a raid on the city that was hosting the camp in which they were emprisonned, their uprising was only strenghtened by their hunger. And even though the prisonners died en masse during the uprising – in no small parts because they were unarmed – the uprising could not be stop by the guards, who were already stretched thin trying to repulse the Urartians. The Levantine thus escaped captivity and began looting the city themselves, looking for food. They began to devastate the countryside, to the horror of the Assyrian soldiers assigned to the protection of Assyria and could not do much against the massive Levantine horde. As they were clearly trying to return to Til-Barsip, the commander in charge of the protection of Assyria decided not to oppose them.

Those news, when they reached the west, were just what Irhuleni and the rebellion leaders were hoping to hear. In the meantime, they had been able to arm themselves, in no small part thanks to Arwad and Tyre.

The Phoenicians of Arwas and Tyre were indeed one of the main supports of the rebellion. Both knew that as long as the Assyrians controlled the Near-East, they would be in danger af an invasion: one day Shalmaneser would find a way to have a loyal fleet, and that day they would become Assyrian provinces as well. Thus Phoenician ships were smuggling into the Levant not only food – in exchange of an allegiance to the "rebels" – but also weapons. Swords, bows came every night nby boats.

The 21st of september, the massive garrison of Til-Barsip – the largest of the entire Assyrian Levant – burned along with the fortress that served as their casern. The rebels invested the palace of the governor and killed him on the spot, along with every Assyrian they could find.

The Assyrians soldiers in the Levant were thus cut off from Assyria itself. Before the new could spread, however, similar uprisings happened in every major towns and cities, with various degrees of success. What rare garrisons that survived the night, however, found themselves isolated among an hostile population. Most surrendered, only to be killed by the rabid populace. The Levant was free once again.