"This operation is being planned as a success, We can not afford to fail."
General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
A repulse of D-Day would have been a serious tactical reversal but,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Dragoon
probably would not have kept the Allies from liberating France in 1944, even if no second invasion was attempted in the north until after Dragoon had secured southern France.
More hyperbole does not transform a brigade level defence to a divisional strength defense on IOW. Show me 2 divisions on IOW, and I'll show you an island that was immune to attack, (Malta had about 30,000 troops (4 brigades with armor support) for an island less than half the size with more fortification).What I find particularly amusing about this thread is that you are as blind to reason, as impervious to reality...<snip>
Doesn't take too much to go wrong before an assault on IOW to fail. Logistically, not only was transport a problem, but after the French campaign the Germans must have been short on assault gliders. Finding enough parachutes would also have been a large hurdle - I see that purchasing teams were all over Europe looking for parachutes.
I find the position taken by posters attacking any suggestion of German offensive air-sea operations in 1940 in the Channel to be dogmatic, but I don't find it to be stupid. Common sense indicates that any such action would be very risky tactically against the RN and RAF. But strategically - the risk was worth it, even given the poor tactical conditions.and as convinced of your own genius in the face of everybody else's stupidity as Ovaron himself