A Different 1939

Yes, but he did this in a directly opposite pattern to Stalin, namely in setting up deliberately a herky-jerky and inefficient system so he, intellectual and otherwise lazy bastard that he was, was the supreme arbiter of power. It really was an efficient system......for Adolf Hitler. Not for Germany the state or the German war machine. And it's things like this that lead to my statements of how the Soviet Union relative to the Nazis is out of their playing field on *all* levels.
I would tend to agree whitch is why killing Adolph Hitler is number one on the Allies "Do not do this nder any circumstances" list. there is a reason the German General Staff wanted him dead so very badly. He was keeping them from winning the war.
 
I would tend to agree whitch is why killing Adolph Hitler is number one on the Allies "Do not do this nder any circumstances" list. there is a reason the German General Staff wanted him dead so very badly. He was keeping them from winning the war.

Ironically if the generals had ever gone through with it, the very absence of any kind of strategic system and the inevitable power jockeying that follows causes the Nazi war machine to explode. The generals willingly gave Hitler strategic arbitration, and this means if Hitler goes, so does the brains, what there were of them, behind the German war effort......
 
Ironically if the generals had ever gone through with it, the very absence of any kind of strategic system and the inevitable power jockeying that follows causes the Nazi war machine to explode. The generals willingly gave Hitler strategic arbitration, and this means if Hitler goes, so does the brains, what there were of them, behind the German war effort......
Wow, that IS ironic, Kill Hitler, lose the war, DON'T kill Hitler, lose the war. That would make me head for Allied lines with a bedsheet hanging from a broomhandle.
 
Wow, that IS ironic, Kill Hitler, lose the war, DON'T kill Hitler, lose the war. That would make me head for Allied lines with a bedsheet hanging from a broomhandle.

As I said, Hitler's system worked very well.....for Hitler. Not for Germany the state or the ultimate long-term good of the German war machine. People forget that in the course of a career that saw only one setback (the first Anschluss attempt) and the successive takeover of Europe to the gates of Moscow, Leningrad, and the Don that anyone would have their already-existing ego issues go to their head. When that person like Hitler is already far outside the boundaries of civilized society, the result goes from mere disaster to the apocalypse.
 
As I said, Hitler's system worked very well.....for Hitler. Not for Germany the state or the ultimate long-term good of the German war machine. People forget that in the course of a career that saw only one setback (the first Anschluss attempt) and the successive takeover of Europe to the gates of Moscow, Leningrad, and the Don that anyone would have their already-existing ego issues go to their head. When that person like Hitler is already far outside the boundaries of civilized society, the result goes from mere disaster to the apocalypse.

That means that the only thing left to do is to pound the country of Germany to absolute rubble so that Ole crazy eyes simply no longer has it to use as a weapon.

As was done.
 
Poland making a leap in engine design would not change the stragetic situation. Hitler HAS to attack Poland. He can't not. Without war, Germany does not HAVE an economy and so Hitler was and will be totally indifferent to the cost of the invasion. given the size of the country, the disparity in numbers and the tactical situation on the ground the Luftwaffe can afford to lose as many planes as it takes to kill every advanced fighter the Poles might be able to build, and while the Luftwaffe engages the Polish superfighters i nthe air, the German Heer moves in supported by artillery and self propelled guns to take their airfields.

The end of the story does not change, only the narrative, and at most all Poland will do is teach the Luftwaffe how to beat Great Britian.
 
I agree that it may seem that a statement like, What would happen if Hitler died of tuberculosis in Vienna is more realistic than saying that the Poles develop a 1200 hp engine in 1937 on their own, but only because we don't appreciate the ASB aspect of Hitler contracting tuberculosis and dying. ASB in the sense that some improbable element would need to have happened to alter reality in a way that would make the infection possible. For example, what changes are required to position an infected person to come into contact with Hitler? You'd need to alter the lives of perhaps hundreds of people for that meeting to happen. That's improbable because it in turn requires thousands of other changes in the lives of those people--and what causes all those changes? Because we don't appreciate the complexity of mundane reality it seems that infection could have happened more readily while making an leap ahead in engine design could not. But, really, how reasonable is that? Positing that the lives of thousands change just to create a situation is just as ASB as proposing that Poland makes a leap in engine design.

Not to put it too finely, Hitler contracting tuberculosis is not ASB. He lived in a goddamn slum while he lived in Vienna, and if you really want to get technical, just have him catch a bullet in WWI, which doesn't affect anyone. And anyways, you don't need to alter the lives of thousands of people when you can just have him forget his raincoat one day. That, I presume, is not ASB, is it?

ASB, as I believe we've said multiple times, requires outright magic. Catching tuberculosis is not magic, and neither is surviving a half-baked assassination saved only by an assassin getting the munchies. Teleporting a town from the future into Germany or giving AK-47s to confederate soldiers is.
 
I would tend to agree whitch is why killing Adolph Hitler is number one on the Allies "Do not do this nder any circumstances" list. there is a reason the German General Staff wanted him dead so very badly. He was keeping them from winning the war.

Honestly, look at the general staff. They weren't Germany's best and brightest. At all. They're all men that really fail to inspire confidence.
 
Germany was being bankrolled by top Western investment houses in US, England and even Switzerland. Even after he attacked Poland. US closed his accounts after Pearl Harbor. And this allows Hitler to spend 10 percent of GDP on an arms buildup.
So, getting money from outside changes nothing of the reality that Germany did not have a functional self sustaing economy as such and furthermore, is any of that supposed to come as some great shock to me, because it does not, I am well aware of America's pro fascist past and in some cases our pro fascist present.
 
BlairWitch749, they were pushed back because of the German breakthrough slicing past them to the west while Belgium was collapsing.

The BEF was engaged on multiple fronts and could not have stood without being overwhelmed. As it was the BEF's losses in manpower and material speaks quite clearly...

They retreated; they were not pushed back; they took less than 1000 casualties of all kinds in Belgium; the overwhelming majority of the fighting done against army group b till they reached the dunkirk perimeter was done by the Dutch and the French. Had the BEF attacked army group B or stood their ground in Belgium, it would have slowed the right side of the encirclement from forming and given the French more time to tray and insert forces between army group a and b to secure a supply corridor and prevent total encirclement
 
They retreated; they were not pushed back; they took less than 1000 casualties of all kinds in Belgium; the overwhelming majority of the fighting done against army group b till they reached the dunkirk perimeter was done by the Dutch and the French. Had the BEF attacked army group B or stood their ground in Belgium, it would have slowed the right side of the encirclement from forming and given the French more time to tray and insert forces between army group a and b to secure a supply corridor and prevent total encirclement
Huh, I did not know that. I tellyuh my time here sure is educational. for sure. :)
 
I would tend to agree whitch is why killing Adolph Hitler is number one on the Allies "Do not do this nder any circumstances" list. there is a reason the German General Staff wanted him dead so very badly. He was keeping them from winning the war.

The general staff were largely a bunch of revisionist toadies

Hitler was a decisive and incisive political and military gambler; he was quick to see the value of new/advanced weapons and tactics

From 33 to 41 Hitler pushed almost every single military button correctly and had conquered most of the continent; so no he wasn't an obstacle to winning the war

not even Manstein pushed every button correctly every time
 
That means that the only thing left to do is to pound the country of Germany to absolute rubble so that Ole crazy eyes simply no longer has it to use as a weapon.

As was done.

Pretty much, yes. Hitler's biggest mistakes were 1) getting into a war with the UK without any plan to sustain or carry out a prolonged one, 2) invading the Soviet Union with a plan flawed from the get-go from hubris he could not change and be in a position to launch a Barbarossa in the first place, and 3) declaring war on the USA because he was under a misconception of the difference between torpedoing destroyers and full-fledged war. In that order. It's a very special level of hubris to turn one unwinnable war into two, then two into three, all in the span of one year. :rolleyes::eek:

Honestly, look at the general staff. They weren't Germany's best and brightest. At all. They're all men that really fail to inspire confidence.

They were, however, good at writing memoirs that told the Cold War-era West what it wanted to hear. :mad::rolleyes:
 
They retreated; they were not pushed back; they took less than 1000 casualties of all kinds in Belgium; the overwhelming majority of the fighting done against army group b till they reached the dunkirk perimeter was done by the Dutch and the French. Had the BEF attacked army group B or stood their ground in Belgium, it would have slowed the right side of the encirclement from forming and given the French more time to tray and insert forces between army group a and b to secure a supply corridor and prevent total encirclement

With what reserves? The French had none.

The general staff were largely a bunch of revisionist toadies

Hitler was a decisive and incisive political and military gambler; he was quick to see the value of new/advanced weapons and tactics

From 33 to 41 Hitler pushed almost every single military button correctly and had conquered most of the continent; so no he wasn't an obstacle to winning the war

not even Manstein pushed every button correctly every time

Arguably he did this even later than 41. He did, after all, guarantee surprise in Operation Blue when this should not have happened, his instincts about reinforcing Africa to keep Italy from defecting proved solid, and his view of how the Italian campaign would play out also proved solid. And as far as the Eastern Front, his instincts tended to be overruled by his generals with more disastrous results and his major mistakes started cropping up in the 1944-5 range when Germany literally had nothing it could do short of summoning an army of demons to stop the Allies.
 
You're right, but consideer this scenario. In 1934 Poland has a great fighter. At that time Germany has a similar design that's not going to give them an advantage. Stalemate. So what do they do? They start work on a new generation fighter. Why? To overcome Poland's parity. Now, if Poland matched German work and came up with a comparable aircraft at about the same time as the Me 109 was ready for production, that would have figured into German thinking. Poland would have parity again. War would have to be postponed again to give the ME 109 an advantage. This creates a stable arms race. Germany is in a worse situation than Poland. If Poland spends money on fighter R&D, it costs them less than Germany having to maintain a vast war machine. Even if they spend 1 % of GDP on fighter Skunk Works, they can stalemate Germans and prolong the outbreak of war a year or two. But by then Germany would not longer be able to fight a war because their economy would fall apart.


you know france and britain had almost as many front line aircraft as the germans in may 1940 right? many of them competitive designs; and they had decent kill ratios.... the problem was they couldn't keep up with German sortie rates, operational tempo, tactics and the loss of bases to rapidly advancing ground forces


poland could have 1000 me-109's with certified pilots, and they would still lose due to superior german sortie rates, operational tempo, tactics and loss of bases to ground forces

german sortie rates were so high that it effectively 4x'ed the size of their airforce versus poland and france... ie german fighter and bomber pilots would fly 6-10 sorties a day whilst the allies only flew 1 or 2;
 
You're right, but consideer this scenario. In 1934 Poland has a great fighter. At that time Germany has a similar design that's not going to give them an advantage. Stalemate. So what do they do? They start work on a new generation fighter. Why? To overcome Poland's parity. Now, if Poland matched German work and came up with a comparable aircraft at about the same time as the Me 109 was ready for production, that would have figured into German thinking. Poland would have parity again. War would have to be postponed again to give the ME 109 an advantage. This creates a stable arms race. Germany is in a worse situation than Poland. If Poland spends money on fighter R&D, it costs them less than Germany having to maintain a vast war machine. Even if they spend 1 % of GDP on fighter Skunk Works, they can stalemate Germans and prolong the outbreak of war a year or two. But by then Germany would not longer be able to fight a war because their economy would fall apart.

That's not how R&D works! That's not even how it works in games! If a developing country spends 1% to maintain a research program, large country with a powerful industrial base and large research programs can spend .1% of their GDP to maintain parity, with any tipover giving them an even greater advantage! There's a reason why Argentina isn't at the forefront of military R&D, and the United States is. Contrary to what you seem to be assuming, being richer makes it easier for you to fund large, extremely expensive research programs, not less.

And in any case, if a country is spending so much money on a vast war machine that's of average quality, it will curbstomp a small country which spends an idiotically large amount of money and resources developing a niche tool, if only because the large numerical advantage has proceeded to become ludicrous.
 
Pretty much, yes. Hitler's biggest mistakes were 1) getting into a war with the UK without any plan to sustain or carry out a prolonged one, 2) invading the Soviet Union with a plan flawed from the get-go from hubris he could not change and be in a position to launch a Barbarossa in the first place, and 3) declaring war on the USA because he was under a misconception of the difference between torpedoing destroyers and full-fledged war. In that order. It's a very special level of hubris to turn one unwinnable war into two, then two into three, all in the span of one year. :rolleyes::eek:



They were, however, good at writing memoirs that told the Cold War-era West what it wanted to hear. :mad::rolleyes:

Once again you educate me, and I must agree with you. right now, fellahs you are helping me do one of my favorite things, Learning. :)
 
A might neuroscientist say that his forgetting his raincoat is impossible because of how human mind works. That he did not forget is the only way he could have ever acted. Any other possibility, while nominally possible, was not actually possible because of how his brain is wired. That's the neuroscience view. So you'd need magic to having him forget. As I said, mundane reality is in fact very complex.

So let me get this straight. Humans aren't actually physically capable of absent-mindedness. It's physically impossible. You need magic to make someone let something slip their mind.
 
So let me get this straight. Humans aren't actually physically capable of absent-mindedness. It's physically impossible. You need magic to make someone let something slip their mind.
DOn't sweat it, he does that, you know, spouting little factoids that are essentially irrelevent to the points we're making in the hopes that he can get us to forget what we were talking avbout.
 
Once again you educate me, and I must agree with you. right now, fellahs you are helping me do one of my favorite things, Learning. :)

I would never trust mere text on the Internet as learning. Thus I would recommend the following books as starting points for the various WWII histories:

Ostkrieg, which is a recent book (written last year) and is the first history of WWII from the German side of the Eastern Front to integrate the Holocaust and some of Glantz's works.

Stumbling Colossus, When Titans Clashed, and Russia's War by David Glantz (the first three), and the latter by Richard Overy.

He also wrote Why the Allies Won which is a good starting point to begin with as it deconstructs a lot of the myths of the inevitably superior Allied side.

I would also recommend the two books An Army At Dawn and The Day of Battle. The third book in the series has as yet not come out, so I'd recommend for the time being an older book by Ambrose, as well as his The Pacific, the older book in question being Citizen Soldiers.

At the same time I'd recommend as well a book entitled Red Storm on the Reich which chronicles the last phase of Soviet-Nazi battles that invariably gets neglected *between* Bagration, Jhassy-Kishinev, and the Battle of Berlin.

In terms of the views of individual WWII battles, I'd recommend Glantz's Kursk, The Battle for Leningrad, Barbarossa Derailed, and from a Western POV, the famous The Longest Day, Ambrose's Band of Brothers, and Matthew Parker's Monte Cassino. I would recommend reading Parker on Cassino and Glantz on Leningrad together to illustrate how in practice the Allies were precisely capable of in both wars repeating the same mistakes again and again despite repeatedly being warned not to do that crap. There's also a book titled A War to be Won that analyzes WWII from a purely operational level applied to *everybody* in the war that's worth recommending.
 
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