About Japanese industrial capacity, I heard they scattered it around. When some American generals surveyed bombed-out areas, they found machine tools in the ruins of houses.
Operation Downfall - The Invasion of Japan
- Thread starter Chilperic
- Start date
Might be, destroying Second World War era machine tools was extremely hard. However, the point in bombing factories was not about eradicating the production entirely but making it vastly more difficult. Sure, one can scatter machine tools around a large areas and continue production. As displayed in often seen propaganda movies about Vietnam War one can even make somewhat effective weapons in the deepest jungles.
But there's a certain reasons why in Second World War era large factories were effective; they minimized the amount of logistics needed to transfer large amounts of raw materials for processing and components for assembly, ensuring, in effect, more bang for buck.
Japan was already trying to surrender
An interesting idea, one that ignores the fact that Japan had been attempting to surrender for several months before Hiroshima & Nagasaki. They were searching for a way to 'save face' and not have the Emperor subject to what they considered humiliation. The american army leadership was, I think, more anxious to test out their new atomic bomb, and given the casual racism prevalent in the day, they saw no problem in using the japanese. (This isn't to say that the japaneses weren't or aren't racist).
Gore Vidal has written extensively on the topic (along with Pearl Harbour), check it out...
An interesting idea, one that ignores the fact that Japan had been attempting to surrender for several months before Hiroshima & Nagasaki. They were searching for a way to 'save face' and not have the Emperor subject to what they considered humiliation. The american army leadership was, I think, more anxious to test out their new atomic bomb, and given the casual racism prevalent in the day, they saw no problem in using the japanese. (This isn't to say that the japaneses weren't or aren't racist).
Gore Vidal has written extensively on the topic (along with Pearl Harbour), check it out...
The Japanese wanted to END the WAR, not surrender. Their "peace feelers" were built on them keeping their conquests in China, Manchuria, parts of the Pacific, their military forces, any accussed war criminals to be tried by Japanese military courts under Japanese rules of engagement, and lastly, allow the Emperor to remain in pre-war status (i.e. divine).
Effectively, they wanted to keep the fruits of their aggression through 12/1/41, have those conquests recognized as legitimate, and be able to rebuild their forces.
In short, they wanted to just pretend the whole war with the U.S. didn't happen, that they didn't lose the war, that they committed no war crimes (since Japanese field regulation did not forbid the treatment of PoWs as occurred), have the U.S. and the rest of the world accept that they controlled much of China & Manchuria. That isn't surrendering, that isn't even negiotiating, that is tell the side that is destroying you to %^$* off.
Can't imagine why the Allies didn't bite.
So that justifies dropping nuclear death on civilians? Twice?
I'm not saying that the Japanese were boy scouts here, just that there could have been a negotiated solution. It may not have been pretty but it wouldn't involve large scale science experiments on the effects of radiation on humans...
Markus
Banned
I can hardly concure more!
Read what CalBear wrote. The Japanese position was utterly inacceptable to the allies and vice versa. Except the allies had good reasons for theirs. Furthermore the Japanese not only conducted large scale biological warfare in china, but were also offered more lenient surrender terms than Germany. Terms they promptly rejected!
Given that and no hindsight, the nukes were the right thing ot do. And yes, twice! The Japanese had studied the idea of nukes and concluded only very few could be made at an enormous cost. After the first one was dropped, they thought that was all the Americans had. The second one disproved that.
Of course those people would be less dead if they had been napalmed.
Agree with this.
This is prime minister Suzuki's reaction to the declaration of Potsdam:
"I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war".
Does that sound like a nation that's going to agree with unconditional surrender?
At Potsdam all parties (including the SU and the USA) had agreed not to accept anything but unconditional surrender from the Japanese.
So that means America can't accept a 'moderate' peace proposal by Japan, even if they seriously offered one.
Also, with each month the Japanese don't surrender, another 200 000 people in Korea, China, Phillipines, Indonesia etc etc will die.
On top of that would be the starving of Japan's civilians because there isn't enough food for them.
The Russian attack in the Far East and the two A-bombs luckily shocked the Japanese into a surrender. Even then parts of the IJA didn't agree with the surrender and luckily didn't succeed in interfering.
Farwalker's theory has some supporters, but is essentially without any evidence AFAIK. Here's a thread on another forum dealing with the same:
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/6866
So would you guys say there is much point in me carrying on, or is it too ASB
No, please not at least as far as I am concerned!
If the Manhattan project had failed for some reason and the USA don't want to wait 3/4 of a year untill the entire Japanese civilian population has died, a landing would have been necessary.
If a landing is necessary, the suggestion to skip directly towards Tokyo might also have merits as to not give the Japanese enough time to mobilize the civilian population.
The Nazi's really screwed up the defense of Berlin, however there's no reason why the Japanese should do so to.
Chilperic
Banned
The Bait
October 29 (X-3) - A huge set of ships sets sail for Kyushu under the command of Adm. Spruance. They include several carriers from the 3rd Fleet, cruisers, destroyers and battleships, adding up to over 1,000 combat ships. Meanwhile, the Japanese High Command is convinced this is the main attack and dispatches 1,000 kamikazes. They soon find that the ships are in fact carriers and battleships. The carrier aircraft rush up and shoot down a huge number of the Japanese aircraft, but there is still devastating damage to the US Navy which suffers the loss of 23 ships including 2 carriers, most of this caused when the carrier aircraft had to return to their ships, leaving the fleets almost defenseless against air attack.
October 30 (X-2) - The Allied Pacific War Council gives final approval to the plan for Olympic.
October 31 (X-1) - The transports set sail for Japan. Little do they know that not only will they have to fight the Japanese, but also a 'divine wind'
October 29 (X-3) - A huge set of ships sets sail for Kyushu under the command of Adm. Spruance. They include several carriers from the 3rd Fleet, cruisers, destroyers and battleships, adding up to over 1,000 combat ships. Meanwhile, the Japanese High Command is convinced this is the main attack and dispatches 1,000 kamikazes. They soon find that the ships are in fact carriers and battleships. The carrier aircraft rush up and shoot down a huge number of the Japanese aircraft, but there is still devastating damage to the US Navy which suffers the loss of 23 ships including 2 carriers, most of this caused when the carrier aircraft had to return to their ships, leaving the fleets almost defenseless against air attack.
October 30 (X-2) - The Allied Pacific War Council gives final approval to the plan for Olympic.
October 31 (X-1) - The transports set sail for Japan. Little do they know that not only will they have to fight the Japanese, but also a 'divine wind'
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Who was it who was trying to surrender?
I heard that the US believed the people making the peace offerings had no authority to actually end the war.
Furthermore, in The Good War by Studs Terkel, the US interviewed an atomic scientist who said the US was going to nuke Germany but the Germans surrendered before the bomb was ready, so all the theories about the US being unwilling to nuke a white city were nonsense.
More people died in the conventional firebombings of German and Japanese cities and most of the critics of Hiroshima and Nagasaki don't care.
Methinks the real problem is "nuclear," not "death."
Still, it might have been better to destroy the remains of the Japanese fleet at Truk first, since it was a military target.
Could you give a more detailed account of the battle? How many transports were there - how many troops? How many ships, carriers? If I recall right, Sprague had 16 flattops with a total of 580 aircraft, and once that transport fleet arrives from the Philipines he has several more carriers.
How come the kamikazes strike so many ships? Go into detail on this. Was the cloud cover high? Kyushu has a lot of mountain ranges that could block radar, just like in Okinawa. The number of ships lost could also correspond with the positioning of the ships. Did the Allies have radar picket boats - now proved since Kwaljein to provide good CICs? OTL, these in Okinawa soaked up a lot of the Kamikazes - Because of the tendency of the inexperienced Kamikaze pilots to dive at any target they saw, thus absorbing the blows meant for the slow transport ships.
Okay, as someone who did his MA Thesis on the planned invasion, here's my two cents:
1) Invasion v. bomb: the planners of the invasion didn't even know there was such a weapon. MacArthur didn't know until 1 Aug 45, and neither did Nimitz. Bombing and blockade (Adm. King's preference) was estimated to take another 18 months to induce surrender. Absent the bomb: the only option was invasion. JCS had no faith in the A-bomb until it actually was tested.
2) Japanese defenses: While formidable, the Japanese were repeating a failed strategy that had been applied on every Pacific Island from Tarawa to Pelileu and failed every time: defend at the beach, fight and die in place. Japanese defenses were in three lines, and all were well within range of naval gunfire from ships offshore. Not to mention that the 8th AF (which would have had groups with B-17s, B-24s, and B-29s: not all of its bomber groups would have transitioned to B-29s when they arrived from Europe) was supposed to drop a thousand tons of bombs on all three primary invasion areas: Miyazaki (I Corps), Ariake Bay (XI Corps) and Kushikino (V Marine Amphibious Corps). In addition, the Japanese were critically short of everything, artillery, anti-tank guns, motor vehicles, fuel, etc. One division supposed to defend against the V MAC (the 146th ID) only had rifles for 10% of its soldiers-the rest would've had to make do with spears and other melee weapons. Also, the Satsuma Peninsula (IX Corps landing on X+4) was practically undefended, with no units in place when the war ended, and none were due there until 1 October. No fortifications had been built, and they would still have been building them when the invasion began.
3) Kamikazes: 10,000 aircraft available to the Japanese, half suicide, half ordinary fighter and attack aircraft. Whole trainee classes were being assigned suicide duty, with a lucky few assigned as attrition replacements to fighter and attack squadrons (both JAAF and JNAF). Kaiten suicide torpedoes, Shinyo suicide boats, and midget subs were also to be used as suicide weapons. However, a lack of radios and even telephone communications would have posed severe problems in coordinating the air and naval suicide effort.
4) Plans: Japanese staff officers knew the likely invasion beaches and made their plans accordingly. Big Mac's staff after the war saw this and assumed a security leak, but there wasn't one. U.S. planning assumed that the battle would be similar in size and scope to Luzon, Okinawa, and Normandy, with similar casualties to Normandy (c. 65,000 for the first 48 days). See AFPAC, Staff Study OLYMPIC, 25 May 1945, and CINCPAC OpPLan A11-45 and OpPlan 10-45 OLYMPIC.
5) CORONET: Plans still incomplete when the war ended. Japanese said postwar that their planning assumed a winner-take-all approach in Kyushu and that it was likely that campaign would be the final battle. Check John Ray Skates The Invasion of Japan for more on this and other aspects of the planned invasion (I used it as a source in the thesis, along with the actual invasion plans).
1) Invasion v. bomb: the planners of the invasion didn't even know there was such a weapon. MacArthur didn't know until 1 Aug 45, and neither did Nimitz. Bombing and blockade (Adm. King's preference) was estimated to take another 18 months to induce surrender. Absent the bomb: the only option was invasion. JCS had no faith in the A-bomb until it actually was tested.
2) Japanese defenses: While formidable, the Japanese were repeating a failed strategy that had been applied on every Pacific Island from Tarawa to Pelileu and failed every time: defend at the beach, fight and die in place. Japanese defenses were in three lines, and all were well within range of naval gunfire from ships offshore. Not to mention that the 8th AF (which would have had groups with B-17s, B-24s, and B-29s: not all of its bomber groups would have transitioned to B-29s when they arrived from Europe) was supposed to drop a thousand tons of bombs on all three primary invasion areas: Miyazaki (I Corps), Ariake Bay (XI Corps) and Kushikino (V Marine Amphibious Corps). In addition, the Japanese were critically short of everything, artillery, anti-tank guns, motor vehicles, fuel, etc. One division supposed to defend against the V MAC (the 146th ID) only had rifles for 10% of its soldiers-the rest would've had to make do with spears and other melee weapons. Also, the Satsuma Peninsula (IX Corps landing on X+4) was practically undefended, with no units in place when the war ended, and none were due there until 1 October. No fortifications had been built, and they would still have been building them when the invasion began.
3) Kamikazes: 10,000 aircraft available to the Japanese, half suicide, half ordinary fighter and attack aircraft. Whole trainee classes were being assigned suicide duty, with a lucky few assigned as attrition replacements to fighter and attack squadrons (both JAAF and JNAF). Kaiten suicide torpedoes, Shinyo suicide boats, and midget subs were also to be used as suicide weapons. However, a lack of radios and even telephone communications would have posed severe problems in coordinating the air and naval suicide effort.
4) Plans: Japanese staff officers knew the likely invasion beaches and made their plans accordingly. Big Mac's staff after the war saw this and assumed a security leak, but there wasn't one. U.S. planning assumed that the battle would be similar in size and scope to Luzon, Okinawa, and Normandy, with similar casualties to Normandy (c. 65,000 for the first 48 days). See AFPAC, Staff Study OLYMPIC, 25 May 1945, and CINCPAC OpPLan A11-45 and OpPlan 10-45 OLYMPIC.
5) CORONET: Plans still incomplete when the war ended. Japanese said postwar that their planning assumed a winner-take-all approach in Kyushu and that it was likely that campaign would be the final battle. Check John Ray Skates The Invasion of Japan for more on this and other aspects of the planned invasion (I used it as a source in the thesis, along with the actual invasion plans).
No they'd be just as dead. I think the Napalming of civilian targets was a war crime as well. But we're not here to talk about that. I was merely pointing out that had the war, along with the blockade of the home islands, gone on for much longer the terms of surrender (or ending the war if you prefer) might have been much more acceptable to the americans.
Markus
Banned
Outright impossible! Kamikazes sucked! Especially this late they were obsolescent planes flown by inexperienced pilots and the lack of success shows this.
More people died in the conventional firebombings of German and Japanese cities and most of the critics of Hiroshima and Nagasaki don't care.
Methinks the real problem is "nuclear," not "death."
Actually, the real problem is "civilian". Just because your leader is war-mongering megalomaniac doesn't mean you are.
And who said I was conventional
Chilperic
Banned
X-DAY
November 1 (X) - At 0200 hours, Japanese coastal forts along the landing beaches and Shikoku come under a fierce shore bombardment. Kamikazes took to the skies to try and hit the ships but carrier planes managed to knock out many of the first waves. However, a typhoon had struck the transport fleet doing devastating damage and blowing many ships slightly offcourse.
Nevertheless, the first landing begun just an hour later, with landings in Ariake Bay. The forces of the US XI Corps came under heavy fire from the start and mines also took their toll on the forces. The beach had turned into a bloodbath in just a few minutes. As the day wore on, things began to improve but they were still at risk from mines and men were still being blown apart by artillery and mortar fire. The navy had also done well in dealing with the kamikazes and the Shin'yo suicide boats that were sent at them.
Not long after, the landings begun near Miyazaki. The landings were far easier than on Ariake, with much less resistance by comparison. There was still much bloodshed however, and many civilians also offered resistance when they were encountered. Neverthless, by the end of the day, the beaches were almost clear and the advance on Miyazaki could begin. High Command were also keen for them to advance south to aid the forces in Ariake Bay.
But it was at Kushikino that the US forces had the toughest time. The terrain was appalling for an invasion, although the area was only lightly defended. The US forces were extremely vulnerable to artillery on the beaches and would remain on the beaches for the entire day, desperately trying to defend the ground they had taken. To make their task even harder, the Japanese had deployed tanks in the area.
In light of these events, High Command decided that the reserves, part of the IX Corps, would be landed in Kagoshima Bay to divert Japanese forces from Kushikino. It was hoped that they could then link up and capture Kagoshima itself. While High Command knew that the Japanese would almost certainly destroy the port facilities, it was hoped they could be repaired within the month.
By the end of X-Day, 10,000 Americans lay dead on the beaches. The Japanese had also suffered heavy casualties; 36,000 were killed on X-Day, about 10,000 of them being civilians.
November 1 (X) - At 0200 hours, Japanese coastal forts along the landing beaches and Shikoku come under a fierce shore bombardment. Kamikazes took to the skies to try and hit the ships but carrier planes managed to knock out many of the first waves. However, a typhoon had struck the transport fleet doing devastating damage and blowing many ships slightly offcourse.
Nevertheless, the first landing begun just an hour later, with landings in Ariake Bay. The forces of the US XI Corps came under heavy fire from the start and mines also took their toll on the forces. The beach had turned into a bloodbath in just a few minutes. As the day wore on, things began to improve but they were still at risk from mines and men were still being blown apart by artillery and mortar fire. The navy had also done well in dealing with the kamikazes and the Shin'yo suicide boats that were sent at them.
Not long after, the landings begun near Miyazaki. The landings were far easier than on Ariake, with much less resistance by comparison. There was still much bloodshed however, and many civilians also offered resistance when they were encountered. Neverthless, by the end of the day, the beaches were almost clear and the advance on Miyazaki could begin. High Command were also keen for them to advance south to aid the forces in Ariake Bay.
But it was at Kushikino that the US forces had the toughest time. The terrain was appalling for an invasion, although the area was only lightly defended. The US forces were extremely vulnerable to artillery on the beaches and would remain on the beaches for the entire day, desperately trying to defend the ground they had taken. To make their task even harder, the Japanese had deployed tanks in the area.
In light of these events, High Command decided that the reserves, part of the IX Corps, would be landed in Kagoshima Bay to divert Japanese forces from Kushikino. It was hoped that they could then link up and capture Kagoshima itself. While High Command knew that the Japanese would almost certainly destroy the port facilities, it was hoped they could be repaired within the month.
By the end of X-Day, 10,000 Americans lay dead on the beaches. The Japanese had also suffered heavy casualties; 36,000 were killed on X-Day, about 10,000 of them being civilians.
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