Very unlikely that the two weapons, detonated TWO MONTHS before, had any such long lasting after effect. No such effect has ever been claimed for other, far more powerful, airbursts. It was simply a huge storm doing what huge storms do, namely whatever the hell it wanted.
Operation Downfall - The Invasion of Japan
- Thread starter Chilperic
- Start date
Very unlikely that the two weapons, detonated TWO MONTHS before, had any such long lasting after effect. No such effect has ever been claimed for other, far more powerful, airbursts. It was simply a huge storm doing what huge storms do, namely whatever the hell it wanted.
Markus
Banned
Treu, but you can also see it this way: When face with certain, utter destruction most Japanese leaders just threw the towel.
By the way, I´m half through R.B. Frank´s Downfall and the Japanese were facing an ammo shortage even more serious than the weapons shortage:
A so-called "Kaisenbun" is the amount of ammo a IJA division consumes in four month of fighting. All japanese ground troops eaualed 60+ division, but there were only 30 "Kaisenbun" . Even the relatively well equipped units on Kyushu had just 15 "Kaisenbun" for 17 divisions and once you llok closer the picture looks even worse. The underlying assumption was there are only 20 fighting days per month and worst of all the ammo consumption was based on battles fighting ill-supplied chinese or moderatley supplied soviet division, not US division that have everything in abundance.
October 4th, 1945
Typhoon started in the Marianas, at first slowly. Then it blew northward - weathermen predicted it would crash thru China.
October 9th, 1945
The typhoon headed straight to Okinawa.
2:00 pm - The winds of the Typhoon are clocked at 95 mph. Midday night follows - then 40 foot walls of water crash.
4:00 pm - The winds are clocked at 115 mph. 80% of Okinawa's homes are wrecked.
Total Destruction (AFAIK) - 12 ships sunk, 222 grounded - 133 beyond repair. Samuel Morrison goes on to say that it's : 'The most furious and lethal storm ever encountered by the USN'
Hope that helped
All due respect, but if you are not familiar with one of the classic episodes from OTL related to the Operation Downfall storyline, you may want to do some more research before resuming the T/L. There are several regular posters in this forum who are serious devotees of Pacific War history (many of whom have already commented here) who will, as you have seen, provide considerable feedback on untenable positions or timelines. (A couple of them are very valuable critics in my current Pacific War Redux T/L.)
It is generally easier to research first, then write rather than write, learn that the writing is so inconsistant with OTL that a POD occuring in 1632 is necessary to hold the T/L together.
Best of luck.
I\ve heard, that without Soviet invension in North China and atomic bombs japan would capitulate before January 1946. What's downfalll for?
Because nobody knew if the Japanese would surrender unconditionally without being defeated on home soil (as was the case with Germany).
January of 1946 is, from everything I've seen, way on the optomistic side for Japan's surrender. Just look at OTL. Two nuclear weapons AND the Far Eastern Front attacking into Manchuria, scattering the Kwantung Army like ten pins and there was STILL a serious coup attempt by the Army field grade officers to prevent the surrender.
Japan WOULD have eventually surrendered (or had so many people starve to death that it wouldn't have mattered), but that day was probably a lot closer to January of '47 than January of '46.
burmafrd
Banned
some people are also forgetting that there would have been thousands of militia wiling to charge our lines with spears. The military would have used them like the Soviets used penal battalions- they soaked up the firepower allowing regular troops to get close. There were more willing to rush our tanks and trucks with primitive explosives on the ends of polls.
And so on. I think some here are just not willing to see just how far this could have gone.
And so on. I think some here are just not willing to see just how far this could have gone.
Typoon
http://home.att.net/~sallyann4/invasion4.html
Downfall
http://home.att.net/~sallyann4/invasion2.html
After another 4~6 months of fire bombings of the Cities and most of the towns, as well as bombing any thing else that may be of military value - I doubt if the survivors would really be ready for starting the Fanatic attacks the Japanese were suppose to be preparing.
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One of the other things I've read is that the Japanese people believed the propaganda put out by the military and government - how things were going reasonably well and that the core islands weren't threatened. When US and British warships got close enough they could shell cities from off-shore, well that put paid to any idea that the home islands were 'safe'. Since this didn't happen until very late in war, there hadn't been much time for the populace to realize that the propaganda had no bearing on reality, for that realization to sink in, and for results to happen therefrom. It's entirely possible that with an almost complete isolation of the Home Islands from anywhere else (no imports of food, fuel, etc), with ships shelling at will anywhere they wanted, with fire bombing reducing every city and town to ash, that Japan might well have surrendered in another few months, with or without invasion.
OTOH, it wouldn't be anything you could COUNT on.
OTOH, it wouldn't be anything you could COUNT on.
Markus
Banned
Ts, ts, ts! The authors don´t even bother to mention the USSR.
Anyway, I came across some interesting info in that regard. The IJA had two divisions and a brigade on Hokkaido. They were stationed in the east to meet an American invasion. The Soviets planned to land a total of three rifle division in the west. Due to the poor infrastructure and soviet air superiority, if not air supremacy, the Japanese troops could not have been redeployed fast enough, to defeat the initial invasion force.
Soviet amphibious capacity was limited, but adequate for an operation of that size. Their air force had at least five different types of fighters able to reach Hokkaido from the Siberian mainland. Off course the invasion would not have been launched before all of Sakhalin had been captured, which makes range a moot point. Even a half fuelled I-16 could make it across the La Pérouse Strait and back.
The Japanese on the other hand had virtually no naval or airpower in the north.
Last but not least, the strait seperating Honshu and Hokkaido is half as wide as the one seperating Kokkaido and Sakhalin.
Off Topic, If I recall correctly, USN had provided landing craft specifically to be used in that attempt, but I don't recall the name of the operation. I think there was an USNI book written about it, but I've only read the review maybe ten years ago. Were those landing craft given back at the end of the 1940's like some larger warships, or were they retained to give an amphibious nucleus for Soviet Pacific Fleet?
An interesting fact to put in the mix is that it was American rice supplied to occupied Japan in the fall/winter of 1945 that prevented massive starvation. There was a poor rice crop that year and the blockade prevented any significant imports from SE Asia or China reaching the home islands. Naturally the military would have gotten what it needed, war workers next, then everyone else. Expect large numbers of the young and old to die of starvation, and significant problems with illness/epidemics in those weakened by malnutrition. Of course, given that adults were being "trained' to charge US forces with spears, and children to wear explosive backpacks and self detonate under tanks, as long as the military leaders wanted to resist these civilian losses would be ignored.
One "problem" with B29 raids is that by August of 1945 there were almost no targets left worth bombing. Almost all Japanese industrial capacity had been destroyed and most cities with populations over 50-100,000 were wrecked. IMHO the role of the B29's in an Olympic/Coronet TL would be massive bombing in a semi-tactical role.
The Soviets had never conducted any significant amphibious operations in WW2. Small scale ops yes, but nothing like an invasion of Hokkaido. Even with limited Japanese abilities, one wonders when they could have done this. First take Sakhalin, then get their act together to land on Hokkaido. Don't forget that 100% of all their food, ammo, POL etc will have to be transported to Hokkaido and then distributed to their forces, and the transportation infrastructure on Hokkaido is poor even before the Japanese wreck it. Operating from the end of the trans-siberian railroad the logistic problems of mounting and then sustaining the operation are non-trivial. Also, the Soviet navy had basically zero capability to deal with even a limited number of kamikazes - no or limited shipboard radar, no naval air & no experience working with the SAF for controlling CAP. Also remember that the weather in that part of the world get pretty nasty in late fall/winter, so IMHO a successful landing of Soviet forces and over-running Hokkaido before November-December 1945 is very iffy. While Stalin may have had "plans" to do this, how much of the personnel and equipment as well as sustainment was where it needed to be in late summer/early fall 1945. Stuff in Manchuria does not count.
One "problem" with B29 raids is that by August of 1945 there were almost no targets left worth bombing. Almost all Japanese industrial capacity had been destroyed and most cities with populations over 50-100,000 were wrecked. IMHO the role of the B29's in an Olympic/Coronet TL would be massive bombing in a semi-tactical role.
The Soviets had never conducted any significant amphibious operations in WW2. Small scale ops yes, but nothing like an invasion of Hokkaido. Even with limited Japanese abilities, one wonders when they could have done this. First take Sakhalin, then get their act together to land on Hokkaido. Don't forget that 100% of all their food, ammo, POL etc will have to be transported to Hokkaido and then distributed to their forces, and the transportation infrastructure on Hokkaido is poor even before the Japanese wreck it. Operating from the end of the trans-siberian railroad the logistic problems of mounting and then sustaining the operation are non-trivial. Also, the Soviet navy had basically zero capability to deal with even a limited number of kamikazes - no or limited shipboard radar, no naval air & no experience working with the SAF for controlling CAP. Also remember that the weather in that part of the world get pretty nasty in late fall/winter, so IMHO a successful landing of Soviet forces and over-running Hokkaido before November-December 1945 is very iffy. While Stalin may have had "plans" to do this, how much of the personnel and equipment as well as sustainment was where it needed to be in late summer/early fall 1945. Stuff in Manchuria does not count.
burmafrd
Banned
Some here need to do some remedial reading on the Japanese people of 1945. It was clear later on that many realized that the war was lost- a lot fewer beleived the propaganda (a little hard when city after city is being burned out and no word is heard from soldiers for years, lack of food, fuel etc) then has been accepted.
BUT on the other hand the willingness of tens if not hundreds of thousands to die fighting cannot be ignored. Simple mines and explosives can be easily manufactured. Carried by someone willing to die- well modern homicide bombers do it every day in Iraq and elsewhere. Imagine instead of one or two a day - 1000 or so a day.
BUT on the other hand the willingness of tens if not hundreds of thousands to die fighting cannot be ignored. Simple mines and explosives can be easily manufactured. Carried by someone willing to die- well modern homicide bombers do it every day in Iraq and elsewhere. Imagine instead of one or two a day - 1000 or so a day.
Markus
Banned
That was fall/winter of 46. The Japanese distributed the "reserves" for 46 in 45 and delayed starvation until the USA could help and was willing to.
No, the entire railraod net was still intact. And would have been the next target.
Wrong on all counts.
Read what R.B. Frank concluded after studying the available forces on both sides.
The trans-siberian railroad was very much capable of supporting a much larger operation against Manchuria and the soviet navy had radar. Guess who gave it to them and the ship it was installed on?
And "Attack of the Aircobras" shows the Russians were quite capable of getting a CAP into place.
No they would not. USSR was going to crush Japan on mainland Asia. If the USSR scares Japan into surrender then the cold war position of the US is much weaker in Asia. Remember the end of WWII is during the Cold War with regards to the leadership. The people haven't been informed yet.
Not to mention the fact that all the kamakazi aircraft had been moved to Kyushu as part of the defensive plan. There was enough fuel to launch them against the invasion fleet or move them to Honshu (not completely sure about Hokkaido), but not both.
This severe lack of fuel, combined with the inability of the IJA to transport forces back from Kyushu to Honshu (or Hokkaido for that matter) in any number thanks to the disruption of the Japanese transport network, was one of the reasons that there was a rapidly growing movement to leave Kyushu alone and go straight for the throat, settling everything on Kwanto Plain outside of Toyko.
Largest true Soviet amphibious operations were corps-sized affairs in the Black Sea. In the Baltics Soviet conducted a number of amphibious raids, and also (tried and failed) an Army level crossing in the Bay of Viipuri using amphibious craft in 1944.
I think due to examples of Gallipoli, Normandy and various Pacific operations many US or British writers, not only in this site but also in historical literature, tend to mystify amphibious operations. There is a large difference in making an opposed landing against the teeth of SNLF or Festung Europa and against limited number of second-level Japanese troops in Hokkaido in 1945.
As for the logistics, I would guess that Soviets would have been more than able to supply the Corps they would have deployed over the beach (which was the mission of DUKW) and naturally supplant this effort by large number of transport aircraft they had available.
Soviet Navy had it's own air force, AV-MF, which had a number of fighters especially for the purpose of covering naval movements. Soviet ships had both US & UK and indigenous radars.
As has been pointed out, compared to buildup in Manchuria and near Vladivostok the amount of troops and equipment needed is trivial. What you should also take into account that after getting to Hokkaido the Soviet Army would have all the trump cards for dealing with Japanese resistance. Tanks, air support, naval gunfire support and artillery support, institutional experience in use of forest terrain, superior infantry armament etc...
All things being equal, the Soviets would have had a very hard time mounting a serious amphibious attack. However, as you and others (including me) have pointed out, all things were not equal. Hokkaido wasn't Okinawa or Saipan, much less fall 1945 Kyushu.