Inspired by a previous thread of mine I thought I'd have a go at writing an alternate history of the British armed forces. Primarily focused on the aircraft carriers of the CVA-01 program but also including other things. Apologies now if I end up veering into ASB territory but some small liberties might have to be taken to keep things interesting.
So we might as well start 50 years ago at a convenient point.
1966
The 1966 defence white paper has been called one of the most bad tempered and fraught government reviews in modern history.
The defence secretary Dennis Healey was adamant in his desire to save money by reducing expenditure on both new equipment and the demands of maintaining a 400,000 strong force spread throughout the world.
The 3 services were desperate not only to preserve as much as they could of what they already had but to safeguard the big ticket equipment programs which they felt would guarantee their future in the long run.
The relatively new Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson was forced to take on the unenviable task of convincing the military establishment that money would have to be saved from somewhere while at the same time reigning in his defence secretary who wanted to go to extreme lengths to save money regardless of the cost to the British armed forces or industry.
The 3 services were told in no uncertain terms that rather than squabling amoungst each other it would be a much better use of their time to start doing a bit of soul searching and work out the differnce between needs and wants.
Defence secratary Dennis Healey was reportedly extremely unhappy at what he felt was meddeling from the PM preventing him from doing his job. However when Wilson was told of the extent of the cutbacks that Healey proposed (even today the rumor mill claims that he planned things like scrapping all of Britains aircraft carriers and withdrawing everything east of Suez) he felt that he had no choice in order to prevent possible major political fallout from the mass job losses and resignations that would pottentially follow such things.
In the end after much compromise, bartering, horse trading, soul searching and more than a few resignations and forced early retirments threatened the following review was announced:
So we might as well start 50 years ago at a convenient point.
1966
The 1966 defence white paper has been called one of the most bad tempered and fraught government reviews in modern history.
The defence secretary Dennis Healey was adamant in his desire to save money by reducing expenditure on both new equipment and the demands of maintaining a 400,000 strong force spread throughout the world.
The 3 services were desperate not only to preserve as much as they could of what they already had but to safeguard the big ticket equipment programs which they felt would guarantee their future in the long run.
The relatively new Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson was forced to take on the unenviable task of convincing the military establishment that money would have to be saved from somewhere while at the same time reigning in his defence secretary who wanted to go to extreme lengths to save money regardless of the cost to the British armed forces or industry.
The 3 services were told in no uncertain terms that rather than squabling amoungst each other it would be a much better use of their time to start doing a bit of soul searching and work out the differnce between needs and wants.
Defence secratary Dennis Healey was reportedly extremely unhappy at what he felt was meddeling from the PM preventing him from doing his job. However when Wilson was told of the extent of the cutbacks that Healey proposed (even today the rumor mill claims that he planned things like scrapping all of Britains aircraft carriers and withdrawing everything east of Suez) he felt that he had no choice in order to prevent possible major political fallout from the mass job losses and resignations that would pottentially follow such things.
In the end after much compromise, bartering, horse trading, soul searching and more than a few resignations and forced early retirments threatened the following review was announced:
- The Royal Navy would be formed around 3 carrier battlegroups. To this end 3 Aircraft carriers of the CVA-01 program would be ordered the first to be named HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH. HMS HERMES being to small to realistically operated the Phantom was deemed surplus to requirements and was to be decommissioned and disposed of. HMS VICTORIOUS, HMS ARK ROYAL and HMS EAGLE would be disposed of and replaced by QUEEN ELIZABETH class vessels as they became available. HMS EAGLE was to be given a major rebuild to extend her service life and enable her to operate the Mcdonnell Douglas F4 Phantom.
- A new class of large air defence destroyer named the type 82 was to be procured to provide air defence for the carriers. An initial batch of 4 was to be immediately ordered with long term plans for a total of 12.
- A requirement was identified for up to 3 vessels to carry at least 9 ASW helicopters. To this end funding was made available to allow design and development work to commence.
- Of the TIGER class cruisers HMS BLAKE was at the time undergoing a refit to convert her to become a helicopter and command cruiser. Further conversions of HMS LION and HMS TIGER were considered to be an inefficient use of funds owing to the large costs and limited increases in capability. In their current form they were considered near obsolete and thus were to be decommissioned as soon as was practical.
- While there had been some within the navy and MOD pushing for the procurement of a 5th RESOLUTION class SSBN it was felt that this would be a step to far on the part of the navy and if ordered would simply drain away funds from other projects and take up space and build time at Barrow that would be better spent on the upcoming SWIFTSURE class SSN program.
- The BAC TSR-2 program would continue with an initial order of 110 aircraft for the RAF. While Healey had been strongly in favour of cancelling the program in favour of the General Dynamics F-111K from the USA political pressure over the potentially massive damage to the British aircraft industry and the superior capabilities offered by the TSR-2 forces his hand. While unhappy with the decision he does state that at least costs will probably be eased by export orders for the aircraft.
- The revolutionary Hawker Siddeley Harrier was showing great potential as a ground attack and close support aircraft about which the RAF were very enfusiastic and the USMC had shown a big interest. Therefore an initial batch of 60 aircraft designated GR1 were to be ordered.
- The Anglo-French Variable Geometry program was cancelled. There was too little money available to adequately fund the program and there was not considered to be a short term need for the aircraft that could not be fulfilled by other programs. It was also secretly hoped that the French might now become interested in the TSR-2. However the Sepcat Jaguar program would continue as planned.
- The Mcdonnell Douglas F4 Phantom would become the principle air defence fighter for both the RAF and FAA. An order of 200 aircraft (150 for the RAF and 50 for the FAA) would be made. Both services are quick to point out that this number falls well below the number they feel they require. This is especially true in with the FAA which now has to form 3 carrier air groups.
- The British military global presence was to be scaled back. Outside of British sovereign territory the only bases that were to be maintained were Malta, Oman and the far east. Far east command was to be dissolved and instead bases would be maintained in Singapore, Brunei and Hong Kong. While British owned these would be made available to and part funded by Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore as part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.