Interesting, then let's say McKinley dies and Bryan becomes president. How good will his policies prove to be in reality? Is a silver standard for the US dollar a viable strategy for the US? Will his agrarian policies benefit the US economy?
Back in 2009, I had a post on the consequences of a Bryan presidency at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/q0N9PcXBl4s/aePaSHpmPzUJ I'll reproduce it here:
***
We had a somewhat extended discussion of a Bryan administration at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/browse_thread/thread/5a4a22cfafdeff41
Here I'll just make a few points:
(1) Assuming that Bryan does succeed in instituting free silver (whether a
narrowly elected Bryan could get it through Congress is an open question)
the best discussion of the likely economic effects is by Noel Maurer (now
of Harvard Business School--one of the few economists who has ever
contributed to this newsgroup) at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/19c1be1c62862260
He agrees with me that Bryan would be introducing free silver at the wrong
time (as I put it, "There was a case for it throughout the long, generally
deflationary period between the 'Crime of 1873' and 1896. But now with
the cyanide process and the discovery of gold in South Africa, the
Klondike, etc., gold production was increasing, and free silver would only
add to inflation.") but thinks it would be only mildly inflationary, and
probably would not harm the economy (though he acknowledges that there is
some danger of loss of investor confidence). So I doubt *very* much that
Bryan is going to extend the depression "all the way to 1903." And that
puts the idea that he will be a one-term president in some doubt--he may
be able to claim some credit for the recovery: even though *we* know it
would have happened without him, all the voters of 1900 would know was
that there was a depression under the conservative gold-standard Cleveland
and there was a recovery under the "radical" Bryan.
(2) The notion that Bryan would have objected to the Spanish-American War
as "imperialism" is a confusion between the war itself and one of its OTL
results--the acquisition of the Philippines. Many people (in the
Bryanite silver camp and elsewhere) favored the former--regarding it as a
just war for the liberation of Cuba--and opposed the latter. Bryan would
have favored an independent Philippine republic--though of course he could
support US naval bases there (and in Cuba). As Bryan's career as
Secretary of State after 1913 showed, his opposition to a formal colonial
empire for the US didn't necessarily mean that he opposed all US
intervention in places like the Caribbean.
(3) Not enough attention is usually given to Bryan's likely domestic
policy in areas other than free silver. As I noted at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/b989f95239596484
"[W]hile it is certainly true that Bryan and the Democrats concentrated on
free silver in the 1896 campaign, one should not forget that the
Democratic platform--while of course not as radical as the Populists'--was
by no means restricted to free silver. It called for an income tax and for
'the enlargement of the powers of the Inter-State Commerce Commission and
such restrictions and guarantees in the control of railroads as will
protect the people from robbery and oppression,' and denounced high
tariffs, 'government by injunction,' and "[t]he absorption of wealth by
the few, the consolidation of our leading railroad systems and the
formation of trusts and pools.'
http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/chicagoplatform.html
"Some comments on the Chicago platform from conservatives:
"'No wild-eyed and rattle-brained horde of the red flag ever proclaimed
such a specific defiance of law, precedent, order, and government' was the
comment of the *New York Mail*...'Considering the platform,' declared C.
Ellery Anderson of New York, 'it may be as well that a revolutionist like
Bryan stands upon it. We want them with red flags so there will be
provocation for shooting them down.' (*Literary Digest,* Vol. XIII, July
18, 1896, p. 357.)" Philip Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the
United States, Volume II* (1955), p. 336. Foner, a Communist, gives the
Chicago Platform the Red Seal of Approval, proclaiming it 'progressive.'
(p. 333).
"It's important to remember this because it goes against the widespread
belief that the Populist support for Bryan was put over by 'conservative'
Populists who believed in free silver as *the* panacea. And it may help
to explain the enthusiastic support for Bryan by what some might consider
an unlikely source--Eugene V. Debs (although, interestingly, even Debs, in
his campaign tour for Bryan, put a heavy emphasis on free silver)."
Of course, once again, the question is to what extent Bryan could get
these "radical" measures through Congress. Perhaps more railroad
regulation and some procedural safeguards in the use of labor injunctions
in federal courts would pass. There might be some strengthening of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Democratic platform pretty much acknowledged
that the tariff couldn't be lowered as long as the Supreme Court decision
invalidating the income tax stood, but the death of Stephen J. Field
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Johnson_Field would eventually give
Bryan a chance to make the Court a bit less conservative. In any event,
presumably the *increases* in the tariff in OTL with the Dingley Act would
not have been enacted.
It is true, though, that while both Bryan and the Democrats were in
principle in favor of many reforms other than free silver, they
concentrated heavily on that last issue in 1896, and Bryan might have
spent a disproportionate amount of his energy as President to getting it
enacted, to the detriment of other reforms.
(4) Bryan is notorious for sharing the white South's attitudes toward
African Americans, though as I note at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/4a22984a42f06a6c he
wasn't as racist in 1896 as he would be later. But in any event it is
hard to see how African Americans (other than some federal patronage
employees) would fare much worse under him than under McKinley. The
southern states would have continued with segregation, disfranchisement,
lynchings, etc., no matter who was in the White House.
(5) On the question "What do you all think of Bill McKinley as a past
President?": Kevin Phillips has argued that in some respects, he was a
surprisingly progressive president.
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/e4f69205197d9fb6
What should at least be beyond dispute is that he was an astute
politician, and no mere tool of Mark Hanna or anyone else. And there is a
strong argument that with the possible exception of William Allison,
McKinley was the only Republican who could have defeated Bryan in 1896.
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/7cbff16a87af9190
In general, the positive reappraisal of McKinley by historians (H. Wayne
Morgan's 1963 *William McKinley and His America* was a pioneering work
here) is part of a larger trend to question the earlier tendency to draw a
sharp line between the "Gilded Age" and the "Progressive Era." In
particular, the idea that Theodore Roosevelt "revitalized" the
presidency--as if it had been "devitalized" before him--has been
questioned. See Charles W. Calhoun, "Reimagining the 'Lost Men' of the
Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth Century Presidents" in
the *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* (July 2002):
"Many scholars now believe that it was McKinley who created the modem
presidency and gave it the preeminence in national affairs it has enjoyed
ever since. As a congressional leader, McKinley had witnessed Harrison's
legislative techniques first-hand. As president, he proved even more
successful in applying these techniques, for he did so with a warmer
personal sensitivity and greater political skill. Moreover, whereas
Cleveland had badgered members of Congress, McKinley petted and cajoled
diem. A frequent recipient of the president's touch, veteran Illinois
Senator Shelby Cullom concluded, 'We have never had a President who had
more influence with Congress than Mr. McKinley.'72 61
"McKinley also recognized the importance of carefully managing the flow of
information to the nation. His staff briefed reporters twice daily and
provided them with work space in the White House. McKinley himself became
an accomplished "leaker" of information to individual reporters to float
ideas before the public. These efforts paid off in generally favorable
press coverage for the president's policies.73 62
"Building on the examples of predecessors such as Hayes and Harrison,
McKinley established the presidency as an independent source of influence
by using public appearances and speeches to carry his proposals directly
to the people. He traveled extensively, and to ensure that the president's
message reached far beyond the immediate audience, his staff took
reporters on his trips and provided the technical means to send their
stories to their home papers. Thus, effectively exploiting technological
developments--the national rail network with telegraph wires paralleling
the tracks--McKinley and his staff seized upon the new tools of modernity
to modernize the presidency. McKinley demonstrated to his successors that
the president's direct access to the public gave him the opportunity to
build a power base independent of his constitutionally defined
relationship with Congress. As one contemporary observer wrote, with
understandable hyperbole, "The pivot upon which we revolve as a nation is
no longer the Capitol, where the people's representatives assemble, but
the White House, where one man sits in almost supreme power."74 63
"In assessing the performance of the presidents in the Gilded Age, one
should not lose sight of the broader political context, which profoundly
influenced their effectiveness. Nineteenth-century Americans' abiding
suspicion of concentrated power persisted and was deepened by the
experience of Andrew Johnson. Moreover, for most of the period the two
major political parties were locked in an equilibrium in electoral
strength that restrained presidents and other party leaders from taking
stands so strong that they would offend some indispensable party
constituency. The closeness in party strength also deprived most of these
presidents of a clear electoral mandate, and it usually resulted in a
divided national government, with the legislative and the executive
branches at loggerheads on many issues. One of the reasons McKinley was
able to lead with the dynamism he showed, besides his inherent talent for
conciliation, was the major realignment that had occurred in 1894 and
1896, making the Republicans the nation's undisputed majority party. 64
"Despite these contextual and systemic handicaps, the presidents of the
Gilded Age presided over a gradual but undeniable accretion of authority
and influence in their office from the depths to which it had plunged in
the Johnson years. Presidents became more influential in their relations
with Congress, and in a variety of ways, including travel and press
manipulation, they increasingly attracted public attention and influenced
public attitudes. By 1888 even James Bryce saw 'reasons for believing that
[the presidency] may reach a higher point than it has occupied at any time
since the Civil War. The tendency everywhere in America to concentrate
power and responsibility in one man is unmistakable.' Because the
president was 'in some respects better fitted both to represent and to
influence public opinion than Congress,' Bryce forecast 'still undeveloped
possibilities of greatness in store for the Presidents of the future.'75
Theodore Roosevelt did not will the modem presidency into being simply by
the assertion of his own indomitable personality. Instead, he recognized
the potential foreshadowed by the efforts of his late-nineteenth century
predecessors. Building on their accomplishments and advances, he moved the
presidency to the center of national political and governmental life where
it has remained ever since. 65"
http://web.archive.org/web/20041128072909/http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jga/1.3/calhoun.html