Correct, Ligachev was Gorbachev's deputy, although the two's relationship did become rocky later on when Ligachev started to criticize Gorbachev. Also you would have to get rid of Gorbachev for Ryzhkov to become General Secretary, since Gorbachev was the clear successor to Chernenko, and Andropov wanted Gorbachev to succeed him, but that didn't work out (Chernenko's death, which meant that the Soviets would have 4 General Secretaries in about 2 years, along with his general incompetence convinced the Soviet leadership that someone younger was needed).
I've often wondered what Ligachev would have looked like as Gen Sec. He strikes me as far more capable of reforming the system than Gorbachev was (most of his criticisms have been proven right as we've uncovered more data about how the Soviets collapsed, and he has the advantage of being a true believer, which means that he could provide moral leadership where Gorbachev offered only tactical political moves). On the other hand, I've not read any deep examination of him, so it may be his subtle flaws could be as bad or worse than Gorbachev's subtle flaws.
And apparently, the reason why Chernenko was chosen as Gen Sec wasn't so much that Gorbachev was denied power by hard-liners, but Gorbachev felt that he needed a year or two to prepare himself for the job and he figured Chernenko would live just about long enough, but not too long.
Certainly, as I've read more about the man, Chernenko comes across as more of a reformist than the popular history paints him as.
Communism is all but dead; what has replaced it is Great Russian nationalism under a crude mask of pan-Slavic brotherhood.
I think you are dead wrong about just about everything you talk about (a war with China seems to me to be an excellent way to lose the cold war right quick - China was always a diversion to the real struggle at the European end of the USSR). However, the quoted bit is where I think you are most wrong - Great Russian nationalism could, IMO, only corrode the USSR. Even an honest pan-slavic nationalism could only be corrosive, if a little less so. The Soviet Union had too many non-slavic citizens for that to be viable and adopting an ideology that as part of its basic nature reduced Central Asians, Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Germans, Jews and all the other smaller nations to second-class citizens is ideological suicide (and, if you ask me, the unofficial slavic nationalism of the USSR was one of the factors that eventually contributed to its destruction).
fasquardon