CanKiwi, just curious here, but I think you'd have more readers and more interest if you simply continued the narrative and added the fact files later. Speaking only for myself, but I think a lot of the detail around tank development and so forth is feeling superfuous. I see a new post on this thread and I end up disappointed that it's just more background, rather than taking the story forward. Your writing is very good and you spin a great story. Clearly you also love research and being attentive to detail (somewhat of an understatement), but I just don't know if you're taking your reader along for the ride or more dragging him.
What If - Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?
- Thread starter CanKiwi
- Start date
Have thought about that in the past. The problem is twofold (or maybe three....)
(1) Finland was small and any change has a lot of ramifications. To my way of thinking, simply stating that X happened instead of Y is overly simplisitic. Thus, when you're getting into armoured formations, just stating that Finland ended up with 3 Armoured Divisions and X # of Y tanks is getting into Space Bat territory unless you get into the finer details of how (and what). This whole ATL runs a permanent risk of getting into complete ASB territory unless there are viable (he says with tongue in cheek) reasons and justification for a lot of the equipment the Finns end up with (Pigeon-guided glider bombs being one example, Nokia one-man portable radios being another, Nokia radar being yet a third.... and that's just a few examples). So.... it gets explained, probably in way too much detail but hey, I always get pissed off by timelines that make way-out-there assumptions without explaining the whys and wherefore's.
(2) and speaking of what, as with aircraft, it's hard to say that Finland simply bought X # of Y tanks. What was available (you can rule out a lot of different models that way) and why could or couldn't they be bought?. Finland would be buying small #'s, why would they have bought a particular model. Were they affordable on a limited budget? How realistic would it be? And all those other details that make it believable that yes, Finland did end up with 3 Panssaridivisoona and then used them to beat the crap out of the Russians. And then the Germans......
(3) re detail, there's more than a few readers (on and off this site because I post this on 2 other sites as well) that don't have a huge background on some of this stuff. Maybe bits and pieces but not all of it. For myself, the Birch Guns and the Vickers Medium II Box Tank as well as the Dragon SP AA Gun were completely new. Given I'm probably going to write these in, a bit of background is (for me anyhow and likely for some other readers) worthwhile.
And yes, a lot of detail, but swings and roundabouts. this whole timeline is way deep in details, it's how I started writing it and without those details, it gets a bit too ASB.... I mean, in this ATL we're talking a tiny country that ends up beating both the USSR and Germany here in 2 seperate wars within WW2. Decisively. Which on the face of it, needs some detail. Anyhow, as I've said before, this is all the detailed background around the novel(s) I started writing (still am off and on) on this. When you get into these sort of details, it works out a lot of reaaaaally bad mistakes that might otherwise have been their. And it's fun (for me anyhow....).
I'd say what I've said before in response to similar comments, which is, if some of the content bores you, just skip over it, there'll be more relevant stuff coming thru the pipeline eventually.....
Thanks for the explanation. Perfectly understandable, and I appreciate your rationale. Mostly, I appreciate your work, so thanks and I look forward to future updates.
French Tanks of the Interwar Decades
As with Britian, French tank design entered a period of hiatus through the 1920’s. Nevertheless, the French Tanks of the Interwar Decades were as good as any designed and built elsewhere in the world, and one in particular, the Souma S35, was perhaps the best tank available anywhere in 1939. In this Post, we’ll walk through French Tanks as of the end of World War One, and then take a look at the French Tanks of the Interwar Decades.
Please note: here and there within this post are snippets of alternative history related to Finland. Any mention of French tanks in use in Finland is fictional, although the remainder of the content is historically accurate. Also, I’ve left out French tank models that were only produced in small numbers or as prototypes.
The French Tanks of World War One
During World War One, France too developed its own tracked Armoured Fighting Vehicles at about the same time as Britain, but the situation there was rather different to Britain’s. In Britain a single committee had coordinated design, and had to overcome the initial resistance of the Army, while the major industries remained passive. Almost all production effort was thus concentrated into the Mark I and its direct successors, all very similar in shape. In France, on the other hand, there were multiple and conflicting lines of development which resulted in three quite disparate production types. The two original French tank designs, the St-Chamond and the Schneider-CA, proved to be flawed. The last of the three, the Renault-FT, pioneered the classic tank configuration which has remained the basis of tank design up to today.
The Renault FT-17 was the first tank to incorporate a top-mounted turret with full 360º traverse capability and was designed with a layout that has been followed by almost all designs ever since: driver at the front; main armament in a fully rotating turret on top; engine at the rear. Previous tank models had been “box tanks”; a single crowded space combining the engine room, fighting compartment, ammunition stock and driver’s cabin. The FT would have the largest production run of any tank of WW1, with over 3,700 built, more numerous than all British tanks combined.
The
Renault FT-17 – the WW1 tank that pioneered the classic tank configuration which has remained the basis of tank design up to today
The Renault FT-17 has already been covered in some detail – suffice it to reiterate that the large fleet of Renault FT-17 tanks with which the French Army ended WW1 would remain the mainstay of the French armoured forces through to the mid-1930’s, when they began to be rapidly replaced with a mixed force of light tanks across both the Infantry and Cavalry branches of the Army, as well as with medium and heavy tanks. The Infantry light tanks included the Renault R 35 (which followed the FT 17 concept closely with its small size, two-man crew and short 37 mm gun armament. albeit heavily armored). The cavalry had the similar Hotchkiss H 35, armed with the same 37 mm gun, as well as light recon tanks such as the AMR 35.
France also produced arguably the best tank of the 1930’s, the SOMUA S35. This tank equipped the armoured divisions of the Cavalry and was probably the best combination of armour, firepower and mobility prior to the appearance of the German PzKpfw IV Ausf. F2 and the Soviet T-34. The SOUMA S35 had a long 47 mm gun that could kill any tank then in service, as well as heavy cast armour and good speed. The French Char B main battle tank was also a formidable heavy tank, with cast and riveted armour, the same long 47 mm gun as the S 35, and in addition a hull-mounted 75 mm howitzer. All Char Bs were equipped with radios and the tank was nearly invulnerable to most tank guns and towed antitank guns.
Arguably the best tank of the 1930’s, the SOMUA S35
In general, French tanks of the 1930s were well-armoured, innovative vehicles that owed little to foreign designs. However, the light tanks lacked firepower and almost all French tanks were crippled by their one-man turrets. Even the vaunted Char B had a commander who was tasked with commanding the vehicle as well as loading and aiming the turret gun. If he were a platoon leader or company commander, he had the additional tasks of controlling his other units. Such a heavy set of tasks was overwhelming, greatly reducing the effectiveness of the tanks.
The lack of radios for the light tanks was not seen as a major drawback, since French doctrine called for slow-paced, deliberate manoeuvers in close conformance to plans: the “Methodical Battle” concept, adopted because wargaming showed it to be superior. The role of small unit leaders was to execute plans, not to take the initiative in combat. This was nearly the opposite of German doctrine, which stressed initiative and decision-making at low command levels (Auftragstaktik). In 1939 a belated effort was made to improve flexibility and increase the number of radios but overall the French general staff failed in defining an effective military doctrine regarding the use of tanks.
In the post, I’ll look more or less briefly at those French tanks in service in 1919 followed by an overview of French tanks from 1919 through to the outbreak of WW2, with an emphasis on those tanks that were produced in reasonably large numbers and thus potentially available for export.
The Char Schneider CA
Schneider, a major French arms producer, took the lead in French tank design and in December 1915 demonstrated a prototype tank based on a Baby Holt tractor to the French Army. Among the onlookers was Colonel Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne — an artilleryman and engineer held in high regard throughout the French army for his technical and tactical expertise. On 12 December 1915 Col. Estienne presented to the High Command a plan for the creation of an armoured force; strong French Army support for tanks would be a constant during the decades to come. For Estienne, the Schneider prototype demonstrated the practicality of using tracked armoured vehicles to move infantry, equipment and cannon over the battlefield.
Général Jean-Baptiste Estienne
Although Schneider’s project had been underway prior to Estienne’s involvement, Estienne’s played a decisive rôle in getting the Schneider tank into production (although actual completion was entrusted to a ministerial bureau headed by General Léon Augustin Jean Marie Mourret, director of the Army automobile service. Mourret did not closely cooperate with Estienne, who was largely excluded from decisions of a technical nature). In February 1916 successful tests were held and the War Ministry ordered the production of four hundred tracteurs-chenilles type Schneider & Cie blindés (“tracked and armoured tractors of the Schneider type”), at a price of 56,000 French francs per vehicle.
To the modern eye, the Schneider CA tank is barely recognizable as a tank, looking much more like an armoured steel box resting on top of a caterpillar tractor. It has no turret, and its inconspicuous main armament is a fortification 75 mm Blockhaus Schneider, placed in a barbette in the right front corner of the tank. The right side had been chosen because the gunner had to stand to the left of the barrel to operate the gun. The cannon type was developed from a 75 mm trench mortar adapted to fire from a fixed fortification position by adding a recoil compensator and a gun shield. This short-barrelled cannon had a length of just 9.5 calibres and fired the standard French HE Model 1915 75 mm shell with a reduced propelling charge, shortening the length of the round from 350 to 241 millimetres and giving a muzzle velocity of only two hundred metres per second.
Schneider CA Tank
While this limited the maximum range to 2,200 metres, the practical range was only 600 metres and the tank needed to close within 200 metres of a target to allow for precision shooting. The gun had a traverse of 60°, a depression of -10° and an elevation of 30°. The ammunition stock was 90 vertically stowed rounds. To the right of the cannon there is a bin for 20 readily accessible 75 mm rounds. Three other ammunition bins were positioned respectively at the extreme right rear corner (14), to the left of the engine (32) and at the left rear corner (24). Two 8 mm Hotchkiss Model 1914 machine guns projected from the flanks in large hemispherical ballmounts. The right machine gun was, because of the room needed for the main gun, positioned more to the rear than the left one. The machine guns could traverse 106°, had a depression of -45° and an elevation of 20°. A bin at the extreme left corner held 4,000 rounds of 8 mm ammunition but in practice fifty belts with ninety-six rounds each were carried, for a total of 4800 rounds.
Another unusual feature is the slanted overhang of the frontal part of the chassis which has the form of a pointed nose, ending in a high obliquely protruding steel spur. It had been designed for cutting through and crushing down German barbed wire, thus opening passages for following French infantry, originally seen as the primary function of the Schneider CA. This long overhang caused the tank to ditch itself readily. The design is of the so-called “box tank” type, in which the crew, propulsion system and all manner of equipment were not clearly separated. As a result there is no real fighting compartment. The space available to the crew, illuminated by three small electric lights, was entered through a double door at the back of the tank and is extremely cramped. The crew consisted of a commanding officer who was also the driver; an NCO who was the main gunner, two machine gunners, a loader who assisted with both the cannon and the machine guns and a mechanic who doubled as a machine gun loader.
Four of these six men had to crouch inside a 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) high space between the roof and the tank’s floor. They then had to stand within two narrow troughs, one, behind the driver’s seat, used by the gunner and a second square one more to the back, between the suspension elements, used by the cannon loader and the two machine gunners. Most of the space however, had a height of just three feet between the roof and the covering of transmission and suspension: if the mechanic wanted to assist the right machine gun, he had to lie on his belly to load it. Each Schneider tank team also included three riflemen who functioned as and outside crew; during battle they accompanied the vehicle. All-around protection was provided by 11.4 mm steel plate, later improved by a spaced armour of 5.4/5.5 mm, raising the weight from 12.5 to 13.5 tonnes. The roof had 5.5 mm armour. The plates are partly riveted; the superstructure is largely bolted.
Space was confined within the interior of the Schneider CA-1
The 60 hp Schneider gasoline engine and its radiator were located in the front part of the tank, to the immediate left of the driver. The four cylinder engine was specially constructed for the Schneider CA with a maximum output of sixty horsepower at 1,000 rpm. The tank’s official top speed was only 8.1 km/h and the practical terrain speed was even lower at 2 to 4 km/h. Two fuel gravity-feed reservoirs placed above the engine below the right front roof and nose plate had a total capacity of 145 litres, giving a practical range of about 50 kilometres, though the official range was 80 kilometres. Steering was generally very tiring and there was a tendency to jump out of gear when the clutch was engaged too forcefully.
As the traverse of the main gun was limited, it had first to be pointed in the general direction of the target by the driver-commander swivelling the entire vehicle. To facilitate this, a small rectangular frame is fitted on the right side of the nose of the tank. Looking through it, the driver had a sightline parallel to that of the cannon in a neutral position. In practice, the commander had a too limited view of his surroundings through the small hatches to his left, front and right and had to resort to lifting his head out of his rectangular top hatch to observe the enemy. Small rectangular hatches, fitted with a vision slit, were positioned to the front of each machine-gun. The main ventilation was provided by a large skylight slit running along the midline of the hull. It is doubly roofed with the lower roof having a second slit in its top, while the higher roof has open lower sides, creating oblique oblong ventilation channels through which fresh air can be sucked in from the outside. The top roof is the highest element of the vehicle. With later production vehicles, polluted air was removed through a broad ventilation grid in the nose, having a recessed armour plate below it. To the left and the right of the skylight roof rectangular escape hatches are present in the hull top.
Schneider tanks, here with the later cross-hatched camouflage, were mostly transported by rail
Schneider CA’s in Battle
By January 1917, 32 Schenider’s had been delivered from the order of 400 for which delivery had been contracted to for November 1916. By January 1917 production had picked up to 3 to 4 units per day and by 1 June, 322 Schenider tanks had been delivered. During production, the Schneider’s design was gradually and progressively improved, which caused further delays. Starting from July 1916, tank crews began to be trained, many of these men were volunteers. Their first instruction consisting of the basics of maintenance and a lot of driver training with an emphasis on crossing trenches, avoiding shell craters and running down trees and walls. Because at first no actual Schneider vehicles were available, Holt tractors were used instead. The training camps that were set up included tank workshops and 64 Schneiders were allocated purerly for training purposes and to limit the wear on combat vehicles.
Char d’assaut Schneider C.A.1
The French Army did not intend to create an independent tank force; the tank units would be part of the Artillery Arm. Each group consisted of four batteries, each battery again of four tanks. This would have resulted in a total of sixteen tanks and indeed this was the official organic strength of an AS, but the fourth battery was normally a depot unit, intended to provide replacement vehicles and crews for the other three batteries. It had an official allotment of three tanks and the total matériel strength of an AS was thus fifteen. Actual operational strength varied wildly, due to frequent breakdowns. The personnel strength consisted of twelve officers — each commanding a tank of the three regular batteries — sixteen NCOs and 110 men of lower rank. In practice often four batteries of three tanks were fielded, to allow for a greater tactical flexibility.
Estienne had hoped to create a powerful and large striking force before committing his tanks to battle. He had strongly disapproved of the, in his eyes premature, British use of tanks in September 1916, just two months after first deliveries of the Mark I. However, political circumstances would compel him to deploy the Artillerie Spéciale before it was at full strength or adequately trained. On the morning of 16 April 1917 the Nivelle Offensive was launched with a heavy commitment of Schneider tanks, with Berry-au-Bac being their first major engagement. The Schneiders penetrated several miles but lost their accompanying infantry and had their numbers whittled down before withdrawing, in the process of which they suffered further losses from artillery fire. Their losses were heavy: 76 of the 128 combat tanks engaged had been lost and many of those lost had burned.
One of the Schneider CA-1 tanks destroyed at Berry-au-Bac
Despite the general failure of the Nivelle Offensive and the ensuing mutinies, the French High Command attempted another offensive in May 1917 at Moulin-de-Laffaux. Tanks were again used, this time in conjunction with an infantry battalion specially trained in combined arms tactics, the 17e Bataillon de Chasseurs à Pied. Coordination with the artillery was improved by attaching a special observation plane, protected by six SPAD VII fighters, whose task was to identify German antitank-batteries and have them destroyed by counterbattery fire; it also had to report the position of the tanks to higher command levels.
Crew posing with their Schneider Tank
While most of the attacks of the offensive were failures, the tank attack on Moulin-de-Laffaux largely attained its objectives. The Schneiders, advancing not in column but “line abreast”, exploited the initial infantry conquest of the first trench by crossing the second and then assisted the foot soldiers in heavy and fluid battles with counterattacking German reserves. Eventually most tanks broke down and had to be left behind by the advancing infantry. The Schneiders had made a good account of themselves. Of thirty-three tanks engaged only five were destroyed. Here we can see the early evolution of modern combined arms warfare, driven by practical lessons rather than theory.
The French High Command considered launching a large-scale summer offensives in 1918, benefiting from a grown number of AFVs. At this point of the war, less than a year after their first employment, the Schneider tanks were already considered obsolete. They nevertheless still formed an essential part of the French tank force with 245 operational in March 1918 and they continued to be used in the ongoing fighting as the German offensives of 1918 were held. By August 1918 only 50 Schneiders were operational, with losses not being replaced.
Schneider CA’s after the First World War
Even before the end of the war, on 6 October 1918 Estienne had proposed to phase out all Schneider tanks from operational units, remove their armament and deploy them as instruction and recovery vehicles. By the end of 1918, all surviving Schneider tanks had been designated utility vehicles. Some of the serviceable Schneiders were rebuilt as recovery vehicles and tank transporters serving with Renault FT units. Some Schneider’s also found their way into the Italian Army in the summer of 1918 and to Spain in 1921 where they fought in the Rif War, as part of a joint French-Spanish effort to subdue the self-declared Rif Republic. They reached Morocco on 28 February 1922 and in September 1925 they took part in the large scale amphibious landings in the bay of Al Hoceima. The Schneider tanks saw action until May 1926, returning to Spain in 1929, not having lost a single vehicle. In Spain, due to their poor mechanical state, they were delegated to a reserve status and used as training and instruction vehicles.
A single Spanish Republican Schneider CA-1 was used against the Alcazar in Toledo
On the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, one unit remained under Republican command, while the second took the side of the Nationalists. The Madrid vehicles saw some action during the bloody attacks on the Cuartel de la Montaña, the main military barracks of the capital. Some of the tanks were manned by militia members of the Unión General de Trabajadores and the Unión de Hermanos Proletarios. Probably all Schneider tanks became inoperational during 1936.
The last surviving Schneider CA-1 is on display at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur.
The only surviving example of the Schneider CA is found at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, and this is also the world’s oldest tank in full running condition. It was donated at the end of WW1 by the French government to the United States of America, was preserved in the Aberdeen Proving Ground Ordnance Museum in Maryland, USA and in 1985 was donated back to France for restoration. The tank’s original four cylinder Schneider gasoline engine and the original transmissions were fully restored to original working condition by the repair teams at the Musée des Blindés.
The Saint-Chamond Tank
The Saint-Chamond was the second French heavy tank of WW1, with some 400 manufactured between April 1917 and July 1918. The Saint-Chamond proved to be an underpowered and fundamentally inadequate design. Its principal weakness was the “caterpillar” tracks, which were far too short in relation to the vehicle’s length and heavy weight (23 tons). Later models attempted to rectify some of the tank’s original flaws by installing wider and stronger track shoes, thicker frontal armor and installing a more effective 75mm Mle 1897 field gun. The Saint-Chamond tanks remained engaged in action until late summer 1918, belatedly becoming more effective as combat moved out of the trenches and onto open ground. Eventually, however, the Saint-Chamond tanks were scheduled to be entirely replaced by the newer model British-designed heavy tanks.
Ateliers des Aciéries de la Marine, avant 1906
The origins of the St Chamond lay in commercial rivalry between the the arms manufacturer Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt aka “FAMH” and Schneider. FAMH was given an order for 400 tanks by the French government and intended to build a tank that would be similar to the Schneider. However, Eugène Brillié, the designer of the Schneider tank, refused to share his patents for free and FAMH refused to pay. Unable to replicate certain patented details of the new Schneider tank, FAMH developed its own proprietary design: the “Char Saint-Chamond”. This also gave Saint-Chamond what they consider to be the opportunity to upstage Schneider. They did this by installing a more powerful, full size 75mm field gun plus 4 Hotchkiss machine guns (instead of the 2 machine guns of the Schneider tank).
Saint-Chamond Tanks under construction in the factory
When Colonel Estienne learned that an order for 400 Saint-Chamond tanks had been placed in April 1916, he was at first elated. When it became apparent that they would be of a completely different type, Estienne was shocked and wrote: “I am painfully surprised that an order of this importance has been placed without asking the opinion of the only officer who, at the time, has undertaken a profound study of the technical and military aspects involved and who had brought the supreme commander to the decision to take this path [towards a tank arm].”
The new tank was a cumbersome and underpowered vehicle. It had a large overhanging front compartment with the 75 mm gun protruding from the nose. Within the forward fighting compartment and on the left was the driver, who was also the vehicle commander. On the right, a machine gunner operated the front Hotchkiss machine gun. This machine gunner was also responsible for the breech operation of the 75mm gun, a task he performed after pivoting on his seat to the left. A loader (referred to in some sources as the gunner) adjusted the gun’s elevation, observing the target through a small hatch in the front of the tank, which left him vulnerable to enemy fire. Traversing the 75mm gun required traversing the whole tank, a task performed by the driver. A second fighting compartment at the back held one machine gunner next to the secondary driver’s position, from where the tank could also be driven backwards by the mechanic in an emergency.
Gunner positions in the St-Chamond WWI tank. You can see just how poorly the side machine gun positions were thought out. The gunner has to crouch down in an awkward position. His shin is inches from a sharp corner of the arch over the tracks. The heat and noise from the engine, located a foot or two away, must have been unbearable.
Between those two compartments the gasoline engine and the electric generator were positioned in the open. Narrow passageways on both sides of the engine connected the front and rear compartments. The passageways also held Hotchkiss positions, one on each side in front of the engine. The Saint-Chamond had 4 Hotchkiss M1914 machine gun positions: one at the front, one at the back and one on each side of the tank. Despite weighing 23 tons, the tank could manage a top speed of 12 km/h. This speed was seldom achieved in the field as the long nose was prone to dig into the ground. The relatively high maximum speed on flat ground was made possible by the “Crochat Collardeau” transmission which coupled a Panhard-Levassor 4 cylinders 90HP sleeve-valve gasoline engine to an electric generator. The generator was connected to two separate electric motors, one for each track.
Due to its short tracks and over-extended body, the vehicle experienced major difficulties in crossing trenches and overcoming obstacles.
Due to its short tracks and over-extended body, the vehicle experienced major difficulties in crossing trenches and overcoming obstacles. This led to such a negative reaction by the crews in training that a special mention was passed on to General Headquarters: Nobody wanted to serve on the Saint-Chamond. Second Lieutenant de Gouyon, principal Saint-Chamond driving instructor at Marly, publicly declared that it had become virtually impossible for him to continue and, since he was a Member of Parliament, he requested that the whole matter be placed on the next parliamentary agenda.
The Improved Saint-Chamond tanks of 1918
The Saint-Chamond was the second French heavy tank of the First World War. Born of the commercial rivalry with the makers of the Schneider CA1, the Saint-Chamond was an inadequate design. Four hundred Saint-Chamond tanks were manufactured but most of them were destroyed in action.
Originally the crew of nine men was protected by 11 mm of steel armour on the sloping front and 17mm on the sides. An extra layer of spaced 8.5 mm armour was added to the front to improve protection. Beginning with the 151st tank, the roof was also redesigned with a double slope so that satchel charges and grenades would slide off. At the same time, the original two observation turrets in front and on top were done away with and replaced by a single low profile square turret permitting front and side vision by the tank’s driver/commander. The tracks were also widened from 324 mm to 412 mm to lower their ground pressure. After Saint-Chamond tank No 210 the more effective Model 1897 field gun was installed instead of Rimailho’s (profitable) 75mm Saint-Chamond gun.
Battle-damaged Saint Chamond. Note the badly damaged roof.
At about the same time barrel-like rollers were added underneath the front and rear of the tank to help crossing trenches. This improved version was later called, unofficially, the Modèle 18. Production slowed down in March 1918, after 377 had been assembled, and ceased completely in July 1918. Initially, forty eight Saint-Chamond tanks were modified as supply and recovery vehicles that could tow the lighter Schneider tanks. Their first action as a fighting vehicle took place at Laffaux Mill on May 5, 1917. During the summer of 1918, as combat moved from the trenches into the open, the Saint-Chamond’s were used to engage German field gun batteries (Nahkampfbatterien) at a distance with their 75mm cannon. The Saint-Chamond proved reasonably effective in this specialist assault gun role. The Saint-Chamond’s final engagement in battle took place in early October 1918, in support of the U.S. First Division near Montfaucon. However, by that time, the Renault FT tank had successfully taken over the major role in the French tank force and had also been purchased by the American Expeditionary Forces in France. After the war 54 were rebuilt as ammunition carriers. The remainder were scrapped.
Saint Chamond ammunition carrier (early)
The last Saint-Chamond tank remaining in existence ( an improved mid-1918 model ), alongside other French tanks of World War I (Schneider CA1 and Renault FT), is preserved at the Musée des Blindés at Saumur, France. It survived, together with a Schneider CA1 tank of the same vintage, at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds Ordnance Museum in Maryland, USA, and was later donated by the U.S. to the French government. Although very well preserved at the Musee des Blindes, this unique Saint-Chamond tank could not be fully restored due to the irreversibly degraded conditions of the two electric motors and of the electric generator.
Industrial Rivalry
Industrial rivalry had played a detrimental role in the design of French Tanks. The heavy Char St Chamond emerged from industrial lobbying of the government, rather than being ordered by the Army. Industrial initiative however also led to swift advances. Some in the French army had lobbied for the alternative mass production of super-heavy tanks, the resultant gigantic Char 2C, the most complex and technologically advanced tank of its day, was the outcome of this. Only ten were eventually produced, and these were far too late to participate in World War. The Char 2C would be the first tank with a three-man turret; the heaviest tank to enter service until late in WW2 and is still the largest ever operational tank.
French tank from the Groupe D’Artillerie Spéciale at Berry-au-Bac, at the opening of the Nivelle Offensive in April 1917
French production initially lagged well behind the British. After August 1916 however, British tank manufacture was temporarily halted while better designs were completed, allowing the French to overtake their allies in numbers at least. During the Nivelle offensive of April 1917, the first use in battle of the French Tanks, the French Army had four times more tanks available that the British.
This numerical superiority was brief however as the French offensive was a major failure; the Schneiders were badly deployed and they suffered large losses from German artillery. The Saint-Chamond tanks, first deployed on 5 May 1917, proved to be so badly designed that they were unable to cross the first line of the German trenches. Not an auspicious start.
The Renault FT 17
We’ve already taken a look at the Renault FT-17 – this tank had a long life and saw use in WWII and even later in Indochina. It was utilised as far away as in China, during the Chinese Civil Wars, and versions of the tank were used both against and by the Japanese during the invasion of China. A large number found their way into both Republican and Nationalist hands during the Spanish Civil War. They were used in the Russian Revolution by both the Bolsheviks and the White Russians. France exported the FT 17 right up to World War II. The design was also developed by the Italians as the Fiat 3000 and the USSR as the T-18. The last known combat action by the Renault FT was in Afghanistan in the 1980’s when a handful of the tanks were used as static pill boxes or roadblocks.
On 20 October, the Afghan Defence Ministry officially handed over the historic vehicle to Polish Ambassador in Kabul Piotr Łukasiewicz. The Russians probably seized the tank during the 1920 war, and presented it as a gift to the then Afghan emir in 1923.
Remnants of equipment from many other countries lie in ruins scattered across the Afghanistan landscape, faint traces of the military equipment of many countries whuh has made its way to this remote land. Many of the items are still being used, but much also litters the sides of the roads and decorates various junkyards. Amongst these remnants were Four old renault FT-17’s, two of which lay disassembled and rusting in a junkyard in Kabul whilst another sat on a plinth on display. These four Renault FT17’s given as a gift by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan in 1923. They had been captured in the Battle of Równe, on 5 July 1920…after being abandoned by the Polish forces. The two tanks in the junkyard have now been shipped to the US whilst the third (photo above) has been given to Poland as of 20 October 2012. The Polish Embassy in Kabul transported the tank to the Bagram base and handed it over to the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan frm where it was transferred to Poland by the Operational Command and the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate. The Renault FT-17 will be renovated by Stefan Czarniecki Land Forces Training Centre in Poznan. According to President Bronislaw Komorowski’s decision, the tank will be put on public display as a valuable reminder of the 1920 Polish-Soviet war.
The FT-17 was one of the success stories of the First World War. The small tank was mechanically reliable after some initial teething problems. Owing to it’s size and narrow body, it was a relatively hard target for German artillerymen. But the standout feature of the FT-17 was the 360 degree rotating turret, which has been the mainstay of tank designs ever since. The version in the foreground is a wireless or command tank.
In battle in 1918, the Renault FT’s proved their worth immediately. They proved themselves technically also, continuing to perform in sustained operations with minimal technical support – miraculous by WW1 standards. The Soissons offensive of July 1918 saw the Renault’s in the vanguard of the attack and also showed the offensive power of tanks. The most significant tactical problem was the continued lack of sufficient tank-infantry training and as the atnks themselves were only good for a few dozen hours of operation before they required an overhaul, training was limited.
The major killers of the Renault’s in battle proved to be artillery, the anti-tank trench (and large shell craters) and mechanical problems. Mines were also a threat, although not many Renault’s were destroyed by these. Bridging tanks were, by the end of WW1, already being used as a solution to the anti-tank trenches. By late 1918, attacks were not necessarily being preceded by heavy artillery bombardments since the resulting craters were obstacles to the passage of the tanks. In the final offensives of September-October 1918, the Renaults enabled the French infantry to return to the fight, the poilus no longer faced the machine-guns alone. They were able to advance behind the tanks, watching as the machinegun nests were smashed and overrun by the tanks. There was no grand victory, but these battles heralded the end of trench warfare.
Although many were sold to other nations, over 2,800 Renault FT-17’s remained with the French Army. In contrast to the United Kingdom, which greatly reduced its armoured forces and scrapped redundant AFVs after the war, France continued to maintain a large number of active or reserve armoured units (with an organic tank strength of about 1,260 tanks) and all of the remaining Renault FTs were at least kept in working order.
The last of the French WW1 Tanks – the Char 2C
The Char 2C was the last of the French tanks developed during WW1 and was a “super-heavy” tank. In physical dimensions it was the largest operational tank ever built – the next operational tank to even approach its weight would be the German Tiger II tank of WW2. Ten were eventually built and entered service, remaining in use up until WW2, when they were activated during the French mobilization.
The Char 2C was intended as a breakthrough tank or “Fortress Tank” (Char de forteresse), intended to lead the great Allied offensives that were planned for the spring of 1919. France planned to produce 300, but only 10 were ever built. This monster had a crew of 12, weighed some 152,100 pounds, and was powered by two Maybach or Daimler Benz 250-hp gasoline engines. It had a speed of 7.5 mph. The Char 2C had maximum 45mm armor and was armed with a turreted 75mm gun (later a 155mm) and four machine guns.
The origins of the Char 2C have always been shrouded in mystery. In the summer of 1916, General Mourret, the Subsecretary of Artillery, verbally granted Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM), a shipyard in the south of France near Toulon, a contract for the development of a heavy tank, a char d’assaut de grand modèle. At the time, French industry was very active in lobbying for defence orders, using their connections with high-placed officials and officers to obtain commissions; development contracts could be very profitable even when not resulting in actual production, as they were fully paid for by the state. The French Army had no stated requirement for a heavy tank, and there was no official policy to procure one so the decision seems to have been taken solely on his personal authority, for reasons we can now only surmise.
The reason he later gave was that the British tanks then in development seemed to be better devised as regarded lay-out, ventilation and fire protection, so awarding a contract to a shipyard might improve on existing French designs. Exact specifications, if they ever existed, have been lost. FCM then largely neglected the project, apart from reaping the financial benefits. At that time all tank projects were highly secret, and therefore well shielded from public scrutiny. This was soon to change, however as, following the British deployment of tanks in battle for the first time, the French people and politicians now became curious as to the state of their own national tank projects. This sudden attention greatly alarmed Mourret, who promptly investigated the progress that had been made at FCM and was shocked to find there there had been none.
Albert Thomas (1878-1932) was a prominent French Socialist and the first Minister of Armament for the French Third Republic during World War I.
On 30 September 1916 he personally took control of the project and even without a design, ordered FCM to build one prototype. This development coincided with a political demand by the Minister of Armament Albert Thomas to produce a tank superior to the British types. Mourret asked Renault for help with the design and with assistance from the Renault team (who had fortuitously already prepared a feasibility study for a heavy tank), a full-size wooden mock-up was quickly constructed. In January 1917 the design was presented to the Consultative Committee of the Assault Artillery, who decided to have two prototypes built. By December 1917 the first prototype, the FCM 1A, was ready.
Mourret had by now been replaced as head of the commission by Estienne, whose good friend General Philippe Pétain, the new High Commander of the French Army, asked him to use his position to end the project. Estienne told Pétain that this was ill-advised while the public was questioning why these heavy tanks had not been produced. Besides, the allies (specifically the British and the US) would consent to give France 700 of the new Mark VIII Liberty design only if France had made at least a token effort to produce its own heavy tanks. Thus the French authorities had to delay the project while outwardly endorsing it. Estienne had already set this course by choosing the heaviest version, the “C”, for production, requiring a completely new prototype, causing a considerable delay. Pétain then demanded unreasonably high production numbers, asking for 300 heavy tanks to be ready for March 1919, thus delaying planning and initiating a political row, causing a quarrel to erupt between Clemenceau, who was both Prime-Minister and Minister of War, and Louis Loucheur, the Minister of Armament, who believed it impossible to provide the labour and steel required.
The Char 2C’s under construction at FCM
Meanwhile, Estienne and Pétain complicated the issue with further demands. Pétain asked for special pontoons while Estienne demanded battering rams and electronic mine detectors. When WW1 ended, not a single Char 2C had been built. The production order for the Char 2C was cancelled. However, despite the end of hostilities, strong political pressure to adopt new heavy tank projects remained as there was now a considerable surplus capacity in French industry. The Direction de l’Artillerie d’Assaut thus decided in April 1919 to procure ten Char 2Cs and to simultaneously use this order as an argument to reject any further projects. The Char 2C prototype was finished together with the other nine tanks being built; all ten were delivered in 1921 although modifications by the factory continued until 1923. They would be the last French tanks to be produced for the home market until the Char D1 pre-series of 1931.
The Char 2C had a loaded weight of 69 tonnes, partly because of its armour – 45 mm at the front, 22 mm at the sides, but much of it just because of its huge size. The armour was among the thickest of World War I-era tanks, though by modern standards this would be considered thin (The 40mm armor plating was substantial in 1918, but much less so by 1940 particularly when combined with the gigantic target the tank presented). With the tail fitted, the hull was over twelve metres long. Within its ample frame there was room for four compartments: a relatively short drivers compartment at the front, a fighting compartment with a 3-man turret (the first such in history) at its top mounting a long 75mm gun, a larger munitions room and finally a large engine compartment at the rear and a rear fighting compartment topped by a machine gun turret. Both turrets had stroboscopic cupolas. The three independent 8 mm machine gun positions at the front gave protection against infantry assault.
Char 2c with 12 crew members, 13th is likely the Company Commander
The fighting compartments were connected by the engine room. Each track was powered by its own 200 or 250 hp engine, via an electrical transmission. The original engines were German-made Mercedes diesels, later replaced by Maybach models, all of them part of the war reparations taken by France following the Great War. Mechanical reliability remained low: The German manufacturers were reluctant to provide spare parts, and may have given the French defective engines. Patriotic French mechanics disliked working on German-made equipment, with more than one man demanding a transfer. As a result, no more than six of the 10 tanks were ever fully operational at the same time, while the enormous fuel consumption made Army accountants reluctant to authorize their use for training.
Tank Number 91, named “Provence,” on its special rail car
The tank had been designed with a comparatively narrow width to make it transportable by rail, but loading the 2C aboard a specially-built flatcar was a difficult and time-consuming task. That cumbersome rail-transport process would eventually prove the undoing of the 2C. Top speed was 15 km/h. Seven fuel tanks, containing 1,260 litres, gave it a range of 150 kilometres. The suspension contained 39 interleaving road wheels on each side, making for a total of 90 wheels on the tank. To man the tank required a crew of twelve: driver, commander, gunner, loader, four machine gunners, mechanic, electrician, assistant-electrician / mechanic and a radio operator. Some sources report thirteen men, probably due to pictures of the crews that included the company commander.
Much attention had been given to ergonomics, Mourret’s stated motive in having the tank designed by a shipyard. The vehicle was less cramped than earlier designs, the crew being able to more or less walk around inside the hull. The mechanic could access the engine from either side. The commander could communicate with the driver, the front machine-gunner and the mechanic via speaking tubes. External communications were the responsibility of the mechanic who could lift a little hatche just behind the turret to signal by fanions, pyrotechnic devices or electrical lights. The tank could be entered through the cupola, but each crew member also had oval or round escape hatches above and below him.
The Normandie #97 with skid tail in place, in maneuvers. Note the difference in size with Renault R-35
Each track was powered by its own 200 or 250 hp engine, via an electrical transmission. Top speed was 15 km/h. Seven fuel tanks, containing 1,260 litres, gave it a range of 150 kilometres. The suspension contained 39 interleaving road wheels on each side, making for a total of 90 wheels on the tank. Later, new engines (two Sautter-Harlé engines 6-cyl 250hp/each) were fitted and the machine guns in the side positions were deleted. In this configuration the tank weighed perhaps 74 tons. Between 15 November and 15 December 1939 the Lorraine, as the company command tank, was experimentally up-armoured at the Société des Aciéries d’Homecourt to make it immune to standard German antitank guns. The front armour was enhanced to 90 mm, the side to 65 mm. In this configuration, weighing about 75 tons, the Lorraine had at that time the thickest armour of any operational tank, and is probably still the heaviest operational tank ever.
Champagne #99. Notice the cammo…
Bretagne #94 coming out of a creek, spraying mud and water.
Tank number 96, named “Anjou,” could not be made to run and was written off in September 1939
During the French mobilisation of 1939, all ten were activated and put into their own unit, the 51st Bataillon de Chars de Combat. For propaganda purposes, each tank had been named after one of the ancient regions of France, numbers 90-99 being named Poitou; Provence; Picardie; Alsace; Bretagne; Touraine; Anjou; Lorraine; Berry; Champagne respectively. In 1939, the Lorraine was renamed Normandie. As their main value was in propaganda, the giants were kept carefully out of harm’s way and did not participate in the September 1939 attack on the Siegfried Line. They were used instead for numerous morale-boosting movies, in which they were often shown climbing and crushing old French forts. Their public reputation was of invincible super tanks, the imagined dimensions of which far surpassed the actual particulars.
Tank number 96, named “Anjou” being examined by the Germans
The French commanders knew perfectly well that this reputation was undeserved. When the German Army ripped apart the French lines after 10 June 1940, the decision was made to prevent the capture of the famous tanks. All were to be sent to the south by rail transport. On 15 June the railway on which they were being transported was blocked by a burning fuel train, so it became necessary to destroy the tanks by detonating charges. Later Goebbels and Göring claimed the tanks were hit by German dive bombers. This propaganda lie was to be repeated by many sources. One tank, the Champagne, was nevertheless captured more or less intact and brought to Berlin to be exhibited as a war trophy. In 1948 this tank disappeared, causing many to speculate it still survives at the Russian Tank museum in Kubinka.
Char 2C Number 91
Next, we’ll look at French Tanks of the 1930’s – some of which were considered by Finland as the Finnish Army built up armoured units through the decade of the 1930’s.
French Tanks through the 1930’s
France came out of the First World War with the laurels of a winner and the promise of interesting developments with the little Renault FT, the first mass-produced tank of the modern age. But the vagaries of the Fourth Republic and the choices facing an ageing staff would turn to the creation of a force largely marked by a strong defensive vision, relying mainly on the Maginot Line. French tanks were classified as infantry and cavalry models, with some “chars de rupture” (breakthrough tanks). Production and testing was ongoing in the late twenties and thirties, leading to a new generation of armored vehicles by 1935-36. These formed the bulk of the armored forces of France (then numerically the largest in the world) in September 1939.
As far as tank design was concerned, French engineers came up with various innovative designs of their own. The army – partly because of political issues and spending concentrated on the Maginot Line – was not given a sizable budget before 1932-34. This forced the continued use of the existing obsolescent types, the fleet of Renault FTs and the very few super-heavy FMC-2s. Renault attempted to modernize its best seller (very popular on the export market) while Panhard courted the cavalry with its armored cars. Both tried to implement the Kégresse track system, an innovative design which proved to be more useful on half-tracks. The mass-produced US M2/M3 models of WW2 used a similar system. The French adopted it for the AMC P13 and also for many off-road trucks and gun tractors delivered to the Army.
Casting was incorporated into French tank manufacturing early on, in 1934-35, first for turrets and then for hulls. The Hotchkiss H35, for example, was the first tank to be built entirely by cast sections (the hull needed three sections, the driver’s compartment, fighting compartment and engine bay), which helped standardization for mass-production. Cast parts when welded together allowed for a lighter weight, were less labor-intensive and prevented the risk of spalling. The SOMUA S35 also made use of an entirely cast hull and turret, also with many large prefabricated parts. The Souma S3 design was in fact influential on the US when they decided to build the Sherman M4A1.
French workers assembling tank guns, probably the 75mm Char-B1-bis hull gun?
Other innovative features were more specific, such as the Oleo-pneumatic steering system designed to steer the massive hull of the B1 heavy tank. In this case, the driver was also aiming the main 75 mm (2.95 in) gun. Many other tanks allowed some limited traverse for their hull-mounted gun, compensating for the lack of precision of the standard brake-steering system. French engineers, however, designed a system theoretically giving the greatest possible precision to the driver, allowing accurate traverse. However this system in operation proved too fragile and complex.
French tanks were generally better protected than their German opponents. The reason behind this was their doctrine of use. They were not seen as independent units but were to be spread amongst infantry units so as to offer close support on the battlefield. For this reason strong armor was of capital importance, the speed was “infantry pace” and the low-velocity guns were meant to deal with concrete fortifications and pillboxes rather than with opposing tanks. This doctrine went back to trench warfare and the experiences of WWI. All French tank models, until 1937 at least, were designed for the same kind of operations as practiced in 1918. They were spread out on the battle line, under the command of generals moving little flags on maps, inside a rigid, pyramidal chain of command.
Consequently French tanks were generally slow (with the exception of cavalry tanks like the SOMUA S35 and scout tankettes) and relatively underpowered – and this was not seen as an issue since infantry pace was required. Range was also limited by fuel consumption but the tactical needs were seen as limited in scope to the area of a typical WWI battlefield. A 50-100 km (30-60 mi) area of operations was foreseen. Radio communication between tanks was sorely lacking, with flags and couriers used instead. The common practice in 1935 was that only command tanks possessed a long-range radio.
Demography was also, surprisingly, a critical factor with French tank design. After the Great War, the demographic pyramid was inverted in France and Germany, resulting in a natality gap largely favorable to Germany, which was crucial twenty years later. After 1935 the French were vividly aware of this, a fact that was reflected in the army’s specifications. To cope with the normal provision of tanks per units, and faced with limited manpower, the most viable option seen was to limit tank crews to three men and design the tank around these men.
With more complex requirements, new tank models saw a multiplication of tasks which were not counter-balanced by an increase in crew numbers nor a new turret design. The commander remained isolated in his single-man turret, with the task of commanding, loading and manning the main gun and the coaxial machine-gun, plus sometimes the radio. The driver and a loader/co-gunner/mechanic completed this busy crew. As a result, French tank commanders were task-overloaded and simply couldn’t cope with both other tanks maneuvering around them and dealing with several threats at the same time. This helps explain why French tanks units were decimated despite having better armor. Another issue was the lack of penetrating power of the French guns, the most common being the short APX (Puteaux) 37 mm (1.46 in) designed for infantry support.
Puteaux M 1918 37mm semi-automatic short gun / Canon de 37mm court semi-automatique Puteaux modèle 1918
French logistics were also a weak point. France pioneered their first armoured division, with a combination of tanks, armoured cars, motorised infantry and artillery. It was called the Division Legere Mecanique (DLM – Light Mechanical Division). In the mid 1930s France created to entirely motorised armoured light divisions, that were equipped with the brand-new SOMAU S-35 tank. Although called ‘light’ divisions, they were well-equipped units that were the equivalent of a German Panzer division. They had 300 armoured vehicles, including 190 tanks, mostly medium tanks like the Hotchkiss H35 H39, Renault R35 and the Somau S-35. By the beginning of 1940, there were four of these divisions in the French army. In 1939 the French army formed a heavier armed unit called the Division Cuirassee (DCR). These contained Char B1 heavy tanks and some older Char D2 tanks as the main striking force.
A group of 13.2 mm-armed AMR 35s, belonging to 4e RDP, 1re DLM; the vehicle in front, No. 87347, is the second produced and shows the large rosettes typical of this unit from 1938
While the French had some excellent medium and heavy tanks, the sheer variety of different types caused logistic problems. The French ordnance officers and quartermasters had to make sure that the correct spare parts and ammunition were sent to the right units when needed. This often did not happen. Once war broke out, some tanks were abandoned because of lack of ammunition and lack of the correct parts to mend a broken down tank. The only helpful factor was that the S-35 had the same turret and 47mm SA 35 gun as fitted to the char B1 and D2 tanks. Logistical problems were a major factor in the defeat of the French army. Lack of fuel was a big problem for the tank units when most tanks consumed gallons of fuel per mile. The French 3rd Light Mechanised Division for example was ordered to start a counter-attack on 20 May 1940 alongside British units. They were unable to get into position until the 22nd due to fuel shortages and crew exhaustion. The 3rd DLM could only muster around 60 Somua S35 tanks as they had already lost all their Hotchkiss H35 tanks.
We’ll now go on to look at the French tanks and armoured vehicles of the 1930’s. In doing so, we’ll concentrate on models which were produced in relatively large numbers and which were potentially available for export to Finland. Those vehicles produced in small numbers will by and large be ignored. As France was a supplier of tanks and other armoured vehicles to the Finnish Army in limited quantities both through the 1930’s and in the early part of the Winter War, I’ll also indicate whether a particular model was purchased or given to Finland and in what quantities. This will serve as a prelude to the study of the founding and expansion of the Finnish Armoured Divisions of the Winter War that will end this series of Posts.
Renault Char D-1 – requested 1928 (160 built between 1930-1934)
The French plan of 1926, calling for the creation of a Light Infantry Support Tank, led to the development of the existing Renault NC1 prototype into the Char D1. In 1923 Louis Renault had obtained an order to build two prototypes of a modification to the design of the Renault FT’s, with the factory designation of Renault NC. In 1928 Renault had his Renault NC accepted as a light infantry tank two prototypes ordered. The Army called this project the Char D and ordered a pre-series of ten vehicles in December 1929. The ten hulls were delivered between May and November 1931: an interval of ten years from the delivery of the last Char 2C in 1921. With this order, French tank production for the home market had finally resumed. In testing the prototypes, many shortcomings were identified and the type entered mass production, albeit with some further modifications.
The Char D1’s Renault FT ancestry can be seen in the sloping engine deck and the profile of the side armour plates. For its time the Char D1 was relatively well armoured; the hull weighing 11 metric tons. A 74 hp V-4 6.08 litre engine gave a top speed of 18.6 km/h with a range of 90 kms. The D1 had a crew of three: a driver who, as with the Renault FT, was seated below large double hatches that formed the nose plates, a radio operator who also assisted in the loading of the gun, and a third crew member, the commander, located in the turret. With the turret, the total weight was 14 metric tons with a total vehicle price of 475,000 FF. The Char D1 was thus neither particularly light nor cheap.
Renault Char D1 with ST2 turret in 1936
One hundred and sixty of these tanks were produced between 1931 and 1935. Until 1936 the vehicles were fitted with Renault FT turrets because the intended cast ST2 turrets were not yet ready. The ST2 turret was fitted with a short 47mm SA34 tank gun with a coaxial 7.5mm machine gun. The hull was equipped with a 7.5mm MG in the bow. In 1932 the Char D1 was the most — indeed the only — modern tank available to the French Army and served as France’s major battle tank of the early thirties rather than as an infantry support tank as originally intended.
Renault Char D1
For the regiments receiving the new tank, the D1 proved a grave disappointment. The main reason was its very poor mechanical reliability. In March 1934, when 110 vehicles had been delivered, seventeen were already worn out and had to be returned to the factory for a complete rebuild; of the remaining 93, 62 were non-operational because of major defects. Burn-through of brakes and transmissions was common; the armour plates bent out of shape because the chassis was not stiff enough, rivets regularly snapped. The fundamental cause was that the Renault design team had “solved” the problem of combining low weight with low cost by using weak components of inferior quality steel: other later Renault designs such as the AMR 33, AMC 35 and Char D2 would also suffer from similar problems.
In 1935 a large maintenance program was started to improve the Char D1’s mechanical reliability. However in March 1936 when tank units were rushed to the German border in reaction to the Rhineland Crisis, it became painfully obvious that their poor readiness state had not been rectified. The new ST2 turret only worsened the situation: the glass of the diascopes was shattered by mere driving; there were no AP-rounds available, the munition racks had not been changed to hold the new and larger 47mm rounds. The ST2 turret also proved too small to be adapted to the much more powerful 47 mm SA35 gun. Analysis led the Army to conclude that it should rid itself as soon as possible of the troublesome tank.
The Char D1s were thereafter shipped to the typical destination of French army ordnance that was obsolete but too valuable to be scrapped: the colonies. In 1937 the D1’s were transferred to colonial units in North Africa.
Renault Char D2 – requested 1930 with 100 built 1936 and 1940
While the Renault D1 was still in development, a heavier version was requested the Direction de l’Infanterie on 23 January 1930. This request called for a medium tank (the D1 was a light model) with 40 mm (1.57 in) of armor and a higher top speed (13.67 mph/22 km/h) than the D1, which in turn required a far more powerful engine. Negotiations ended in April-May, Renault also agreeing to build an adapted version for the colonies, the D3. It was also hoped that it could replace the heavy B1 bis if the later would have been banned by an armament reduction treaty in negotiation at that time. However, this never happened, and the D2 soon became a low-priority project and the army greatly reduced the initial order of 750. Two batches of 50 would be eventually delivered by the company, the first in 1936-37 (called model 1935) and the second, much improved, in 1940 (model 1938).
The Renault Char D2 was developed from the Renault D1
Three prototypes were built. The first was the Renault UZ, with a riveted hull and Renault FT turret (April 1932). It was tested at Rueil with the 503e RCC and accepted in service in December 1933. One year earlier, two welded hull prototypes had been ordered and build, to be delivered in November 1933. Nevertheless, the first batch was approved without testing the real production model. This was done in order to partially finance the cost of applying new welding techniques. This building technique proposed by Renault saved weight and time. This was a costly and complex process that Renault had a hard time mastering, and since the production was rushed, problems immediately appeared.
The first 50 D2 tanks manufactured were delivered to the 1st Battalion, 507th RCC (based in the neighborhood of Metz) to replace their D1’s, which were sent to Tunisia
In most respects, the D2 was a slightly enlarged D1, retaining many features of the previous vehicle, like the vertical coil suspension design. The D2 was still narrow, with the turret placed forward, immediately behind the driver’s compartment, and a long, sloped back engine hood. Massive side skirts with mud chutes, similar to the former vehicles, were also retained. Previous experience dictated the return rollers be placed higher to prevent track resonance. The tracks were 35 cm (13.78 in) wide. The suspensions counted three bogies, each with four road wheels, one coil spring and two shock absorbers, per side. The crew was three, the radio operator being seated next to the driver, operating the hull Reibel machine-gun (low, right side). The commander was seated in the turret. As usual in this configuration, he had to operate the gun (loading, aiming and firing), serve the coaxial machine-gun and command the tank at the same time. There was a four-speed gearbox, and four fuel tanks, giving a 100 km (62 mi) range. The D2 could cross a 2.1 m (6.89 ft) wide trench, climb a 80 cm (2.62 ft) obstacle, climb slopes of 45° and ford 120 cm (3.94 ft) deep rivers.
Renault Char D2 with APX1 cast turret
The first batch was approved on 29 December 1934, based on the tests performed with the three prototypes, fitted with gasoline and diesel engines. The gasoline engine was retained. The turret was bought separately from another manufacturer, the Puteaux factory near Paris, and the APX-1 was chosen, a modern, cast turret fitted with a SA-34 short barrel 47 mm gun (1.85 in) (from the same manufacturer) and a coaxial Reibeil 7.5 mm (0.29 in) machine-gun, and a hemispheric observation cupola. As usual, the commander could sit partly outside on a rear turret hatch. The turret cost was 200,000 frs, which when added to the cost of the hull (410,000 frs apiece) raised the unit cost to 610,000 frs. The first units from the batch were delivered in May 1935, the last in February 1937. The SA-34 had limited antitank capabilities. It was supplied with HE shells (obus D, muzzle velocity of 490 m/s / 1607 ft/s), and AP shells (model 1932, muzzle velocity of 480 m/s / 1574 ft/s, piercing only 25 mm/0.98 in at 100 m/328 ft). Two command vehicles were built (chassis 2016 – 2049), equipped with a second ER51 long range set.
The second batch was ordered in June 1938, (despite alarming tests reporting balance unreliability) following Renault’s assurance that they could produce two hundred units a year. However, this proved overoptimistic in the context of 1937-1938, with Renault plagued by general strikes and financial problems. Production was postponed, and there was uncertainty about possible exports to Poland or Belgium, exports which were eventually opposed by the Supreme Commander Maurice Gamelin for fear of technology transfers. The state of the first batch was so poor that their conversion into flame-thrower tanks was envisioned, while the unit tanks were to be replaced by newer tanks. When WW2 broke out, Edouard Daladier confirmed mass production of the type, however deliveries were kept low, three to five vehicles per month, so that the entire second batch was not completed until June. The last fifteen were probably not taken in action in time.
Renault Char D2
The second batch was basically identical, mostly differing by the use of a more modern APX-4 turret, bearing a 47 mm (1.85 in) SA-35 long barrel gun, quite effective against tanks. PPLR X 160 episcopes replaced the older Chrétien type, and there was a S 190 G attachment point on the roof for an extra 7.5 mm (0.29 in) AA machine gun. An improved greasing system, modified idler wheels and sprockets, ball bearings, shorter mudguards, a new Vertex distributor and Vlex starter completed this overhaul. At the same time, older vehicles from the first batch received upgraded APX 1A turrets, and were taken over at the Atelier de Rueil for rebuilding – namely to fix all the issues previously known. This process started in March 1940 and continued until May 1940. At the same time, the flame-thrower project was maintained but never carried out despite a prototype being built in 1939.
The D2 was plagued by mechanical unreliability and quickly worn-out, a problem further aggravated by the lack of spare parts. The D2 also proved ill-adapted to snow conditions.
Renault AMR 33 (123 built between 1933 and 1936)
In 1931 the French cavalry arm needed a fast vehicle for forward reconnaissance missions. Renault, eager to be ready for the upcoming specifications, quickly completed the design for a very small and light vehicle by November 1931. This first Tracteur léger de cavalerie type VM was equipped with Carden-Loyd suspension (copied without a licence), was lightly armored and equipped only with a single machine-gun. On January 16, 1932, the specification came in, calling for a three-ton light reconnaissance tracked vehicle armed with a machine gun and with a range of 200 km (124.27 mi), to be called “Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance”, abbreviated as AMR, since the Cavalry was forbidden by law to have tanks. For the army this was a skirmishing, radio-less vehicle rather than a pure recon vehicle, like the AMDs (Automitrailleuse de Découverte).
Renault AMR 33
Renault meanwhile had completed its prototype, based on the Renault UE and showing impressive performance. It had excellent off-road capabilities and could cruise at 50 km/h (31 mph) and could reach 35-40 km/h (21.74-24.85 mph) on bad terrain. This prototype was rejected as too cramped for operational use. Ten days later, officers from the Section Technique de la Cavalerie approached Renault to design a tankette based on the AMR concept. The General HQ commander, General Maxime Weygand, eventually agreed to the type. Renault then quickly returned to the drawing board and presented a larger wooden mock-up in March 1932. On April 20 1932 an order for 5 prototypes was signed, with a deadline of the Champagne maneuvers in September 1933. Each of the prototypes was delivered on schedule, testing different suspension configurations, all based on the Carden-Loyd type. These prototypes were equipped with one of Renault’s most powerful, already available, commercial engines, the 6-cylinder Reinastella, also used on the luxury sedan of the same name.
AMR 33 Design
By weight and dimensions the AMR 33 was first considered as a light tank, not a tankette, but that was before the appearance of the much heavier Hotchkiss 35, Renault 35 and FCM-36 tanks. By all other standards, the AMR 33’s were tankettes. First of all, they were small with a very low profile. Their suspension was largely “inspired” by (copied from) the Carden-Loyd design. The empty hull weighed just 4.5 tons, the armor was only 13 mm (0.51 in) thick and was made from riveted plates which supposedly protected the crew from heavy machine guns . The engine fitted was another commercial model, the eight-cylinder 84 hp 4241 cc Renault Nervasport. This powerful engine combined with the lightweight hull allowed for speeds in excess of 60 km/h (37 mph) on flat ground, and 47 km/h (28 mph) off-road. There was a Cleveland differential and a 4 forward, 1 reverse gearbox. The main fuel tank contained 128 liters (33.81 gal), giving a 225 km (139 mi) range. The tracks were narrow, as was customary for tankettes, at just 22 cm (8.66 in) width. The AMR 33 could ford 60 cm (1.96 ft) deep rivers, cross 1.4 m (4.59 ft) wide trenches, climb a 45 cm (1.47 ft) high obstacle or a 50° slope.
Renault AMR 33
The armor was well sloped at the front glacis (9 mm/0.35 in), 13 mm (0.51 in) thick on the vertical plates, 6 mm (0.23) on the top and 5 mm (0.19 in) on the bottom. The driver sat on the left, next to the engine, seeing through a large opening protected by a lifting hatch pierced by a vision slit. The engine could be accessed through a hatch on the right, and crew entered the vehicle through the rear two-piece door. The turret was also on the left, with the commander inside, provided with a top observation hatch (and not a rear hatch as was customary in French tanks). The turret was of the Renault type. Initially a Schneider cast one was preferred, but found to be too expensive. The Renault type, made of sloped riveted plates was lighter and easier to build. This AVIS turret had been designed by the Atelier de Vincennes and was shifted slightly to the front to improve visibility. The compact Reibel 7.5 mm (0.29 in) machine-gun was a fortress model, comparable to the British-Czech Besa. There was however an optional pedestal mount, adjusted on top of the turret for an extra AA machine gun.
AMR 33 Trials and production
Défilé de Renault AMR 33. C’était un des chars de reconnaissance français les plus répandus.
The Renault prototypes were tested in real and large scale exercises with the first operational French cavalry unit, the Détachement Mécanique de Sûreté. However the Commission de Vincennes charged to test them, although finding their speed sufficient enough, was not so positive about their weight and range. In April 1933, new tests were performed with two tankettes fitted with dead weight mimicking extra armor. One had a horizontal rubber spring suspension, the other a central vertical spring and casings of the horizontal springs oil-filled to act as dampers. Renault preferred the first, but the Army choose the second (with dire consequences), and approved this version for productionon the 6th of June 1933 as the Renault AMR modèle 1933.
The first order of 45 units was issued by the Cavalry Corps as early as March 1933. A second order of twenty was put through on June 22nd, with deliveries being scheduled for July. Finally a third order for fifty was placed in August. However production proved difficult at first and finally the deliveries began in June 1934 and ended in September. Two machines were completely rebuilt to produce a new improved model, the AMR-35. To compensate, three others were built in the spring of 1935. Indeed the flaws quickly detected on the model 33 put an end to further developments. The AMR-35 was much more successful. The first problem was excessive vibrations and noise caused by the engine. Compartmentalization was poor and there no intercom nor radio. But moreover, the suspensions, initially designed for far lighter models proved far too too weak for the task, broke down, broke off, or literally fell to pieces in prolonged off-road rides.
The AMR 33 in action
AMR 33’s on the move
At the beginning their operational concept called for a mass of light tanks preceding the medium types, but since in the meantime mediums were produced in sufficient numbers and the AMR 33s saw themselves quickly replaced by the AMR-35, their role shifted towards infantry and dismounted cavalry support. By 1934, 115 vehicles has been delivered so far, and spread among five cavalry divisions, in GAM (Groupe d’Automitrailleuses) units comprising three platoons of four, two reserve/training, and one command model. However the 5th DC received only ten and the 4th DC forty. It was composed then of the 4th BPC (Bataillon de Dragons Portés) and 18e Dragons.
By 1935, the 4e DC was converted into a fully armored division, at first with six full squadrons of AMR 33s and later reinforced with medium tanks. At the end, the 1 DLM and 2 DLM (Division légères Mécaniques) formed the core of these new divisions in case of war. However by 1937, the mechanical unreliability of the AMR 33 was notorious and all had been replaced by the AMR-35. The AMR 33s were concentrated in remaining RAMs (Régiment d’Automitailleuses) forming light divisions of 46 vehicles.
Knocked out French Army AMR 33
However, these were reorganized once again between September 1939 and May 1940 into five newly-formed Divisions Légères de Cavalerie (“Light Cavalry Divisions”). However their organic strength was still poor, ranging from 26 to 22 per DLC, and this was proven during the battle of France. They had been posted in the Ardennes sector and found themselves badly prepared to stop the German advance, only participating in skirmishes, covering actions and support actions for the infantry, but proved easy prey for the Panzer II and many armored cars equipped with the same 20 mm (0.78 in) gun.
The losses were appalling. An AMR 33 of the 3rd DLC was the first French tank destroyed in battle, but most of the 75% losses occurred due to breakdowns issues rather than enemy fire. On June 7, 1940, the 7e DLM was created of surviving vehicles and some reserves, having 14 AMRs in total. Most were lost. After the armistice, the Germans captured a handful of these models, renamed Panzerspähwagen VM 701 (f). They never left French soil and were probably kept for patrolling and anti-partisan activity. A single AMR 33 has survived to this day. It is on static display at the Saumur tank museum in France.
Hotchkiss H35/39 – (1200 built from 1935 to 1940)
Renault and Schneider had been long time manufacturers of French tanks. Hotchkiss (Société Anonyme des Anciens Etablissements Hotchkiss et Cie), founded in 1875 near St Denis (Paris) by Benjamin B. Hotchkiss, an American engineer, was a newcomer in this field in the 1930’s, although already well known by the army for its world-famous machine-guns, cars and transmissions (the Hotchkiss drive). The Hotchkiss H35 Tank was a private design in response to a 1926 specification for a light, cheap infantry tank (or Char d’accompagnement). A proposal was made in June 1933 showing some innovations, including a steel hull cast in sections. It was also theoretically cheaper and lighter than the Renault D2 and was initially selected by the army’s Conseil Consultatif de l’Armement. The final specification (issued on the 2nd of August 1933) asked for a 6-ton tank, uniformly protected by 30 mm (1.18 in) of armor.
French Hotchkiss H35 tanks on parade
Hotchkiss was not the only bidder against this specification. Renault quickly entered the fray, being the first to deliver its prototype, which would be accepted as the Renault R35. However, the first prototype Hotchkiss demonstrated to Colonel Keller of the Commission of Vincennes, was a machine-gun armed tankette, tested in March 1935 and followed by another identical vehicle in May. Both were rejected because the initial specification had been changed in the meantime and was now asking for 40 mm (1.57 in) of armor. In August 1935, a third and last prototype was delivered, with a brand new cast steel hull and an APX-R (Puteaux) cast turret fitted with a 37 mm (1.46 in) short barrelled gun. The proposal was accepted in November 1935 as the Hotchkiss H35 and an order for 200 machines promptly.
Production started mid-1936 and by September 1936 the first series of H35’s were being delivered and heavily tested. However their cross-country capabilities had been overestimated. They were badly balanced and gave quite bumpy ride, which was potentially dangerous in formation, particularly when firing on the move. The power-to-weight ratio was also insufficient. Therefore, the Army turned them down. But as the initial order could not be cancelled for fear of a political upheaval, the Cavalry, already interested because of the slow deliveries of the costly Somua S35, decided to take the H35’s instead.
Production was interrupted in late 1937 after 400 had been built. Hotchkiss was requested to revise the design, which became the H39. The Hotchkiss H35 initially equipped several cavalry units but later on, with R35 deliveries proving insufficient, part of the H35 production run was diverted to meeting infantry tank requirements. All the H35 equipped units took part in the fighting of May-June 1940, but performed poorly as a result of of their limited speed, endurance and the low-velocity main gun. However, the German infantry, largely equipped with the PaK 36 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, was baffled to see how their anti-tank rounds simply bounced off the thick armor of these light tanks.
French Army Hotchkiss H35 tanks
Design of the Hotchkiss H35
The initial H35 was a small and narrow machine, in order to fulfill the bid and keep the weight in check while having the thickest armor any light tank of 1935. The H35 was very similar to the Renault R35, its main competitor. They shared the same APX-R (Puteaux foundry) single-piece cast turret characterized by sloped sides, rounded bottom and a spherical vision cupola. The cupola comprised a PPL RX 180 P optical visor and targeting sight. Just abaft the mantlet there were three Chrétien binocular slide projectors (later horizontal PPL vision slits). The turret, which weighed 1350 kg with full equipment, housed a low-velocity SA 18 gun M37 (87 kg), with a coaxial 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel machine-gun M31, protected by a small additional mantlet. The main gun received 102 rounds, and the machine-gun 2400 rounds. The SA 18 had a +20 -13° elevation. The hull was rather small, completely built of cast parts welded together, only 4.22 m (13.78 ft) long and narrow, at just 1.95 m (6.4). The total weight, in battle order, was a mere 9.6 tons. The tracks were small too – each link was only 27 cm (10.63 in) wide. The smaller links procured a smoother ride. The commander had a small seat and strap, but stood for observation and for operating his weapons.
Hotchkiss H35 tanks
The suspension was made of six pincer bogies, each holding two rubberized roadwheels, sprung by helicoidal horizontal springs. There was a front drive sprocket, a rear idler wheel and two return rollers on each side. The driver/mechanic sat on the right side, seeing through a periscope mounted on a hinged flap, supplemented by two oblique vision slits on the sides. A door section of the hood opened forward to allow the driver access. The commander/gunner accessed the turret through a rear door, and there was an extra emergency manhole at the hull bottom, just behind the driver. Equipment and tools were situated around the hull, comprising a camouflaged tarp fastened by straps to the back, a shovel, hatchet and cutter, on the left fender, a pickaxe bracket at the left of the hull, a mass, jack and crank on the right fender, a track cleaner on the rear cover, a 10-ton cable at the rear and two towing steel chains attached to the hull rear panel. The engine hood plunged forward, protecting a gasoline, air-cooled, Hotchkiss 3.4 liters, 6 cylinder, developing 75 hp@2400 rpm, for a 8.8 hp/ton ratio. The gearbox was a synchromesh with 5 speeds forward and one reverse. Normal consumption was 130 liters/100 km. The normal speed on road and over flat terrain was 28 km/h, ground pressure was 0.9 kg/cm2. The H35 was capable of climbing a 35° slope, a 70 cm high obstacle and of fording a 0.85 m deep river. However, trench crossing was limited to 1.80 m.
Hotchkiss H35 tanks in the field
The later-model Hotchkiss H39
Hotchkiss H39 Tank – an improved H35
The H39 was an overhaul and upgrade of the H35, with a new Hotchkiss 6-cyl. 5.97 litre engine giving 120 hp at 2800 rpm. With a power-to-weight ratio of 10 hp/ton (the weight had increased to 12.1 tons), top speed was now 36.5 km/h (22.6 mph) on the road and range was increased to 150 km (93 km) thanks to a new 207 litre gasoline tank. The new engine required a redesigned hood, the rear being raised and now being nearly horizontal. Apart from these details, the H39 was very similar to the previous AFV, with the same SA 18 short barrel gun. But it was also subjected to some criticism and, at the end of 1938 a proposal was made to adopt the new SA 38, a long barreled 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, which had far superior penetration power and muzzle velocity. The turret was now equipped only with the new PPL horizontal vision slits.
The SA 38 was supplied with longer rounds, and thus only 90 could be carried (instead of 100 rounds with the SA 18). The gun was in relatively short supply, and despite the priority given to production of this new weapon, many H39s were put in service with the older gun model. 700 H39’s were built in total, starting in October 1938, the last being delivered in feverish conditions, thrown into combat right from the factory door in May 1940 without exhausts or mudguards. In early 1939, the Hotchkiss delivery rate was around 60 units each month. Final records are confusing, and based on the chassis numbers and factory monthly deliveries by 1940, the usual figure is 1200 machines in total, for both subtypes.
The Hotchkiss H35/39 in action
This French light tank stands in the centre of Narvik today. It was captured by the German army in 1940 and further modified.
The Hotchkiss H39 was also allocated to cavalry units and Army units. Some 15 H39’s were shipped to Narvik on the 7th of May 1940. Only 12 were withdrawn in June and these finally disembarked in Great Britain where they formed an embryo of the armored forces of the FFL (Forces Françaises Libres), the Free French led by De Gaulle, as the 1e Compagnie de Chars de Combat de la France Libre. Operational formations were unfortunately mismatched. The slow H35s operated with the faster Somua S35, and the H39 with the B1 bis.
During the May-June 1940 campaign in France, the H35 and H39 found themselves committed in spread out formations and rarely had a clear superiority over the enemy. Their 37 mm (1.46 in) “long” model 38 gun was, added to their thick armor, a clear advantage in tank-to-tank engagements against German light tanks. They were matched only by the Czech-built PzKpfw 38(t). However, tactically, the lack of radio and communication with HQ, as well as the overburdened tank commander led to disastrous results. Many were abandoned due to the lack of gasoline, entire units being captured later in this way. Some participated in a few improvised counter-offensives directed against the Germans without air support, which had dire consequences.
Export of the Hotchkiss H35 to Finland
Finnish Army Hotchkiss H35, Winter War, January 1940
In 1936, Finland purchased 60 H35’s, sufficient to equip one Panssaripataljoona (Panzer Battalion). These were delivered without guns – the standard Tampella-manufactured Bofors 37mm was fitted after delivery in Finland, together with the first tank version of the Suomi submachinegun. The H35-equipped Pataljoona would be one of the three Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona (Separate Panzer Battalions) tasked with fighting the initial delaying action on the Karelian Isthmus when the Soviet Union first attacked at the start of the Winter War. In the defensive battles on the Isthmus, operating in close cooperation with infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery and almost always from pre-prepared hull-down positions, the H35’s fought to their strengths. Their Bofors 37 mm gun, added to their thick armor, gave then an advantage in front-on tank-to-tank engagements against the Red Army’s light tanks.
In such conditions, well-protected, with clear lines of fire, pre-planned lines of retreat and good inter-arms cooperation with accompanying infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery, the H35’s inflicted heavy losses on the Red Army’s armour while taking very few of their own. By the end of the Winter War, the H35-equipped Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona remained in existence and by this time formed part of the 23rd Panssaridivisoona. The H35’s would be phased out of armoured combat units over 1941 and 1942, replaced with Finnish Patria-built tanks.
Other H35/39s also saw action under foreign colors.
Three H35’s were (as well as three R35) to the Polish Bureau of Technical Studies of Armored Weapons for trials sent in July 1939. In September 1939 these were integrated into an ad hoc unit commanded by Lieutenant J. Jakubowicz where they fought as part of the Dubrno task force. Two were sold to Turkey in February 1940.
Renault AMR 35 (187 built 1936-1939)
The AMR (Auto Mitrailleuse de Reconnaissance) 35 was not ordered by the army. When the AMR 33 hadn’t even reached production stage, Louis Renault took two prototypes and completely overhauled them, starting in February 1934. Trials indeed showed the weight distribution – due to a forward-mounted engine – was a serious issue, and he addressed it first by placing a new, more powerful Nerva Stella 28 CV, Renault sport coupé regular engine. Changes were made accordingly to the transmission, because the drive sprockets were maintained at the front. This also considerably lowered the noise inside the fighting compartment. The ventilator and exhaust pipe were also shifted to the rear. The weak suspension of the AMR 33 was also completely changed and tested on a third prototype made of bolted boiler plates in September 1934.
Renault AMR 35 ZT2 tank
During the first trials at Vincennes, speeds attained were up to 72 km/h (44 mph), an impressive feat for any tank of that time with such a small engine. Louis Renault did not intend to support the cost of upgrading the production line, however the army was impressed, and General Flavigny insisted these changes be made. Cavalry officers noted that the engine was perhaps too delicate for military service and later asked for a sturdier one. Therefore, the second prototype was fitted with a 432 22 CV four-cylinder bus engine. Top speed was still 63 km/h (39 mph), with a weight of 5.03 tons. It was subsequently accepted into service as the AMR 35 and followed the AMR 33 on the factory line, sanctioned by an official order on July, 3, 1934.
Design of the AMR 35
The initial plans introduced a specific command vehicle fitted with a AVIS-1 turret (“Atelier de Vincennes”) armed with a 7.5 mm (0.295 in) machine-gun and equipped with a top observation hatch. The regular vehicles would be fitted with an AVIS-2 turret and a 13.2 mm (0.52 in) machine-gun. But these plans were dropped although the turret models were accepted. 100 were ordered including 8 command vehicles, factory designated ZT (this was purely chronological, without meaning). Changes compared to the AMR 33 were considerable. Despite relatively similar internal accommodations and equipment, the similarities ended here, as the engine and transmission were relocated and the suspension was brand new. The AMR 35 was larger and almost 1.5 tons heavier (6.5 vs 5 metric tons). It was assembled with armor plates riveted on a frame, ranging from 13 mm (0.51 in) for all vertical plates, 9 mm (0.35 in) for the glacis and sloped plates, and 5 mm (0.2 in) for the top and bottom. This meant it was better protected than its predecessor.
Renault AMR 35 ZDT1
The driver sat to the left and at his right was placed a large ventilation grill. The commander turret was placed offset to the left. Eventually two turret types were used on the ZT-1, recognizable by their shape and armament. The 7.5 mm (0.295 in) armed AVIS-1 (Atelier de Vincennes turret) was octagonal and could receive an extra machine gun on a small AA mount on top of the turret. Normal provision was 2250 rounds. The AVIS-2 was fitted with a Hotchkiss 13.2 mm (0.52 in) heavy machine-gun. In battle the 13.2 mm gun, despite its ability to penetrate 20mm steel at 500m, proved to be incapable of defeating even the German armored cars, its bullets being deflected by their sloped armour. Radio command versions received a ER 29 model, operated by the commander. The suspension was of the new type also used for the light tank R35, and was quite heavier and much sturdier than the previous design. It could, in theory, take twice the load it was intended to. It comprised a sprocket and idler of similar types, retained from the AMR 33 but with the spoke intervals filled for better strength, the sprocket just receiving dents. There were also four paired all-metal roadwheels resting on independent bogies front and rear, and a central twin bogie. All three were horizontally sprung with large rubber cylinder blocks. The central ones counted five smaller rubber cylinders separated by steel discs, acting as shock dampers. The track was 22 cm (8.66 in) wide and was supported by three return rollers. As shown at Vincennes, the AMR 35 could ford 60 cm (2 ft) deep rivers, cross 1.7 m (5.6 ft) wide trenches and climb a 50 cm (1.6 ft) obstacle or 50% slope.
The Renault 447 22 CV four-cylinder 5881 cc petrol engine was capable of giving the 6.5 ton tank a top speed of 55 km/h (34 mph) and average top speed of 40 km/h (25 mph), making it the fastest French tank of the day. The engine had a max output of 85 hp at 2200 rpm. Fuel capacity was 130 liters. Transmission used a Cleveland differential, with single dry plate type brake with four gears forward and one reverse. The Zénith carburetor and Scintilla Vertex magneto allowed it to start at temperatures well below zero.
Renault AMR35 tanks on parade
AMR 35 Production
Renault AMR 35 ZT2 with turret mounted 25mm
The first order asked for the delivery of ten pre-series vehicles in March 1935, but it was postponed in August. Due to a bad financial situation and strikes Renault eventually refused the second order for fifty tankettes, but accepted an order in April 1936 for only thirty others. There were coordination issues with the subcontractors as well, Schneider for the armor plates and empty hulls and Batignolles-Châtillon for the AVIS-2 turrets. By August 1935 trials at Satory had already led the army to ask for a change to the gear ratio and even refused the twelve vehicles delivered in September. These were returned for modifications and were accepted in October 1935. The first entered service on the 22nd of April, 1936.
By June 1936 seventy-six AMR 35s had been produced. However exercises showed serious reliability issues due to weak mechanical parts, including the Cleveland differentials not being suited for such speeds. In 1937, production almost stopped to allow the refitting of 92 vehicles, but the problems with the differential persisted, some being replaced up to five times in a short period. By August 1937 a second and third series were started, and seventy-five were delivered by the end of 1938. Most were now equipped with a synchromesh gear box and reinforced chassis girders, but reliability issues persisted until May 1940 and availability was poor. In January 1939 only 123 were reported serviceable, while the others were in repairs. In 1936 it had been envisioned to replace obsolete Renault FTs in service throughout the colonies with Renault AMR 35 ZT-4s, equipped with FT turrets. But this was given low-priority and of a total order of 56 vehicles only 40 had been completed when France surrendered. Another variant was the AMR 35 ADF (Renault YS), used for artillery observation, and equipped with advanced telemetric systems.
The AMR 35 in action
In May 1940 178 AMR 35s equipped the French Army. Tactically they operated in three squadrons for each DLM (“Division Legere Mecanisee”), and two squadrons for each DLC (light cavalry divisions). Tactically, and contrary to their acronym, they were used as fighting vanguard units, covering the infantry rather than for reconnaissance, a role already taken by the Panhard 178 and Somua-Gendron armored cars. In the Battle of France the AMR fared very badly being both poorly armed and armoured. The one main advantage of the AMR was its speed; it was the fastest French tank of its day and faster than all the German light tanks. However travelling at high speed cross-country played havoc with the poorly designed suspension which quickly wore out. During the campaign, more AMR’s were lost to mechanical trouble than to enemy action. Their actions are not known with precision, but their fate is shared between vehicles destroyed in action (due to poor armor and armament), abandoned due to the lack of gasoline or because of mechanical failure, mostly coming from the differential, transmission or more commonly because of suspension failure.
German soldier posing in front of an abandoned French light tank AMR 35 (№ 87363) of 5 RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés) – the fate of much of the French Armoured Force of 1939/1940
Renault R35 & R40 (1,690 built between 1936-1940)
Until 1935 the little vintage Renault FT had been the staple of the French tank force. It was clear by 1932 that the new Renault tanks developed from the NC27 were not sufficient for the task demanded from them. They were too heavy, complex, costly and not suited for mass-production. The original requirements dated back to 1926 and asked for a “char d’accompagnement” (support tank) that could replace the FT and still operate in the same manner. However, with increase in AT gun caliber and velocity, the emphasis was put on protection. In early 1933 Hotchkiss proposed a solution, with an affordable small tank which turned the tables. But instead of purchasing these, for political reasons and due to the contract size, other contractors were in August 1933 asked to present their own model. Fourteen responded, ranging from automotive companies to small armories.
Renault, badly wanting the contract, rushed out a prototype which was ready when a further new specification was issued on June, 21, 1934. The new specification asked for an increase of armor from 30 to 40 mm (1.18-1.57 in). Renault could not revise the design on time and nevertheless presented its ZM prototype to the Commission de Vincennes on 20 December 1934. The model performed well, but was sent back to the factory for add-on armor and mounting the new APX (Atelier de Rueil) cast turret in April 1935. Tests were then resumed when, due to growing tension caused by the swift and massive German rearmament, the commission awarded a contract for 300 of the new “R35″ tanks on 29 April 1935. This was even before the model could be perfected by Renault for pre-production. By 4 June 1936, the first deliveries were being tested and modifications performed during production. The hollow hull price was 190,000 FF, but with engine, mechanical parts, the turret and modifications, rose to 1,400,000 FF (the equivalent of 32.000$ at the time). Contrary to the Hotchkiss H35, the R35 was also produced for export.
French light tank Renault R-35
The cast APX hexagonal turret had a 30 mm thick domed rotatable cupola with vertical vision slits (the highest point of 2.13 m) and had to be either hand cranked or moved about by the weight of the commander, the only other crew member. There was sometimes unofficially a seat installed for him but he most often stood. The rear of the turret had a hatch that hinged down that could be used as a seat to improve observation. The earliest vehicles were fitted with the APX-R turret (with the L713 sight) mounting the short Puteaux 37 mm L/21 SA18 gun (the first batches were removed from FT 17 guntanks which were then rebuilt as utility vehicles) and the 7.5 mm Châtellerault fortress machine gun. The cannon had a very poor armour penetration: only 12 mm at 500 metres. Afterwards the APX turret with the same cannon but the improved L739 sight and the standard Châtellerault 7.5 mm MAC31 Reibel machine gun was used because of delivery delays of the original weapon. There were also so many delays in the production of the turrets that after the first 380 hulls had been produced in 1936 and only 37 could be fitted with a turret, production was slowed down to 200 annually. The 7.5 mm machine gun’s spent cartridges (from a total of 2,400) went down a chute through a hole in the floor. The tank carried 42 armour piercing and 58 high explosive rounds.
Due to the deterioriating international situation, the total number of units ordered rose to 2,300 by 1939. As a result of the frequent delays experienced by APX in manufacturing the turrets, by 1936 Renault had succeeded in delivering only 380 hulls, while only 37 turrets were available – the annual delivery rate fell to just 200. By 1 September 1939, only 975 R35’s had been delivered to the army out of the 1070 produced. They only just replaced most of the units that had been equipped with the Renault FT’s, but crews still needed a few weeks to retrain. In consequence, by May 1940 there were still eight battalions of FT’s operational due to the lack of trained men. By June 1940, 1,601 R35’s had been produced for the Army. Out of this number, 245 had been exported: Poland (50), Turkey (100), Romania (41) and Yugoslavia (54). Production ceased after the capitulation of France.
Renault R35 Tanks
The Renault R-40
Due to insufficient tests before production, it was quickly apparent to the receiving units that the R35 suspension was unreliable and experienced many failures. Work started in 1939 at AMX (the new name for the Renault tank department since 2 December 1936) to devise a better system, which could be fitted into the existing production run. This new system mounted twelve wheels in six pairs suspended by large vertical coil springs. These were protected by armored side skirts. The engine was upgraded to a more powerful model, while the hull was lengthened at the rear. The turret was the new APX-R1 cast model with a L767 sight, mounting a long barrel 37 mm (1.46 in) L/35 SA38. Last but not least, a radio was fitted. The new gun was capable of defeating 40 mm (1.57 in) of armor at 500 m (1640 ft).
The R40’s began to replace the R35’s after the 1540th unit. Only a few were delivered in time. The reconstituted Polish 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade in France was the first unit to be equipped with the new tank. At the same time, from 1939, some R35s were re-equipped with the new APX-R turret and the long-barrel 37mm. These were known as the R35 modifié 39, but only a few were converted and allocated to to unit commanders. AMX also produced quantities of steering tails prior to the war to improve their trench crossing capabilities. These were not always fitted.
The R35 bears a strong resemblance to its rival, the Hotchkiss H35. They shared the same APX turret, the three-module hull construction and placement for the driver and engine. However their dimensions differed, as well as the placement of the hull casemate, placed further to the rear for the Renault and, most obviously, the drivetrain. The hull, as stated, was made of three main prefabricated cast sections bolted together, while on the H35 these were welded. This helped improve Renault production times. Everything else was welded-on. Maximum thickness on the glacis was 43 mm (1.69 in), and 40 to 30 (1.57-1.18 in) on the hull lower sides, rear and engine deck. The turret itself was made of hard cast iron, 30 mm (1.18 in) thick.
The Renault R40 was the final variation of the R35. It was developed by the Atelier de Construction d’Issy-les-Moulineaux (AMX) which introduced a brand new and better suspension that consisted of 12 pairs of small road-wheels on each side mounted in pairs, vertical coil springs, and protective skirting plates. This vehicle mounted the long barreled 37mm SA38 L/33 gun in the APX-R1 turret and had an AMX crossing tail.
The running gear was based on the one used for the light cavalry AMR 35 tank, with five double roadwheels encased in two sets of bogies and another single one at the front. All three were suspended by massive horizontal coil springs, with characteristic rubber ringlets. The drive sprocket was at the front and idler at the rear. The tracks reposed on three rubberized return rollers.
The tank used a crew of two. The driver’s position was offset to the left and the commander/gunner was in the turret behind. The final drive and differentials were in the nose. The driver had a Cletrac differential with five gears and steering brakes at his disposal. He had two hatches and one periscope for vision. The Renault V-4 85 hp engine was at the right rear, with a self-sealing 166 liter gasoline tank on its left. On final production tests, practical top speed was measured as 20 km/h (12.4 mph), which could fall to 14 km/h (8.7 mph) on soft or bumpy terrain. Fuel consumption was 212 liters/100 km off-road, but that was not believed to be a problem since it was believed 50 km (31 mi) was more than sufficient for a real breakthrough on a static front.
The turret received a dome-like rotatable cupola with vertical vision slits. It was free running on a ball track ring, either traversed by the weight of the commander or cranked more precisely for aiming. The commander normally stood on the tank floor. As was customary in French practice, the turret had a rear hatch that could be hinged down, allowing the commander to sit on it, legs inside, for external observation. The early turret model was the APX-R, equipped with a L713 sight, mounting the short barrel 37 mm (1.46 in) Puteaux L/21 SA-18 and a coaxial 7.5 mm (0.29 in) Châtellerault fortress machine-gun. This main gun was effective only against concrete fortifications at relatively short range, as muzzle velocity was only 300 m/s (984 ft/s). At best only 12 mm (0.47 in) of armor could be defeated at less than 500 m (1640 ft). Once again, it was a tactical limitation. The R35 was never intended to deal with other tanks. Normal provision of ammuniion was 72 AP and 58 HE rounds plus 2400 machinegun cartridges.
Renault R35 tanks in the field
At the time of the German attack on France, the French Army had 900 R35’s in service, then the most numerous model available. According to French military doctrine it was to be used only for direct support of infantry. However, its gun proved able to defeat Panzer I and IIs, while the frontal armor could withstand a direct hit from the standard 37 mm (1.46 in) gun. These were strictly to tank units without other organic components, and only committed to infantry support in close coordination with infantry units. However, in May, when it was clear that doctrine was failing the test of battle, 135 R35’s were allocated to a newly formed 4th DCR (Division Cuirassée de Réserve) while others reinforced the 2nd DCR. Later, 300 tanks from the materiel reserve were also allocated to these new units.
The majority (843) of R35s fell into German hands; 131 were used as such as Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731 (f), issued to panzer units and mainly used for security duties or driver training, or used on armoured trains; most were later rebuilt as artillery tractors and ammunition carriers after removing the turret. Others were converted for use as tank destroyers. Some of the tanks that Germany captured were given or sold to Germany’s allies (124 to Italy for example).
R35 Exports – Poland
In 1938, the Polish Army bought two R35’s for tests by the Office of Armored Forces Technical Research. The tank did not meet Polish requirements, neither did the Hotchkiss H35. The Polish Army wanted to buy the SOMUA S35, but the French government did not give its consent. In April 1939, due to the impending conflict with Germany and the lack of opportunities to increase production of the 7TP, 100 R-35’s were ordered. The first batch of 50 (including three H35’s) wer delivered in July 1939, and were given to the 12th Armored Battalion in Lutsk. In September, this unit formed part of the 21st Light Tank Battalion, entrusted with the defense of the border with Romania. Others were incorporated into the composition of Group “Dubno” which took part in the battles against the Germans at Strumiłową and the Soviets at Krasne. 34 tanks of the 21st Light Tank Battalion crossed the border into Romania on 18th September and were interned.
R35 Exports – Finland
After the Polish capitulation, a Polish cavalry unit was raised in France (the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade / 10 Brygada Kawalerii Pancernej / 10e Brigade de cavalerie blindée polonaise). When the Soviet Union attacked Finland, the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade under the command of General Stanisław Maczek was brought up to strength in both men and equipment, being made up of two tank battalions, two strong motorized cavalry squadrons, one motorized infantry battalion one anti-tank battery, one anti-aircraft battery with engineering, signals, transport and support units. The two tank battalions were equipped with a total of 120 Renault R35’s. The Brigade was dispatched to Finland in February 1940 but with much new equipment that many Polish soldiers had no idea how to use.
Some 115 more Renault R35’s were taken from the Material Reserve and shipped as Aid to Finland together with the Brigade (these tanks were used to hastily equip two further Finnish Panssaripataljoona). Training was carried out after arrival in Finland, with the Brigade forming a part of the rather ad-hoc 23rd Panssaridivisioona (“Marskin Vasara – The Marshal’s Hammer”). The 10th Brigade fought well on the Karelian Isthmus and would end the Winter War on the outskirts of Leningrad.After the Winter War ended, General Maczek and his men eventually returned to the UK, leaving their surviving R35’s behind for the Finnish Army.
In the UK, the Polish 10th Brigade formed part of the 1st Polish Armoured Division, which was placed under General Maczek’s command. The 1st would return to Finland in late 1943 with rather more modern Sherman tanks and American-supplied equipment, after which they would fight their way down the coast of the Baltic and into Poland under overall Finnish command. General Maczek and the 1st Polish Armoured Division would lead the offensive that broke through German lines and relieved the besieged Polish Home Army forces in Warsaw after the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944. The 1st would spend the rest of WW2 ensuring Polish territory remained Polish, a bitter and ruthlessly fought internecine and largely clandestine struggle against the NKVD and the Red Army which resulted in Poland retaining its pre-WW2 borders in the east.
R35 Exports – Yugoslavia
The kingdom of Yugoslavia ordered and obtained 45 R35s in April 1940, where they formed two brigades. One of these saw heavy action against the Germans around Belgrade. Surviving ones were re-used by the Independent State of Croatia, which fought alongside the 11th Panzerdivision on 13 and 14 April 1941. After that, they formed the Croatian 11 Dalmatinska udarna brigada (Dalmatian brigade) which fought against partisans.
R35 Exports – Romania
Romania’s rearmament plan was in full sweep in the early 1930’s when the last Renault tank was tested. The Romanian government investigated acquiring a licence to produce 200 R35’s locally. However, with French rearmament being given priority, as a stopgap measure, forty-five R35’s were sold and shipped in Romania in August and September 1939, making the bulk of the newly formed 2nd Armored Regiment. At the end of September 1939, an unexpected 34 Polish R35s from the 21st Light Tank Battalion retreating before the Germans crossed the northern border. These were interned and bolstered the strength of the 2nd Armored Regiment. Although these were used as is by the Romanian army, 36 were converted by Atelierele Loenida in 1943-44 with a high-velocity Soviet 45 mm (1.77 in) gun and saw action as the Vanatorul de Care R-35.
The R35 at the Musée des Blindés at Saumur in France
Somua S35 (430 built 1936-1940)
During WW1, the famous Cuirassier horse guards had their traditions shattered when it became obvious that the cavalry was obsolete in this new kind of warfare. When the first tanks appeared in 1917, new tactics in conjunctions with tanks proved there were still possible uses for cavalry. The French, as well as the British and Soviets, thereafter made the distinction between three kinds of tanks: those for the infantry and the cavalry, and lastly the heavy breakthrough tank, the “char de rupture”, like the FMC 2C. Plans for a new cavalry tank came in 1931, revised on 26 June 1934. A new and heavier model was specified, capable of resisting any antitank gun of the time. The responsibility was given to the St. Ouen Societe d’Outillage Mecanique et d’Usinage d’Artillerie (SOMUA). At that time the old French Army ban on cavalry having tanks was removed. Cavalry tanks were to be called “Automitrailleuses” (armored cars) in French service, like the AMR 33/35. The SOMUA was in a completely different – it was the first cavalry vehicle to be called a tank. It was classed as a fast medium, aimed not only at reconnaissance but also at contact and engagement with advancing enemy units.
Design of the S35
The SOMUA S35 was a French Cavalry tank of the Second World War. Built from 1936 until 1940 to equip the armoured divisions of the Cavalry, it was for its time a relatively agile medium-weight tank, superior in armour and armament to both its French and foreign competitors, such as the contemporary versions of the German Panzerkampfwagen III. It was constructed from well-sloped, mainly cast, armour sections, that however made it expensive to produce and time-consuming to maintain.
The hull was cast in four parts – a world first – and the turret was cast as well. The maximum thickness of the hull and turret armour was 47 and 40 mm (1.85/1.5 in) respectively. The turret was derived from the B1 heavy tank, but with an enlarged turret ring. The medium-barrel SA35 47 mm (1.85 in) in the turret was efficient against most German and Soviet tanks of the time and a mix of 90 AP and 28 HE shots was carried. There was also a coaxial 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel machine gun with 2,250 rounds. All S35 units were scheduled to be equipped with radio, but as ER28 production never reached the required level, only one tank of five was equipped, despite the fact that many of them included an antenna. Crew was 3 – a driver, the tank commander/gunner and a radio operator. As with the B1, the commander was expected to direct the tank while also aiming, loading and firing the 47 mm SA 35 main gun.
Engineer Eugene Brillé worked on the suspension, inspired by the suspension used on the Skoda LTvz. 35, with eight road wheels on four bogies with leaf spring and a large torsion wheel. The initial tracks were 75 mm (2.95 in) wide, with 144 links, later 103 with enlarged pieces. The rear engine was side by side with two self-feeding fuel tanks. The crew was protected by a thick firewall bulkhead. The V8 SOMUA engine designed by engineer Javier-Sabin developed about 200 bhp and used a double filling tank system which at times caused some problems with inexperienced crews. Overall, the S35 was regarded as the most potent medium tank of its day. It is said that the US Ordnance studied the S35 for its construction aspects which helped later to design the Sherman.
Somua S 35 Production
The preliminary design was ready in September 1934, definitive plans in October 1934, just as construction began. The first prototype was ready in April 1935, undergoing successful trials until August of that year. The model was named after its first year of production. A preseries model was to be tested until January 1936 with the new APX1 turret, with production scheduled to start in March.
Souma S35
However, the S35 had several flaws, the first of which was a common issue among French tanks. The commander was still overloaded and the turret still lacked hatches, mostly due to budgetary reasons, which caused the same commander to sit completely outside of the turret in order to get a good view. Other flaws were maintenance-related. The cast-steel modules didn’t facilitate access to the suspension, which made maintenance and repair time-consuming. The cost per unit was high and only limited numbers of this excellent medium tank were produced. By the 1st of September, 1939, 246 had been delivered, and only 288 were in service in May 1940. But by June 1940 some 430 had been built. Production was then halted for the more advanced SOMUA S40. Due to French needs, a Polish order was declined. However, for political reasons a small Finnish order was accepted, with 50 Somua 35’s delivered to Finland in early 1939.
The Finnish Export Order – Somua S 35
In early 1939, for purely political reasons and in the face of some heated opposition from the French Army, the sale of 50 Somua 35’s to Finland was approved – out of approximately 150 which had been produced by that date. Worse from the French Army’s point of view was that these 50 were to be delivered immediately from stocks of the Somua S35 in hand and about to be handed over to the Army. Despite the at times vociferous opposition from within the French Army, the sale and handover was approved.
Finnish Army Somua S35’s parading through Helsinki, Autumn 1939
The sale had it’s origins in the large French government loan (approximately $15,000,000 US Dollars) made to Finland in 1937 for the purchase of military equipment. While the financing was available, the Finns had been somewhat selective about the equipment and weapons ordered from the French, with the result being that by late 1938, there was still considerable unspent funding. The triumvirate responsible for Finnish defence spending had decided, after the bombshell decision on the fate of Czechoslovakia in October 1938, that Finland must accelerate her defensive armaments build up at almost any cost.
After some debate, the Finnish government had almost unanimously allocated additional funds to defence purchasing for the remainder of 1938 and very substantially increased the defence budget planned for 1939. The decision was also made that everything possible must be done to purchase critically needed armaments, including using the unspent loan financing still available from the sizable French and US Loans. The Somua S35, perhaps the best tank in the world at the time, was near the top of the defense shopping list, as it were. The Finns by now had some considerable experience in dealing with French politicians and it was obvious what needed to be done to ensure Finland got the wanted Somua S35’s.
Finnish Army Somua S35 in Finland during the Winter War
Some judicious (and not inconsiderable) funds were expended on greasing the palms of French politicians and a number of influential voices within the French Army and within weeks, the sale had been approved. The end result was that 50 Somua S35’s were offloaded in Turku in April 1939, following which they would be used to form a second Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona (Separate Tank/Panzer Battalion). In Finnish hands, the Somua S35’s fought very effectively to their strengths. The one-man turret was a major limiting factor, but in the largely defensive fighting on the Isthmus in which the Somua S35’s would fight, this was not so much of a disadvantage as it would be in more mobile or offensive fighting. Also, the high velocity SA35 47 mm gun proved to be very effective against Red Army tanks.
The Red Army made no attempt to outmaneuver the Finns, instead relying on sheer numbers and massed wave attacks of tanks and infantry to overcome the Finnish defences. Unfortunately for the Red Army, this was the war the Finns had planned to fight, with doctrine, tactics and training geared to counter the Red Army’s tactics (or lack of them) and strengths. The result was an ongoing slaughter.
Two knocked out Finnish Army Somua tanks on the Leningrad Front, August 1940
A company of Somua 35’s, well dug in and covering each other, with prepared positions to fall back on, equipped with effective radios and coordinating with well-trained infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery (and with close air support available, weather permitting) time and again decimated attacking Red Army forces before falling back to the next line of pre-prepared defensive positions and repeating. The Somua’s armour seemed impervious to the guns of the lighter Soviet tanks – and the Finns would use this to advantage time and again in their limited objective counter-attacks.
The Somua S35-equipped Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona emerged from the defensive fighting on the Karelian Isthmus over the winter of 1939-1940 virtually unscathed, although some losses did occur. Further losses occurred during the Spring 1940 offensive down the Karelian Isthmus and more in the fighting on the outskirts of Leningrad, as the photo on the right of two knocked out Finnish Army Somua S35’s illustrates. Again, in these actions the Finnish Army used their limited numbers of Somua S35’s carefully and to their strengths in well-coordinated actions which kept losses minimal. The surviving Somua S35’s remained in use with the Finnish Army until 1943, when they were retired from active service and used as training tanks after being replaced with US-supplied Lend-Lease tanks. The remaining Somua S35’s were retired completely and scrapped in 1946.
SOMUAs S35 and S40 in action in France
In May 1940, the bulk of the S40 force was allocated to the 1st Amy deployed in Belgium. Because of the lack of support and a weak organization when compared to the German Panzerdivisions, these units performed with high losses, but with some successes, most of them as a result of the S35’s armor and firepower. The battle of Hannut (May 12-14), the largest tank battle of 1940, occurred between six armored divisions, a clash of nearly 1,700 tanks and armored vehicles. Despite tactical victories at strong-points, it was a strategic failure for the French defence – the Germans systematically outmaneuvering the French, gaining local firepower superiority and with excellent communication and support. The French “by the book” tactics proved hopelessly obsolete.
On another occasion, on May, 17, Colonel De Gaulle’s 4th DCR, comprising many S35’s as well as Hotchkiss, Char B1 and Renault tanks, tried to stop the German advance at Laon and Montcornet. Although they gained momentum and local successes, even taking hundreds of German prisoners, the Luftwaffe and German Flak 88 mm (3.46 in) quickly deployed and used as antitank batteries for the first time in the war, crushed any further progress. Many S35s of the remaining forces fought to prevent three German Panzerdivisions from approaching Dunkirk. They were destroyed or ultimately abandoned, running out of ammunition and fuel. Later in June, other S35’s fought in Weygand’s so-called “strongpoints”, which were outmaneuvered once again, hammered by artillery and the Luftwaffe, and eventually forced to surrender one by one.
Somua S35’s after the fall of France
The remaining S35s, perhaps a hundred in all, which escaped to Vichy France, were allocated to the Vichy regime for police duties and most were transferred to North Africa. Most of the S35s remaining in occupied France were taken over by the Germans, some sources mentioning about 250 to 290. Most of these fought eventually on the Eastern Front where they were outclassed by Soviet KV-1s and T-34s. In December 1944, a single German unit was still equipped with a handful of S35s but by this time they were hopelessly outclassed.
Somua S 35 in german service, Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739 (f)
Char B1 bis (781 built between 1935-1940)
The Char de bataille was Col. Estienne’s concept. The French “father of tanks” wrote a memorandum (Mémoire sur les missions des chars blindés en campagne) in 1919, full of war experience, tactical reports and theoretical concepts of mechanized warfare, notably the proper use of different types in the offensive. The “char de bataille” (“battle tank”) was a heavy tank, near to the “char de rupture” or “breakthrough tank”, but the former was more a dual-purpose (infantry support and antitank) machine than the “char de rupture”. The latter concept gave birth to huge the FMC F1, with the sole purpose of terminating fortifications.
The prototype Renault SRA – on it’s first run over a 20km test course it began to fall apart
This duality was at the very core of the idea, shaping the many prototypes which followed in response. In 1921, the project was studied by a commission led by General Edmond Buat. First specification was for a low-cost self-propelled artillery, 25 mm (0.98 in) of armor and some machine-guns in turrets. Maximum metric weight was 30 tons. The project evolved and the machine-gun turret was equipped with an antitank 47 mm (1.85 in) gun. The main gun was a 75 mm (2.95 in) howitzer, in a low hull sponson. Industrial rivalry in the past had delayed several projects, including the FCM 2C, so Estienne was poised to create a formal agreement, submitted to the industrialists involved, free to share their plans, with the promise of no less 1000 orders. The Army was then to choose between the projects and various patents to compose their model, built by all. The four companies involved in the project were Renault (SRA), Schneider (SRB), FAMH (Saint Chamond) and FCM (Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée) with the FCM 21.
The prototype FCM21 resembled a scaled dwn Char 2C
The prototype Schneider SRB – six metres long, 228 centimetres high and 2,5 metres wide with a 47mm gun.
Prototype FAMH-tank
The four projects, one for each company, were submitted to the commission on 13 May 1924 at Atelier de Rueil. The twenty kilometer test course proved too much for them, showing the haste of their conception. The commission, over the supervision of Estienne, choose the SRB as a base. The SRB (Schneider project) weighed 18.5 tons, was 6 meters long (19.7 ft), with modified FT17 tracks, an antitank 47 mm (1.85 in) gun, Renault six-cylinder 180 hp engine, with hydraulic Naëder transmission from the Chaize company combined with a Fieux clutch and Schneider gear box, a speed of 18.5 km/h (11.5 mph) and a 370 l fuel tank giving a 370 km (230 mi) autonomy. This prototype then received many modifications, including the 75 mm (2.95 in) howitzer, new Holt-type tracks, the FAMH suspension, track tension wheel and a small gangway to access to the engine, with 40 mm (1.57 in) armor.
Design of the Char Bis B1
The design process of this modified SRB led to the 1926 “tracteur 30″. The plans were made by Schneider’s chief engineer, revised by the STCC (Section Technique des Chars de Combat). A mockup was built by Renault and three prototypes were to be built by the companies involved, with some modifications by the new 1926 “direction de l’infanterie”, changing it to a primarily infantry support tank. Modifications of the design included no AT weapon, lower speed, 22 tons max and radio for coordination. The three prototypes of the “B” serie (n°101, 102 and 103) were ready by 1929-30. They differed by their engine, clutch, transmission and served both for technological and tactical experiments, at the champ de Châlons, forming the “Détachement d’Experimentation” unit in 1931. They were extensively used in maneuvers until 1934, each time with some modifications by the Atelier de Reuil near Paris, to meet new requirements and army specifications. In the end, the B1 received its final turret, with the low velocity 47 mm (1.85 in), and coaxial Reibel machine-gun.
Char B1 Prototype N° 101, here in its original state with a small machine gun turret
Like the 1924 prototypes, it had a very large track, inspired by earlier famous British models. Armor also protected the suspension and the hull was riveted. The Renault inline 6 cylinder 16.5 litre petrol engine was chosen, which provided 9.7 bhp/ton, the power was transmitted by a double differential steering system, 5 forward, 1 reverse gear. Suspension was in the form of bogies with a mixture of vertical coil and leaf springs. Both early and final turret designs (APX1) were one-man only.
The Char B1’s original specification was for a self-propelled gun able to destroy enemy infantry and artillery. The main weapon of the tank was intended to be its 75 mm howitzer, and the entire design of the vehicle was directed to making this gun as effective as possible. When in the early 1930’s it became obvious that the Char B1 also had to defeat counterattacking enemy armour, it was too late for a complete redesign. The solution was to add the standard cast APX-1 turret which also equipped the Char D2. Like most French tanks of the period (the exception being the AMC34 and the AMC35) the Char B thus had a small one-man turret. Today this is typically seen as one of their greatest flaws.
Production: The B1
Production started in 1935, with Renault building 182, AMX – a Schneider subsidiary – 47, FCM 72 and FAMH 32. At 1.5 million francs apiece it was by far the costliest tank ever built en masse. Consequently, the original order of 1000 was reduced to 400. This further increased the tension between the two doctrinal schools which then had influence, one professing the use of a few, heavily armored battle tanks while the other advocated the use of swarms of light tanks. Almost ten light Renault tanks could be built for the price of a single Char B1. This exasparated men like Colonel Charles de Gaulle, who wanted to build more of the medium Char D2 at a third of the cost of the Char B1 bis, but armed with the same 47 mm gun.
As the few, even more expensive and now largely obsolete FCM 2C’s were kept out of real operations, the B1 became the main French “char de rupture”, a breakthrough tank held in specialized units. Operational capabilities were limited by their high fuel consumption, which in turn limited their range and condemned them to be used as a strategic reserve. In fact they formed the “Divisions Cuirassées de Réserve” (DCR) with limited strategic flexibility, intended for the second phase of the assault.
Renault Char B1 bis cutout
The B1 had some shortcomings which had to be dealt with. An obvious lack of antitank firepower, with its low velocity L27/6 SA34 47 mm (1.85 in), which was only given APHE rounds (high explosive), capable of defeating 25 mm (0.98 in) of armor. The 75 mm (2.95 in) SA35 ABS L17.1 howitzer could fire HE and APHE rounds, only suitable against fortifications, with a poor traverse of only one degree. The aiming was given to the driver’s abilities with the Naëder hydraulic precision transmission. It was served by the radioman and the commander, who was also given the task of aiming and firing the turret 47 mm (1.85 in) gun. Communication was assumed by an ER53 radio telegraphy set, which worked with Morse code only. There was a small corridor, right on the rear, giving access to the ammunition reserve, next to the engine. The main access door was on the right side. The suspension system was rather complicated, made of three main bogies, sprung by vertical coil springs, each supporting two others, with a pair of road wheels. Production of the B1 was very slow. Only 34 machines were delivered until July 1937. By then, there was serious consideration given to an upgrade, which led to the B1 bis.
The upgraded B1 bis and B1 ter
Canon de 75 pour Char b1
The B1 bis was a modernization of the type, with an emphasis on anti-tank capability and protection. The armor was uprated to 60 mm (2.36 in), and a new APX4 turret with a longer barrel (L/32) SA 35 47 mm (1.85 in) gun was mounted. To cope with the added weight (now 31 tons) a new engine was fitted, a V12 Renault capable of 307 bhp (229 kW). 35 of the first series were retrofitted with the new engine. Autonomy was limited to only 180 km (110 mi). There had been some attempts of towing an extra 800 litre fuel tank, but it never realized. At cruise speed reserves were exhausted in just 6 hours. A larger left air intake was fitted. Ammunition storage was improved between the beginning and the end of the production, from 62 to 72 47 mm (1.85 in) rounds, but still, no AP shells. Production started in April 1937 and stopped in June 1940. By then, 377 had been delivered out of an order of 1144, but only 129 in September 1939. In exercises, the complex and advanced hydrostatic steering Naëder system proved difficult to use and costly, betrayed by other technical elements like a porous bronze housing and feeble seals causing significant losses of castor oil. The TSF was not practical as the tanks needed to be at rest to communicate. No tactical coordination was possible on the move. The costly turret was slower to produce than the hulls and three B1 bis were ultimately put in service without turret, as gun carriages.
Char B1 ter – only two prototypes were built
The B1 ter was a late attempt to radically improve the design. The main features were new 75 mm (2.95 in) armor welded with slopes to the hull, a new 350 bhp engine to deal with this added weight (36.6 tons) and some simplification in the design for mass-production in 1940, like the omittance of the Naëder transmission. A rearranged interior allowed a fifth crew member to be carried, as a mechanic. The main howitzer received better traverse, 5 degrees higher. Only two prototypes were ready by June 1940. Production never started.
The B1 had some additional flaws as well, which never helped its performances. High consumption issue, which was aggravated by any aiming of the main howitzer, was never solved. The absence of an efficient compass orientation and no internal communication system were also resented in operations. The one-man APX-1 turret was also cramped and ergonomy was poor and the feebly armored cupola had inadequate means of vision. Plus, the barrel pointing device was quickly deregulated. Many other issues were never solved because of the delays. The most serious was of course disastrous tactical management. B1s were “wasted” at individual defensive spots, many were simply outmaneuvered. But despite all this, the B1s were still, tank to tank, formidable machines, which proved very effective in single actions.
The Finnish Export Order – Char B1
As with the Souma S35 order, in early 1939, for the same (ahem!) reasons and in the face of the same heated opposition from the French Army, the sale of 60 Char B1 bis’s to Finland was approved – out of approximately 150 which had been produced by that date. As with the S35’s, these 60 were to be delivered immediately from stocks of the Char B1’s already in service with the French Army. And as with the S35’s, despite vociferous opposition from within the Army, the sale and handover was approved at the highest political levels.
Finnish Army Cha B1 bis tank unit mobilizing, Autumn 1939
The Souma S35 was near the top of the Finns defense shopping list and the Finns actually wanted more of these than they were sold, but the numbers that even heavily-bribed French politicians were prepared to sell were limited and instead of the requested S35’s, the balance of the numbers requested was met by a French political decision to offer the Finns the Char B1 bis’s instead. The fact that the high cost of the Char B1 bis’s resulted in rather more in the way of bribes being paid may have also had a bearing on the decision but this was a situation where beggars could not be choosers. The end result was that in addition to the 50 Souma S35’s offloaded in Turku in April 1939, some 60 Char B1 bis’s were also delivered. These 60 Char B1 bis’s would form the third Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona (Separate Tank/Panzer Battalion) in service with the Finnish Army in the Winter War.
In Finnish hands, the Char 1b bis’s fought a lethal defensive fight. The tanks thick armour made it next to impervious to Soviet tank and anti-tank guns and it’s firepower (in particular the high-velocity 47mm gun) easily ripped apart the lighter Soviet tanks used in the early months of the Winter War. Again, as with the Souma S35, the one-man turret was a major limiting factor, but in the largely defensive fighting on the Isthmus, this was not so much of a disadvantage as it would be in rather more mobile or offensive fighting. The Finns had immediately on arrival fitted the French-supplied tanks with new-model Nokia voice radios and again, the vastly improved communction, when combined with the Finnish Army’s pervasive portable radio network, meant tight cooperation was possible both between individual tanks and between panssari units and the attached infantry, anti-tank batteries and artillery with which they operated.
Finnish Army Char 1b in battle
To the great benefit of the Char B1 bis-equipped panssaripataljoona, the Red Army fought the war that the Finnish Army had developed the doctrine to fight. Doctrine, solid preparation and training, training and more training paid off over those early weeks of defensive fighting as the Char 1B battalion slowly fell back down the length of the Isthmus to the Mannerheim Line, while repeatedly causing heavy casualties to the attacking Red Army armor. Through to the end of the war, the Char B1 would be the Red Army’s most feared enemy tank, a mechanized nightmare which time and again annihilated the Russian tank units with which it was engaged. The lack of Red Army survivors to pass the experience on meant that in general, the Red Army failed to learn any lessons from these devastating encounters.
In one defensive counter attack in January 1940 for example, a single troop of six B1’s, working together with two companies of infantry, artillery and close air support and fighting from carefully prepared defensive positions initially severely mauled a major Red Army assault. As the Red Army units pulled back, the Finnish tanks attacked frontally and completed the annihilation of an entire Red Army Tank Regiment, with Finnish infantry capturing six Soviet tanks which had been abandoned by their crews. These were then driven back to the Finnish lines as the Finns withdrew. All the B1’s were hit numerous times but suffered no major damage in the action. Time and again the Finnish Army would carry out such counter-attacks on slowly advancing Red Army units, taking advantage of the Red Army’s lack of cohesion between Tanks, Infantry and Artillery to inflict massive losses (and not incidentally, capturing much Soviet equipment in the process). Combining these tanks, excellent communications and the outstanding artillery fire control and artillery concentration methods used by the Finns, the Soviet spearheads found themselves smashed to pieces again and again.
Destroyed Finnish Army Char B1 – Karelian Isthmus – Summer 1940
Through the entire length of the Winter War and wherever they were found, the small number of Finnish Army’s Char 1B’s ruled the battlefield, only losing the occasional tank to heavy indirect fire from Soviet artillery. The Char 1B bis-equipped Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona emerged from the defensive fighting on the Karelian Isthmus over the winter of 1939-1940 virtually unscathed. Heavier losses occurred during the Spring 1940 offensive down the Karelian Isthmus where the heavily armoured Char 1B’s often took the lead in major attacks, as a consequence suffering rather more heavily than they had in the purely defensive fighting of earlier months. They also suffered rather more losses in the fighting on the outskirts of Leningrad. While they were used carefully and to their strengths in well-coordinated actions, losses were no longer minimal and by the end of the Winter War, only 15 of the 60 Char 1B’s acquired from the French remained in action.
The B1 bis in action with the French Army
Char B1 bis and Hotchkiss H39
Despite its obsolete features, low autonomy and speed, the B1 was hard to stop. Its most formidable assets were its huge armor and good firepower, then unmatched in the west. The 60 mm (2.36 in) frontal armor was sloped, which mean it was near 80 mm (3.15 in) effectively. There were no real weak spots, and this invulnerability helped the B1 to close on targets, then destroy it with the turret 47 mm (1.85 in) or the brute force of the howitzer HE shells. For this reasons, the B1 was the Wehrmacht’s most feared enemy tank, a mechanized nightmare which caused heavy casualties by itself during the few fights during which it was engaged. The Germans never again experienced such losses in tank to tank combat until the fall of 1941, when encountering the Soviet KV-1 and T-34.
The Panzer I and II were absolutely harmless to the B1, and the Panzer III with its thin armor and 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, presented no serious threat the the French B1. As for the Panzer IV, it had only 20 mm (0.79 in) protection (Ausf. A, 30 mm (1.18 in) (Ausf. B and C) and 50 mm (1.97 in) (Ausf. D). It’s standard gun was the low velocity, short barrel 75 mm (2.95 in) KwK 37 , which was only effective at short range. For this reasons, the Panzer IV barely presented a real threat except in close, real time coordination with other vehicles. The same could be said about most German antitank guns of the time. The famous standard-issue “door-knocker” Pak 37 and even the Pak 40 were harmless. Contrary to common opinion of the time, the large ventilation exhaust panel was indirectly 55 mm (2.17 in) strong and never presented a weak point.
When the war broke out in September 1939, there were perhaps 180 operational B1 and B1 bis in all. They were used for the Sarre offensive, a short-lived burst without serious opposition, with a massive force of 41 divisions and 2400 tanks. The aim was to distract and divert German forces from Poland, France’s ally. After slowly penetrating 8 km (5 mi) into enemy territory, the entire force withdrew by order of General Gamelin into the security of the Maginot line. Several officers, including Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle, wildly protested. In effect, the Germans would have been in great danger and the Rhine was in reach. But Gamelin then was so confident about the famous fortified line that he saw any large-scale offensive to be a useless waste of material and men.
During the “Phoney War”, all B1s were gathered in massive infantry support divisions, the “division cuirassés de réserve” or DCR, which were tactically committed in the second phase of any assault, the first being led by cavalry tanks like the SOMUA S35. No tanks were sent in Norway, but the real deal began in May 1940. Three DCR, comprising each 69 tanks, were mobilized. Part of the 37th Bataillon de Chars de Combat, it comprised only B1s, were all rearmed with long-barrel SA 35 guns in May 1940 (turret designation APX1A). After the German invasion began, four new DCR of 52 B1s were constituted, as well as five Compagnie Autonome de Chars (autonomous tanks companies), with 56 B1s in all, plus 34 more in the 28 BCC (Bataillon de chars de combat). All B1s were reequipped with phonic versions of the ER53 radios, and command tanks received ER55 long-range radios.
Captain, later Colonel & then General Pierre Billotte
B1 tanks were used (and lost) during the first phase of the operations, especially the first week. Most counter-offensives against Guderian’s “run to the sea” counted at least several B1s. Without air support these moves were doomed to failure against the quick and lethal Stuka attacks. Bad tactics of course brought these precious tanks to inept, hasty defensive “plugs” in the defensive lines, most of the time, ending in pure waste. In some case, the B1’s extraordinary sturdiness allowed some success, notably the counter-attacks at laon and Moncornet led by Col. De Gaulle, and stiff resistance like at Hannut and particularly Stonne. During these events, some individual B1’s blocked by themselves the German advance, inflicting horrendous casualties.
In a particular case, a single B1, Eure, commanded by Captain Pierre Billotte, attacked frontally and destroyed single-handedly thirteen Panzer IIIs and IVs, and then withdrew, while being hit 140 times. During two days, B1 tanks from the 3rd Division Cuirassée de Réserve literally ruled the battlefield at Stonne, destruction coming only due to German overwhelming attacks against single tanks and excellent communication, air strikes and indirect fire (by German howitzers). Some B1’s also broke down or ran out of ammunition and petrol. The last surviving B1’s were mixed with other tanks in support of the so-called “hedgehogs”, which fell one after the other in June 1940. By the 26th of June 1940, the campaign was over.
Char B1 Eure in action…
Two Stories about the Char B1 bis during the Battle of Stonne (15-18 May 1940)
The Eure and her crew
Eure: The 1/41e BCC outflanks Stonne by the north-west but capitaine Billotte is hampered by several cliffs and important slopes. He has to move to the right, arriving in Stonne itself (from the north-west) before the battalion commander. The B1bis “Eure” arrives nose to nose with 13 German tanks of Pz.Rgt.8 (10.PzD) in column in the main street of the town. The first tank is only at 30m. Billotte orders the driver (sergent Durupt) to target the last tank with the 75mm SA35 hull gun while he destroys the first tank with the 47mm SA35 turret gun. The first shots destroyed simultaneously the first and the last German tank of the column, the others could hardly move. In several minutes, the B1bis “Eure” advances in the street and neutralize the 11 remaining tanks while numerous shells are hitting the armor of the B1bis without penetrating it. 2 Panzer IVs and 11 Panzer IIIs are reported as being destroyed (It is however not 100% sure that among them there were not several wrecks from the previous day). Billotte crosses the whole town and destroys also two 3.7cm AT guns next to the “Pain de Sucre”. The armor of the B1bis revealed later to be scattered with 140 impacts and gouges, none of the projectiles penetrated the armor according to the war diary of the 41e BCC. One can see here a kind of small reversed “Villers Bocage”. The “Eure” was scuttled on the 13th June as the drive wheels were unable to be used.
The “Ricquewihr” and her crew
Ricquewihr: On May 16, around 17h00, the Char B1bis “Ricquewihr” (commanded by Lieutenant Doumecq or Domercq ? Apparently the second name is the right one but the first one can be found in several books) from 49e BCC attacks towards Stonne and encounters a German infantry column, which fires at the tank with infantry weapons including anti-tank rifles, without effect. The B1bis crushes its way through the German troops and pushes into the town defended by the Schützen-Regiment 64. When the German soldiers saw the bloody tracks of the tank they fled in panic and abandoned Stonne which remained unoccupied for the night. After that action Domercq was nicknamed “the butcher of Stonne” by his comrades. Ricquewihr will be heavily involved in the combat at Tannay over May 23-24. The B1bis “Ricquewihr” will be the last surviving tank of the 3e DCr, abandoned on June 18, at Sombernon north-east of Dijon, the weapons having been previously scuttled by the crew. At the end of 1942, Domercq (former commander of the tank and living in Paris) is in a pub on the Poincaré Avenue where a German tanker shows several photos to his friends. Domercq recognize his former tank, the “Ricquewihr”. The German explains that he is now the commander of this tank, that he has fired with it and that it was a good tank. He will be taking the tank and the rest of the crew to the Russian front.
B1/B1 bis fate: German and French service
French Renault Char B1 bis tank, with German ‘B2′ modifications, owned by Bovington Tank Museum
The Germans captured hundreds of tanks, including no less than 161 B1 bis tanks, later pressed into service as the Panzerkampfwagen B-2 740(f). Sixty were converted into flamethrower versions (Flammwagen auf Panzerkampfwagen B-2 (f)), and sixteen to carry the 105 mm (4.13 in) howitzer. A single unit was equipped only with B1s, the Panzer-Abteilung 213, stationed in the British Channel Islands. One of these ended at the Bovington museum, repainted in French colors. 17 units in all received modified B1s, as they saw service in the Balkans (March-April 1941) and the Eastern Front, where their armor and armament initially proved well-adapted against Russian heavy tanks. By 1944, they were all gone.
Those stationed in France took part in the defense of Normandy, and others were stationed in support of the German units defending Paris. In August 1944 some were captured by insurgents and used in action by local FFI units. In 1945, German pockets of resistance in France, especially those on the western coast, were left to the FFI and the regular French 1st army. Edmond Voillaume’s 2nd Company was equipped with 19 B1s, which decisively took part in the reduction of the Royan pocket, and La Rochelle. B1s were also part of the 13th Dragoon Regiment, which took part in operations in Alsace and Southern Germany. They were stationed after V-day in the French occupied zone, until the unit was disbanded in 1946.
Surviving Char B1’s
Today eleven vehicles survive, one Char B1 and ten Char B1 bis. The last surviving Char B1 can be seen at the “Association pour la Sauvegarde du Patrimoine Historique et Militaire” (ASPHM), near Strasbourg, in France. It was previously at the Fort de Seclin. It is in a bad condition, with parts like the main gun missing. It was salvaged from a firing range, but will be restored by the owner.
The only remaining Char B1 at the Fort de Seclin, near Lille (France)
Ten Char B1 bis tanks can be seen in various places in Great Britain and in France:
As with Britian, French tank design entered a period of hiatus through the 1920’s. Nevertheless, the French Tanks of the Interwar Decades were as good as any designed and built elsewhere in the world, and one in particular, the Souma S35, was perhaps the best tank available anywhere in 1939. In this Post, we’ll walk through French Tanks as of the end of World War One, and then take a look at the French Tanks of the Interwar Decades.
Please note: here and there within this post are snippets of alternative history related to Finland. Any mention of French tanks in use in Finland is fictional, although the remainder of the content is historically accurate. Also, I’ve left out French tank models that were only produced in small numbers or as prototypes.
The French Tanks of World War One
During World War One, France too developed its own tracked Armoured Fighting Vehicles at about the same time as Britain, but the situation there was rather different to Britain’s. In Britain a single committee had coordinated design, and had to overcome the initial resistance of the Army, while the major industries remained passive. Almost all production effort was thus concentrated into the Mark I and its direct successors, all very similar in shape. In France, on the other hand, there were multiple and conflicting lines of development which resulted in three quite disparate production types. The two original French tank designs, the St-Chamond and the Schneider-CA, proved to be flawed. The last of the three, the Renault-FT, pioneered the classic tank configuration which has remained the basis of tank design up to today.
The Renault FT-17 was the first tank to incorporate a top-mounted turret with full 360º traverse capability and was designed with a layout that has been followed by almost all designs ever since: driver at the front; main armament in a fully rotating turret on top; engine at the rear. Previous tank models had been “box tanks”; a single crowded space combining the engine room, fighting compartment, ammunition stock and driver’s cabin. The FT would have the largest production run of any tank of WW1, with over 3,700 built, more numerous than all British tanks combined.
The Renault FT-17 – the WW1 tank that pioneered the classic tank configuration which has remained the basis of tank design up to today
The Renault FT-17 has already been covered in some detail – suffice it to reiterate that the large fleet of Renault FT-17 tanks with which the French Army ended WW1 would remain the mainstay of the French armoured forces through to the mid-1930’s, when they began to be rapidly replaced with a mixed force of light tanks across both the Infantry and Cavalry branches of the Army, as well as with medium and heavy tanks. The Infantry light tanks included the Renault R 35 (which followed the FT 17 concept closely with its small size, two-man crew and short 37 mm gun armament. albeit heavily armored). The cavalry had the similar Hotchkiss H 35, armed with the same 37 mm gun, as well as light recon tanks such as the AMR 35.
France also produced arguably the best tank of the 1930’s, the SOMUA S35. This tank equipped the armoured divisions of the Cavalry and was probably the best combination of armour, firepower and mobility prior to the appearance of the German PzKpfw IV Ausf. F2 and the Soviet T-34. The SOUMA S35 had a long 47 mm gun that could kill any tank then in service, as well as heavy cast armour and good speed. The French Char B main battle tank was also a formidable heavy tank, with cast and riveted armour, the same long 47 mm gun as the S 35, and in addition a hull-mounted 75 mm howitzer. All Char Bs were equipped with radios and the tank was nearly invulnerable to most tank guns and towed antitank guns.
Arguably the best tank of the 1930’s, the SOMUA S35
In general, French tanks of the 1930s were well-armoured, innovative vehicles that owed little to foreign designs. However, the light tanks lacked firepower and almost all French tanks were crippled by their one-man turrets. Even the vaunted Char B had a commander who was tasked with commanding the vehicle as well as loading and aiming the turret gun. If he were a platoon leader or company commander, he had the additional tasks of controlling his other units. Such a heavy set of tasks was overwhelming, greatly reducing the effectiveness of the tanks.
The lack of radios for the light tanks was not seen as a major drawback, since French doctrine called for slow-paced, deliberate manoeuvers in close conformance to plans: the “Methodical Battle” concept, adopted because wargaming showed it to be superior. The role of small unit leaders was to execute plans, not to take the initiative in combat. This was nearly the opposite of German doctrine, which stressed initiative and decision-making at low command levels (Auftragstaktik). In 1939 a belated effort was made to improve flexibility and increase the number of radios but overall the French general staff failed in defining an effective military doctrine regarding the use of tanks.
In the post, I’ll look more or less briefly at those French tanks in service in 1919 followed by an overview of French tanks from 1919 through to the outbreak of WW2, with an emphasis on those tanks that were produced in reasonably large numbers and thus potentially available for export.
The Char Schneider CA
Schneider, a major French arms producer, took the lead in French tank design and in December 1915 demonstrated a prototype tank based on a Baby Holt tractor to the French Army. Among the onlookers was Colonel Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne — an artilleryman and engineer held in high regard throughout the French army for his technical and tactical expertise. On 12 December 1915 Col. Estienne presented to the High Command a plan for the creation of an armoured force; strong French Army support for tanks would be a constant during the decades to come. For Estienne, the Schneider prototype demonstrated the practicality of using tracked armoured vehicles to move infantry, equipment and cannon over the battlefield.
Général Jean-Baptiste Estienne
Although Schneider’s project had been underway prior to Estienne’s involvement, Estienne’s played a decisive rôle in getting the Schneider tank into production (although actual completion was entrusted to a ministerial bureau headed by General Léon Augustin Jean Marie Mourret, director of the Army automobile service. Mourret did not closely cooperate with Estienne, who was largely excluded from decisions of a technical nature). In February 1916 successful tests were held and the War Ministry ordered the production of four hundred tracteurs-chenilles type Schneider & Cie blindés (“tracked and armoured tractors of the Schneider type”), at a price of 56,000 French francs per vehicle.
To the modern eye, the Schneider CA tank is barely recognizable as a tank, looking much more like an armoured steel box resting on top of a caterpillar tractor. It has no turret, and its inconspicuous main armament is a fortification 75 mm Blockhaus Schneider, placed in a barbette in the right front corner of the tank. The right side had been chosen because the gunner had to stand to the left of the barrel to operate the gun. The cannon type was developed from a 75 mm trench mortar adapted to fire from a fixed fortification position by adding a recoil compensator and a gun shield. This short-barrelled cannon had a length of just 9.5 calibres and fired the standard French HE Model 1915 75 mm shell with a reduced propelling charge, shortening the length of the round from 350 to 241 millimetres and giving a muzzle velocity of only two hundred metres per second.
Schneider CA Tank
While this limited the maximum range to 2,200 metres, the practical range was only 600 metres and the tank needed to close within 200 metres of a target to allow for precision shooting. The gun had a traverse of 60°, a depression of -10° and an elevation of 30°. The ammunition stock was 90 vertically stowed rounds. To the right of the cannon there is a bin for 20 readily accessible 75 mm rounds. Three other ammunition bins were positioned respectively at the extreme right rear corner (14), to the left of the engine (32) and at the left rear corner (24). Two 8 mm Hotchkiss Model 1914 machine guns projected from the flanks in large hemispherical ballmounts. The right machine gun was, because of the room needed for the main gun, positioned more to the rear than the left one. The machine guns could traverse 106°, had a depression of -45° and an elevation of 20°. A bin at the extreme left corner held 4,000 rounds of 8 mm ammunition but in practice fifty belts with ninety-six rounds each were carried, for a total of 4800 rounds.
Another unusual feature is the slanted overhang of the frontal part of the chassis which has the form of a pointed nose, ending in a high obliquely protruding steel spur. It had been designed for cutting through and crushing down German barbed wire, thus opening passages for following French infantry, originally seen as the primary function of the Schneider CA. This long overhang caused the tank to ditch itself readily. The design is of the so-called “box tank” type, in which the crew, propulsion system and all manner of equipment were not clearly separated. As a result there is no real fighting compartment. The space available to the crew, illuminated by three small electric lights, was entered through a double door at the back of the tank and is extremely cramped. The crew consisted of a commanding officer who was also the driver; an NCO who was the main gunner, two machine gunners, a loader who assisted with both the cannon and the machine guns and a mechanic who doubled as a machine gun loader.
Four of these six men had to crouch inside a 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) high space between the roof and the tank’s floor. They then had to stand within two narrow troughs, one, behind the driver’s seat, used by the gunner and a second square one more to the back, between the suspension elements, used by the cannon loader and the two machine gunners. Most of the space however, had a height of just three feet between the roof and the covering of transmission and suspension: if the mechanic wanted to assist the right machine gun, he had to lie on his belly to load it. Each Schneider tank team also included three riflemen who functioned as and outside crew; during battle they accompanied the vehicle. All-around protection was provided by 11.4 mm steel plate, later improved by a spaced armour of 5.4/5.5 mm, raising the weight from 12.5 to 13.5 tonnes. The roof had 5.5 mm armour. The plates are partly riveted; the superstructure is largely bolted.
Space was confined within the interior of the Schneider CA-1
The 60 hp Schneider gasoline engine and its radiator were located in the front part of the tank, to the immediate left of the driver. The four cylinder engine was specially constructed for the Schneider CA with a maximum output of sixty horsepower at 1,000 rpm. The tank’s official top speed was only 8.1 km/h and the practical terrain speed was even lower at 2 to 4 km/h. Two fuel gravity-feed reservoirs placed above the engine below the right front roof and nose plate had a total capacity of 145 litres, giving a practical range of about 50 kilometres, though the official range was 80 kilometres. Steering was generally very tiring and there was a tendency to jump out of gear when the clutch was engaged too forcefully.
As the traverse of the main gun was limited, it had first to be pointed in the general direction of the target by the driver-commander swivelling the entire vehicle. To facilitate this, a small rectangular frame is fitted on the right side of the nose of the tank. Looking through it, the driver had a sightline parallel to that of the cannon in a neutral position. In practice, the commander had a too limited view of his surroundings through the small hatches to his left, front and right and had to resort to lifting his head out of his rectangular top hatch to observe the enemy. Small rectangular hatches, fitted with a vision slit, were positioned to the front of each machine-gun. The main ventilation was provided by a large skylight slit running along the midline of the hull. It is doubly roofed with the lower roof having a second slit in its top, while the higher roof has open lower sides, creating oblique oblong ventilation channels through which fresh air can be sucked in from the outside. The top roof is the highest element of the vehicle. With later production vehicles, polluted air was removed through a broad ventilation grid in the nose, having a recessed armour plate below it. To the left and the right of the skylight roof rectangular escape hatches are present in the hull top.
Schneider tanks, here with the later cross-hatched camouflage, were mostly transported by rail
Schneider CA’s in Battle
By January 1917, 32 Schenider’s had been delivered from the order of 400 for which delivery had been contracted to for November 1916. By January 1917 production had picked up to 3 to 4 units per day and by 1 June, 322 Schenider tanks had been delivered. During production, the Schneider’s design was gradually and progressively improved, which caused further delays. Starting from July 1916, tank crews began to be trained, many of these men were volunteers. Their first instruction consisting of the basics of maintenance and a lot of driver training with an emphasis on crossing trenches, avoiding shell craters and running down trees and walls. Because at first no actual Schneider vehicles were available, Holt tractors were used instead. The training camps that were set up included tank workshops and 64 Schneiders were allocated purerly for training purposes and to limit the wear on combat vehicles.
Char d’assaut Schneider C.A.1
The French Army did not intend to create an independent tank force; the tank units would be part of the Artillery Arm. Each group consisted of four batteries, each battery again of four tanks. This would have resulted in a total of sixteen tanks and indeed this was the official organic strength of an AS, but the fourth battery was normally a depot unit, intended to provide replacement vehicles and crews for the other three batteries. It had an official allotment of three tanks and the total matériel strength of an AS was thus fifteen. Actual operational strength varied wildly, due to frequent breakdowns. The personnel strength consisted of twelve officers — each commanding a tank of the three regular batteries — sixteen NCOs and 110 men of lower rank. In practice often four batteries of three tanks were fielded, to allow for a greater tactical flexibility.
Estienne had hoped to create a powerful and large striking force before committing his tanks to battle. He had strongly disapproved of the, in his eyes premature, British use of tanks in September 1916, just two months after first deliveries of the Mark I. However, political circumstances would compel him to deploy the Artillerie Spéciale before it was at full strength or adequately trained. On the morning of 16 April 1917 the Nivelle Offensive was launched with a heavy commitment of Schneider tanks, with Berry-au-Bac being their first major engagement. The Schneiders penetrated several miles but lost their accompanying infantry and had their numbers whittled down before withdrawing, in the process of which they suffered further losses from artillery fire. Their losses were heavy: 76 of the 128 combat tanks engaged had been lost and many of those lost had burned.
One of the Schneider CA-1 tanks destroyed at Berry-au-Bac
Despite the general failure of the Nivelle Offensive and the ensuing mutinies, the French High Command attempted another offensive in May 1917 at Moulin-de-Laffaux. Tanks were again used, this time in conjunction with an infantry battalion specially trained in combined arms tactics, the 17e Bataillon de Chasseurs à Pied. Coordination with the artillery was improved by attaching a special observation plane, protected by six SPAD VII fighters, whose task was to identify German antitank-batteries and have them destroyed by counterbattery fire; it also had to report the position of the tanks to higher command levels.
Crew posing with their Schneider Tank
While most of the attacks of the offensive were failures, the tank attack on Moulin-de-Laffaux largely attained its objectives. The Schneiders, advancing not in column but “line abreast”, exploited the initial infantry conquest of the first trench by crossing the second and then assisted the foot soldiers in heavy and fluid battles with counterattacking German reserves. Eventually most tanks broke down and had to be left behind by the advancing infantry. The Schneiders had made a good account of themselves. Of thirty-three tanks engaged only five were destroyed. Here we can see the early evolution of modern combined arms warfare, driven by practical lessons rather than theory.
The French High Command considered launching a large-scale summer offensives in 1918, benefiting from a grown number of AFVs. At this point of the war, less than a year after their first employment, the Schneider tanks were already considered obsolete. They nevertheless still formed an essential part of the French tank force with 245 operational in March 1918 and they continued to be used in the ongoing fighting as the German offensives of 1918 were held. By August 1918 only 50 Schneiders were operational, with losses not being replaced.
Schneider CA’s after the First World War
Even before the end of the war, on 6 October 1918 Estienne had proposed to phase out all Schneider tanks from operational units, remove their armament and deploy them as instruction and recovery vehicles. By the end of 1918, all surviving Schneider tanks had been designated utility vehicles. Some of the serviceable Schneiders were rebuilt as recovery vehicles and tank transporters serving with Renault FT units. Some Schneider’s also found their way into the Italian Army in the summer of 1918 and to Spain in 1921 where they fought in the Rif War, as part of a joint French-Spanish effort to subdue the self-declared Rif Republic. They reached Morocco on 28 February 1922 and in September 1925 they took part in the large scale amphibious landings in the bay of Al Hoceima. The Schneider tanks saw action until May 1926, returning to Spain in 1929, not having lost a single vehicle. In Spain, due to their poor mechanical state, they were delegated to a reserve status and used as training and instruction vehicles.
A single Spanish Republican Schneider CA-1 was used against the Alcazar in Toledo
On the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, one unit remained under Republican command, while the second took the side of the Nationalists. The Madrid vehicles saw some action during the bloody attacks on the Cuartel de la Montaña, the main military barracks of the capital. Some of the tanks were manned by militia members of the Unión General de Trabajadores and the Unión de Hermanos Proletarios. Probably all Schneider tanks became inoperational during 1936.
The last surviving Schneider CA-1 is on display at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur.
The only surviving example of the Schneider CA is found at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, and this is also the world’s oldest tank in full running condition. It was donated at the end of WW1 by the French government to the United States of America, was preserved in the Aberdeen Proving Ground Ordnance Museum in Maryland, USA and in 1985 was donated back to France for restoration. The tank’s original four cylinder Schneider gasoline engine and the original transmissions were fully restored to original working condition by the repair teams at the Musée des Blindés.
The Saint-Chamond Tank
The Saint-Chamond was the second French heavy tank of WW1, with some 400 manufactured between April 1917 and July 1918. The Saint-Chamond proved to be an underpowered and fundamentally inadequate design. Its principal weakness was the “caterpillar” tracks, which were far too short in relation to the vehicle’s length and heavy weight (23 tons). Later models attempted to rectify some of the tank’s original flaws by installing wider and stronger track shoes, thicker frontal armor and installing a more effective 75mm Mle 1897 field gun. The Saint-Chamond tanks remained engaged in action until late summer 1918, belatedly becoming more effective as combat moved out of the trenches and onto open ground. Eventually, however, the Saint-Chamond tanks were scheduled to be entirely replaced by the newer model British-designed heavy tanks.
Ateliers des Aciéries de la Marine, avant 1906
The origins of the St Chamond lay in commercial rivalry between the the arms manufacturer Forges et Aciéries de la Marine et d’Homécourt aka “FAMH” and Schneider. FAMH was given an order for 400 tanks by the French government and intended to build a tank that would be similar to the Schneider. However, Eugène Brillié, the designer of the Schneider tank, refused to share his patents for free and FAMH refused to pay. Unable to replicate certain patented details of the new Schneider tank, FAMH developed its own proprietary design: the “Char Saint-Chamond”. This also gave Saint-Chamond what they consider to be the opportunity to upstage Schneider. They did this by installing a more powerful, full size 75mm field gun plus 4 Hotchkiss machine guns (instead of the 2 machine guns of the Schneider tank).
Saint-Chamond Tanks under construction in the factory
When Colonel Estienne learned that an order for 400 Saint-Chamond tanks had been placed in April 1916, he was at first elated. When it became apparent that they would be of a completely different type, Estienne was shocked and wrote: “I am painfully surprised that an order of this importance has been placed without asking the opinion of the only officer who, at the time, has undertaken a profound study of the technical and military aspects involved and who had brought the supreme commander to the decision to take this path [towards a tank arm].”
The new tank was a cumbersome and underpowered vehicle. It had a large overhanging front compartment with the 75 mm gun protruding from the nose. Within the forward fighting compartment and on the left was the driver, who was also the vehicle commander. On the right, a machine gunner operated the front Hotchkiss machine gun. This machine gunner was also responsible for the breech operation of the 75mm gun, a task he performed after pivoting on his seat to the left. A loader (referred to in some sources as the gunner) adjusted the gun’s elevation, observing the target through a small hatch in the front of the tank, which left him vulnerable to enemy fire. Traversing the 75mm gun required traversing the whole tank, a task performed by the driver. A second fighting compartment at the back held one machine gunner next to the secondary driver’s position, from where the tank could also be driven backwards by the mechanic in an emergency.
Gunner positions in the St-Chamond WWI tank. You can see just how poorly the side machine gun positions were thought out. The gunner has to crouch down in an awkward position. His shin is inches from a sharp corner of the arch over the tracks. The heat and noise from the engine, located a foot or two away, must have been unbearable.
Between those two compartments the gasoline engine and the electric generator were positioned in the open. Narrow passageways on both sides of the engine connected the front and rear compartments. The passageways also held Hotchkiss positions, one on each side in front of the engine. The Saint-Chamond had 4 Hotchkiss M1914 machine gun positions: one at the front, one at the back and one on each side of the tank. Despite weighing 23 tons, the tank could manage a top speed of 12 km/h. This speed was seldom achieved in the field as the long nose was prone to dig into the ground. The relatively high maximum speed on flat ground was made possible by the “Crochat Collardeau” transmission which coupled a Panhard-Levassor 4 cylinders 90HP sleeve-valve gasoline engine to an electric generator. The generator was connected to two separate electric motors, one for each track.
Due to its short tracks and over-extended body, the vehicle experienced major difficulties in crossing trenches and overcoming obstacles.
Due to its short tracks and over-extended body, the vehicle experienced major difficulties in crossing trenches and overcoming obstacles. This led to such a negative reaction by the crews in training that a special mention was passed on to General Headquarters: Nobody wanted to serve on the Saint-Chamond. Second Lieutenant de Gouyon, principal Saint-Chamond driving instructor at Marly, publicly declared that it had become virtually impossible for him to continue and, since he was a Member of Parliament, he requested that the whole matter be placed on the next parliamentary agenda.
The Improved Saint-Chamond tanks of 1918
The Saint-Chamond was the second French heavy tank of the First World War. Born of the commercial rivalry with the makers of the Schneider CA1, the Saint-Chamond was an inadequate design. Four hundred Saint-Chamond tanks were manufactured but most of them were destroyed in action.
Originally the crew of nine men was protected by 11 mm of steel armour on the sloping front and 17mm on the sides. An extra layer of spaced 8.5 mm armour was added to the front to improve protection. Beginning with the 151st tank, the roof was also redesigned with a double slope so that satchel charges and grenades would slide off. At the same time, the original two observation turrets in front and on top were done away with and replaced by a single low profile square turret permitting front and side vision by the tank’s driver/commander. The tracks were also widened from 324 mm to 412 mm to lower their ground pressure. After Saint-Chamond tank No 210 the more effective Model 1897 field gun was installed instead of Rimailho’s (profitable) 75mm Saint-Chamond gun.
Battle-damaged Saint Chamond. Note the badly damaged roof.
At about the same time barrel-like rollers were added underneath the front and rear of the tank to help crossing trenches. This improved version was later called, unofficially, the Modèle 18. Production slowed down in March 1918, after 377 had been assembled, and ceased completely in July 1918. Initially, forty eight Saint-Chamond tanks were modified as supply and recovery vehicles that could tow the lighter Schneider tanks. Their first action as a fighting vehicle took place at Laffaux Mill on May 5, 1917. During the summer of 1918, as combat moved from the trenches into the open, the Saint-Chamond’s were used to engage German field gun batteries (Nahkampfbatterien) at a distance with their 75mm cannon. The Saint-Chamond proved reasonably effective in this specialist assault gun role. The Saint-Chamond’s final engagement in battle took place in early October 1918, in support of the U.S. First Division near Montfaucon. However, by that time, the Renault FT tank had successfully taken over the major role in the French tank force and had also been purchased by the American Expeditionary Forces in France. After the war 54 were rebuilt as ammunition carriers. The remainder were scrapped.
Saint Chamond ammunition carrier (early)
The last Saint-Chamond tank remaining in existence ( an improved mid-1918 model ), alongside other French tanks of World War I (Schneider CA1 and Renault FT), is preserved at the Musée des Blindés at Saumur, France. It survived, together with a Schneider CA1 tank of the same vintage, at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds Ordnance Museum in Maryland, USA, and was later donated by the U.S. to the French government. Although very well preserved at the Musee des Blindes, this unique Saint-Chamond tank could not be fully restored due to the irreversibly degraded conditions of the two electric motors and of the electric generator.
Industrial Rivalry
Industrial rivalry had played a detrimental role in the design of French Tanks. The heavy Char St Chamond emerged from industrial lobbying of the government, rather than being ordered by the Army. Industrial initiative however also led to swift advances. Some in the French army had lobbied for the alternative mass production of super-heavy tanks, the resultant gigantic Char 2C, the most complex and technologically advanced tank of its day, was the outcome of this. Only ten were eventually produced, and these were far too late to participate in World War. The Char 2C would be the first tank with a three-man turret; the heaviest tank to enter service until late in WW2 and is still the largest ever operational tank.
French tank from the Groupe D’Artillerie Spéciale at Berry-au-Bac, at the opening of the Nivelle Offensive in April 1917
French production initially lagged well behind the British. After August 1916 however, British tank manufacture was temporarily halted while better designs were completed, allowing the French to overtake their allies in numbers at least. During the Nivelle offensive of April 1917, the first use in battle of the French Tanks, the French Army had four times more tanks available that the British.
This numerical superiority was brief however as the French offensive was a major failure; the Schneiders were badly deployed and they suffered large losses from German artillery. The Saint-Chamond tanks, first deployed on 5 May 1917, proved to be so badly designed that they were unable to cross the first line of the German trenches. Not an auspicious start.
The Renault FT 17
We’ve already taken a look at the Renault FT-17 – this tank had a long life and saw use in WWII and even later in Indochina. It was utilised as far away as in China, during the Chinese Civil Wars, and versions of the tank were used both against and by the Japanese during the invasion of China. A large number found their way into both Republican and Nationalist hands during the Spanish Civil War. They were used in the Russian Revolution by both the Bolsheviks and the White Russians. France exported the FT 17 right up to World War II. The design was also developed by the Italians as the Fiat 3000 and the USSR as the T-18. The last known combat action by the Renault FT was in Afghanistan in the 1980’s when a handful of the tanks were used as static pill boxes or roadblocks.
On 20 October, the Afghan Defence Ministry officially handed over the historic vehicle to Polish Ambassador in Kabul Piotr Łukasiewicz. The Russians probably seized the tank during the 1920 war, and presented it as a gift to the then Afghan emir in 1923.
Remnants of equipment from many other countries lie in ruins scattered across the Afghanistan landscape, faint traces of the military equipment of many countries whuh has made its way to this remote land. Many of the items are still being used, but much also litters the sides of the roads and decorates various junkyards. Amongst these remnants were Four old renault FT-17’s, two of which lay disassembled and rusting in a junkyard in Kabul whilst another sat on a plinth on display. These four Renault FT17’s given as a gift by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan in 1923. They had been captured in the Battle of Równe, on 5 July 1920…after being abandoned by the Polish forces. The two tanks in the junkyard have now been shipped to the US whilst the third (photo above) has been given to Poland as of 20 October 2012. The Polish Embassy in Kabul transported the tank to the Bagram base and handed it over to the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan frm where it was transferred to Poland by the Operational Command and the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate. The Renault FT-17 will be renovated by Stefan Czarniecki Land Forces Training Centre in Poznan. According to President Bronislaw Komorowski’s decision, the tank will be put on public display as a valuable reminder of the 1920 Polish-Soviet war.
The FT-17 was one of the success stories of the First World War. The small tank was mechanically reliable after some initial teething problems. Owing to it’s size and narrow body, it was a relatively hard target for German artillerymen. But the standout feature of the FT-17 was the 360 degree rotating turret, which has been the mainstay of tank designs ever since. The version in the foreground is a wireless or command tank.
In battle in 1918, the Renault FT’s proved their worth immediately. They proved themselves technically also, continuing to perform in sustained operations with minimal technical support – miraculous by WW1 standards. The Soissons offensive of July 1918 saw the Renault’s in the vanguard of the attack and also showed the offensive power of tanks. The most significant tactical problem was the continued lack of sufficient tank-infantry training and as the atnks themselves were only good for a few dozen hours of operation before they required an overhaul, training was limited.
The major killers of the Renault’s in battle proved to be artillery, the anti-tank trench (and large shell craters) and mechanical problems. Mines were also a threat, although not many Renault’s were destroyed by these. Bridging tanks were, by the end of WW1, already being used as a solution to the anti-tank trenches. By late 1918, attacks were not necessarily being preceded by heavy artillery bombardments since the resulting craters were obstacles to the passage of the tanks. In the final offensives of September-October 1918, the Renaults enabled the French infantry to return to the fight, the poilus no longer faced the machine-guns alone. They were able to advance behind the tanks, watching as the machinegun nests were smashed and overrun by the tanks. There was no grand victory, but these battles heralded the end of trench warfare.
Although many were sold to other nations, over 2,800 Renault FT-17’s remained with the French Army. In contrast to the United Kingdom, which greatly reduced its armoured forces and scrapped redundant AFVs after the war, France continued to maintain a large number of active or reserve armoured units (with an organic tank strength of about 1,260 tanks) and all of the remaining Renault FTs were at least kept in working order.
The last of the French WW1 Tanks – the Char 2C
The Char 2C was the last of the French tanks developed during WW1 and was a “super-heavy” tank. In physical dimensions it was the largest operational tank ever built – the next operational tank to even approach its weight would be the German Tiger II tank of WW2. Ten were eventually built and entered service, remaining in use up until WW2, when they were activated during the French mobilization.
The Char 2C was intended as a breakthrough tank or “Fortress Tank” (Char de forteresse), intended to lead the great Allied offensives that were planned for the spring of 1919. France planned to produce 300, but only 10 were ever built. This monster had a crew of 12, weighed some 152,100 pounds, and was powered by two Maybach or Daimler Benz 250-hp gasoline engines. It had a speed of 7.5 mph. The Char 2C had maximum 45mm armor and was armed with a turreted 75mm gun (later a 155mm) and four machine guns.
The origins of the Char 2C have always been shrouded in mystery. In the summer of 1916, General Mourret, the Subsecretary of Artillery, verbally granted Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM), a shipyard in the south of France near Toulon, a contract for the development of a heavy tank, a char d’assaut de grand modèle. At the time, French industry was very active in lobbying for defence orders, using their connections with high-placed officials and officers to obtain commissions; development contracts could be very profitable even when not resulting in actual production, as they were fully paid for by the state. The French Army had no stated requirement for a heavy tank, and there was no official policy to procure one so the decision seems to have been taken solely on his personal authority, for reasons we can now only surmise.
The reason he later gave was that the British tanks then in development seemed to be better devised as regarded lay-out, ventilation and fire protection, so awarding a contract to a shipyard might improve on existing French designs. Exact specifications, if they ever existed, have been lost. FCM then largely neglected the project, apart from reaping the financial benefits. At that time all tank projects were highly secret, and therefore well shielded from public scrutiny. This was soon to change, however as, following the British deployment of tanks in battle for the first time, the French people and politicians now became curious as to the state of their own national tank projects. This sudden attention greatly alarmed Mourret, who promptly investigated the progress that had been made at FCM and was shocked to find there there had been none.
Albert Thomas (1878-1932) was a prominent French Socialist and the first Minister of Armament for the French Third Republic during World War I.
On 30 September 1916 he personally took control of the project and even without a design, ordered FCM to build one prototype. This development coincided with a political demand by the Minister of Armament Albert Thomas to produce a tank superior to the British types. Mourret asked Renault for help with the design and with assistance from the Renault team (who had fortuitously already prepared a feasibility study for a heavy tank), a full-size wooden mock-up was quickly constructed. In January 1917 the design was presented to the Consultative Committee of the Assault Artillery, who decided to have two prototypes built. By December 1917 the first prototype, the FCM 1A, was ready.
Mourret had by now been replaced as head of the commission by Estienne, whose good friend General Philippe Pétain, the new High Commander of the French Army, asked him to use his position to end the project. Estienne told Pétain that this was ill-advised while the public was questioning why these heavy tanks had not been produced. Besides, the allies (specifically the British and the US) would consent to give France 700 of the new Mark VIII Liberty design only if France had made at least a token effort to produce its own heavy tanks. Thus the French authorities had to delay the project while outwardly endorsing it. Estienne had already set this course by choosing the heaviest version, the “C”, for production, requiring a completely new prototype, causing a considerable delay. Pétain then demanded unreasonably high production numbers, asking for 300 heavy tanks to be ready for March 1919, thus delaying planning and initiating a political row, causing a quarrel to erupt between Clemenceau, who was both Prime-Minister and Minister of War, and Louis Loucheur, the Minister of Armament, who believed it impossible to provide the labour and steel required.
The Char 2C’s under construction at FCM
Meanwhile, Estienne and Pétain complicated the issue with further demands. Pétain asked for special pontoons while Estienne demanded battering rams and electronic mine detectors. When WW1 ended, not a single Char 2C had been built. The production order for the Char 2C was cancelled. However, despite the end of hostilities, strong political pressure to adopt new heavy tank projects remained as there was now a considerable surplus capacity in French industry. The Direction de l’Artillerie d’Assaut thus decided in April 1919 to procure ten Char 2Cs and to simultaneously use this order as an argument to reject any further projects. The Char 2C prototype was finished together with the other nine tanks being built; all ten were delivered in 1921 although modifications by the factory continued until 1923. They would be the last French tanks to be produced for the home market until the Char D1 pre-series of 1931.
The Char 2C had a loaded weight of 69 tonnes, partly because of its armour – 45 mm at the front, 22 mm at the sides, but much of it just because of its huge size. The armour was among the thickest of World War I-era tanks, though by modern standards this would be considered thin (The 40mm armor plating was substantial in 1918, but much less so by 1940 particularly when combined with the gigantic target the tank presented). With the tail fitted, the hull was over twelve metres long. Within its ample frame there was room for four compartments: a relatively short drivers compartment at the front, a fighting compartment with a 3-man turret (the first such in history) at its top mounting a long 75mm gun, a larger munitions room and finally a large engine compartment at the rear and a rear fighting compartment topped by a machine gun turret. Both turrets had stroboscopic cupolas. The three independent 8 mm machine gun positions at the front gave protection against infantry assault.
Char 2c with 12 crew members, 13th is likely the Company Commander
The fighting compartments were connected by the engine room. Each track was powered by its own 200 or 250 hp engine, via an electrical transmission. The original engines were German-made Mercedes diesels, later replaced by Maybach models, all of them part of the war reparations taken by France following the Great War. Mechanical reliability remained low: The German manufacturers were reluctant to provide spare parts, and may have given the French defective engines. Patriotic French mechanics disliked working on German-made equipment, with more than one man demanding a transfer. As a result, no more than six of the 10 tanks were ever fully operational at the same time, while the enormous fuel consumption made Army accountants reluctant to authorize their use for training.
Tank Number 91, named “Provence,” on its special rail car
The tank had been designed with a comparatively narrow width to make it transportable by rail, but loading the 2C aboard a specially-built flatcar was a difficult and time-consuming task. That cumbersome rail-transport process would eventually prove the undoing of the 2C. Top speed was 15 km/h. Seven fuel tanks, containing 1,260 litres, gave it a range of 150 kilometres. The suspension contained 39 interleaving road wheels on each side, making for a total of 90 wheels on the tank. To man the tank required a crew of twelve: driver, commander, gunner, loader, four machine gunners, mechanic, electrician, assistant-electrician / mechanic and a radio operator. Some sources report thirteen men, probably due to pictures of the crews that included the company commander.
Much attention had been given to ergonomics, Mourret’s stated motive in having the tank designed by a shipyard. The vehicle was less cramped than earlier designs, the crew being able to more or less walk around inside the hull. The mechanic could access the engine from either side. The commander could communicate with the driver, the front machine-gunner and the mechanic via speaking tubes. External communications were the responsibility of the mechanic who could lift a little hatche just behind the turret to signal by fanions, pyrotechnic devices or electrical lights. The tank could be entered through the cupola, but each crew member also had oval or round escape hatches above and below him.
The Normandie #97 with skid tail in place, in maneuvers. Note the difference in size with Renault R-35
Each track was powered by its own 200 or 250 hp engine, via an electrical transmission. Top speed was 15 km/h. Seven fuel tanks, containing 1,260 litres, gave it a range of 150 kilometres. The suspension contained 39 interleaving road wheels on each side, making for a total of 90 wheels on the tank. Later, new engines (two Sautter-Harlé engines 6-cyl 250hp/each) were fitted and the machine guns in the side positions were deleted. In this configuration the tank weighed perhaps 74 tons. Between 15 November and 15 December 1939 the Lorraine, as the company command tank, was experimentally up-armoured at the Société des Aciéries d’Homecourt to make it immune to standard German antitank guns. The front armour was enhanced to 90 mm, the side to 65 mm. In this configuration, weighing about 75 tons, the Lorraine had at that time the thickest armour of any operational tank, and is probably still the heaviest operational tank ever.
Champagne #99. Notice the cammo…
Bretagne #94 coming out of a creek, spraying mud and water.
Tank number 96, named “Anjou,” could not be made to run and was written off in September 1939
During the French mobilisation of 1939, all ten were activated and put into their own unit, the 51st Bataillon de Chars de Combat. For propaganda purposes, each tank had been named after one of the ancient regions of France, numbers 90-99 being named Poitou; Provence; Picardie; Alsace; Bretagne; Touraine; Anjou; Lorraine; Berry; Champagne respectively. In 1939, the Lorraine was renamed Normandie. As their main value was in propaganda, the giants were kept carefully out of harm’s way and did not participate in the September 1939 attack on the Siegfried Line. They were used instead for numerous morale-boosting movies, in which they were often shown climbing and crushing old French forts. Their public reputation was of invincible super tanks, the imagined dimensions of which far surpassed the actual particulars.
Tank number 96, named “Anjou” being examined by the Germans
The French commanders knew perfectly well that this reputation was undeserved. When the German Army ripped apart the French lines after 10 June 1940, the decision was made to prevent the capture of the famous tanks. All were to be sent to the south by rail transport. On 15 June the railway on which they were being transported was blocked by a burning fuel train, so it became necessary to destroy the tanks by detonating charges. Later Goebbels and Göring claimed the tanks were hit by German dive bombers. This propaganda lie was to be repeated by many sources. One tank, the Champagne, was nevertheless captured more or less intact and brought to Berlin to be exhibited as a war trophy. In 1948 this tank disappeared, causing many to speculate it still survives at the Russian Tank museum in Kubinka.
Char 2C Number 91
Next, we’ll look at French Tanks of the 1930’s – some of which were considered by Finland as the Finnish Army built up armoured units through the decade of the 1930’s.
French Tanks through the 1930’s
France came out of the First World War with the laurels of a winner and the promise of interesting developments with the little Renault FT, the first mass-produced tank of the modern age. But the vagaries of the Fourth Republic and the choices facing an ageing staff would turn to the creation of a force largely marked by a strong defensive vision, relying mainly on the Maginot Line. French tanks were classified as infantry and cavalry models, with some “chars de rupture” (breakthrough tanks). Production and testing was ongoing in the late twenties and thirties, leading to a new generation of armored vehicles by 1935-36. These formed the bulk of the armored forces of France (then numerically the largest in the world) in September 1939.
As far as tank design was concerned, French engineers came up with various innovative designs of their own. The army – partly because of political issues and spending concentrated on the Maginot Line – was not given a sizable budget before 1932-34. This forced the continued use of the existing obsolescent types, the fleet of Renault FTs and the very few super-heavy FMC-2s. Renault attempted to modernize its best seller (very popular on the export market) while Panhard courted the cavalry with its armored cars. Both tried to implement the Kégresse track system, an innovative design which proved to be more useful on half-tracks. The mass-produced US M2/M3 models of WW2 used a similar system. The French adopted it for the AMC P13 and also for many off-road trucks and gun tractors delivered to the Army.
Casting was incorporated into French tank manufacturing early on, in 1934-35, first for turrets and then for hulls. The Hotchkiss H35, for example, was the first tank to be built entirely by cast sections (the hull needed three sections, the driver’s compartment, fighting compartment and engine bay), which helped standardization for mass-production. Cast parts when welded together allowed for a lighter weight, were less labor-intensive and prevented the risk of spalling. The SOMUA S35 also made use of an entirely cast hull and turret, also with many large prefabricated parts. The Souma S3 design was in fact influential on the US when they decided to build the Sherman M4A1.
French workers assembling tank guns, probably the 75mm Char-B1-bis hull gun?
Other innovative features were more specific, such as the Oleo-pneumatic steering system designed to steer the massive hull of the B1 heavy tank. In this case, the driver was also aiming the main 75 mm (2.95 in) gun. Many other tanks allowed some limited traverse for their hull-mounted gun, compensating for the lack of precision of the standard brake-steering system. French engineers, however, designed a system theoretically giving the greatest possible precision to the driver, allowing accurate traverse. However this system in operation proved too fragile and complex.
French tanks were generally better protected than their German opponents. The reason behind this was their doctrine of use. They were not seen as independent units but were to be spread amongst infantry units so as to offer close support on the battlefield. For this reason strong armor was of capital importance, the speed was “infantry pace” and the low-velocity guns were meant to deal with concrete fortifications and pillboxes rather than with opposing tanks. This doctrine went back to trench warfare and the experiences of WWI. All French tank models, until 1937 at least, were designed for the same kind of operations as practiced in 1918. They were spread out on the battle line, under the command of generals moving little flags on maps, inside a rigid, pyramidal chain of command.
Consequently French tanks were generally slow (with the exception of cavalry tanks like the SOMUA S35 and scout tankettes) and relatively underpowered – and this was not seen as an issue since infantry pace was required. Range was also limited by fuel consumption but the tactical needs were seen as limited in scope to the area of a typical WWI battlefield. A 50-100 km (30-60 mi) area of operations was foreseen. Radio communication between tanks was sorely lacking, with flags and couriers used instead. The common practice in 1935 was that only command tanks possessed a long-range radio.
Demography was also, surprisingly, a critical factor with French tank design. After the Great War, the demographic pyramid was inverted in France and Germany, resulting in a natality gap largely favorable to Germany, which was crucial twenty years later. After 1935 the French were vividly aware of this, a fact that was reflected in the army’s specifications. To cope with the normal provision of tanks per units, and faced with limited manpower, the most viable option seen was to limit tank crews to three men and design the tank around these men.
With more complex requirements, new tank models saw a multiplication of tasks which were not counter-balanced by an increase in crew numbers nor a new turret design. The commander remained isolated in his single-man turret, with the task of commanding, loading and manning the main gun and the coaxial machine-gun, plus sometimes the radio. The driver and a loader/co-gunner/mechanic completed this busy crew. As a result, French tank commanders were task-overloaded and simply couldn’t cope with both other tanks maneuvering around them and dealing with several threats at the same time. This helps explain why French tanks units were decimated despite having better armor. Another issue was the lack of penetrating power of the French guns, the most common being the short APX (Puteaux) 37 mm (1.46 in) designed for infantry support.
Puteaux M 1918 37mm semi-automatic short gun / Canon de 37mm court semi-automatique Puteaux modèle 1918
French logistics were also a weak point. France pioneered their first armoured division, with a combination of tanks, armoured cars, motorised infantry and artillery. It was called the Division Legere Mecanique (DLM – Light Mechanical Division). In the mid 1930s France created to entirely motorised armoured light divisions, that were equipped with the brand-new SOMAU S-35 tank. Although called ‘light’ divisions, they were well-equipped units that were the equivalent of a German Panzer division. They had 300 armoured vehicles, including 190 tanks, mostly medium tanks like the Hotchkiss H35 H39, Renault R35 and the Somau S-35. By the beginning of 1940, there were four of these divisions in the French army. In 1939 the French army formed a heavier armed unit called the Division Cuirassee (DCR). These contained Char B1 heavy tanks and some older Char D2 tanks as the main striking force.
A group of 13.2 mm-armed AMR 35s, belonging to 4e RDP, 1re DLM; the vehicle in front, No. 87347, is the second produced and shows the large rosettes typical of this unit from 1938
While the French had some excellent medium and heavy tanks, the sheer variety of different types caused logistic problems. The French ordnance officers and quartermasters had to make sure that the correct spare parts and ammunition were sent to the right units when needed. This often did not happen. Once war broke out, some tanks were abandoned because of lack of ammunition and lack of the correct parts to mend a broken down tank. The only helpful factor was that the S-35 had the same turret and 47mm SA 35 gun as fitted to the char B1 and D2 tanks. Logistical problems were a major factor in the defeat of the French army. Lack of fuel was a big problem for the tank units when most tanks consumed gallons of fuel per mile. The French 3rd Light Mechanised Division for example was ordered to start a counter-attack on 20 May 1940 alongside British units. They were unable to get into position until the 22nd due to fuel shortages and crew exhaustion. The 3rd DLM could only muster around 60 Somua S35 tanks as they had already lost all their Hotchkiss H35 tanks.
We’ll now go on to look at the French tanks and armoured vehicles of the 1930’s. In doing so, we’ll concentrate on models which were produced in relatively large numbers and which were potentially available for export to Finland. Those vehicles produced in small numbers will by and large be ignored. As France was a supplier of tanks and other armoured vehicles to the Finnish Army in limited quantities both through the 1930’s and in the early part of the Winter War, I’ll also indicate whether a particular model was purchased or given to Finland and in what quantities. This will serve as a prelude to the study of the founding and expansion of the Finnish Armoured Divisions of the Winter War that will end this series of Posts.
Renault Char D-1 – requested 1928 (160 built between 1930-1934)
The French plan of 1926, calling for the creation of a Light Infantry Support Tank, led to the development of the existing Renault NC1 prototype into the Char D1. In 1923 Louis Renault had obtained an order to build two prototypes of a modification to the design of the Renault FT’s, with the factory designation of Renault NC. In 1928 Renault had his Renault NC accepted as a light infantry tank two prototypes ordered. The Army called this project the Char D and ordered a pre-series of ten vehicles in December 1929. The ten hulls were delivered between May and November 1931: an interval of ten years from the delivery of the last Char 2C in 1921. With this order, French tank production for the home market had finally resumed. In testing the prototypes, many shortcomings were identified and the type entered mass production, albeit with some further modifications.
The Char D1’s Renault FT ancestry can be seen in the sloping engine deck and the profile of the side armour plates. For its time the Char D1 was relatively well armoured; the hull weighing 11 metric tons. A 74 hp V-4 6.08 litre engine gave a top speed of 18.6 km/h with a range of 90 kms. The D1 had a crew of three: a driver who, as with the Renault FT, was seated below large double hatches that formed the nose plates, a radio operator who also assisted in the loading of the gun, and a third crew member, the commander, located in the turret. With the turret, the total weight was 14 metric tons with a total vehicle price of 475,000 FF. The Char D1 was thus neither particularly light nor cheap.
Renault Char D1 with ST2 turret in 1936
One hundred and sixty of these tanks were produced between 1931 and 1935. Until 1936 the vehicles were fitted with Renault FT turrets because the intended cast ST2 turrets were not yet ready. The ST2 turret was fitted with a short 47mm SA34 tank gun with a coaxial 7.5mm machine gun. The hull was equipped with a 7.5mm MG in the bow. In 1932 the Char D1 was the most — indeed the only — modern tank available to the French Army and served as France’s major battle tank of the early thirties rather than as an infantry support tank as originally intended.
Renault Char D1
For the regiments receiving the new tank, the D1 proved a grave disappointment. The main reason was its very poor mechanical reliability. In March 1934, when 110 vehicles had been delivered, seventeen were already worn out and had to be returned to the factory for a complete rebuild; of the remaining 93, 62 were non-operational because of major defects. Burn-through of brakes and transmissions was common; the armour plates bent out of shape because the chassis was not stiff enough, rivets regularly snapped. The fundamental cause was that the Renault design team had “solved” the problem of combining low weight with low cost by using weak components of inferior quality steel: other later Renault designs such as the AMR 33, AMC 35 and Char D2 would also suffer from similar problems.
In 1935 a large maintenance program was started to improve the Char D1’s mechanical reliability. However in March 1936 when tank units were rushed to the German border in reaction to the Rhineland Crisis, it became painfully obvious that their poor readiness state had not been rectified. The new ST2 turret only worsened the situation: the glass of the diascopes was shattered by mere driving; there were no AP-rounds available, the munition racks had not been changed to hold the new and larger 47mm rounds. The ST2 turret also proved too small to be adapted to the much more powerful 47 mm SA35 gun. Analysis led the Army to conclude that it should rid itself as soon as possible of the troublesome tank.
The Char D1s were thereafter shipped to the typical destination of French army ordnance that was obsolete but too valuable to be scrapped: the colonies. In 1937 the D1’s were transferred to colonial units in North Africa.
Renault Char D2 – requested 1930 with 100 built 1936 and 1940
While the Renault D1 was still in development, a heavier version was requested the Direction de l’Infanterie on 23 January 1930. This request called for a medium tank (the D1 was a light model) with 40 mm (1.57 in) of armor and a higher top speed (13.67 mph/22 km/h) than the D1, which in turn required a far more powerful engine. Negotiations ended in April-May, Renault also agreeing to build an adapted version for the colonies, the D3. It was also hoped that it could replace the heavy B1 bis if the later would have been banned by an armament reduction treaty in negotiation at that time. However, this never happened, and the D2 soon became a low-priority project and the army greatly reduced the initial order of 750. Two batches of 50 would be eventually delivered by the company, the first in 1936-37 (called model 1935) and the second, much improved, in 1940 (model 1938).
The Renault Char D2 was developed from the Renault D1
Three prototypes were built. The first was the Renault UZ, with a riveted hull and Renault FT turret (April 1932). It was tested at Rueil with the 503e RCC and accepted in service in December 1933. One year earlier, two welded hull prototypes had been ordered and build, to be delivered in November 1933. Nevertheless, the first batch was approved without testing the real production model. This was done in order to partially finance the cost of applying new welding techniques. This building technique proposed by Renault saved weight and time. This was a costly and complex process that Renault had a hard time mastering, and since the production was rushed, problems immediately appeared.
The first 50 D2 tanks manufactured were delivered to the 1st Battalion, 507th RCC (based in the neighborhood of Metz) to replace their D1’s, which were sent to Tunisia
In most respects, the D2 was a slightly enlarged D1, retaining many features of the previous vehicle, like the vertical coil suspension design. The D2 was still narrow, with the turret placed forward, immediately behind the driver’s compartment, and a long, sloped back engine hood. Massive side skirts with mud chutes, similar to the former vehicles, were also retained. Previous experience dictated the return rollers be placed higher to prevent track resonance. The tracks were 35 cm (13.78 in) wide. The suspensions counted three bogies, each with four road wheels, one coil spring and two shock absorbers, per side. The crew was three, the radio operator being seated next to the driver, operating the hull Reibel machine-gun (low, right side). The commander was seated in the turret. As usual in this configuration, he had to operate the gun (loading, aiming and firing), serve the coaxial machine-gun and command the tank at the same time. There was a four-speed gearbox, and four fuel tanks, giving a 100 km (62 mi) range. The D2 could cross a 2.1 m (6.89 ft) wide trench, climb a 80 cm (2.62 ft) obstacle, climb slopes of 45° and ford 120 cm (3.94 ft) deep rivers.
Renault Char D2 with APX1 cast turret
The first batch was approved on 29 December 1934, based on the tests performed with the three prototypes, fitted with gasoline and diesel engines. The gasoline engine was retained. The turret was bought separately from another manufacturer, the Puteaux factory near Paris, and the APX-1 was chosen, a modern, cast turret fitted with a SA-34 short barrel 47 mm gun (1.85 in) (from the same manufacturer) and a coaxial Reibeil 7.5 mm (0.29 in) machine-gun, and a hemispheric observation cupola. As usual, the commander could sit partly outside on a rear turret hatch. The turret cost was 200,000 frs, which when added to the cost of the hull (410,000 frs apiece) raised the unit cost to 610,000 frs. The first units from the batch were delivered in May 1935, the last in February 1937. The SA-34 had limited antitank capabilities. It was supplied with HE shells (obus D, muzzle velocity of 490 m/s / 1607 ft/s), and AP shells (model 1932, muzzle velocity of 480 m/s / 1574 ft/s, piercing only 25 mm/0.98 in at 100 m/328 ft). Two command vehicles were built (chassis 2016 – 2049), equipped with a second ER51 long range set.
The second batch was ordered in June 1938, (despite alarming tests reporting balance unreliability) following Renault’s assurance that they could produce two hundred units a year. However, this proved overoptimistic in the context of 1937-1938, with Renault plagued by general strikes and financial problems. Production was postponed, and there was uncertainty about possible exports to Poland or Belgium, exports which were eventually opposed by the Supreme Commander Maurice Gamelin for fear of technology transfers. The state of the first batch was so poor that their conversion into flame-thrower tanks was envisioned, while the unit tanks were to be replaced by newer tanks. When WW2 broke out, Edouard Daladier confirmed mass production of the type, however deliveries were kept low, three to five vehicles per month, so that the entire second batch was not completed until June. The last fifteen were probably not taken in action in time.
Renault Char D2
The second batch was basically identical, mostly differing by the use of a more modern APX-4 turret, bearing a 47 mm (1.85 in) SA-35 long barrel gun, quite effective against tanks. PPLR X 160 episcopes replaced the older Chrétien type, and there was a S 190 G attachment point on the roof for an extra 7.5 mm (0.29 in) AA machine gun. An improved greasing system, modified idler wheels and sprockets, ball bearings, shorter mudguards, a new Vertex distributor and Vlex starter completed this overhaul. At the same time, older vehicles from the first batch received upgraded APX 1A turrets, and were taken over at the Atelier de Rueil for rebuilding – namely to fix all the issues previously known. This process started in March 1940 and continued until May 1940. At the same time, the flame-thrower project was maintained but never carried out despite a prototype being built in 1939.
The D2 was plagued by mechanical unreliability and quickly worn-out, a problem further aggravated by the lack of spare parts. The D2 also proved ill-adapted to snow conditions.
Renault AMR 33 (123 built between 1933 and 1936)
In 1931 the French cavalry arm needed a fast vehicle for forward reconnaissance missions. Renault, eager to be ready for the upcoming specifications, quickly completed the design for a very small and light vehicle by November 1931. This first Tracteur léger de cavalerie type VM was equipped with Carden-Loyd suspension (copied without a licence), was lightly armored and equipped only with a single machine-gun. On January 16, 1932, the specification came in, calling for a three-ton light reconnaissance tracked vehicle armed with a machine gun and with a range of 200 km (124.27 mi), to be called “Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance”, abbreviated as AMR, since the Cavalry was forbidden by law to have tanks. For the army this was a skirmishing, radio-less vehicle rather than a pure recon vehicle, like the AMDs (Automitrailleuse de Découverte).
Renault AMR 33
Renault meanwhile had completed its prototype, based on the Renault UE and showing impressive performance. It had excellent off-road capabilities and could cruise at 50 km/h (31 mph) and could reach 35-40 km/h (21.74-24.85 mph) on bad terrain. This prototype was rejected as too cramped for operational use. Ten days later, officers from the Section Technique de la Cavalerie approached Renault to design a tankette based on the AMR concept. The General HQ commander, General Maxime Weygand, eventually agreed to the type. Renault then quickly returned to the drawing board and presented a larger wooden mock-up in March 1932. On April 20 1932 an order for 5 prototypes was signed, with a deadline of the Champagne maneuvers in September 1933. Each of the prototypes was delivered on schedule, testing different suspension configurations, all based on the Carden-Loyd type. These prototypes were equipped with one of Renault’s most powerful, already available, commercial engines, the 6-cylinder Reinastella, also used on the luxury sedan of the same name.
AMR 33 Design
By weight and dimensions the AMR 33 was first considered as a light tank, not a tankette, but that was before the appearance of the much heavier Hotchkiss 35, Renault 35 and FCM-36 tanks. By all other standards, the AMR 33’s were tankettes. First of all, they were small with a very low profile. Their suspension was largely “inspired” by (copied from) the Carden-Loyd design. The empty hull weighed just 4.5 tons, the armor was only 13 mm (0.51 in) thick and was made from riveted plates which supposedly protected the crew from heavy machine guns . The engine fitted was another commercial model, the eight-cylinder 84 hp 4241 cc Renault Nervasport. This powerful engine combined with the lightweight hull allowed for speeds in excess of 60 km/h (37 mph) on flat ground, and 47 km/h (28 mph) off-road. There was a Cleveland differential and a 4 forward, 1 reverse gearbox. The main fuel tank contained 128 liters (33.81 gal), giving a 225 km (139 mi) range. The tracks were narrow, as was customary for tankettes, at just 22 cm (8.66 in) width. The AMR 33 could ford 60 cm (1.96 ft) deep rivers, cross 1.4 m (4.59 ft) wide trenches, climb a 45 cm (1.47 ft) high obstacle or a 50° slope.
Renault AMR 33
The armor was well sloped at the front glacis (9 mm/0.35 in), 13 mm (0.51 in) thick on the vertical plates, 6 mm (0.23) on the top and 5 mm (0.19 in) on the bottom. The driver sat on the left, next to the engine, seeing through a large opening protected by a lifting hatch pierced by a vision slit. The engine could be accessed through a hatch on the right, and crew entered the vehicle through the rear two-piece door. The turret was also on the left, with the commander inside, provided with a top observation hatch (and not a rear hatch as was customary in French tanks). The turret was of the Renault type. Initially a Schneider cast one was preferred, but found to be too expensive. The Renault type, made of sloped riveted plates was lighter and easier to build. This AVIS turret had been designed by the Atelier de Vincennes and was shifted slightly to the front to improve visibility. The compact Reibel 7.5 mm (0.29 in) machine-gun was a fortress model, comparable to the British-Czech Besa. There was however an optional pedestal mount, adjusted on top of the turret for an extra AA machine gun.
AMR 33 Trials and production
Défilé de Renault AMR 33. C’était un des chars de reconnaissance français les plus répandus.
The Renault prototypes were tested in real and large scale exercises with the first operational French cavalry unit, the Détachement Mécanique de Sûreté. However the Commission de Vincennes charged to test them, although finding their speed sufficient enough, was not so positive about their weight and range. In April 1933, new tests were performed with two tankettes fitted with dead weight mimicking extra armor. One had a horizontal rubber spring suspension, the other a central vertical spring and casings of the horizontal springs oil-filled to act as dampers. Renault preferred the first, but the Army choose the second (with dire consequences), and approved this version for productionon the 6th of June 1933 as the Renault AMR modèle 1933.
The first order of 45 units was issued by the Cavalry Corps as early as March 1933. A second order of twenty was put through on June 22nd, with deliveries being scheduled for July. Finally a third order for fifty was placed in August. However production proved difficult at first and finally the deliveries began in June 1934 and ended in September. Two machines were completely rebuilt to produce a new improved model, the AMR-35. To compensate, three others were built in the spring of 1935. Indeed the flaws quickly detected on the model 33 put an end to further developments. The AMR-35 was much more successful. The first problem was excessive vibrations and noise caused by the engine. Compartmentalization was poor and there no intercom nor radio. But moreover, the suspensions, initially designed for far lighter models proved far too too weak for the task, broke down, broke off, or literally fell to pieces in prolonged off-road rides.
The AMR 33 in action
AMR 33’s on the move
At the beginning their operational concept called for a mass of light tanks preceding the medium types, but since in the meantime mediums were produced in sufficient numbers and the AMR 33s saw themselves quickly replaced by the AMR-35, their role shifted towards infantry and dismounted cavalry support. By 1934, 115 vehicles has been delivered so far, and spread among five cavalry divisions, in GAM (Groupe d’Automitrailleuses) units comprising three platoons of four, two reserve/training, and one command model. However the 5th DC received only ten and the 4th DC forty. It was composed then of the 4th BPC (Bataillon de Dragons Portés) and 18e Dragons.
By 1935, the 4e DC was converted into a fully armored division, at first with six full squadrons of AMR 33s and later reinforced with medium tanks. At the end, the 1 DLM and 2 DLM (Division légères Mécaniques) formed the core of these new divisions in case of war. However by 1937, the mechanical unreliability of the AMR 33 was notorious and all had been replaced by the AMR-35. The AMR 33s were concentrated in remaining RAMs (Régiment d’Automitailleuses) forming light divisions of 46 vehicles.
Knocked out French Army AMR 33
However, these were reorganized once again between September 1939 and May 1940 into five newly-formed Divisions Légères de Cavalerie (“Light Cavalry Divisions”). However their organic strength was still poor, ranging from 26 to 22 per DLC, and this was proven during the battle of France. They had been posted in the Ardennes sector and found themselves badly prepared to stop the German advance, only participating in skirmishes, covering actions and support actions for the infantry, but proved easy prey for the Panzer II and many armored cars equipped with the same 20 mm (0.78 in) gun.
The losses were appalling. An AMR 33 of the 3rd DLC was the first French tank destroyed in battle, but most of the 75% losses occurred due to breakdowns issues rather than enemy fire. On June 7, 1940, the 7e DLM was created of surviving vehicles and some reserves, having 14 AMRs in total. Most were lost. After the armistice, the Germans captured a handful of these models, renamed Panzerspähwagen VM 701 (f). They never left French soil and were probably kept for patrolling and anti-partisan activity. A single AMR 33 has survived to this day. It is on static display at the Saumur tank museum in France.
Hotchkiss H35/39 – (1200 built from 1935 to 1940)
Renault and Schneider had been long time manufacturers of French tanks. Hotchkiss (Société Anonyme des Anciens Etablissements Hotchkiss et Cie), founded in 1875 near St Denis (Paris) by Benjamin B. Hotchkiss, an American engineer, was a newcomer in this field in the 1930’s, although already well known by the army for its world-famous machine-guns, cars and transmissions (the Hotchkiss drive). The Hotchkiss H35 Tank was a private design in response to a 1926 specification for a light, cheap infantry tank (or Char d’accompagnement). A proposal was made in June 1933 showing some innovations, including a steel hull cast in sections. It was also theoretically cheaper and lighter than the Renault D2 and was initially selected by the army’s Conseil Consultatif de l’Armement. The final specification (issued on the 2nd of August 1933) asked for a 6-ton tank, uniformly protected by 30 mm (1.18 in) of armor.
French Hotchkiss H35 tanks on parade
Hotchkiss was not the only bidder against this specification. Renault quickly entered the fray, being the first to deliver its prototype, which would be accepted as the Renault R35. However, the first prototype Hotchkiss demonstrated to Colonel Keller of the Commission of Vincennes, was a machine-gun armed tankette, tested in March 1935 and followed by another identical vehicle in May. Both were rejected because the initial specification had been changed in the meantime and was now asking for 40 mm (1.57 in) of armor. In August 1935, a third and last prototype was delivered, with a brand new cast steel hull and an APX-R (Puteaux) cast turret fitted with a 37 mm (1.46 in) short barrelled gun. The proposal was accepted in November 1935 as the Hotchkiss H35 and an order for 200 machines promptly.
Production started mid-1936 and by September 1936 the first series of H35’s were being delivered and heavily tested. However their cross-country capabilities had been overestimated. They were badly balanced and gave quite bumpy ride, which was potentially dangerous in formation, particularly when firing on the move. The power-to-weight ratio was also insufficient. Therefore, the Army turned them down. But as the initial order could not be cancelled for fear of a political upheaval, the Cavalry, already interested because of the slow deliveries of the costly Somua S35, decided to take the H35’s instead.
Production was interrupted in late 1937 after 400 had been built. Hotchkiss was requested to revise the design, which became the H39. The Hotchkiss H35 initially equipped several cavalry units but later on, with R35 deliveries proving insufficient, part of the H35 production run was diverted to meeting infantry tank requirements. All the H35 equipped units took part in the fighting of May-June 1940, but performed poorly as a result of of their limited speed, endurance and the low-velocity main gun. However, the German infantry, largely equipped with the PaK 36 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, was baffled to see how their anti-tank rounds simply bounced off the thick armor of these light tanks.
French Army Hotchkiss H35 tanks
Design of the Hotchkiss H35
The initial H35 was a small and narrow machine, in order to fulfill the bid and keep the weight in check while having the thickest armor any light tank of 1935. The H35 was very similar to the Renault R35, its main competitor. They shared the same APX-R (Puteaux foundry) single-piece cast turret characterized by sloped sides, rounded bottom and a spherical vision cupola. The cupola comprised a PPL RX 180 P optical visor and targeting sight. Just abaft the mantlet there were three Chrétien binocular slide projectors (later horizontal PPL vision slits). The turret, which weighed 1350 kg with full equipment, housed a low-velocity SA 18 gun M37 (87 kg), with a coaxial 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel machine-gun M31, protected by a small additional mantlet. The main gun received 102 rounds, and the machine-gun 2400 rounds. The SA 18 had a +20 -13° elevation. The hull was rather small, completely built of cast parts welded together, only 4.22 m (13.78 ft) long and narrow, at just 1.95 m (6.4). The total weight, in battle order, was a mere 9.6 tons. The tracks were small too – each link was only 27 cm (10.63 in) wide. The smaller links procured a smoother ride. The commander had a small seat and strap, but stood for observation and for operating his weapons.
Hotchkiss H35 tanks
The suspension was made of six pincer bogies, each holding two rubberized roadwheels, sprung by helicoidal horizontal springs. There was a front drive sprocket, a rear idler wheel and two return rollers on each side. The driver/mechanic sat on the right side, seeing through a periscope mounted on a hinged flap, supplemented by two oblique vision slits on the sides. A door section of the hood opened forward to allow the driver access. The commander/gunner accessed the turret through a rear door, and there was an extra emergency manhole at the hull bottom, just behind the driver. Equipment and tools were situated around the hull, comprising a camouflaged tarp fastened by straps to the back, a shovel, hatchet and cutter, on the left fender, a pickaxe bracket at the left of the hull, a mass, jack and crank on the right fender, a track cleaner on the rear cover, a 10-ton cable at the rear and two towing steel chains attached to the hull rear panel. The engine hood plunged forward, protecting a gasoline, air-cooled, Hotchkiss 3.4 liters, 6 cylinder, developing 75 hp@2400 rpm, for a 8.8 hp/ton ratio. The gearbox was a synchromesh with 5 speeds forward and one reverse. Normal consumption was 130 liters/100 km. The normal speed on road and over flat terrain was 28 km/h, ground pressure was 0.9 kg/cm2. The H35 was capable of climbing a 35° slope, a 70 cm high obstacle and of fording a 0.85 m deep river. However, trench crossing was limited to 1.80 m.
Hotchkiss H35 tanks in the field
The later-model Hotchkiss H39
Hotchkiss H39 Tank – an improved H35
The H39 was an overhaul and upgrade of the H35, with a new Hotchkiss 6-cyl. 5.97 litre engine giving 120 hp at 2800 rpm. With a power-to-weight ratio of 10 hp/ton (the weight had increased to 12.1 tons), top speed was now 36.5 km/h (22.6 mph) on the road and range was increased to 150 km (93 km) thanks to a new 207 litre gasoline tank. The new engine required a redesigned hood, the rear being raised and now being nearly horizontal. Apart from these details, the H39 was very similar to the previous AFV, with the same SA 18 short barrel gun. But it was also subjected to some criticism and, at the end of 1938 a proposal was made to adopt the new SA 38, a long barreled 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, which had far superior penetration power and muzzle velocity. The turret was now equipped only with the new PPL horizontal vision slits.
The SA 38 was supplied with longer rounds, and thus only 90 could be carried (instead of 100 rounds with the SA 18). The gun was in relatively short supply, and despite the priority given to production of this new weapon, many H39s were put in service with the older gun model. 700 H39’s were built in total, starting in October 1938, the last being delivered in feverish conditions, thrown into combat right from the factory door in May 1940 without exhausts or mudguards. In early 1939, the Hotchkiss delivery rate was around 60 units each month. Final records are confusing, and based on the chassis numbers and factory monthly deliveries by 1940, the usual figure is 1200 machines in total, for both subtypes.
The Hotchkiss H35/39 in action
This French light tank stands in the centre of Narvik today. It was captured by the German army in 1940 and further modified.
The Hotchkiss H39 was also allocated to cavalry units and Army units. Some 15 H39’s were shipped to Narvik on the 7th of May 1940. Only 12 were withdrawn in June and these finally disembarked in Great Britain where they formed an embryo of the armored forces of the FFL (Forces Françaises Libres), the Free French led by De Gaulle, as the 1e Compagnie de Chars de Combat de la France Libre. Operational formations were unfortunately mismatched. The slow H35s operated with the faster Somua S35, and the H39 with the B1 bis.
During the May-June 1940 campaign in France, the H35 and H39 found themselves committed in spread out formations and rarely had a clear superiority over the enemy. Their 37 mm (1.46 in) “long” model 38 gun was, added to their thick armor, a clear advantage in tank-to-tank engagements against German light tanks. They were matched only by the Czech-built PzKpfw 38(t). However, tactically, the lack of radio and communication with HQ, as well as the overburdened tank commander led to disastrous results. Many were abandoned due to the lack of gasoline, entire units being captured later in this way. Some participated in a few improvised counter-offensives directed against the Germans without air support, which had dire consequences.
Export of the Hotchkiss H35 to Finland
Finnish Army Hotchkiss H35, Winter War, January 1940
In 1936, Finland purchased 60 H35’s, sufficient to equip one Panssaripataljoona (Panzer Battalion). These were delivered without guns – the standard Tampella-manufactured Bofors 37mm was fitted after delivery in Finland, together with the first tank version of the Suomi submachinegun. The H35-equipped Pataljoona would be one of the three Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona (Separate Panzer Battalions) tasked with fighting the initial delaying action on the Karelian Isthmus when the Soviet Union first attacked at the start of the Winter War. In the defensive battles on the Isthmus, operating in close cooperation with infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery and almost always from pre-prepared hull-down positions, the H35’s fought to their strengths. Their Bofors 37 mm gun, added to their thick armor, gave then an advantage in front-on tank-to-tank engagements against the Red Army’s light tanks.
In such conditions, well-protected, with clear lines of fire, pre-planned lines of retreat and good inter-arms cooperation with accompanying infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery, the H35’s inflicted heavy losses on the Red Army’s armour while taking very few of their own. By the end of the Winter War, the H35-equipped Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona remained in existence and by this time formed part of the 23rd Panssaridivisoona. The H35’s would be phased out of armoured combat units over 1941 and 1942, replaced with Finnish Patria-built tanks.
Other H35/39s also saw action under foreign colors.
Three H35’s were (as well as three R35) to the Polish Bureau of Technical Studies of Armored Weapons for trials sent in July 1939. In September 1939 these were integrated into an ad hoc unit commanded by Lieutenant J. Jakubowicz where they fought as part of the Dubrno task force. Two were sold to Turkey in February 1940.
Renault AMR 35 (187 built 1936-1939)
The AMR (Auto Mitrailleuse de Reconnaissance) 35 was not ordered by the army. When the AMR 33 hadn’t even reached production stage, Louis Renault took two prototypes and completely overhauled them, starting in February 1934. Trials indeed showed the weight distribution – due to a forward-mounted engine – was a serious issue, and he addressed it first by placing a new, more powerful Nerva Stella 28 CV, Renault sport coupé regular engine. Changes were made accordingly to the transmission, because the drive sprockets were maintained at the front. This also considerably lowered the noise inside the fighting compartment. The ventilator and exhaust pipe were also shifted to the rear. The weak suspension of the AMR 33 was also completely changed and tested on a third prototype made of bolted boiler plates in September 1934.
Renault AMR 35 ZT2 tank
During the first trials at Vincennes, speeds attained were up to 72 km/h (44 mph), an impressive feat for any tank of that time with such a small engine. Louis Renault did not intend to support the cost of upgrading the production line, however the army was impressed, and General Flavigny insisted these changes be made. Cavalry officers noted that the engine was perhaps too delicate for military service and later asked for a sturdier one. Therefore, the second prototype was fitted with a 432 22 CV four-cylinder bus engine. Top speed was still 63 km/h (39 mph), with a weight of 5.03 tons. It was subsequently accepted into service as the AMR 35 and followed the AMR 33 on the factory line, sanctioned by an official order on July, 3, 1934.
Design of the AMR 35
The initial plans introduced a specific command vehicle fitted with a AVIS-1 turret (“Atelier de Vincennes”) armed with a 7.5 mm (0.295 in) machine-gun and equipped with a top observation hatch. The regular vehicles would be fitted with an AVIS-2 turret and a 13.2 mm (0.52 in) machine-gun. But these plans were dropped although the turret models were accepted. 100 were ordered including 8 command vehicles, factory designated ZT (this was purely chronological, without meaning). Changes compared to the AMR 33 were considerable. Despite relatively similar internal accommodations and equipment, the similarities ended here, as the engine and transmission were relocated and the suspension was brand new. The AMR 35 was larger and almost 1.5 tons heavier (6.5 vs 5 metric tons). It was assembled with armor plates riveted on a frame, ranging from 13 mm (0.51 in) for all vertical plates, 9 mm (0.35 in) for the glacis and sloped plates, and 5 mm (0.2 in) for the top and bottom. This meant it was better protected than its predecessor.
Renault AMR 35 ZDT1
The driver sat to the left and at his right was placed a large ventilation grill. The commander turret was placed offset to the left. Eventually two turret types were used on the ZT-1, recognizable by their shape and armament. The 7.5 mm (0.295 in) armed AVIS-1 (Atelier de Vincennes turret) was octagonal and could receive an extra machine gun on a small AA mount on top of the turret. Normal provision was 2250 rounds. The AVIS-2 was fitted with a Hotchkiss 13.2 mm (0.52 in) heavy machine-gun. In battle the 13.2 mm gun, despite its ability to penetrate 20mm steel at 500m, proved to be incapable of defeating even the German armored cars, its bullets being deflected by their sloped armour. Radio command versions received a ER 29 model, operated by the commander. The suspension was of the new type also used for the light tank R35, and was quite heavier and much sturdier than the previous design. It could, in theory, take twice the load it was intended to. It comprised a sprocket and idler of similar types, retained from the AMR 33 but with the spoke intervals filled for better strength, the sprocket just receiving dents. There were also four paired all-metal roadwheels resting on independent bogies front and rear, and a central twin bogie. All three were horizontally sprung with large rubber cylinder blocks. The central ones counted five smaller rubber cylinders separated by steel discs, acting as shock dampers. The track was 22 cm (8.66 in) wide and was supported by three return rollers. As shown at Vincennes, the AMR 35 could ford 60 cm (2 ft) deep rivers, cross 1.7 m (5.6 ft) wide trenches and climb a 50 cm (1.6 ft) obstacle or 50% slope.
The Renault 447 22 CV four-cylinder 5881 cc petrol engine was capable of giving the 6.5 ton tank a top speed of 55 km/h (34 mph) and average top speed of 40 km/h (25 mph), making it the fastest French tank of the day. The engine had a max output of 85 hp at 2200 rpm. Fuel capacity was 130 liters. Transmission used a Cleveland differential, with single dry plate type brake with four gears forward and one reverse. The Zénith carburetor and Scintilla Vertex magneto allowed it to start at temperatures well below zero.
Renault AMR35 tanks on parade
AMR 35 Production
Renault AMR 35 ZT2 with turret mounted 25mm
The first order asked for the delivery of ten pre-series vehicles in March 1935, but it was postponed in August. Due to a bad financial situation and strikes Renault eventually refused the second order for fifty tankettes, but accepted an order in April 1936 for only thirty others. There were coordination issues with the subcontractors as well, Schneider for the armor plates and empty hulls and Batignolles-Châtillon for the AVIS-2 turrets. By August 1935 trials at Satory had already led the army to ask for a change to the gear ratio and even refused the twelve vehicles delivered in September. These were returned for modifications and were accepted in October 1935. The first entered service on the 22nd of April, 1936.
By June 1936 seventy-six AMR 35s had been produced. However exercises showed serious reliability issues due to weak mechanical parts, including the Cleveland differentials not being suited for such speeds. In 1937, production almost stopped to allow the refitting of 92 vehicles, but the problems with the differential persisted, some being replaced up to five times in a short period. By August 1937 a second and third series were started, and seventy-five were delivered by the end of 1938. Most were now equipped with a synchromesh gear box and reinforced chassis girders, but reliability issues persisted until May 1940 and availability was poor. In January 1939 only 123 were reported serviceable, while the others were in repairs. In 1936 it had been envisioned to replace obsolete Renault FTs in service throughout the colonies with Renault AMR 35 ZT-4s, equipped with FT turrets. But this was given low-priority and of a total order of 56 vehicles only 40 had been completed when France surrendered. Another variant was the AMR 35 ADF (Renault YS), used for artillery observation, and equipped with advanced telemetric systems.
The AMR 35 in action
In May 1940 178 AMR 35s equipped the French Army. Tactically they operated in three squadrons for each DLM (“Division Legere Mecanisee”), and two squadrons for each DLC (light cavalry divisions). Tactically, and contrary to their acronym, they were used as fighting vanguard units, covering the infantry rather than for reconnaissance, a role already taken by the Panhard 178 and Somua-Gendron armored cars. In the Battle of France the AMR fared very badly being both poorly armed and armoured. The one main advantage of the AMR was its speed; it was the fastest French tank of its day and faster than all the German light tanks. However travelling at high speed cross-country played havoc with the poorly designed suspension which quickly wore out. During the campaign, more AMR’s were lost to mechanical trouble than to enemy action. Their actions are not known with precision, but their fate is shared between vehicles destroyed in action (due to poor armor and armament), abandoned due to the lack of gasoline or because of mechanical failure, mostly coming from the differential, transmission or more commonly because of suspension failure.
German soldier posing in front of an abandoned French light tank AMR 35 (№ 87363) of 5 RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés) – the fate of much of the French Armoured Force of 1939/1940
Renault R35 & R40 (1,690 built between 1936-1940)
Until 1935 the little vintage Renault FT had been the staple of the French tank force. It was clear by 1932 that the new Renault tanks developed from the NC27 were not sufficient for the task demanded from them. They were too heavy, complex, costly and not suited for mass-production. The original requirements dated back to 1926 and asked for a “char d’accompagnement” (support tank) that could replace the FT and still operate in the same manner. However, with increase in AT gun caliber and velocity, the emphasis was put on protection. In early 1933 Hotchkiss proposed a solution, with an affordable small tank which turned the tables. But instead of purchasing these, for political reasons and due to the contract size, other contractors were in August 1933 asked to present their own model. Fourteen responded, ranging from automotive companies to small armories.
Renault, badly wanting the contract, rushed out a prototype which was ready when a further new specification was issued on June, 21, 1934. The new specification asked for an increase of armor from 30 to 40 mm (1.18-1.57 in). Renault could not revise the design on time and nevertheless presented its ZM prototype to the Commission de Vincennes on 20 December 1934. The model performed well, but was sent back to the factory for add-on armor and mounting the new APX (Atelier de Rueil) cast turret in April 1935. Tests were then resumed when, due to growing tension caused by the swift and massive German rearmament, the commission awarded a contract for 300 of the new “R35″ tanks on 29 April 1935. This was even before the model could be perfected by Renault for pre-production. By 4 June 1936, the first deliveries were being tested and modifications performed during production. The hollow hull price was 190,000 FF, but with engine, mechanical parts, the turret and modifications, rose to 1,400,000 FF (the equivalent of 32.000$ at the time). Contrary to the Hotchkiss H35, the R35 was also produced for export.
French light tank Renault R-35
The cast APX hexagonal turret had a 30 mm thick domed rotatable cupola with vertical vision slits (the highest point of 2.13 m) and had to be either hand cranked or moved about by the weight of the commander, the only other crew member. There was sometimes unofficially a seat installed for him but he most often stood. The rear of the turret had a hatch that hinged down that could be used as a seat to improve observation. The earliest vehicles were fitted with the APX-R turret (with the L713 sight) mounting the short Puteaux 37 mm L/21 SA18 gun (the first batches were removed from FT 17 guntanks which were then rebuilt as utility vehicles) and the 7.5 mm Châtellerault fortress machine gun. The cannon had a very poor armour penetration: only 12 mm at 500 metres. Afterwards the APX turret with the same cannon but the improved L739 sight and the standard Châtellerault 7.5 mm MAC31 Reibel machine gun was used because of delivery delays of the original weapon. There were also so many delays in the production of the turrets that after the first 380 hulls had been produced in 1936 and only 37 could be fitted with a turret, production was slowed down to 200 annually. The 7.5 mm machine gun’s spent cartridges (from a total of 2,400) went down a chute through a hole in the floor. The tank carried 42 armour piercing and 58 high explosive rounds.
Due to the deterioriating international situation, the total number of units ordered rose to 2,300 by 1939. As a result of the frequent delays experienced by APX in manufacturing the turrets, by 1936 Renault had succeeded in delivering only 380 hulls, while only 37 turrets were available – the annual delivery rate fell to just 200. By 1 September 1939, only 975 R35’s had been delivered to the army out of the 1070 produced. They only just replaced most of the units that had been equipped with the Renault FT’s, but crews still needed a few weeks to retrain. In consequence, by May 1940 there were still eight battalions of FT’s operational due to the lack of trained men. By June 1940, 1,601 R35’s had been produced for the Army. Out of this number, 245 had been exported: Poland (50), Turkey (100), Romania (41) and Yugoslavia (54). Production ceased after the capitulation of France.
Renault R35 Tanks
The Renault R-40
Due to insufficient tests before production, it was quickly apparent to the receiving units that the R35 suspension was unreliable and experienced many failures. Work started in 1939 at AMX (the new name for the Renault tank department since 2 December 1936) to devise a better system, which could be fitted into the existing production run. This new system mounted twelve wheels in six pairs suspended by large vertical coil springs. These were protected by armored side skirts. The engine was upgraded to a more powerful model, while the hull was lengthened at the rear. The turret was the new APX-R1 cast model with a L767 sight, mounting a long barrel 37 mm (1.46 in) L/35 SA38. Last but not least, a radio was fitted. The new gun was capable of defeating 40 mm (1.57 in) of armor at 500 m (1640 ft).
The R40’s began to replace the R35’s after the 1540th unit. Only a few were delivered in time. The reconstituted Polish 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade in France was the first unit to be equipped with the new tank. At the same time, from 1939, some R35s were re-equipped with the new APX-R turret and the long-barrel 37mm. These were known as the R35 modifié 39, but only a few were converted and allocated to to unit commanders. AMX also produced quantities of steering tails prior to the war to improve their trench crossing capabilities. These were not always fitted.
The R35 bears a strong resemblance to its rival, the Hotchkiss H35. They shared the same APX turret, the three-module hull construction and placement for the driver and engine. However their dimensions differed, as well as the placement of the hull casemate, placed further to the rear for the Renault and, most obviously, the drivetrain. The hull, as stated, was made of three main prefabricated cast sections bolted together, while on the H35 these were welded. This helped improve Renault production times. Everything else was welded-on. Maximum thickness on the glacis was 43 mm (1.69 in), and 40 to 30 (1.57-1.18 in) on the hull lower sides, rear and engine deck. The turret itself was made of hard cast iron, 30 mm (1.18 in) thick.
The Renault R40 was the final variation of the R35. It was developed by the Atelier de Construction d’Issy-les-Moulineaux (AMX) which introduced a brand new and better suspension that consisted of 12 pairs of small road-wheels on each side mounted in pairs, vertical coil springs, and protective skirting plates. This vehicle mounted the long barreled 37mm SA38 L/33 gun in the APX-R1 turret and had an AMX crossing tail.
The running gear was based on the one used for the light cavalry AMR 35 tank, with five double roadwheels encased in two sets of bogies and another single one at the front. All three were suspended by massive horizontal coil springs, with characteristic rubber ringlets. The drive sprocket was at the front and idler at the rear. The tracks reposed on three rubberized return rollers.
The tank used a crew of two. The driver’s position was offset to the left and the commander/gunner was in the turret behind. The final drive and differentials were in the nose. The driver had a Cletrac differential with five gears and steering brakes at his disposal. He had two hatches and one periscope for vision. The Renault V-4 85 hp engine was at the right rear, with a self-sealing 166 liter gasoline tank on its left. On final production tests, practical top speed was measured as 20 km/h (12.4 mph), which could fall to 14 km/h (8.7 mph) on soft or bumpy terrain. Fuel consumption was 212 liters/100 km off-road, but that was not believed to be a problem since it was believed 50 km (31 mi) was more than sufficient for a real breakthrough on a static front.
The turret received a dome-like rotatable cupola with vertical vision slits. It was free running on a ball track ring, either traversed by the weight of the commander or cranked more precisely for aiming. The commander normally stood on the tank floor. As was customary in French practice, the turret had a rear hatch that could be hinged down, allowing the commander to sit on it, legs inside, for external observation. The early turret model was the APX-R, equipped with a L713 sight, mounting the short barrel 37 mm (1.46 in) Puteaux L/21 SA-18 and a coaxial 7.5 mm (0.29 in) Châtellerault fortress machine-gun. This main gun was effective only against concrete fortifications at relatively short range, as muzzle velocity was only 300 m/s (984 ft/s). At best only 12 mm (0.47 in) of armor could be defeated at less than 500 m (1640 ft). Once again, it was a tactical limitation. The R35 was never intended to deal with other tanks. Normal provision of ammuniion was 72 AP and 58 HE rounds plus 2400 machinegun cartridges.
Renault R35 tanks in the field
At the time of the German attack on France, the French Army had 900 R35’s in service, then the most numerous model available. According to French military doctrine it was to be used only for direct support of infantry. However, its gun proved able to defeat Panzer I and IIs, while the frontal armor could withstand a direct hit from the standard 37 mm (1.46 in) gun. These were strictly to tank units without other organic components, and only committed to infantry support in close coordination with infantry units. However, in May, when it was clear that doctrine was failing the test of battle, 135 R35’s were allocated to a newly formed 4th DCR (Division Cuirassée de Réserve) while others reinforced the 2nd DCR. Later, 300 tanks from the materiel reserve were also allocated to these new units.
The majority (843) of R35s fell into German hands; 131 were used as such as Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731 (f), issued to panzer units and mainly used for security duties or driver training, or used on armoured trains; most were later rebuilt as artillery tractors and ammunition carriers after removing the turret. Others were converted for use as tank destroyers. Some of the tanks that Germany captured were given or sold to Germany’s allies (124 to Italy for example).
R35 Exports – Poland
In 1938, the Polish Army bought two R35’s for tests by the Office of Armored Forces Technical Research. The tank did not meet Polish requirements, neither did the Hotchkiss H35. The Polish Army wanted to buy the SOMUA S35, but the French government did not give its consent. In April 1939, due to the impending conflict with Germany and the lack of opportunities to increase production of the 7TP, 100 R-35’s were ordered. The first batch of 50 (including three H35’s) wer delivered in July 1939, and were given to the 12th Armored Battalion in Lutsk. In September, this unit formed part of the 21st Light Tank Battalion, entrusted with the defense of the border with Romania. Others were incorporated into the composition of Group “Dubno” which took part in the battles against the Germans at Strumiłową and the Soviets at Krasne. 34 tanks of the 21st Light Tank Battalion crossed the border into Romania on 18th September and were interned.
R35 Exports – Finland
After the Polish capitulation, a Polish cavalry unit was raised in France (the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade / 10 Brygada Kawalerii Pancernej / 10e Brigade de cavalerie blindée polonaise). When the Soviet Union attacked Finland, the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade under the command of General Stanisław Maczek was brought up to strength in both men and equipment, being made up of two tank battalions, two strong motorized cavalry squadrons, one motorized infantry battalion one anti-tank battery, one anti-aircraft battery with engineering, signals, transport and support units. The two tank battalions were equipped with a total of 120 Renault R35’s. The Brigade was dispatched to Finland in February 1940 but with much new equipment that many Polish soldiers had no idea how to use.
Some 115 more Renault R35’s were taken from the Material Reserve and shipped as Aid to Finland together with the Brigade (these tanks were used to hastily equip two further Finnish Panssaripataljoona). Training was carried out after arrival in Finland, with the Brigade forming a part of the rather ad-hoc 23rd Panssaridivisioona (“Marskin Vasara – The Marshal’s Hammer”). The 10th Brigade fought well on the Karelian Isthmus and would end the Winter War on the outskirts of Leningrad.After the Winter War ended, General Maczek and his men eventually returned to the UK, leaving their surviving R35’s behind for the Finnish Army.
In the UK, the Polish 10th Brigade formed part of the 1st Polish Armoured Division, which was placed under General Maczek’s command. The 1st would return to Finland in late 1943 with rather more modern Sherman tanks and American-supplied equipment, after which they would fight their way down the coast of the Baltic and into Poland under overall Finnish command. General Maczek and the 1st Polish Armoured Division would lead the offensive that broke through German lines and relieved the besieged Polish Home Army forces in Warsaw after the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944. The 1st would spend the rest of WW2 ensuring Polish territory remained Polish, a bitter and ruthlessly fought internecine and largely clandestine struggle against the NKVD and the Red Army which resulted in Poland retaining its pre-WW2 borders in the east.
R35 Exports – Yugoslavia
The kingdom of Yugoslavia ordered and obtained 45 R35s in April 1940, where they formed two brigades. One of these saw heavy action against the Germans around Belgrade. Surviving ones were re-used by the Independent State of Croatia, which fought alongside the 11th Panzerdivision on 13 and 14 April 1941. After that, they formed the Croatian 11 Dalmatinska udarna brigada (Dalmatian brigade) which fought against partisans.
R35 Exports – Romania
Romania’s rearmament plan was in full sweep in the early 1930’s when the last Renault tank was tested. The Romanian government investigated acquiring a licence to produce 200 R35’s locally. However, with French rearmament being given priority, as a stopgap measure, forty-five R35’s were sold and shipped in Romania in August and September 1939, making the bulk of the newly formed 2nd Armored Regiment. At the end of September 1939, an unexpected 34 Polish R35s from the 21st Light Tank Battalion retreating before the Germans crossed the northern border. These were interned and bolstered the strength of the 2nd Armored Regiment. Although these were used as is by the Romanian army, 36 were converted by Atelierele Loenida in 1943-44 with a high-velocity Soviet 45 mm (1.77 in) gun and saw action as the Vanatorul de Care R-35.
The R35 at the Musée des Blindés at Saumur in France
Somua S35 (430 built 1936-1940)
During WW1, the famous Cuirassier horse guards had their traditions shattered when it became obvious that the cavalry was obsolete in this new kind of warfare. When the first tanks appeared in 1917, new tactics in conjunctions with tanks proved there were still possible uses for cavalry. The French, as well as the British and Soviets, thereafter made the distinction between three kinds of tanks: those for the infantry and the cavalry, and lastly the heavy breakthrough tank, the “char de rupture”, like the FMC 2C. Plans for a new cavalry tank came in 1931, revised on 26 June 1934. A new and heavier model was specified, capable of resisting any antitank gun of the time. The responsibility was given to the St. Ouen Societe d’Outillage Mecanique et d’Usinage d’Artillerie (SOMUA). At that time the old French Army ban on cavalry having tanks was removed. Cavalry tanks were to be called “Automitrailleuses” (armored cars) in French service, like the AMR 33/35. The SOMUA was in a completely different – it was the first cavalry vehicle to be called a tank. It was classed as a fast medium, aimed not only at reconnaissance but also at contact and engagement with advancing enemy units.
Design of the S35
The SOMUA S35 was a French Cavalry tank of the Second World War. Built from 1936 until 1940 to equip the armoured divisions of the Cavalry, it was for its time a relatively agile medium-weight tank, superior in armour and armament to both its French and foreign competitors, such as the contemporary versions of the German Panzerkampfwagen III. It was constructed from well-sloped, mainly cast, armour sections, that however made it expensive to produce and time-consuming to maintain.
The hull was cast in four parts – a world first – and the turret was cast as well. The maximum thickness of the hull and turret armour was 47 and 40 mm (1.85/1.5 in) respectively. The turret was derived from the B1 heavy tank, but with an enlarged turret ring. The medium-barrel SA35 47 mm (1.85 in) in the turret was efficient against most German and Soviet tanks of the time and a mix of 90 AP and 28 HE shots was carried. There was also a coaxial 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel machine gun with 2,250 rounds. All S35 units were scheduled to be equipped with radio, but as ER28 production never reached the required level, only one tank of five was equipped, despite the fact that many of them included an antenna. Crew was 3 – a driver, the tank commander/gunner and a radio operator. As with the B1, the commander was expected to direct the tank while also aiming, loading and firing the 47 mm SA 35 main gun.
Engineer Eugene Brillé worked on the suspension, inspired by the suspension used on the Skoda LTvz. 35, with eight road wheels on four bogies with leaf spring and a large torsion wheel. The initial tracks were 75 mm (2.95 in) wide, with 144 links, later 103 with enlarged pieces. The rear engine was side by side with two self-feeding fuel tanks. The crew was protected by a thick firewall bulkhead. The V8 SOMUA engine designed by engineer Javier-Sabin developed about 200 bhp and used a double filling tank system which at times caused some problems with inexperienced crews. Overall, the S35 was regarded as the most potent medium tank of its day. It is said that the US Ordnance studied the S35 for its construction aspects which helped later to design the Sherman.
Somua S 35 Production
The preliminary design was ready in September 1934, definitive plans in October 1934, just as construction began. The first prototype was ready in April 1935, undergoing successful trials until August of that year. The model was named after its first year of production. A preseries model was to be tested until January 1936 with the new APX1 turret, with production scheduled to start in March.
Souma S35
However, the S35 had several flaws, the first of which was a common issue among French tanks. The commander was still overloaded and the turret still lacked hatches, mostly due to budgetary reasons, which caused the same commander to sit completely outside of the turret in order to get a good view. Other flaws were maintenance-related. The cast-steel modules didn’t facilitate access to the suspension, which made maintenance and repair time-consuming. The cost per unit was high and only limited numbers of this excellent medium tank were produced. By the 1st of September, 1939, 246 had been delivered, and only 288 were in service in May 1940. But by June 1940 some 430 had been built. Production was then halted for the more advanced SOMUA S40. Due to French needs, a Polish order was declined. However, for political reasons a small Finnish order was accepted, with 50 Somua 35’s delivered to Finland in early 1939.
The Finnish Export Order – Somua S 35
In early 1939, for purely political reasons and in the face of some heated opposition from the French Army, the sale of 50 Somua 35’s to Finland was approved – out of approximately 150 which had been produced by that date. Worse from the French Army’s point of view was that these 50 were to be delivered immediately from stocks of the Somua S35 in hand and about to be handed over to the Army. Despite the at times vociferous opposition from within the French Army, the sale and handover was approved.
Finnish Army Somua S35’s parading through Helsinki, Autumn 1939
The sale had it’s origins in the large French government loan (approximately $15,000,000 US Dollars) made to Finland in 1937 for the purchase of military equipment. While the financing was available, the Finns had been somewhat selective about the equipment and weapons ordered from the French, with the result being that by late 1938, there was still considerable unspent funding. The triumvirate responsible for Finnish defence spending had decided, after the bombshell decision on the fate of Czechoslovakia in October 1938, that Finland must accelerate her defensive armaments build up at almost any cost.
After some debate, the Finnish government had almost unanimously allocated additional funds to defence purchasing for the remainder of 1938 and very substantially increased the defence budget planned for 1939. The decision was also made that everything possible must be done to purchase critically needed armaments, including using the unspent loan financing still available from the sizable French and US Loans. The Somua S35, perhaps the best tank in the world at the time, was near the top of the defense shopping list, as it were. The Finns by now had some considerable experience in dealing with French politicians and it was obvious what needed to be done to ensure Finland got the wanted Somua S35’s.
Finnish Army Somua S35 in Finland during the Winter War
Some judicious (and not inconsiderable) funds were expended on greasing the palms of French politicians and a number of influential voices within the French Army and within weeks, the sale had been approved. The end result was that 50 Somua S35’s were offloaded in Turku in April 1939, following which they would be used to form a second Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona (Separate Tank/Panzer Battalion). In Finnish hands, the Somua S35’s fought very effectively to their strengths. The one-man turret was a major limiting factor, but in the largely defensive fighting on the Isthmus in which the Somua S35’s would fight, this was not so much of a disadvantage as it would be in more mobile or offensive fighting. Also, the high velocity SA35 47 mm gun proved to be very effective against Red Army tanks.
The Red Army made no attempt to outmaneuver the Finns, instead relying on sheer numbers and massed wave attacks of tanks and infantry to overcome the Finnish defences. Unfortunately for the Red Army, this was the war the Finns had planned to fight, with doctrine, tactics and training geared to counter the Red Army’s tactics (or lack of them) and strengths. The result was an ongoing slaughter.
Two knocked out Finnish Army Somua tanks on the Leningrad Front, August 1940
A company of Somua 35’s, well dug in and covering each other, with prepared positions to fall back on, equipped with effective radios and coordinating with well-trained infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery (and with close air support available, weather permitting) time and again decimated attacking Red Army forces before falling back to the next line of pre-prepared defensive positions and repeating. The Somua’s armour seemed impervious to the guns of the lighter Soviet tanks – and the Finns would use this to advantage time and again in their limited objective counter-attacks.
The Somua S35-equipped Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona emerged from the defensive fighting on the Karelian Isthmus over the winter of 1939-1940 virtually unscathed, although some losses did occur. Further losses occurred during the Spring 1940 offensive down the Karelian Isthmus and more in the fighting on the outskirts of Leningrad, as the photo on the right of two knocked out Finnish Army Somua S35’s illustrates. Again, in these actions the Finnish Army used their limited numbers of Somua S35’s carefully and to their strengths in well-coordinated actions which kept losses minimal. The surviving Somua S35’s remained in use with the Finnish Army until 1943, when they were retired from active service and used as training tanks after being replaced with US-supplied Lend-Lease tanks. The remaining Somua S35’s were retired completely and scrapped in 1946.
SOMUAs S35 and S40 in action in France
In May 1940, the bulk of the S40 force was allocated to the 1st Amy deployed in Belgium. Because of the lack of support and a weak organization when compared to the German Panzerdivisions, these units performed with high losses, but with some successes, most of them as a result of the S35’s armor and firepower. The battle of Hannut (May 12-14), the largest tank battle of 1940, occurred between six armored divisions, a clash of nearly 1,700 tanks and armored vehicles. Despite tactical victories at strong-points, it was a strategic failure for the French defence – the Germans systematically outmaneuvering the French, gaining local firepower superiority and with excellent communication and support. The French “by the book” tactics proved hopelessly obsolete.
On another occasion, on May, 17, Colonel De Gaulle’s 4th DCR, comprising many S35’s as well as Hotchkiss, Char B1 and Renault tanks, tried to stop the German advance at Laon and Montcornet. Although they gained momentum and local successes, even taking hundreds of German prisoners, the Luftwaffe and German Flak 88 mm (3.46 in) quickly deployed and used as antitank batteries for the first time in the war, crushed any further progress. Many S35s of the remaining forces fought to prevent three German Panzerdivisions from approaching Dunkirk. They were destroyed or ultimately abandoned, running out of ammunition and fuel. Later in June, other S35’s fought in Weygand’s so-called “strongpoints”, which were outmaneuvered once again, hammered by artillery and the Luftwaffe, and eventually forced to surrender one by one.
Somua S35’s after the fall of France
The remaining S35s, perhaps a hundred in all, which escaped to Vichy France, were allocated to the Vichy regime for police duties and most were transferred to North Africa. Most of the S35s remaining in occupied France were taken over by the Germans, some sources mentioning about 250 to 290. Most of these fought eventually on the Eastern Front where they were outclassed by Soviet KV-1s and T-34s. In December 1944, a single German unit was still equipped with a handful of S35s but by this time they were hopelessly outclassed.
Somua S 35 in german service, Panzerkampfwagen 35S 739 (f)
Char B1 bis (781 built between 1935-1940)
The Char de bataille was Col. Estienne’s concept. The French “father of tanks” wrote a memorandum (Mémoire sur les missions des chars blindés en campagne) in 1919, full of war experience, tactical reports and theoretical concepts of mechanized warfare, notably the proper use of different types in the offensive. The “char de bataille” (“battle tank”) was a heavy tank, near to the “char de rupture” or “breakthrough tank”, but the former was more a dual-purpose (infantry support and antitank) machine than the “char de rupture”. The latter concept gave birth to huge the FMC F1, with the sole purpose of terminating fortifications.
The prototype Renault SRA – on it’s first run over a 20km test course it began to fall apart
This duality was at the very core of the idea, shaping the many prototypes which followed in response. In 1921, the project was studied by a commission led by General Edmond Buat. First specification was for a low-cost self-propelled artillery, 25 mm (0.98 in) of armor and some machine-guns in turrets. Maximum metric weight was 30 tons. The project evolved and the machine-gun turret was equipped with an antitank 47 mm (1.85 in) gun. The main gun was a 75 mm (2.95 in) howitzer, in a low hull sponson. Industrial rivalry in the past had delayed several projects, including the FCM 2C, so Estienne was poised to create a formal agreement, submitted to the industrialists involved, free to share their plans, with the promise of no less 1000 orders. The Army was then to choose between the projects and various patents to compose their model, built by all. The four companies involved in the project were Renault (SRA), Schneider (SRB), FAMH (Saint Chamond) and FCM (Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée) with the FCM 21.
The prototype FCM21 resembled a scaled dwn Char 2C
The prototype Schneider SRB – six metres long, 228 centimetres high and 2,5 metres wide with a 47mm gun.
Prototype FAMH-tank
The four projects, one for each company, were submitted to the commission on 13 May 1924 at Atelier de Rueil. The twenty kilometer test course proved too much for them, showing the haste of their conception. The commission, over the supervision of Estienne, choose the SRB as a base. The SRB (Schneider project) weighed 18.5 tons, was 6 meters long (19.7 ft), with modified FT17 tracks, an antitank 47 mm (1.85 in) gun, Renault six-cylinder 180 hp engine, with hydraulic Naëder transmission from the Chaize company combined with a Fieux clutch and Schneider gear box, a speed of 18.5 km/h (11.5 mph) and a 370 l fuel tank giving a 370 km (230 mi) autonomy. This prototype then received many modifications, including the 75 mm (2.95 in) howitzer, new Holt-type tracks, the FAMH suspension, track tension wheel and a small gangway to access to the engine, with 40 mm (1.57 in) armor.
Design of the Char Bis B1
The design process of this modified SRB led to the 1926 “tracteur 30″. The plans were made by Schneider’s chief engineer, revised by the STCC (Section Technique des Chars de Combat). A mockup was built by Renault and three prototypes were to be built by the companies involved, with some modifications by the new 1926 “direction de l’infanterie”, changing it to a primarily infantry support tank. Modifications of the design included no AT weapon, lower speed, 22 tons max and radio for coordination. The three prototypes of the “B” serie (n°101, 102 and 103) were ready by 1929-30. They differed by their engine, clutch, transmission and served both for technological and tactical experiments, at the champ de Châlons, forming the “Détachement d’Experimentation” unit in 1931. They were extensively used in maneuvers until 1934, each time with some modifications by the Atelier de Reuil near Paris, to meet new requirements and army specifications. In the end, the B1 received its final turret, with the low velocity 47 mm (1.85 in), and coaxial Reibel machine-gun.
Char B1 Prototype N° 101, here in its original state with a small machine gun turret
Like the 1924 prototypes, it had a very large track, inspired by earlier famous British models. Armor also protected the suspension and the hull was riveted. The Renault inline 6 cylinder 16.5 litre petrol engine was chosen, which provided 9.7 bhp/ton, the power was transmitted by a double differential steering system, 5 forward, 1 reverse gear. Suspension was in the form of bogies with a mixture of vertical coil and leaf springs. Both early and final turret designs (APX1) were one-man only.
The Char B1’s original specification was for a self-propelled gun able to destroy enemy infantry and artillery. The main weapon of the tank was intended to be its 75 mm howitzer, and the entire design of the vehicle was directed to making this gun as effective as possible. When in the early 1930’s it became obvious that the Char B1 also had to defeat counterattacking enemy armour, it was too late for a complete redesign. The solution was to add the standard cast APX-1 turret which also equipped the Char D2. Like most French tanks of the period (the exception being the AMC34 and the AMC35) the Char B thus had a small one-man turret. Today this is typically seen as one of their greatest flaws.
Production: The B1
Production started in 1935, with Renault building 182, AMX – a Schneider subsidiary – 47, FCM 72 and FAMH 32. At 1.5 million francs apiece it was by far the costliest tank ever built en masse. Consequently, the original order of 1000 was reduced to 400. This further increased the tension between the two doctrinal schools which then had influence, one professing the use of a few, heavily armored battle tanks while the other advocated the use of swarms of light tanks. Almost ten light Renault tanks could be built for the price of a single Char B1. This exasparated men like Colonel Charles de Gaulle, who wanted to build more of the medium Char D2 at a third of the cost of the Char B1 bis, but armed with the same 47 mm gun.
As the few, even more expensive and now largely obsolete FCM 2C’s were kept out of real operations, the B1 became the main French “char de rupture”, a breakthrough tank held in specialized units. Operational capabilities were limited by their high fuel consumption, which in turn limited their range and condemned them to be used as a strategic reserve. In fact they formed the “Divisions Cuirassées de Réserve” (DCR) with limited strategic flexibility, intended for the second phase of the assault.
Renault Char B1 bis cutout
The B1 had some shortcomings which had to be dealt with. An obvious lack of antitank firepower, with its low velocity L27/6 SA34 47 mm (1.85 in), which was only given APHE rounds (high explosive), capable of defeating 25 mm (0.98 in) of armor. The 75 mm (2.95 in) SA35 ABS L17.1 howitzer could fire HE and APHE rounds, only suitable against fortifications, with a poor traverse of only one degree. The aiming was given to the driver’s abilities with the Naëder hydraulic precision transmission. It was served by the radioman and the commander, who was also given the task of aiming and firing the turret 47 mm (1.85 in) gun. Communication was assumed by an ER53 radio telegraphy set, which worked with Morse code only. There was a small corridor, right on the rear, giving access to the ammunition reserve, next to the engine. The main access door was on the right side. The suspension system was rather complicated, made of three main bogies, sprung by vertical coil springs, each supporting two others, with a pair of road wheels. Production of the B1 was very slow. Only 34 machines were delivered until July 1937. By then, there was serious consideration given to an upgrade, which led to the B1 bis.
The upgraded B1 bis and B1 ter
Canon de 75 pour Char b1
The B1 bis was a modernization of the type, with an emphasis on anti-tank capability and protection. The armor was uprated to 60 mm (2.36 in), and a new APX4 turret with a longer barrel (L/32) SA 35 47 mm (1.85 in) gun was mounted. To cope with the added weight (now 31 tons) a new engine was fitted, a V12 Renault capable of 307 bhp (229 kW). 35 of the first series were retrofitted with the new engine. Autonomy was limited to only 180 km (110 mi). There had been some attempts of towing an extra 800 litre fuel tank, but it never realized. At cruise speed reserves were exhausted in just 6 hours. A larger left air intake was fitted. Ammunition storage was improved between the beginning and the end of the production, from 62 to 72 47 mm (1.85 in) rounds, but still, no AP shells. Production started in April 1937 and stopped in June 1940. By then, 377 had been delivered out of an order of 1144, but only 129 in September 1939. In exercises, the complex and advanced hydrostatic steering Naëder system proved difficult to use and costly, betrayed by other technical elements like a porous bronze housing and feeble seals causing significant losses of castor oil. The TSF was not practical as the tanks needed to be at rest to communicate. No tactical coordination was possible on the move. The costly turret was slower to produce than the hulls and three B1 bis were ultimately put in service without turret, as gun carriages.
Char B1 ter – only two prototypes were built
The B1 ter was a late attempt to radically improve the design. The main features were new 75 mm (2.95 in) armor welded with slopes to the hull, a new 350 bhp engine to deal with this added weight (36.6 tons) and some simplification in the design for mass-production in 1940, like the omittance of the Naëder transmission. A rearranged interior allowed a fifth crew member to be carried, as a mechanic. The main howitzer received better traverse, 5 degrees higher. Only two prototypes were ready by June 1940. Production never started.
The B1 had some additional flaws as well, which never helped its performances. High consumption issue, which was aggravated by any aiming of the main howitzer, was never solved. The absence of an efficient compass orientation and no internal communication system were also resented in operations. The one-man APX-1 turret was also cramped and ergonomy was poor and the feebly armored cupola had inadequate means of vision. Plus, the barrel pointing device was quickly deregulated. Many other issues were never solved because of the delays. The most serious was of course disastrous tactical management. B1s were “wasted” at individual defensive spots, many were simply outmaneuvered. But despite all this, the B1s were still, tank to tank, formidable machines, which proved very effective in single actions.
The Finnish Export Order – Char B1
As with the Souma S35 order, in early 1939, for the same (ahem!) reasons and in the face of the same heated opposition from the French Army, the sale of 60 Char B1 bis’s to Finland was approved – out of approximately 150 which had been produced by that date. As with the S35’s, these 60 were to be delivered immediately from stocks of the Char B1’s already in service with the French Army. And as with the S35’s, despite vociferous opposition from within the Army, the sale and handover was approved at the highest political levels.
Finnish Army Cha B1 bis tank unit mobilizing, Autumn 1939
The Souma S35 was near the top of the Finns defense shopping list and the Finns actually wanted more of these than they were sold, but the numbers that even heavily-bribed French politicians were prepared to sell were limited and instead of the requested S35’s, the balance of the numbers requested was met by a French political decision to offer the Finns the Char B1 bis’s instead. The fact that the high cost of the Char B1 bis’s resulted in rather more in the way of bribes being paid may have also had a bearing on the decision but this was a situation where beggars could not be choosers. The end result was that in addition to the 50 Souma S35’s offloaded in Turku in April 1939, some 60 Char B1 bis’s were also delivered. These 60 Char B1 bis’s would form the third Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona (Separate Tank/Panzer Battalion) in service with the Finnish Army in the Winter War.
In Finnish hands, the Char 1b bis’s fought a lethal defensive fight. The tanks thick armour made it next to impervious to Soviet tank and anti-tank guns and it’s firepower (in particular the high-velocity 47mm gun) easily ripped apart the lighter Soviet tanks used in the early months of the Winter War. Again, as with the Souma S35, the one-man turret was a major limiting factor, but in the largely defensive fighting on the Isthmus, this was not so much of a disadvantage as it would be in rather more mobile or offensive fighting. The Finns had immediately on arrival fitted the French-supplied tanks with new-model Nokia voice radios and again, the vastly improved communction, when combined with the Finnish Army’s pervasive portable radio network, meant tight cooperation was possible both between individual tanks and between panssari units and the attached infantry, anti-tank batteries and artillery with which they operated.
Finnish Army Char 1b in battle
To the great benefit of the Char B1 bis-equipped panssaripataljoona, the Red Army fought the war that the Finnish Army had developed the doctrine to fight. Doctrine, solid preparation and training, training and more training paid off over those early weeks of defensive fighting as the Char 1B battalion slowly fell back down the length of the Isthmus to the Mannerheim Line, while repeatedly causing heavy casualties to the attacking Red Army armor. Through to the end of the war, the Char B1 would be the Red Army’s most feared enemy tank, a mechanized nightmare which time and again annihilated the Russian tank units with which it was engaged. The lack of Red Army survivors to pass the experience on meant that in general, the Red Army failed to learn any lessons from these devastating encounters.
In one defensive counter attack in January 1940 for example, a single troop of six B1’s, working together with two companies of infantry, artillery and close air support and fighting from carefully prepared defensive positions initially severely mauled a major Red Army assault. As the Red Army units pulled back, the Finnish tanks attacked frontally and completed the annihilation of an entire Red Army Tank Regiment, with Finnish infantry capturing six Soviet tanks which had been abandoned by their crews. These were then driven back to the Finnish lines as the Finns withdrew. All the B1’s were hit numerous times but suffered no major damage in the action. Time and again the Finnish Army would carry out such counter-attacks on slowly advancing Red Army units, taking advantage of the Red Army’s lack of cohesion between Tanks, Infantry and Artillery to inflict massive losses (and not incidentally, capturing much Soviet equipment in the process). Combining these tanks, excellent communications and the outstanding artillery fire control and artillery concentration methods used by the Finns, the Soviet spearheads found themselves smashed to pieces again and again.
Destroyed Finnish Army Char B1 – Karelian Isthmus – Summer 1940
Through the entire length of the Winter War and wherever they were found, the small number of Finnish Army’s Char 1B’s ruled the battlefield, only losing the occasional tank to heavy indirect fire from Soviet artillery. The Char 1B bis-equipped Erillinen Pansaaripataljoona emerged from the defensive fighting on the Karelian Isthmus over the winter of 1939-1940 virtually unscathed. Heavier losses occurred during the Spring 1940 offensive down the Karelian Isthmus where the heavily armoured Char 1B’s often took the lead in major attacks, as a consequence suffering rather more heavily than they had in the purely defensive fighting of earlier months. They also suffered rather more losses in the fighting on the outskirts of Leningrad. While they were used carefully and to their strengths in well-coordinated actions, losses were no longer minimal and by the end of the Winter War, only 15 of the 60 Char 1B’s acquired from the French remained in action.
The B1 bis in action with the French Army
Char B1 bis and Hotchkiss H39
Despite its obsolete features, low autonomy and speed, the B1 was hard to stop. Its most formidable assets were its huge armor and good firepower, then unmatched in the west. The 60 mm (2.36 in) frontal armor was sloped, which mean it was near 80 mm (3.15 in) effectively. There were no real weak spots, and this invulnerability helped the B1 to close on targets, then destroy it with the turret 47 mm (1.85 in) or the brute force of the howitzer HE shells. For this reasons, the B1 was the Wehrmacht’s most feared enemy tank, a mechanized nightmare which caused heavy casualties by itself during the few fights during which it was engaged. The Germans never again experienced such losses in tank to tank combat until the fall of 1941, when encountering the Soviet KV-1 and T-34.
The Panzer I and II were absolutely harmless to the B1, and the Panzer III with its thin armor and 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, presented no serious threat the the French B1. As for the Panzer IV, it had only 20 mm (0.79 in) protection (Ausf. A, 30 mm (1.18 in) (Ausf. B and C) and 50 mm (1.97 in) (Ausf. D). It’s standard gun was the low velocity, short barrel 75 mm (2.95 in) KwK 37 , which was only effective at short range. For this reasons, the Panzer IV barely presented a real threat except in close, real time coordination with other vehicles. The same could be said about most German antitank guns of the time. The famous standard-issue “door-knocker” Pak 37 and even the Pak 40 were harmless. Contrary to common opinion of the time, the large ventilation exhaust panel was indirectly 55 mm (2.17 in) strong and never presented a weak point.
When the war broke out in September 1939, there were perhaps 180 operational B1 and B1 bis in all. They were used for the Sarre offensive, a short-lived burst without serious opposition, with a massive force of 41 divisions and 2400 tanks. The aim was to distract and divert German forces from Poland, France’s ally. After slowly penetrating 8 km (5 mi) into enemy territory, the entire force withdrew by order of General Gamelin into the security of the Maginot line. Several officers, including Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle, wildly protested. In effect, the Germans would have been in great danger and the Rhine was in reach. But Gamelin then was so confident about the famous fortified line that he saw any large-scale offensive to be a useless waste of material and men.
During the “Phoney War”, all B1s were gathered in massive infantry support divisions, the “division cuirassés de réserve” or DCR, which were tactically committed in the second phase of any assault, the first being led by cavalry tanks like the SOMUA S35. No tanks were sent in Norway, but the real deal began in May 1940. Three DCR, comprising each 69 tanks, were mobilized. Part of the 37th Bataillon de Chars de Combat, it comprised only B1s, were all rearmed with long-barrel SA 35 guns in May 1940 (turret designation APX1A). After the German invasion began, four new DCR of 52 B1s were constituted, as well as five Compagnie Autonome de Chars (autonomous tanks companies), with 56 B1s in all, plus 34 more in the 28 BCC (Bataillon de chars de combat). All B1s were reequipped with phonic versions of the ER53 radios, and command tanks received ER55 long-range radios.
Captain, later Colonel & then General Pierre Billotte
B1 tanks were used (and lost) during the first phase of the operations, especially the first week. Most counter-offensives against Guderian’s “run to the sea” counted at least several B1s. Without air support these moves were doomed to failure against the quick and lethal Stuka attacks. Bad tactics of course brought these precious tanks to inept, hasty defensive “plugs” in the defensive lines, most of the time, ending in pure waste. In some case, the B1’s extraordinary sturdiness allowed some success, notably the counter-attacks at laon and Moncornet led by Col. De Gaulle, and stiff resistance like at Hannut and particularly Stonne. During these events, some individual B1’s blocked by themselves the German advance, inflicting horrendous casualties.
In a particular case, a single B1, Eure, commanded by Captain Pierre Billotte, attacked frontally and destroyed single-handedly thirteen Panzer IIIs and IVs, and then withdrew, while being hit 140 times. During two days, B1 tanks from the 3rd Division Cuirassée de Réserve literally ruled the battlefield at Stonne, destruction coming only due to German overwhelming attacks against single tanks and excellent communication, air strikes and indirect fire (by German howitzers). Some B1’s also broke down or ran out of ammunition and petrol. The last surviving B1’s were mixed with other tanks in support of the so-called “hedgehogs”, which fell one after the other in June 1940. By the 26th of June 1940, the campaign was over.
Char B1 Eure in action…
Two Stories about the Char B1 bis during the Battle of Stonne (15-18 May 1940)
The Eure and her crew
Eure: The 1/41e BCC outflanks Stonne by the north-west but capitaine Billotte is hampered by several cliffs and important slopes. He has to move to the right, arriving in Stonne itself (from the north-west) before the battalion commander. The B1bis “Eure” arrives nose to nose with 13 German tanks of Pz.Rgt.8 (10.PzD) in column in the main street of the town. The first tank is only at 30m. Billotte orders the driver (sergent Durupt) to target the last tank with the 75mm SA35 hull gun while he destroys the first tank with the 47mm SA35 turret gun. The first shots destroyed simultaneously the first and the last German tank of the column, the others could hardly move. In several minutes, the B1bis “Eure” advances in the street and neutralize the 11 remaining tanks while numerous shells are hitting the armor of the B1bis without penetrating it. 2 Panzer IVs and 11 Panzer IIIs are reported as being destroyed (It is however not 100% sure that among them there were not several wrecks from the previous day). Billotte crosses the whole town and destroys also two 3.7cm AT guns next to the “Pain de Sucre”. The armor of the B1bis revealed later to be scattered with 140 impacts and gouges, none of the projectiles penetrated the armor according to the war diary of the 41e BCC. One can see here a kind of small reversed “Villers Bocage”. The “Eure” was scuttled on the 13th June as the drive wheels were unable to be used.
The “Ricquewihr” and her crew
Ricquewihr: On May 16, around 17h00, the Char B1bis “Ricquewihr” (commanded by Lieutenant Doumecq or Domercq ? Apparently the second name is the right one but the first one can be found in several books) from 49e BCC attacks towards Stonne and encounters a German infantry column, which fires at the tank with infantry weapons including anti-tank rifles, without effect. The B1bis crushes its way through the German troops and pushes into the town defended by the Schützen-Regiment 64. When the German soldiers saw the bloody tracks of the tank they fled in panic and abandoned Stonne which remained unoccupied for the night. After that action Domercq was nicknamed “the butcher of Stonne” by his comrades. Ricquewihr will be heavily involved in the combat at Tannay over May 23-24. The B1bis “Ricquewihr” will be the last surviving tank of the 3e DCr, abandoned on June 18, at Sombernon north-east of Dijon, the weapons having been previously scuttled by the crew. At the end of 1942, Domercq (former commander of the tank and living in Paris) is in a pub on the Poincaré Avenue where a German tanker shows several photos to his friends. Domercq recognize his former tank, the “Ricquewihr”. The German explains that he is now the commander of this tank, that he has fired with it and that it was a good tank. He will be taking the tank and the rest of the crew to the Russian front.
B1/B1 bis fate: German and French service
French Renault Char B1 bis tank, with German ‘B2′ modifications, owned by Bovington Tank Museum
The Germans captured hundreds of tanks, including no less than 161 B1 bis tanks, later pressed into service as the Panzerkampfwagen B-2 740(f). Sixty were converted into flamethrower versions (Flammwagen auf Panzerkampfwagen B-2 (f)), and sixteen to carry the 105 mm (4.13 in) howitzer. A single unit was equipped only with B1s, the Panzer-Abteilung 213, stationed in the British Channel Islands. One of these ended at the Bovington museum, repainted in French colors. 17 units in all received modified B1s, as they saw service in the Balkans (March-April 1941) and the Eastern Front, where their armor and armament initially proved well-adapted against Russian heavy tanks. By 1944, they were all gone.
Those stationed in France took part in the defense of Normandy, and others were stationed in support of the German units defending Paris. In August 1944 some were captured by insurgents and used in action by local FFI units. In 1945, German pockets of resistance in France, especially those on the western coast, were left to the FFI and the regular French 1st army. Edmond Voillaume’s 2nd Company was equipped with 19 B1s, which decisively took part in the reduction of the Royan pocket, and La Rochelle. B1s were also part of the 13th Dragoon Regiment, which took part in operations in Alsace and Southern Germany. They were stationed after V-day in the French occupied zone, until the unit was disbanded in 1946.
Surviving Char B1’s
Today eleven vehicles survive, one Char B1 and ten Char B1 bis. The last surviving Char B1 can be seen at the “Association pour la Sauvegarde du Patrimoine Historique et Militaire” (ASPHM), near Strasbourg, in France. It was previously at the Fort de Seclin. It is in a bad condition, with parts like the main gun missing. It was salvaged from a firing range, but will be restored by the owner.
The only remaining Char B1 at the Fort de Seclin, near Lille (France)
Ten Char B1 bis tanks can be seen in various places in Great Britain and in France:
- One is on display at the Bovington Tank Museum, England. It was modified for German service as the B2 variant.
- Three are in the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France. One, Flandres, is in running condition, while another, Rhône, is on permanent display in the museum. A third, a mine roller tank, is in storage.
- One is serving as a monument in the town of Stonne, France, where during the Battle of France the B1 tanks of the 3rd Division Cuirassée de Réserve played a key role in delaying the advance of the 10th Panzer Division for two days.
- Three are owned by the ASPHM, which bought one of them at the same time as the B1, from the Fort de Seclin. This B1 bis is also in a bad condition, with parts, including the main gun, missing. Salvaged from a firing range, it is intended for restoration by the owner. The two others were acquired in 2009 and are very badly damaged. They will most likely be used as “organ donors” in order to restore the B1 and one of the B1 bis tanks. One of the two B1 bis wrecks was identified as being n° 243 Intrépide, which belonged to 8th BCC and was put out of combat on 1 June 1940, at Moreuil.
- Two are on display at the 501st-503rd Tank Regiment at Mourmelon-le-Grand, France. One of these tanks was previously on display at the ERGMEB, Gien.
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A final note on Czech Tanks and Finland – the Patria M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf")
Thx - and feeling guilty as I am for not having posted anything for quite a while (work, dammit), here's another installment that comes out of sequence. There's posts on German, Russian, Czech and Finnish tanks to come, and this is the penultimate "Finnish Tanks" post. I kind of got hooked up on finishing this one so forgive me..... and if anyone has any suggestions on edits, I'm wide open....
A final note on Czech Tanks and Finland – the Patria M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf")
Between the end of the Winter War in late 1940, and the re-entry of Finland into WW2 as one of the Allies fighting against Germany, Finland introduced the Czech/Finnish-designed and built Patria M/42 Valkosusi into service. One of the main contenders for the “best tank of WW2″, the Valkosusi was a lethal weapon when fought to its strengths. This is the story of Finland’s Main Battle Tank of the last years of WW2.
By the end of the Winter War, it was obvious that the Finnish M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä, whilst a capable armoured fighting vehicle, would all too soon be outclassed by the heavy Russian tanks that had begun to be seen in small numbers in September and October 1940. In addition, the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä was more of a tank destroyer, suited to the defense but not to the tactical offensive that was at the heart of Finnish war-fighting doctrine. It was an effective armoured fighting vehicle on the defensive (and indeed, would remain in production until 1945 and in service well into the 1950’s with the Finnish Army) but it was not the tank that the Finnish Panssaaridivisoona’s doctrine called for.
Finnish Army Patria M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä
Likewise, the Patria M/38 Sotavaunut, based on the same chassis and hull but with a Swedish-built turret, had an outclassed 37mm gun that could do nothing against the heavy frontal armour of the newer Soviet tanks such as the KV-1 – although still effective from the sides or rear. The M/38’s fairly lightweight armour, while adequate in the Winter War, could be shredded by the new Soviet tank guns that had been encountered in the last weeks of fighting (and indeed, by the Finnish Army’s own 75mm anti-tank guns) which did not bode well for the future. Likewise, the Bofors 37mm gun, the main armament of the Sotavaunut M/38, could do nothing to the prototype Soviet T-34 tank’s thick, sloped armor plate (although side or rear shots were still effective – but much harder to get in position for). Conversely, the high velocity Bofors-Tampella 76mm gun with which the Patria M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä was equipped had proved itself quite capable of taking out the new Soviet tanks.
Patria M/38 Sotavaunut – the mainstay of the Finnish Army’s tank force in the Winter War
One result of the immediate post-war reviews that were completed within weeks of the war ending was a recommendation to urgently develop a more capable, better protected and better armed tank capabe of taking on the new model Soviet tanks on an equal footing. This was without any doubt inspired by the latest model Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks encountered in the last weeks of fighting of the Winter War, many examples of which had been captured and which were available for study. A special commission, consisting of Patria engineers and the Škoda and CKD engineers and designers who had remained in Finland (or who had previously left to find refuge in Finland for various reasons) was formed to study the adversary and design a solution. However, it was understood from the start that to develop a completely new tank would take too long and be too expensive.
The design team was formed in December 1940 and given the goal of having a draft design ready by the end of April 1941. Study of the newest captured Soviet tanks together with almost a year of continuous combat against the Red Army had resulted in the identification of numerous areas where improvements were needed and/or could be achieved. Most critical amongst these were:
- Increased thickness of armour, particularly frontal armour but also side armour;
- Sloped armour, which would improve shot deflection and increase the effective resistance to penetration;
- Welded armour rather than riveted;
- Wider tracks to decrease ground pressure and improve mobility over soft ground and snow – something that the Finns, with their experience in building heavy tracked vehicles for use by the logging industry in winter, would exel in);
- A low centre of gravity and a low profile;
- A more powerful engine offering greater speed: one of the most frequent recommendations made by surviving tank commanders was that speed was essential: “Tanks must be fast. That, I would say, is the most important lesson of the war in regard to tank design….”;
- Preferably a diesel engine to increase survivability if hit;
- Larger fuel tanks giving an extended range, meaning less frequently required refueling;
- Mechanical reliability and serviceability: Engines and parts must be reliable and easy to service;
- Extended track life: average track life should be at least 2,000 miles (in the Winter War, the average track life of both the Sotavaunut M/38 and the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä was approximately 500 miles;
- “Fire-power, armor protection, speed, maneuverability and cross-country performance are the essentials, and the best type of tank is that which combines these conflicting requirements with the most success. As low a silhouette as possible should come next….”;
- A turret for the Bofors/Tampella 76mm gun, the gun turret should come with a turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns);
- A power-operated turret to increase the speed of traverse and subsequent target acquisition;
- A 3-man turret with provision for commander, gunner and loader: one of the major lessons learnt from the French-supplied tanks used by the Finnish Army in the Winter War was that it was impossible for the commander to effectively act as the gunner at one and the same time (Suggested crew of 5 – Driver and radio-operator/hull machine gunner in the forward compartment, commander, gunner & loader in the turret);
- Every tank must be equipped with radio;
- External Intercom on the back of each tank for communication with accompanying infantry;
Other key considerations were:
- Ease of manufacture (as few manhours as possible)’
- Reuse of as much of the existing armoured fighting vehicle production line as possible to minimize retooling requirements;
- Dimensions restricted the height, width, and weight so that it could be transported via typical bridges, roads, railroads (and potentially landing craft) without any special accommodation. This was intended to aid the strategic, logistical, and tactical flexibility and mobility of the armoured forces;
The design team was made up of a small number of Patria, Tampella, Škoda and CKD engineers and designers (the Škoda and CKD engineers were largely refugees who had been working in Finland with Patria when Czechoslovakia was taken over by the Germans and who had elected to remain in Finland) together with selected Panssaari officers and by April 1941 they not only had a completed design, they had built half a dozen wooden mockups plus one working prototype (built with soft steel). The tank, subsequently designated the M/42 Valkoinensusi, was based on a chassis that was an enlargement of the M/38 Sotavaunut / M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä with a conventional track design with a brand new turret modeled somewhat on those of the Soviet T-34. The tank would be powered by a 450-horsepower Finnish-manufactured Hispano-Suiza inline aircraft engine while the main gun was to be the Bofors-Tampella 76mm used in the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä that had proven so effective in the Winter War. Armour was significantly thicker than with the earlier tanks and at 25 tons weight overall (for the initial design), with its wide tracks, good off-road mobility and powerful engine, the proposed M/42 Valkoinensusi promised to be a very capable armoured fighting platform.
One of the early issues for Patria when they first began building tanks had been tank turret construction, in particular the turret rings, an issue that was the partial origin of Patria’s Panssarinhävittäjä design – initiated when a major bottleneck was encountered with turret ring manufacturing. However, with the assistance of Škoda engineers, this issue had been resolved in late 1939 and by late 1940, Patria was able to manufacture their own turrets, no longer needing to rely on Bofors in Sweden to build these. With the expertise so painfully and lengthily acquired on turret design and build for the Sotavaunut M/38, Patria was able to come up with a vastly improved turret for the M/42 Valkosusi (and for this, the contribution of the Škoda and CKD engineers and designers should be gratefully acknowledged – Patria’s success was very much due to the whole-hearted contribution of the Škoda / CKD team’s industrial engineering expertise and knowledge).
Multiple objectives were set for the new turret – it had to be as low as possible, in line with one of the tank’s major design goals being a low profile overall. It had to accomodate three crew members (commander, gunner and loader), it had to have a powered traverse independent of the main engine and be capable of turning 180 degrees in 15 seconds. It needed to accommodate the Tampella-Bofors 76mm gun and ready ammunition storage needed to hold at least 60 rounds of main gun ammunition, with provision for further ammunition storage within the tank.The hull and turret should also be cast or welded, with no riveting and without a single vertical surface; the goal being to have no shot traps. A wooden mockup of the new turret was built early in the design process to assist with design decisions on the placement of internal components. One of the outcomes was that a turret basket was added to the rear of the turret (an additional basket was later added to the rear of the tank in order to allow 10 jerrycans of petrol to be carried, permitting range to be extended somewhat).
A wooden mockup of the Patria M/42 Valkosusi turret was constructed on an existing M/38 chassis in tandem with the design and presented to the Review Committee on 29 April 1941
With the 76mm main gun in mind, the size of the new tank design was increased overall to allow a larger (1820mm/182cm turret ring) 3-man turret, with provision for a loader as well as the gunner and commander. The larger turret was also redesigned to include a large back extension for added ammunition storage (to a total of 137 main gun rounds) and was designed with an integral turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns). The large back extension to the turret also served as a counterweight to the main gun. The turret could be rotated either mechanically, or via an electric drive that ran independently of the main engine. While the turret crew main entry point was situated on the right side of the turret roof, experience in the Winter War had also demonstrated that one hatch in the turret was often insufficient for evacuation of the tank when it was hit so a second hatch was added besides the commander’s. An external pedestal-mounted Lahti 20mm cannon with a box feed was added to the turret for the tank commander to use while the main gun was paired with a coaxial 7.92mm heavy machine gun in the same mount (2,000 rounds of 7.92mm ammunition was also stored within the turret). Perhaps the greatest thing about this turret was its ability to depress the gun, the depression was 15 degrees giving it an insane hull-down capability which the Finnish tank crews would use to their advantage when fighting against the Germans through 1944 and 1945 (and now and then against the Red Army as well).
The ability of the M/42 Valkosusi to depress the main gun up to 15 degrees gave it an insane hull-down capability – and an ability to “snipe” from behind cover which Finnish tank crews grew to appreciate deeply in the fighting of 1944 and 1945
For reconnaissance and exterior viewing in battle, a rotary periscope was installed on the turret roof. Nokia Infra-red active night viewing equipment was proposed as standard. The active night vision for the gunner consisting of a Nokia infrared search light, and passive night vision optics for the driver, gunner and commander. The commander also had a passive night vision sight on the rotary periscope, featuring an image intensifier not unlike that used in night vision goggles. The combination of active searchlight and low level television gave the M/42 Valkosusi a night-fighting capability not matched in other tanks until the 1970’s, although its advantage was in the late ’70s was rapidly reduced with the increasing use of solid-state electronics and the quantum leap in microelectronics production beginning in the 1980s’.
Finnish Army Patria M/42 Valkosusi turret hatch with Infra-red night fighting device mounted. By mid-1944, almost all Finnish Army Tanks were also fitted with these Nokia IR systems, giving the entire Finnish armoured force an effective night-fighting capability, something the Finns used to full advantage.
Internal communication within the crew was performed thru an on-board Nokia communications system (or via light signals should the intercom go down). An external communications hookup was provided on the rear of the tank so as to allow easy communication with accompanying infantry. Provision was also made for three Nokia radios enabling Platoon, Company and Battalion communications to be maintained simultaneously by all tanks within a Panssaaripataljoona. This radio network had only been in its infancy in the Winter War but its effectiveness had been well-proven, having been used to co-ordinate communications between head-quarters, air, armoured, artillery and infantry units throughout the fighting.
The radio network linking armoured command, observation and communications vehicles and radio equipped combat vehicles that had proven so effective in the Winter War was to be vastly improved on between 1941 and 1943. In the fighting of 1940, their radio network had given the Finnish commanders both a clear picture of the battlefield and the means to direct their troops as quickly and precisely as possible. This network allowed the panssaari to penetrate deep behind enemy lines whilst maintaining constant contact with headquarters. It also allowed them access to the latest reconnaissance reports and to be deployed at a moments notice. Well trained panssaari commanders were frequently given the freedom to exploit this advantage to the fullest extent and certainly, the rapid and fluid Finnish advances in 1940 would not have been possible without radio. The combination of wide radio distribution and thorough radio training had proved invaluable to Finnish armoured units in 1940 and with the new tanks and armoured fighting vehicles with which the Panssaaridvisoona were being re-equipped from 1942 on, it was intended to expand on these capabilities.
The hull was split into two parts by an 8mm thick armor plate with the crew compartment in the front and the turret set above it. The propulsion (engine) and fuel tanks were at the rear. The front compartment had two seats (driver to the left, radioman/hull machine-gunner to the right) with access for both of them to the turret. Both hull crewmembers had their own viewports in the hull, covered by armored shutters. Viewports were also present in the side armor for both crewmembers (without the shutters). These side sections with viewports could be opened and used as entry points for the driver and the radioman. The radioman/hull machine-gunner operated a 7.92mm mounted in the front hull on an independent mount with 2,000 rounds of ammunition. The engine compartment space was designed to be watertight so that the M/42 could be submerged and cross waterways (a snorkel was designed in for this purpose, giving the M/42 the ability to ford water to a depth of 1.7m / 5 ft 7 inches).
Overall dimensions of the M42 Valkosusi were:
- Length (hull only): 22 ft 6 in (6.87m)
- Width (hull): 10ft 9 in (3.27m)
- Height: 2.49m
- Combat Weight: 30 tons
- Performance: maximum road speed of 35mph
- Operational Range: 250 miles
- Tracks: 460mm wide, 0.68 kg/cm^3 ground pressure
- Vehicle to be designed to cross a 265cm wide ditch, wade in 120cm of water, and climb a 40 degree incline
- Main Gun: 76mm Tampella-Bofors with Tampella-Skoda 20 round autoloader
- Secondary armament: 1x20mm Lahti cannon, 2×7.92mm machineguns
Armour was strategically thickened to offer additional protection, while welding rather than riveting was used. The M/38 Sotavaunut chassis and hull had been widened and lengthened, the M/42’s tracks were also widened to keep ground pressure low (weight had increased to 25 tons overall), provide better traction and a larger 450hp engine was specified. Smoke and defensive grenade launchers were also added, along with a protective thin (in fact mesh) layer of spaced armor. The front and side armour was well-sloped and built only with a homogeneous steel glacis plate. The armor for the side hull and superstructure (the side sponsons) was much thinner at 60 mm). The thinner side armor was necessary to keep the overall weight within reasonable bounds, but it made the M/42 vulnerable to attacks from the side by all German and Soviet tank and anti-tank guns. Finnish tactical doctrine for the use of the M/42 Valkosusi thus emphasized the importance of flank protection. Finnish tank crews were well aware of the weak side armor and made unauthorized augmentations by hanging track links or spare roadwheels (or even fastening logs of wood) onto the hull sides;
- Hull front, lower: 100 mm @ 55°; upper: 160 mm @ 55° [lower: 80 mm @ 55°; upper: 120 mm @ 55°]
- Hull side, lower: 60 mm @ 90°; upper: 60 mm @ 65°
- Hull rear: 60 mm @ 60°, 60mm @60° twin side hinged doors (engine servicing/rearming/escape/)
- Hull top: 34 mm @ 0°, 4 mm @ 0° (ammo store)
- Hull bottom: 40 mm @ 0°
- Turret front: 180 mm @ 80°, [120 mm @ 65°]
- Turret side: 80 mm @ 69°, [80 mm @ 65°]
- Turret rear: 80 mm @ 70°, [80 mm @ 65°]
- Turret top: 44 mm @ 0–10°
Skirt armour 5mm thick would later be fitted to the hull sides. The curved turret and the mantlet shape gave added likeliehood of any shells hitting the turret being deflected. With the considerable extra weight that had been added, the chassis design was strengthened. The front was reinforced, shock absorbers replaced and steering gear substantially modified. A new track design substantially increased off-road traction. The Hispano-Suiza engine was fitted with direct injection rather than carburetors and an engine silencer was added. Together with a number of other cold-weather modifications, fuel consumption was lowered and the engine could cold start from -25º C. And engine warmer was also added for use in extreme cold.
Early concept design for the M/42 Valkosusi was drawn up by a small Skoda Team, later to be substantially modified as the design process continued….
Overall, the end result weighed in at just 30 tons, with a powerful engine giving a projected top speed of 35mph and with substantially widened tracks giving low ground pressure (a particular concern for snowy or swampy conditions), the new tank promised good off-road mobility, good speed and had reasonable armor protection. The welded armour was rather thicker than its predecessor (although crews would come to regard it as too thin), offering adequate protection to the crew without being excessively heavy (the designers had intentionally traded off protection for speed). The design was simple and straightforward, making it cheap and fast to build – and to achive this, numerous simplifications had been made to the design. It had also been designed to rapidly replace the Patria M/38 Sotavaunut on the Patria assembly lines at Tornio. On paper, at least, Patria had produced a very capable armoured fighting vehicle. A wooden mockup of the Patria M/42 Valkosusi was constructed in tandem with the design and presented to the Review Committee on 29 April 1941.
One of the first Patria M/42 Valkosusi tanks to come of the production line being road-tested in 1942
One of the first Patria M/42 Valkosusi tanks to come of the production line being road-tested in 1942
The Patria M/42 Valkosusi’s Main Gun
The gun that gave the Patria M/42 Valkosusi its punch was a rather more modified version of the Tampella-Bofors 76mm that gave the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä its firepower. In the Winter War, the firepower this gun gave the Finnish Army was devastating. By 1942/43, it was rather less so, but this would be restored with new ammunition, as we will see.
The main gun proposed for the M/42 Valkosusi was a Škoda/Tampella engineering team modified version of the Bofors 76mm in use on the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä. The gun was the same, the main modification consisted of making the gun fully automatic with a drum feed capable of 15 shots per minute and using a new type of armour-piercing ammunition. The long barrel and large propellant charge for the new ammunition to be used gave a very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory and excellent armor-piercing qualities. The flat trajectory also made hitting targets much easier, since accuracy was less sensitive to errors in range estimation and increased the chance of hitting a moving target, though these same attributes made the gun a poor fire-support weapon using HE ammo. Indeed, the Valkosusi’s 76mm gun had more penetrating power than the main gun of the Tiger I heavy tank, the 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56. The AP-T projectile used initially had an overall weight of 7.2 kg and a muzzle velocity of 925 m/sec.
Tampella-Bofors 76mm gun assembly line, Tampella plant, Tampere
Average penetration performance established against rolled homogenous steel armor plate laid back at 30° from the vertical was:
- 100 m: 138 mm
- 500 m: 124 mm
- 1,000 m: 111 mm
- 1,500 m: 99 mm
- 2,000 m: 89 mm
To compensate for the wear of such rapid fire, a special compressed-air device had been designed which would clean the barrel after every shot. The weight of the gun, with it’s long barrel, was balanced by the rearward extension of the gun turret with added ammunition storage in the rear of the turret. The autoloader was proposed so as to ensure that the high velocity 76.2mm gun could fire so much faster than Russian / German weapons that an enemy target could be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of fire. On the other hand, this could also be somewhat of an issue as the main gun’s high rate of fire could use up all the ammunition in the autoloader (20 rounds in two bins of 10 rounds each) in less than two minutes. The tank itself would hold only 137 main gun rounds and given the high rate of fire, this could easily be expended in just a few minutes of combat. Also, reloading the autoloader could take up to 15 minutes if all rounds had been expended.
Debate on this subject was considerable. With the autoloader, 15 rounds per minute could be fired, while in manual loading, a rate of firing of around 8 rounds per minute could be achieved under favorable conditions with an experienced crew (one round each 7.5 seconds). There’s a considerable choreography involved in a manual reload – imagine that the loader would have to, in the confines of the turret and hull, under combat conditions, possibly while moving across country, reach to the rear stowage, pull out a 11 kg round from a magazine with one hand, get a grip on it, then turn so he could load the round and push it in. Getting to the reserve rounds under the floor and in the sponsons also required some intricate dance steps as the loader moved around to get the rounds.
However, this rate of fire would drop considerably under combat conditions and as the crew became increasingly fatigued. There was also of course the question of target acquisition. And then of course, after continuously firing rounds from tanks, after you get about 15 -20 shell casings laying/bouncing around/etc. on the floor, it gets really difficult for the loader to load more rounds and the turret to move or the gun to recoil safely, so there would have to be a pause just to clear the turret. But even at 8 rounds per minute the emptying of ready ammo racks and the obstruction of empty shell casings prevents tanks from sustaining this rate for any length of time. While the autoloader potentially enabled one crew member to be removed, reducing the crew from 5 to 4, a further drawback was seen as being that while replenishment of ammunition for the autoloader could be done from inside the tank, a complete reload of both bins generally took approximately 15 minutes.
The Patria M/42 Valkosusi’s Main Gun was in fact one of the most powerful tank guns of World War II, due to the large propellant charge and the long gun barrel, which gave the round a very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory and excellent armor-piercing qualities.
The review committee took one look at the autoloader proposal, viewed the risk as far too high and in an unusual example of Finnish verbosity, took the designers to task for a “dangerously high-risk proposal”. The Finnish equivalent of a shit-storm erupted, with the two opposing viewpoints being put forward at length. However, Škoda and Tampella had already worked together to produce a working prototype and this was satisfactorily demonstrated. Tampella also had considerable prior experience with autoloaders from 1938-39 with the autoloaders designed and developed for the Wihuri ground-attack aircraft with their nose-mounted magazine-fed 37mm anti-tank gun. Extensive trials of the 76mm autoloader were carried out. The improved 76mm used a more powerful charge which allowed it to penetrate 138 mm (of RHA sloped at 30 degrees) at 100 m and 111 mm at 1000 m, which was considered excellent. This gun gave the Valkosusi a firepower advantage over the Russian T-34 (the key design objective), although the muzzle flash due to unburnt powder from the increased charge could leave crews momentarily blinded after firing. The blast also kicked up dust from the ground and often obscured vision for further firing.
The addition of a muzzle brake solved this problem by directing the blast sideways (with the added benefit of substantially reducing recoil. The “improved” Tampella-Bofors 76mm also featured a gyroscopic stabilized gun and sight. The stabilization was only in the vertical plane, as the mechanism could not slew the turret. The stabilizer was sufficient to keep the gun within 1/8th of a degree, or 2 mils while crossing moderately rough terrain at 15 miles an hour. This gave a hit probability of 70% on enemy tanks at ranges of 300 to 1200 yards. The utility of the stabilization is debatable; with some Finnish tank crews saying it was useful for its intended purpose, others only used the sights for stabilized viewing on the move. Some Finnish Army tank crews disabled the stabilizer.
In the event, after considerable and very heated debate, it was decided to proceed with the autoloader in production as the advantages in combat were seen to outweigh the disadvantages. The 76mm autoloader gun went into production in time to be used for the first Valkosusi’s to roll of Patria’s Tornio production line. The Valkosusi’s 76mm main gun was in fact one of the most powerful tank guns of World War II, due to the large propellant charge and the long gun barrel, which gave the round a very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory and excellent armor-piercing qualities.
Standard AP-T ammunition was manufactured by Ammus Oy, but going into 1944, the tanks were also supplied with a white phosphorus shell intended for use as an artillery marker to help with targeting. Once the war against Germany started, Valkosusi tank crews quickly discovered that the shell could also be used against the Tiger and Panther tanks (and Russian T34’s for that matter) — when the burning white phosphorus adhered to enemy tanks, their optics would be blinded and the acrid smoke would get sucked inside the vehicle, making it difficult or impossible for the crew to breathe. This, and the fear of the fire spreading inside the tank, would sometimes cause the crew to abandon the tank.
The Patria M/42 Valkosusi in it’s final design iteration as production commenced… the profile was somewhat distinctive
In its final design iteration as production commenced, the Patria M/42 Valkosusi weighed 30 tons, was powered by a 450-horsepower Finnish-manufactured Hispano-Suiza engine giving a maximum road speed of 35 mph and a range of 250 miles. With a crew of 5, it mounted the Tampell-Bofors 76mm main gun with a 20 round autoloader, 2 x 7.92mm machine guns and an external Lahti 200 cannon. The M/42 Valkosusi retained some of the design features of the earlier Patria M/38 Sotavaunut and the Sotavaunut’s immediate ancestor, the Czech LT35, primarily centered around the chassis and torsion bar system and the general “look” of the hull, although overall size had increased considerably to around the same dimensions as the German Panther.
In its final design iteration as production commenced, the Patria M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf")
Patria M/42 Valkosusi Production
The first mild steel prototype was produced by April 1941. An extensive and detailed review over the summer of 1941 was followed by further design modifications and the production of two further prototypes for August 1941, only one of which was fitted with a turret. The three prototypes were extensively and exhaustively tested and proved prone to a number of technical problems which were worked on. Likewise, many modifications were made to the interior layout, including much improved ergonomics. Nevertheless, the early consensus was that, even though fixes were needed for the problems identified, the new design had surpassed design specifications and expectations.
In June 1941, the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union, an event that the Finnish military had been expecting for some time based on intelligence reports. The Finnish military had been partially mobilized over April and May 1941 in expectation of such an attack as at this point, the Finnish government and military command trusted neither the Soviet’s nor the German’s to respect Finland’s neutrality. Both Germany and the Soviet Union placed ongoing pressure on Finland, both economic and political, covertly and overtly, but Finland was determined to remain neutral. Without going into any further details at this point in the narrative, the outbreak of open war between Germany and the USSR resulted in a further large-scale mobilization of the Merivoimat and Ilmavoimat together with the Armeija. At the same time both Germany and the Soviet Union were repeatedly given notice of Finland’s intent to maintain its neutrality at all costs – a declaration that both sides reluctantly respected given their earlier encounters with Finland.
A view of the prototype from the rear: a single prototypes was also constructed on an M/38 Sotavaunu chassis with a wooden mock-up turret and gun.
The outbreak of open war gave an added impetus to the drive to re-equip Finland’s armoured units and in July 1941, the Army placed an initial order for 400 M/42 Valkosusi’s (as the new tank was now officially designated) to be manufactured in 1942, while a further 750 were to be completed over 1943. Patria M4/2 Valkosusi production commenced in March 1942 after an increasingly frantic re-jigging of the production lines was finally completed. As the M/42 had been designed very specifically to rapidly replace the M/38 Sotavaunut on the assembly lines at Patria, the changeover moved ahead rapidly, actually managing to come in 4 weeks ahead of the targeted completion date – a miracle of sorts for almost any engineering project. Patria had taken advantage of the new design to streamline and improve workflow and production techniques in light of experience gained with the production of the Sotavaunut M/38 and the M/39 and manufacturing efficiency had been very considerably improved.
Potential bottlenecks existed with four major components – steel, suitable engines, the Tampella-Bofors 76mm main gun and the turrets. Without adequate supplies of these, production in suffient quantity would prove a challenge, as had occurred with the Sotavaunut M/38. The new M/42 Valkosusi was a formidable design, but with war between Germany and the USSR already underway and the fighting taking place close to Finland’s borders, there was an urgent need to introduce the M/42 into service regardless of obstacles.
The first bottleneck, steel, was addressed through the simple expedient of increasing the output of rolled plate steel from the Tornio Steel Mill. Casting of the tank hulls had been considered, and certainly by 1940 the Tornio Mills could have been used to produce large cast components. Castings, though, have certain inherent disadvantages. No matter how metallurgically sophisticated a nation is, the physics dictates that grain orientation cannot be controlled, and grain growth is mostly uncontrollable in large castings. Thus even the most elegant tool steel alloys are not particularly strong as raw castings, without a further hardening process to make a fine grain structure. Casting’s main advantages, once the tooling is built, are production rate and lower (not higher!) technological requirements. A casting facility–especially one that works with simple alloys–can be nothing more than a big building, an overhead crane and a furnace.
Rolled plate, on the other hand, may not be perfect, but it offers fairly good and consistent grain size, work hardening, and especially grain orientation. Welding of fabricated plate sections, if done properly, does not compromise these advantages. The gains from plate’s metallurgical advantages more than offset the small trigonometric differences in effective thickness from small angles of incidence of shell impact against angled sections of cast hulls and turrets. Sophisticated heat treating can be combined with rolling to make very strong steel. But good rolled plate requires a very, very expensive and complicated mill. Fortunately, the Tornio Steel Mill had been built in the mid-1930’s with this kind of high quality rolled alloy steel output in mind and by reducing exported amounts, sufficient rolled plate steel was available for M/42 and M/39 production.
Rolled armor is essentially cast armor which has been further worked and shaped, which aligns the grain structure which increases ballistic strength. Rolled steel armor is made by first pouring molten metal into molds and allowing it to cool and solidify into ingots. These big barrel-shaped pieces which come out of the molds are then pounded with hammers (BIG hammers) to form billets, which are then rolled at the rolling mill to become slabs, which can be sized in thickness to fit the tank design. They are flame cut to the profile of the desired tank part, then heat treated, then welded into the tank. Cast steel armor components bypass all that working, and are made simply by pouring molten metal directly into tank component shaped molds. They are removed from the molds, rough spots, risers and gate marks ground off, and heat treated. Then they are built into the tank.
Given their small manpower pool and the need to keep casualties down, the Finns opted for better quality armour plate albeit at a higher labour cost per manufactured tank. Very good armor may deliver three or four times the performance, inch for inch, of the best possible homogeneous casting and this was factored into the alloy steel specified for the M/42’s construction. The flexural strength and notch sensitivity of the metal are perhaps the most important characteristics that distinguish sophisticated fine-grained differentially cold-rolled high-alloy plate, with not only a hardened face but maximum toughness of the plate core and maximum ductility of the inner face (to resist spalling), from homogeneous hot-rolled plate or varying-characteristic cast sections of carbon steel with no heat treatment beyond surface carburizing. Sophisticated plate depends on the flexural strength of the plate core to contribute its local stiffness to the spreading of the incoming shock wave over a larger area, so that the inner face will experience a lower peak force. Notch sensitivity, of course, is relevant to whether the inner face of the armor stays in one piece under dynamic conditions.
Good armor has a hard outer face to reflect as much energy as possible and spread the remainder over as large an armor area as possible; a high-strength tough interior to resist deformation and convert kinetic energy to heat; and a ductile inner face to resist spalling due to the propagated shock wave and local deformation. When an AP round hits it, the armor undergoes tremendous local heating. If the AP round overwhelms the armor and penetrates, a sizable amount of armor metal is typically ejected into the tank interior ahead of the penetrating round. That metal is at least very hot and sometimes molten. It can have a much higher velocity inside the tank than the remnant velocity of the penetrating round. This spray of liquid steel generally ignites whatever is flammable. Also, having lost much of its kinetic energy penetrating the first armor surface, the projectile is likely to bounce off the inner face of the far armor surface and ricochet around the interior to the detriment of the occupants within.
Bad armor is hard through. When an AP round hits it, a few large chunks of armor pop inward to make a hole a bit bigger than the diameter of the projectile. These chunks may initially be moving fairly quickly, but having broken out at relatively low force levels, they are probably barely warm. Thus their damage contribution is minimal. The projectile
itself, having lost little velocity, continues onward. If it ricochets off the gun or a wall, it may lose all of its energy bouncing around tens or hundreds of times inside, but if it hits the second wall cleanly, it may break out another clean hole and exit. For a given incoming round, the odds are very much higher that bad armor will result in a penetration. The reason that the results of a good-armor penetration are so much more violent is that the armor died its own violent death trying to keep the projectile away from the crew. You’re much, much more likely to end up dead behind bad armor than behind good armor. The Tornio Mills manufactured good armour and in more than enough quantity to meet Patria’s needs.
The second major bottleneck was suitable engines. In the years leading up to World War II, as the need for armored vehicles was realized, designers in all countries were faced with the problem of how to power the vehicles, which weighed considerably more than the usual trucks that large vehicle engines were designed for. To solve this, they turned to using aircraft engines, which provided greater power-to-weight ratios and were more reliable than conventional inline vehicle engines available at the time. In this, the Finns chose to utilize the Finnish-manufactured Hispano-Suiza inline engines that were then being manufactured in increasing numbers.
For tank use the Hispano-Suiza had its supercharger, reduction gear, and other equipment removed from its camshaft, greatly simplifying its construction. It had cast, rather than forged, pistons, and was de-rated to around 600 bhp (447 kW), running on lower-octane petrol instead of high-octane aviation fuel. In addition, because weight saving was not so important for a tank engine, some of the Hispano-Suiza’s more expensive light-alloy components were replaced with cheaper, steel components in the “M39/M42″ version. It was also envisaged that the tank engine would use some components rejected on quality grounds for the Hispano-Suiza aircraft engine, i.e. Hispano-Suiza scrap. In use as a tank engine, the Hispano-Suiza engine was very lightly stressed and reliable, and substantially increased the power available. The first Hispano-Suiza prepared for tank use was tried in a modified M/38 Sotavaunut in September 1941 at Tornio and proved more than successful. Further helping avoid any bottleneck, the Hispano-Suiza engines were reserved for M/39’s and M/42’s to be delivered for Finnish use.
Patria M/42 Valkosusi turrets in the Patria turret assembly building, Tornio
Those M/42’s destined for Sweden were shipped without engines, turrets or guns. A similar approach to the Tampella-Bofors 76mm main gun and the turrets ensured that adequate supplies were available for Patria. This in turn enabled the production line to be maintained at full speed from the date of inauguration of M/42 Valkosusi production in early 1942 through to the end of WW2. And afterwards for that matter, as orders were placed for the re-equipment of the Armies of Finland’s close allies, in particular Poland and the four small Baltic States.
Once in service, the M4/2 Valkosusi reliability would prove to have benefited greatly from the detailed input into the requirements and design. Indeed, in tests against US-supplied Sherman tanks, Russian T-34’s from the tail-end of the Winter War and, later, on captured German Panther and Tiger tanks, “…the Valkosusi was faster than all the others, both across country and on the highway and could make sharper turns. It was also the better hill climber and could maneuver nicely over ground where the US and German tanks, and at times also the Russian tanks, would bog down…..” Advantage had also been taken of many features developed in the US in the 1930’s of which the Finns had become aware when working to procure arms and equipment over the course of the Winter War.
The first M/42 Valkosusi rolled of the Patria production line in early April 1942, with the 200th completed in mid-November of the same year. Production continued, with the Patria line working at full capacity as the Soviet Union fought on against the Germans, a battle which the Finns watched with something close to paranoia, fearing that one side or the other might attempt to drag them in. Ongoing attempts through this period to put in place a formal military alliance with Sweden were rebuffed, with the Swedish Government continuing to regard Finland’s domestic politics and “overtly and aggressively militaristic stance” with great suspicion. Finland’s public commitment to the cause of Estonia also caused the Swedish Government concern, as they wished to remain neutral and not be drawn into a war with either the USSR or Germany by the “unsteady and adventurous” Finns. Finland was now perhaps even more isolated than she had been at the time of the Winter War, although now the two totalitarian behemoths were warring on Finland’s very borders.
Standard practice when moving the Patria M/42 Valkosusi cross-country in non-combat situations was to fully elevate the gun, or reverse the turret – here, reversed and locked down
By January 1943, on average approximately 25 M/42 Valkosusi’s per week were being produced and sufficient were on hand have completed the re-equipment of the 21st Panssaridivisoona. Unfortunately for the Finnish Army, Finland did require export income and Sweden would again apply pressure to the Finnish government to export weapons to Sweden. This caused a considerable debate within the Finnish government, particularly as Sweden’s defence spending and investment in defence manufacturing infrastructure was nowhere near the level that Finland maintained, at great cost, throughout the years of WW2. Despite this, from April 1943 on, almost half the Valkosusi production was exported to Sweden, albeit without the turrets and guns, which were produced in Sweden (as they had been for the Swedish Army’s M/38 Sotavaunut’s).
Finnish Army M/42 Valkosusi in cover outside a Latvian village during the advance south down the Baltic, May 1944
This considerably slowed deliveries of the Valkosusi’s to the Finnish Army through 1943 and it was only by March 1944 that the 22nd Pansaaridivisoona found itself fully equipped at last with the Valkosusi. The 23rd had to make to with lend-lease Shermans supplied by the United States. A great deal of ill-feeling was generated by this Swedish demand, particularly as the hundreds of Valkosusi’s supplied to Sweden would never see battle. As one Finnish panssaari officer put it succinctly in mid 1944, shortly after the landings in Estonia, “the damned Swedes are protecting themselves yet again at the cost of the lives of Finnish soldiers.” This ill-feeling was somewhat offset by the full Division of Swedish volunteers who were now fighting within the Finnish Army.
After the Patria M/42 Valkosusi began to enter service in 1942, some further problems were identified. One was the length of the 76mm main gun barrel. Not unexpectedly, as with the Patria M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä, it was necessary for crews to be careful not to plough the gun barrel into the ground while traveling cross-country or in combat. A Finnish tank crewman later commented: “…the tank gun could easily dig into the ground in the smallest ditch. If you fired it after that, the barrel would open up at the end like the petals of a flower.” Standard practice when moving the M/42 Valkosusi cross-country in non-combat situations was to fully elevate the gun, or reverse the turret. On the other hand, none of the Valkosusi crews wished to trade off a lower velocity round for the convenience of a shorter barrel.
Finnish Army M/42 Valkosusi moving south with accompanying infantry, Lithuania June 1944
During the winter and spring fighting of 1944–45, the M/42 Valkosusi demonstrated a marked advantage over both Russian and German tanks in its ability to move easily and rapidly over deep mud or snow without bogging down, leaving even the renowned T-34 in its wake. Finnish experience through the 1930’s with operating heavy logging equipment under similar conditions, and the resultant contribution to the M/42 Valkosusi design had paid off in spades. In terms of mobility, the Patria M/42 Valkosusi’s broad tracks, truly excellent suspension, low ground pressure and powerful engine gave it unparalleled cross-country performance while the tracks themselves were generally reliable and capable of running up high mileages before needing replacement. The powerful motor in proportion to overall weight resulted in a good turn of speed. Mechanically, the M/42 Valkosusi proved to be highly reliable; maintenance in the field was straightforward while the tank’s low profile was also a definite advantage in combat, as was the ability to depress the main gun, allowing the Valkosusi to “snipe” from cover.
Finnish Army M/42 Valkosusi advancing into Poland, late summer 1944
In battle through 1944 and 1945, the M/42 Valkosusi generally proved superior to both the German tanks and, when called for (as happened on any number of occasions) Russian tanks. The Valkosusi was certainly far superior to the US-supplied Sherman’s; the American, British, Canadian and Polish armoured units fighting under overall Finnish Command on the Baltic Front over these years were generally envious of the superior Finnish tanks. This envy was no doubt further enhanced when the Finnish Army introduced its new High-Velocity Armor Piercing (HVAP) ammunition in May 1944 for the 76 mm gun, just in time for E-Day and the invasion of Estonia. The projectile contained a tungsten core penetrator surrounded by a lightweight aluminum body, which gave it a higher velocity and more penetrating power. The higher-velocity 76 mm gun and the HVAP round combination would give the Patria M/42 Valkosusi anti-tank firepower that would be superior to most of the German tanks they encountered through the remainder of WW2.
Agile enough for fast tactical relocation, reasonably armored and with excellent firepower, the M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf") has long been considered as contender for one of the best tanks of the WW2 years, a remarkable feat considering its origins in the mid-1930’s.
Pioneeri Variant
On March 29th of 1943, it was decided to produce a recovery version of the Valkosusi for use in the Panssaaridivisoona. In June of 1943, Patria produced the first 20 of a prototype series Pioneeri-Valkosusi which were turret less and heavily modified for engineering and recovery tasks. Production started on a small scale, mixed in with the main production run, from July of 1943. Production was intermittent with batches intermingled with the Valkosusi runs and various modifications were made during the production. Early versions were armed with a 20mm Lahti cannon and later on with twin 7.92mm machineguns as well.
The Pioneeri-Valkosusi was operated by a crew made up of a commander, a driver and a mechanic. It was fitted with a 1.5 ton lifting crane and other recovery/repair equipment (eg. a large shovel, a 40 ton winch, etc.), some of it specially designed. Overall, 97 were produced from June of 1943 through to March of 1945 and were spread across all 3 Finnish Panssaridivisoona, a part of the significant investment in tank recovery and repair units that the Finnish Army made – that paid off with disabled vehicles being repaired and returned to service more often than not. The Pioneeri-Valkosusi proved one of the best recovery vehicles of World War II and remained in use through to the mid 1950’s. Post WW2, numbers were manufactured and exported to the armed forces of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, East Prussia, North Germany and the Czech Republic.
The Patria Valkosusi – a brief post-WW2 history
While not directly relevant, I’ve included this as a post-script on the life of this historic tank, which, when it finally went out of production at the tail-end of the 1960’s, would close the book on a pedigree that went back to the early 1930’s and almost the first post-WW1 tanks.
Post WW2, the Valkosusi-I would continue to form the mainstay of the Finnish Army’s armoured units through the 1940’s and well into the 1950’s. An upgraded version with a 105mm gun, additional armour and a more powerful engine, the Patria M/52 Valkosusi-II, was manufactured and used by the Finnish Army as well as by the Polish Army and the Army’s of the four small Baltic States. Following the establishment of the Czech Republic in 1945, Škoda Works would be re-established and would soon go on to produce the Valkosusi-II for the Czech Army. Škoda Works and Patria would jointly export the upgraded Valkosusi-II (and the later Valkosusi-III) to Sweden, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, East Prussia and later on, to the armed forces of Northern Germany, Denmark, Israel and Spain as well as to some South American countries in small numbers.
Over the course of the 1950’s, Spain received a total of 389 M/52 Valkosusi-II’s financed by US Military Aid, which incidentally also funded the acquisition of the M/52 Valkosusi-II’s by Poland, North Germany and the four small Baltic States as part of the ongoing Cold War between the US and the USSR. In addition, both Finland and Škoda Works sold arms and tanks to Israel in the years after WW2. Even prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, as the Haganah searched for weapons, its agents would establish ties with Finland’s Osasto Karhu, a department of the Etsivä Keskuspoliisi and it’s secretive and ruthless head, Esko Riekki. Working as he did directly for the President of Finland until his retirement in 1958, it can only be surmised that these sales had Presidential approval, although it must be said that Riekki was not noted for his deference to authority, even when serving under Mannerheim during the war years, nor was he noted for leaving paper trails.
While little or no documentation exists, circumstantial evidence does point to Riekki being instrumental in arranging the sale of 10 of the surviving Finnish Army Hotchkiss H35 tanks, together with a further 15 Renault R35’s and an indeterminate number of Sherman’s (of which the Finn’s possessed large stockpiles, many of them damaged but repairable; these Shermans were sold to Israel by the ton as “scrap metal”, hence the lack of specific numbers). Also sold to Israel as “scrap metal” were large numbers of WW2-era Soviet and German rifles, machineguns, artillery, tanks (including a number of T-34’s which the Finns “just happened to have lying around”) and assorted ammunition for which the Finnish Army had no need. While these were the only direct Finnish arms sales to Israel at this time, they were large in volume and came at a time when the Israeli armed forces needed every weapon they could lay their hands on.
Indirectly, the Israeli’s would go on to acquire large numbers of the M/52 Valkosusi-II’s from Škoda Works in the late 1950’s. As tensions had mounted with Eqypt through the early 1950’s, Israel had made an application (which was refused) to the US in 1955 to purchase 60 M47 tanks (and applied again in 1958, this time to purchase 100 M47 tanks but the answer was again the same). Škoda Works had by this time fulfilled all extent orders for the Valkosusi-II’s and, looking to keep the production line going, was in search of orders. An approach by the Israeli’s met with a positive response, the Czech government raised no objections (and indeed, facilitated the order in every way possible). The end result was that an immediate order for 230 M/52 Valkosusi-II’s was closed, with an initial shipment of 100 taken from the Czech Army’s reserves (to be replaced with new tanks).
Thus, at the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956, the main IDF tanks were the French-supplied AMX-13, the M/52 Valkosusi-II’s and WW2-era US tanks. And finally, in the early 1960’s, Israel signed a deal with Škoda Works for the purchase of 150 M/60 Valkosusi-III tanks. A further 120 were ordered in 1966 and delivered over the next two years. The Valkosusi-III incorporated a number of modifications including a new 553hp gas turbine engine, a Tampella-Skoda 105mm L/60 main gun with an autoloader allowing a rate of fire of 15 rounds/minute and a crew of 3 (driver, gunner, commander). There was also provision for an extra crew member, a rear driver/radio operator, who faced the rear of the tank equipped with a complete setup for driving. This allowed the tank to be driven backwards at the same speed as forwards, keeping its frontal armour pointed at the enemy.
The Patria and Škoda Works partnership would sell Valkosusi-II and III’s in small numbers elsewhere but by the early 1970’s, the cost of developing a new Main Battle Tank far exceeded the financing available to either Patria or Škoda Works and, without government backing or guaranteed orders in large volume, both companies withdrew from the MBT market, bringing the end to an era.
Reference and thanks: a special mention of http://www.ointres.se/strv_74.htm for many of the photos re-used.
Nice informative update, Canwiki.
Lady J
Thx
- and feeling guilty as I am for not having posted anything for quite a while (work, dammit), here's another installment that comes out of sequence. There's posts on German, Russian, Czech and Finnish tanks to come, and this is the penultimate "Finnish Tanks" post. I kind of got hooked up on finishing this one so forgive me..... and if anyone has any suggestions on edits, I'm wide open.... A final note on Czech Tanks and Finland – the Patria M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf")
Between the end of the Winter War in late 1940, and the re-entry of Finland into WW2 as one of the Allies fighting against Germany, Finland introduced the Czech/Finnish-designed and built Patria M/42 Valkosusi into service. One of the main contenders for the “best tank of WW2″, the Valkosusi was a lethal weapon when fought to its strengths. This is the story of Finland’s Main Battle Tank of the last years of WW2.
By the end of the Winter War, it was obvious that the Finnish M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä, whilst a capable armoured fighting vehicle, would all too soon be outclassed by the heavy Russian tanks that had begun to be seen in small numbers in September and October 1940. In addition, the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä was more of a tank destroyer, suited to the defense but not to the tactical offensive that was at the heart of Finnish war-fighting doctrine. It was an effective armoured fighting vehicle on the defensive (and indeed, would remain in production until 1945 and in service well into the 1950’s with the Finnish Army) but it was not the tank that the Finnish Panssaaridivisoona’s doctrine called for.
Finnish Army Patria M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä
Likewise, the Patria M/38 Sotavaunut, based on the same chassis and hull but with a Swedish-built turret, had an outclassed 37mm gun that could do nothing against the heavy frontal armour of the newer Soviet tanks such as the KV-1 – although still effective from the sides or rear. The M/38’s fairly lightweight armour, while adequate in the Winter War, could be shredded by the new Soviet tank guns that had been encountered in the last weeks of fighting (and indeed, by the Finnish Army’s own 75mm anti-tank guns) which did not bode well for the future. Likewise, the Bofors 37mm gun, the main armament of the Sotavaunut M/38, could do nothing to the prototype Soviet T-34 tank’s thick, sloped armor plate (although side or rear shots were still effective – but much harder to get in position for). Conversely, the high velocity Bofors-Tampella 76mm gun with which the Patria M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä was equipped had proved itself quite capable of taking out the new Soviet tanks.
Patria M/38 Sotavaunut – the mainstay of the Finnish Army’s tank force in the Winter War
One result of the immediate post-war reviews that were completed within weeks of the war ending was a recommendation to urgently develop a more capable, better protected and better armed tank capabe of taking on the new model Soviet tanks on an equal footing. This was without any doubt inspired by the latest model Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks encountered in the last weeks of fighting of the Winter War, many examples of which had been captured and which were available for study. A special commission, consisting of Patria engineers and the Škoda and CKD engineers and designers who had remained in Finland (or who had previously left to find refuge in Finland for various reasons) was formed to study the adversary and design a solution. However, it was understood from the start that to develop a completely new tank would take too long and be too expensive.
The design team was formed in December 1940 and given the goal of having a draft design ready by the end of April 1941. Study of the newest captured Soviet tanks together with almost a year of continuous combat against the Red Army had resulted in the identification of numerous areas where improvements were needed and/or could be achieved. Most critical amongst these were:
- Increased thickness of armour, particularly frontal armour but also side armour;
- Sloped armour, which would improve shot deflection and increase the effective resistance to penetration;
- Welded armour rather than riveted;
- Wider tracks to decrease ground pressure and improve mobility over soft ground and snow – something that the Finns, with their experience in building heavy tracked vehicles for use by the logging industry in winter, would exel in);
- A low centre of gravity and a low profile;
- A more powerful engine offering greater speed: one of the most frequent recommendations made by surviving tank commanders was that speed was essential: “Tanks must be fast. That, I would say, is the most important lesson of the war in regard to tank design….”;
- Preferably a diesel engine to increase survivability if hit;
- Larger fuel tanks giving an extended range, meaning less frequently required refueling;
- Mechanical reliability and serviceability: Engines and parts must be reliable and easy to service;
- Extended track life: average track life should be at least 2,000 miles (in the Winter War, the average track life of both the Sotavaunut M/38 and the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä was approximately 500 miles;
- “Fire-power, armor protection, speed, maneuverability and cross-country performance are the essentials, and the best type of tank is that which combines these conflicting requirements with the most success. As low a silhouette as possible should come next….”;
- A turret for the Bofors/Tampella 76mm gun, the gun turret should come with a turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns);
- A power-operated turret to increase the speed of traverse and subsequent target acquisition;
- A 3-man turret with provision for commander, gunner and loader: one of the major lessons learnt from the French-supplied tanks used by the Finnish Army in the Winter War was that it was impossible for the commander to effectively act as the gunner at one and the same time (Suggested crew of 5 – Driver and radio-operator/hull machine gunner in the forward compartment, commander, gunner & loader in the turret);
- Every tank must be equipped with radio;
- External Intercom on the back of each tank for communication with accompanying infantry;
Other key considerations were:
- Ease of manufacture (as few manhours as possible)’
- Reuse of as much of the existing armoured fighting vehicle production line as possible to minimize retooling requirements;
- Dimensions restricted the height, width, and weight so that it could be transported via typical bridges, roads, railroads (and potentially landing craft) without any special accommodation. This was intended to aid the strategic, logistical, and tactical flexibility and mobility of the armoured forces;
The design team was made up of a small number of Patria, Tampella, Škoda and CKD engineers and designers (the Škoda and CKD engineers were largely refugees who had been working in Finland with Patria when Czechoslovakia was taken over by the Germans and who had elected to remain in Finland) together with selected Panssaari officers and by April 1941 they not only had a completed design, they had built half a dozen wooden mockups plus one working prototype (built with soft steel). The tank, subsequently designated the M/42 Valkoinensusi, was based on a chassis that was an enlargement of the M/38 Sotavaunut / M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä with a conventional track design with a brand new turret modeled somewhat on those of the Soviet T-34. The tank would be powered by a 450-horsepower Finnish-manufactured Hispano-Suiza inline aircraft engine while the main gun was to be the Bofors-Tampella 76mm used in the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä that had proven so effective in the Winter War. Armour was significantly thicker than with the earlier tanks and at 25 tons weight overall (for the initial design), with its wide tracks, good off-road mobility and powerful engine, the proposed M/42 Valkoinensusi promised to be a very capable armoured fighting platform.
One of the early issues for Patria when they first began building tanks had been tank turret construction, in particular the turret rings, an issue that was the partial origin of Patria’s Panssarinhävittäjä design – initiated when a major bottleneck was encountered with turret ring manufacturing. However, with the assistance of Škoda engineers, this issue had been resolved in late 1939 and by late 1940, Patria was able to manufacture their own turrets, no longer needing to rely on Bofors in Sweden to build these. With the expertise so painfully and lengthily acquired on turret design and build for the Sotavaunut M/38, Patria was able to come up with a vastly improved turret for the M/42 Valkosusi (and for this, the contribution of the Škoda and CKD engineers and designers should be gratefully acknowledged – Patria’s success was very much due to the whole-hearted contribution of the Škoda / CKD team’s industrial engineering expertise and knowledge).
Multiple objectives were set for the new turret – it had to be as low as possible, in line with one of the tank’s major design goals being a low profile overall. It had to accomodate three crew members (commander, gunner and loader), it had to have a powered traverse independent of the main engine and be capable of turning 180 degrees in 15 seconds. It needed to accommodate the Tampella-Bofors 76mm gun and ready ammunition storage needed to hold at least 60 rounds of main gun ammunition, with provision for further ammunition storage within the tank.The hull and turret should also be cast or welded, with no riveting and without a single vertical surface; the goal being to have no shot traps. A wooden mockup of the new turret was built early in the design process to assist with design decisions on the placement of internal components. One of the outcomes was that a turret basket was added to the rear of the turret (an additional basket was later added to the rear of the tank in order to allow 10 jerrycans of petrol to be carried, permitting range to be extended somewhat).
A wooden mockup of the Patria M/42 Valkosusi turret was constructed on an existing M/38 chassis in tandem with the design and presented to the Review Committee on 29 April 1941
With the 76mm main gun in mind, the size of the new tank design was increased overall to allow a larger (1820mm/182cm turret ring) 3-man turret, with provision for a loader as well as the gunner and commander. The larger turret was also redesigned to include a large back extension for added ammunition storage (to a total of 137 main gun rounds) and was designed with an integral turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns). The large back extension to the turret also served as a counterweight to the main gun. The turret could be rotated either mechanically, or via an electric drive that ran independently of the main engine. While the turret crew main entry point was situated on the right side of the turret roof, experience in the Winter War had also demonstrated that one hatch in the turret was often insufficient for evacuation of the tank when it was hit so a second hatch was added besides the commander’s. An external pedestal-mounted Lahti 20mm cannon with a box feed was added to the turret for the tank commander to use while the main gun was paired with a coaxial 7.92mm heavy machine gun in the same mount (2,000 rounds of 7.92mm ammunition was also stored within the turret). Perhaps the greatest thing about this turret was its ability to depress the gun, the depression was 15 degrees giving it an insane hull-down capability which the Finnish tank crews would use to their advantage when fighting against the Germans through 1944 and 1945 (and now and then against the Red Army as well).
The ability of the M/42 Valkosusi to depress the main gun up to 15 degrees gave it an insane hull-down capability – and an ability to “snipe” from behind cover which Finnish tank crews grew to appreciate deeply in the fighting of 1944 and 1945
For reconnaissance and exterior viewing in battle, a rotary periscope was installed on the turret roof. Nokia Infra-red active night viewing equipment was proposed as standard. The active night vision for the gunner consisting of a Nokia infrared search light, and passive night vision optics for the driver, gunner and commander. The commander also had a passive night vision sight on the rotary periscope, featuring an image intensifier not unlike that used in night vision goggles. The combination of active searchlight and low level television gave the M/42 Valkosusi a night-fighting capability not matched in other tanks until the 1970’s, although its advantage was in the late ’70s was rapidly reduced with the increasing use of solid-state electronics and the quantum leap in microelectronics production beginning in the 1980s’.
Finnish Army Patria M/42 Valkosusi turret hatch with Infra-red night fighting device mounted. By mid-1944, almost all Finnish Army Tanks were also fitted with these Nokia IR systems, giving the entire Finnish armoured force an effective night-fighting capability, something the Finns used to full advantage.
Internal communication within the crew was performed thru an on-board Nokia communications system (or via light signals should the intercom go down). An external communications hookup was provided on the rear of the tank so as to allow easy communication with accompanying infantry. Provision was also made for three Nokia radios enabling Platoon, Company and Battalion communications to be maintained simultaneously by all tanks within a Panssaaripataljoona. This radio network had only been in its infancy in the Winter War but its effectiveness had been well-proven, having been used to co-ordinate communications between head-quarters, air, armoured, artillery and infantry units throughout the fighting.
The radio network linking armoured command, observation and communications vehicles and radio equipped combat vehicles that had proven so effective in the Winter War was to be vastly improved on between 1941 and 1943. In the fighting of 1940, their radio network had given the Finnish commanders both a clear picture of the battlefield and the means to direct their troops as quickly and precisely as possible. This network allowed the panssaari to penetrate deep behind enemy lines whilst maintaining constant contact with headquarters. It also allowed them access to the latest reconnaissance reports and to be deployed at a moments notice. Well trained panssaari commanders were frequently given the freedom to exploit this advantage to the fullest extent and certainly, the rapid and fluid Finnish advances in 1940 would not have been possible without radio. The combination of wide radio distribution and thorough radio training had proved invaluable to Finnish armoured units in 1940 and with the new tanks and armoured fighting vehicles with which the Panssaaridvisoona were being re-equipped from 1942 on, it was intended to expand on these capabilities.
The hull was split into two parts by an 8mm thick armor plate with the crew compartment in the front and the turret set above it. The propulsion (engine) and fuel tanks were at the rear. The front compartment had two seats (driver to the left, radioman/hull machine-gunner to the right) with access for both of them to the turret. Both hull crewmembers had their own viewports in the hull, covered by armored shutters. Viewports were also present in the side armor for both crewmembers (without the shutters). These side sections with viewports could be opened and used as entry points for the driver and the radioman. The radioman/hull machine-gunner operated a 7.92mm mounted in the front hull on an independent mount with 2,000 rounds of ammunition. The engine compartment space was designed to be watertight so that the M/42 could be submerged and cross waterways (a snorkel was designed in for this purpose, giving the M/42 the ability to ford water to a depth of 1.7m / 5 ft 7 inches).
Overall dimensions of the M42 Valkosusi were:
- Length (hull only): 22 ft 6 in (6.87m)
- Width (hull): 10ft 9 in (3.27m)
- Height: 2.49m
- Combat Weight: 30 tons
- Performance: maximum road speed of 35mph
- Operational Range: 250 miles
- Tracks: 460mm wide, 0.68 kg/cm^3 ground pressure
- Vehicle to be designed to cross a 265cm wide ditch, wade in 120cm of water, and climb a 40 degree incline
- Main Gun: 76mm Tampella-Bofors with Tampella-Skoda 20 round autoloader
- Secondary armament: 1x20mm Lahti cannon, 2×7.92mm machineguns
Armour was strategically thickened to offer additional protection, while welding rather than riveting was used. The M/38 Sotavaunut chassis and hull had been widened and lengthened, the M/42’s tracks were also widened to keep ground pressure low (weight had increased to 25 tons overall), provide better traction and a larger 450hp engine was specified. Smoke and defensive grenade launchers were also added, along with a protective thin (in fact mesh) layer of spaced armor. The front and side armour was well-sloped and built only with a homogeneous steel glacis plate. The armor for the side hull and superstructure (the side sponsons) was much thinner at 60 mm). The thinner side armor was necessary to keep the overall weight within reasonable bounds, but it made the M/42 vulnerable to attacks from the side by all German and Soviet tank and anti-tank guns. Finnish tactical doctrine for the use of the M/42 Valkosusi thus emphasized the importance of flank protection. Finnish tank crews were well aware of the weak side armor and made unauthorized augmentations by hanging track links or spare roadwheels (or even fastening logs of wood) onto the hull sides;
- Hull front, lower: 100 mm @ 55°; upper: 160 mm @ 55° [lower: 80 mm @ 55°; upper: 120 mm @ 55°]
- Hull side, lower: 60 mm @ 90°; upper: 60 mm @ 65°
- Hull rear: 60 mm @ 60°, 60mm @60° twin side hinged doors (engine servicing/rearming/escape/)
- Hull top: 34 mm @ 0°, 4 mm @ 0° (ammo store)
- Hull bottom: 40 mm @ 0°
- Turret front: 180 mm @ 80°, [120 mm @ 65°]
- Turret side: 80 mm @ 69°, [80 mm @ 65°]
- Turret rear: 80 mm @ 70°, [80 mm @ 65°]
- Turret top: 44 mm @ 0–10°
Skirt armour 5mm thick would later be fitted to the hull sides. The curved turret and the mantlet shape gave added likeliehood of any shells hitting the turret being deflected. With the considerable extra weight that had been added, the chassis design was strengthened. The front was reinforced, shock absorbers replaced and steering gear substantially modified. A new track design substantially increased off-road traction. The Hispano-Suiza engine was fitted with direct injection rather than carburetors and an engine silencer was added. Together with a number of other cold-weather modifications, fuel consumption was lowered and the engine could cold start from -25º C. And engine warmer was also added for use in extreme cold.
Early concept design for the M/42 Valkosusi was drawn up by a small Skoda Team, later to be substantially modified as the design process continued….
Overall, the end result weighed in at just 30 tons, with a powerful engine giving a projected top speed of 35mph and with substantially widened tracks giving low ground pressure (a particular concern for snowy or swampy conditions), the new tank promised good off-road mobility, good speed and had reasonable armor protection. The welded armour was rather thicker than its predecessor (although crews would come to regard it as too thin), offering adequate protection to the crew without being excessively heavy (the designers had intentionally traded off protection for speed). The design was simple and straightforward, making it cheap and fast to build – and to achive this, numerous simplifications had been made to the design. It had also been designed to rapidly replace the Patria M/38 Sotavaunut on the Patria assembly lines at Tornio. On paper, at least, Patria had produced a very capable armoured fighting vehicle. A wooden mockup of the Patria M/42 Valkosusi was constructed in tandem with the design and presented to the Review Committee on 29 April 1941.
One of the first Patria M/42 Valkosusi tanks to come of the production line being road-tested in 1942
One of the first Patria M/42 Valkosusi tanks to come of the production line being road-tested in 1942
The Patria M/42 Valkosusi’s Main Gun
The gun that gave the Patria M/42 Valkosusi its punch was a rather more modified version of the Tampella-Bofors 76mm that gave the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä its firepower. In the Winter War, the firepower this gun gave the Finnish Army was devastating. By 1942/43, it was rather less so, but this would be restored with new ammunition, as we will see.
The main gun proposed for the M/42 Valkosusi was a Škoda/Tampella engineering team modified version of the Bofors 76mm in use on the M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä. The gun was the same, the main modification consisted of making the gun fully automatic with a drum feed capable of 15 shots per minute and using a new type of armour-piercing ammunition. The long barrel and large propellant charge for the new ammunition to be used gave a very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory and excellent armor-piercing qualities. The flat trajectory also made hitting targets much easier, since accuracy was less sensitive to errors in range estimation and increased the chance of hitting a moving target, though these same attributes made the gun a poor fire-support weapon using HE ammo. Indeed, the Valkosusi’s 76mm gun had more penetrating power than the main gun of the Tiger I heavy tank, the 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56. The AP-T projectile used initially had an overall weight of 7.2 kg and a muzzle velocity of 925 m/sec.
Tampella-Bofors 76mm gun assembly line, Tampella plant, Tampere
Average penetration performance established against rolled homogenous steel armor plate laid back at 30° from the vertical was:
- 100 m: 138 mm
- 500 m: 124 mm
- 1,000 m: 111 mm
- 1,500 m: 99 mm
- 2,000 m: 89 mm
To compensate for the wear of such rapid fire, a special compressed-air device had been designed which would clean the barrel after every shot. The weight of the gun, with it’s long barrel, was balanced by the rearward extension of the gun turret with added ammunition storage in the rear of the turret. The autoloader was proposed so as to ensure that the high velocity 76.2mm gun could fire so much faster than Russian / German weapons that an enemy target could be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of fire. On the other hand, this could also be somewhat of an issue as the main gun’s high rate of fire could use up all the ammunition in the autoloader (20 rounds in two bins of 10 rounds each) in less than two minutes. The tank itself would hold only 137 main gun rounds and given the high rate of fire, this could easily be expended in just a few minutes of combat. Also, reloading the autoloader could take up to 15 minutes if all rounds had been expended.
Debate on this subject was considerable. With the autoloader, 15 rounds per minute could be fired, while in manual loading, a rate of firing of around 8 rounds per minute could be achieved under favorable conditions with an experienced crew (one round each 7.5 seconds). There’s a considerable choreography involved in a manual reload – imagine that the loader would have to, in the confines of the turret and hull, under combat conditions, possibly while moving across country, reach to the rear stowage, pull out a 11 kg round from a magazine with one hand, get a grip on it, then turn so he could load the round and push it in. Getting to the reserve rounds under the floor and in the sponsons also required some intricate dance steps as the loader moved around to get the rounds.
However, this rate of fire would drop considerably under combat conditions and as the crew became increasingly fatigued. There was also of course the question of target acquisition. And then of course, after continuously firing rounds from tanks, after you get about 15 -20 shell casings laying/bouncing around/etc. on the floor, it gets really difficult for the loader to load more rounds and the turret to move or the gun to recoil safely, so there would have to be a pause just to clear the turret. But even at 8 rounds per minute the emptying of ready ammo racks and the obstruction of empty shell casings prevents tanks from sustaining this rate for any length of time. While the autoloader potentially enabled one crew member to be removed, reducing the crew from 5 to 4, a further drawback was seen as being that while replenishment of ammunition for the autoloader could be done from inside the tank, a complete reload of both bins generally took approximately 15 minutes.
The Patria M/42 Valkosusi’s Main Gun was in fact one of the most powerful tank guns of World War II, due to the large propellant charge and the long gun barrel, which gave the round a very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory and excellent armor-piercing qualities.
The review committee took one look at the autoloader proposal, viewed the risk as far too high and in an unusual example of Finnish verbosity, took the designers to task for a “dangerously high-risk proposal”. The Finnish equivalent of a shit-storm erupted, with the two opposing viewpoints being put forward at length. However, Škoda and Tampella had already worked together to produce a working prototype and this was satisfactorily demonstrated. Tampella also had considerable prior experience with autoloaders from 1938-39 with the autoloaders designed and developed for the Wihuri ground-attack aircraft with their nose-mounted magazine-fed 37mm anti-tank gun. Extensive trials of the 76mm autoloader were carried out. The improved 76mm used a more powerful charge which allowed it to penetrate 138 mm (of RHA sloped at 30 degrees) at 100 m and 111 mm at 1000 m, which was considered excellent. This gun gave the Valkosusi a firepower advantage over the Russian T-34 (the key design objective), although the muzzle flash due to unburnt powder from the increased charge could leave crews momentarily blinded after firing. The blast also kicked up dust from the ground and often obscured vision for further firing.
The addition of a muzzle brake solved this problem by directing the blast sideways (with the added benefit of substantially reducing recoil. The “improved” Tampella-Bofors 76mm also featured a gyroscopic stabilized gun and sight. The stabilization was only in the vertical plane, as the mechanism could not slew the turret. The stabilizer was sufficient to keep the gun within 1/8th of a degree, or 2 mils while crossing moderately rough terrain at 15 miles an hour. This gave a hit probability of 70% on enemy tanks at ranges of 300 to 1200 yards. The utility of the stabilization is debatable; with some Finnish tank crews saying it was useful for its intended purpose, others only used the sights for stabilized viewing on the move. Some Finnish Army tank crews disabled the stabilizer.
In the event, after considerable and very heated debate, it was decided to proceed with the autoloader in production as the advantages in combat were seen to outweigh the disadvantages. The 76mm autoloader gun went into production in time to be used for the first Valkosusi’s to roll of Patria’s Tornio production line. The Valkosusi’s 76mm main gun was in fact one of the most powerful tank guns of World War II, due to the large propellant charge and the long gun barrel, which gave the round a very high muzzle velocity, a flat trajectory and excellent armor-piercing qualities.
Standard AP-T ammunition was manufactured by Ammus Oy, but going into 1944, the tanks were also supplied with a white phosphorus shell intended for use as an artillery marker to help with targeting. Once the war against Germany started, Valkosusi tank crews quickly discovered that the shell could also be used against the Tiger and Panther tanks (and Russian T34’s for that matter) — when the burning white phosphorus adhered to enemy tanks, their optics would be blinded and the acrid smoke would get sucked inside the vehicle, making it difficult or impossible for the crew to breathe. This, and the fear of the fire spreading inside the tank, would sometimes cause the crew to abandon the tank.
The Patria M/42 Valkosusi in it’s final design iteration as production commenced… the profile was somewhat distinctive
In its final design iteration as production commenced, the Patria M/42 Valkosusi weighed 30 tons, was powered by a 450-horsepower Finnish-manufactured Hispano-Suiza engine giving a maximum road speed of 35 mph and a range of 250 miles. With a crew of 5, it mounted the Tampell-Bofors 76mm main gun with a 20 round autoloader, 2 x 7.92mm machine guns and an external Lahti 200 cannon. The M/42 Valkosusi retained some of the design features of the earlier Patria M/38 Sotavaunut and the Sotavaunut’s immediate ancestor, the Czech LT35, primarily centered around the chassis and torsion bar system and the general “look” of the hull, although overall size had increased considerably to around the same dimensions as the German Panther.
In its final design iteration as production commenced, the Patria M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf")
Patria M/42 Valkosusi Production
The first mild steel prototype was produced by April 1941. An extensive and detailed review over the summer of 1941 was followed by further design modifications and the production of two further prototypes for August 1941, only one of which was fitted with a turret. The three prototypes were extensively and exhaustively tested and proved prone to a number of technical problems which were worked on. Likewise, many modifications were made to the interior layout, including much improved ergonomics. Nevertheless, the early consensus was that, even though fixes were needed for the problems identified, the new design had surpassed design specifications and expectations.
In June 1941, the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union, an event that the Finnish military had been expecting for some time based on intelligence reports. The Finnish military had been partially mobilized over April and May 1941 in expectation of such an attack as at this point, the Finnish government and military command trusted neither the Soviet’s nor the German’s to respect Finland’s neutrality. Both Germany and the Soviet Union placed ongoing pressure on Finland, both economic and political, covertly and overtly, but Finland was determined to remain neutral. Without going into any further details at this point in the narrative, the outbreak of open war between Germany and the USSR resulted in a further large-scale mobilization of the Merivoimat and Ilmavoimat together with the Armeija. At the same time both Germany and the Soviet Union were repeatedly given notice of Finland’s intent to maintain its neutrality at all costs – a declaration that both sides reluctantly respected given their earlier encounters with Finland.
A view of the prototype from the rear: a single prototypes was also constructed on an M/38 Sotavaunu chassis with a wooden mock-up turret and gun.
The outbreak of open war gave an added impetus to the drive to re-equip Finland’s armoured units and in July 1941, the Army placed an initial order for 400 M/42 Valkosusi’s (as the new tank was now officially designated) to be manufactured in 1942, while a further 750 were to be completed over 1943. Patria M4/2 Valkosusi production commenced in March 1942 after an increasingly frantic re-jigging of the production lines was finally completed. As the M/42 had been designed very specifically to rapidly replace the M/38 Sotavaunut on the assembly lines at Patria, the changeover moved ahead rapidly, actually managing to come in 4 weeks ahead of the targeted completion date – a miracle of sorts for almost any engineering project. Patria had taken advantage of the new design to streamline and improve workflow and production techniques in light of experience gained with the production of the Sotavaunut M/38 and the M/39 and manufacturing efficiency had been very considerably improved.
Potential bottlenecks existed with four major components – steel, suitable engines, the Tampella-Bofors 76mm main gun and the turrets. Without adequate supplies of these, production in suffient quantity would prove a challenge, as had occurred with the Sotavaunut M/38. The new M/42 Valkosusi was a formidable design, but with war between Germany and the USSR already underway and the fighting taking place close to Finland’s borders, there was an urgent need to introduce the M/42 into service regardless of obstacles.
The first bottleneck, steel, was addressed through the simple expedient of increasing the output of rolled plate steel from the Tornio Steel Mill. Casting of the tank hulls had been considered, and certainly by 1940 the Tornio Mills could have been used to produce large cast components. Castings, though, have certain inherent disadvantages. No matter how metallurgically sophisticated a nation is, the physics dictates that grain orientation cannot be controlled, and grain growth is mostly uncontrollable in large castings. Thus even the most elegant tool steel alloys are not particularly strong as raw castings, without a further hardening process to make a fine grain structure. Casting’s main advantages, once the tooling is built, are production rate and lower (not higher!) technological requirements. A casting facility–especially one that works with simple alloys–can be nothing more than a big building, an overhead crane and a furnace.
Rolled plate, on the other hand, may not be perfect, but it offers fairly good and consistent grain size, work hardening, and especially grain orientation. Welding of fabricated plate sections, if done properly, does not compromise these advantages. The gains from plate’s metallurgical advantages more than offset the small trigonometric differences in effective thickness from small angles of incidence of shell impact against angled sections of cast hulls and turrets. Sophisticated heat treating can be combined with rolling to make very strong steel. But good rolled plate requires a very, very expensive and complicated mill. Fortunately, the Tornio Steel Mill had been built in the mid-1930’s with this kind of high quality rolled alloy steel output in mind and by reducing exported amounts, sufficient rolled plate steel was available for M/42 and M/39 production.
Rolled armor is essentially cast armor which has been further worked and shaped, which aligns the grain structure which increases ballistic strength. Rolled steel armor is made by first pouring molten metal into molds and allowing it to cool and solidify into ingots. These big barrel-shaped pieces which come out of the molds are then pounded with hammers (BIG hammers) to form billets, which are then rolled at the rolling mill to become slabs, which can be sized in thickness to fit the tank design. They are flame cut to the profile of the desired tank part, then heat treated, then welded into the tank. Cast steel armor components bypass all that working, and are made simply by pouring molten metal directly into tank component shaped molds. They are removed from the molds, rough spots, risers and gate marks ground off, and heat treated. Then they are built into the tank.
Given their small manpower pool and the need to keep casualties down, the Finns opted for better quality armour plate albeit at a higher labour cost per manufactured tank. Very good armor may deliver three or four times the performance, inch for inch, of the best possible homogeneous casting and this was factored into the alloy steel specified for the M/42’s construction. The flexural strength and notch sensitivity of the metal are perhaps the most important characteristics that distinguish sophisticated fine-grained differentially cold-rolled high-alloy plate, with not only a hardened face but maximum toughness of the plate core and maximum ductility of the inner face (to resist spalling), from homogeneous hot-rolled plate or varying-characteristic cast sections of carbon steel with no heat treatment beyond surface carburizing. Sophisticated plate depends on the flexural strength of the plate core to contribute its local stiffness to the spreading of the incoming shock wave over a larger area, so that the inner face will experience a lower peak force. Notch sensitivity, of course, is relevant to whether the inner face of the armor stays in one piece under dynamic conditions.
Good armor has a hard outer face to reflect as much energy as possible and spread the remainder over as large an armor area as possible; a high-strength tough interior to resist deformation and convert kinetic energy to heat; and a ductile inner face to resist spalling due to the propagated shock wave and local deformation. When an AP round hits it, the armor undergoes tremendous local heating. If the AP round overwhelms the armor and penetrates, a sizable amount of armor metal is typically ejected into the tank interior ahead of the penetrating round. That metal is at least very hot and sometimes molten. It can have a much higher velocity inside the tank than the remnant velocity of the penetrating round. This spray of liquid steel generally ignites whatever is flammable. Also, having lost much of its kinetic energy penetrating the first armor surface, the projectile is likely to bounce off the inner face of the far armor surface and ricochet around the interior to the detriment of the occupants within.
Bad armor is hard through. When an AP round hits it, a few large chunks of armor pop inward to make a hole a bit bigger than the diameter of the projectile. These chunks may initially be moving fairly quickly, but having broken out at relatively low force levels, they are probably barely warm. Thus their damage contribution is minimal. The projectile
itself, having lost little velocity, continues onward. If it ricochets off the gun or a wall, it may lose all of its energy bouncing around tens or hundreds of times inside, but if it hits the second wall cleanly, it may break out another clean hole and exit. For a given incoming round, the odds are very much higher that bad armor will result in a penetration. The reason that the results of a good-armor penetration are so much more violent is that the armor died its own violent death trying to keep the projectile away from the crew. You’re much, much more likely to end up dead behind bad armor than behind good armor. The Tornio Mills manufactured good armour and in more than enough quantity to meet Patria’s needs.
The second major bottleneck was suitable engines. In the years leading up to World War II, as the need for armored vehicles was realized, designers in all countries were faced with the problem of how to power the vehicles, which weighed considerably more than the usual trucks that large vehicle engines were designed for. To solve this, they turned to using aircraft engines, which provided greater power-to-weight ratios and were more reliable than conventional inline vehicle engines available at the time. In this, the Finns chose to utilize the Finnish-manufactured Hispano-Suiza inline engines that were then being manufactured in increasing numbers.
For tank use the Hispano-Suiza had its supercharger, reduction gear, and other equipment removed from its camshaft, greatly simplifying its construction. It had cast, rather than forged, pistons, and was de-rated to around 600 bhp (447 kW), running on lower-octane petrol instead of high-octane aviation fuel. In addition, because weight saving was not so important for a tank engine, some of the Hispano-Suiza’s more expensive light-alloy components were replaced with cheaper, steel components in the “M39/M42″ version. It was also envisaged that the tank engine would use some components rejected on quality grounds for the Hispano-Suiza aircraft engine, i.e. Hispano-Suiza scrap. In use as a tank engine, the Hispano-Suiza engine was very lightly stressed and reliable, and substantially increased the power available. The first Hispano-Suiza prepared for tank use was tried in a modified M/38 Sotavaunut in September 1941 at Tornio and proved more than successful. Further helping avoid any bottleneck, the Hispano-Suiza engines were reserved for M/39’s and M/42’s to be delivered for Finnish use.
Patria M/42 Valkosusi turrets in the Patria turret assembly building, Tornio
Those M/42’s destined for Sweden were shipped without engines, turrets or guns. A similar approach to the Tampella-Bofors 76mm main gun and the turrets ensured that adequate supplies were available for Patria. This in turn enabled the production line to be maintained at full speed from the date of inauguration of M/42 Valkosusi production in early 1942 through to the end of WW2. And afterwards for that matter, as orders were placed for the re-equipment of the Armies of Finland’s close allies, in particular Poland and the four small Baltic States.
Once in service, the M4/2 Valkosusi reliability would prove to have benefited greatly from the detailed input into the requirements and design. Indeed, in tests against US-supplied Sherman tanks, Russian T-34’s from the tail-end of the Winter War and, later, on captured German Panther and Tiger tanks, “…the Valkosusi was faster than all the others, both across country and on the highway and could make sharper turns. It was also the better hill climber and could maneuver nicely over ground where the US and German tanks, and at times also the Russian tanks, would bog down…..” Advantage had also been taken of many features developed in the US in the 1930’s of which the Finns had become aware when working to procure arms and equipment over the course of the Winter War.
The first M/42 Valkosusi rolled of the Patria production line in early April 1942, with the 200th completed in mid-November of the same year. Production continued, with the Patria line working at full capacity as the Soviet Union fought on against the Germans, a battle which the Finns watched with something close to paranoia, fearing that one side or the other might attempt to drag them in. Ongoing attempts through this period to put in place a formal military alliance with Sweden were rebuffed, with the Swedish Government continuing to regard Finland’s domestic politics and “overtly and aggressively militaristic stance” with great suspicion. Finland’s public commitment to the cause of Estonia also caused the Swedish Government concern, as they wished to remain neutral and not be drawn into a war with either the USSR or Germany by the “unsteady and adventurous” Finns. Finland was now perhaps even more isolated than she had been at the time of the Winter War, although now the two totalitarian behemoths were warring on Finland’s very borders.
Standard practice when moving the Patria M/42 Valkosusi cross-country in non-combat situations was to fully elevate the gun, or reverse the turret – here, reversed and locked down
By January 1943, on average approximately 25 M/42 Valkosusi’s per week were being produced and sufficient were on hand have completed the re-equipment of the 21st Panssaridivisoona. Unfortunately for the Finnish Army, Finland did require export income and Sweden would again apply pressure to the Finnish government to export weapons to Sweden. This caused a considerable debate within the Finnish government, particularly as Sweden’s defence spending and investment in defence manufacturing infrastructure was nowhere near the level that Finland maintained, at great cost, throughout the years of WW2. Despite this, from April 1943 on, almost half the Valkosusi production was exported to Sweden, albeit without the turrets and guns, which were produced in Sweden (as they had been for the Swedish Army’s M/38 Sotavaunut’s).
Finnish Army M/42 Valkosusi in cover outside a Latvian village during the advance south down the Baltic, May 1944
This considerably slowed deliveries of the Valkosusi’s to the Finnish Army through 1943 and it was only by March 1944 that the 22nd Pansaaridivisoona found itself fully equipped at last with the Valkosusi. The 23rd had to make to with lend-lease Shermans supplied by the United States. A great deal of ill-feeling was generated by this Swedish demand, particularly as the hundreds of Valkosusi’s supplied to Sweden would never see battle. As one Finnish panssaari officer put it succinctly in mid 1944, shortly after the landings in Estonia, “the damned Swedes are protecting themselves yet again at the cost of the lives of Finnish soldiers.” This ill-feeling was somewhat offset by the full Division of Swedish volunteers who were now fighting within the Finnish Army.
After the Patria M/42 Valkosusi began to enter service in 1942, some further problems were identified. One was the length of the 76mm main gun barrel. Not unexpectedly, as with the Patria M/39 Panssarinhävittäjä, it was necessary for crews to be careful not to plough the gun barrel into the ground while traveling cross-country or in combat. A Finnish tank crewman later commented: “…the tank gun could easily dig into the ground in the smallest ditch. If you fired it after that, the barrel would open up at the end like the petals of a flower.” Standard practice when moving the M/42 Valkosusi cross-country in non-combat situations was to fully elevate the gun, or reverse the turret. On the other hand, none of the Valkosusi crews wished to trade off a lower velocity round for the convenience of a shorter barrel.
Finnish Army M/42 Valkosusi moving south with accompanying infantry, Lithuania June 1944
During the winter and spring fighting of 1944–45, the M/42 Valkosusi demonstrated a marked advantage over both Russian and German tanks in its ability to move easily and rapidly over deep mud or snow without bogging down, leaving even the renowned T-34 in its wake. Finnish experience through the 1930’s with operating heavy logging equipment under similar conditions, and the resultant contribution to the M/42 Valkosusi design had paid off in spades. In terms of mobility, the Patria M/42 Valkosusi’s broad tracks, truly excellent suspension, low ground pressure and powerful engine gave it unparalleled cross-country performance while the tracks themselves were generally reliable and capable of running up high mileages before needing replacement. The powerful motor in proportion to overall weight resulted in a good turn of speed. Mechanically, the M/42 Valkosusi proved to be highly reliable; maintenance in the field was straightforward while the tank’s low profile was also a definite advantage in combat, as was the ability to depress the main gun, allowing the Valkosusi to “snipe” from cover.
Finnish Army M/42 Valkosusi advancing into Poland, late summer 1944
In battle through 1944 and 1945, the M/42 Valkosusi generally proved superior to both the German tanks and, when called for (as happened on any number of occasions) Russian tanks. The Valkosusi was certainly far superior to the US-supplied Sherman’s; the American, British, Canadian and Polish armoured units fighting under overall Finnish Command on the Baltic Front over these years were generally envious of the superior Finnish tanks. This envy was no doubt further enhanced when the Finnish Army introduced its new High-Velocity Armor Piercing (HVAP) ammunition in May 1944 for the 76 mm gun, just in time for E-Day and the invasion of Estonia. The projectile contained a tungsten core penetrator surrounded by a lightweight aluminum body, which gave it a higher velocity and more penetrating power. The higher-velocity 76 mm gun and the HVAP round combination would give the Patria M/42 Valkosusi anti-tank firepower that would be superior to most of the German tanks they encountered through the remainder of WW2.
Agile enough for fast tactical relocation, reasonably armored and with excellent firepower, the M/42 Valkosusi ("White Wolf") has long been considered as contender for one of the best tanks of the WW2 years, a remarkable feat considering its origins in the mid-1930’s.
Pioneeri Variant
On March 29th of 1943, it was decided to produce a recovery version of the Valkosusi for use in the Panssaaridivisoona. In June of 1943, Patria produced the first 20 of a prototype series Pioneeri-Valkosusi which were turret less and heavily modified for engineering and recovery tasks. Production started on a small scale, mixed in with the main production run, from July of 1943. Production was intermittent with batches intermingled with the Valkosusi runs and various modifications were made during the production. Early versions were armed with a 20mm Lahti cannon and later on with twin 7.92mm machineguns as well.
The Pioneeri-Valkosusi was operated by a crew made up of a commander, a driver and a mechanic. It was fitted with a 1.5 ton lifting crane and other recovery/repair equipment (eg. a large shovel, a 40 ton winch, etc.), some of it specially designed. Overall, 97 were produced from June of 1943 through to March of 1945 and were spread across all 3 Finnish Panssaridivisoona, a part of the significant investment in tank recovery and repair units that the Finnish Army made – that paid off with disabled vehicles being repaired and returned to service more often than not. The Pioneeri-Valkosusi proved one of the best recovery vehicles of World War II and remained in use through to the mid 1950’s. Post WW2, numbers were manufactured and exported to the armed forces of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, East Prussia, North Germany and the Czech Republic.
The Patria Valkosusi – a brief post-WW2 history
While not directly relevant, I’ve included this as a post-script on the life of this historic tank, which, when it finally went out of production at the tail-end of the 1960’s, would close the book on a pedigree that went back to the early 1930’s and almost the first post-WW1 tanks.
Post WW2, the Valkosusi-I would continue to form the mainstay of the Finnish Army’s armoured units through the 1940’s and well into the 1950’s. An upgraded version with a 105mm gun, additional armour and a more powerful engine, the Patria M/52 Valkosusi-II, was manufactured and used by the Finnish Army as well as by the Polish Army and the Army’s of the four small Baltic States. Following the establishment of the Czech Republic in 1945, Škoda Works would be re-established and would soon go on to produce the Valkosusi-II for the Czech Army. Škoda Works and Patria would jointly export the upgraded Valkosusi-II (and the later Valkosusi-III) to Sweden, Norway, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, East Prussia and later on, to the armed forces of Northern Germany, Denmark, Israel and Spain as well as to some South American countries in small numbers.
Over the course of the 1950’s, Spain received a total of 389 M/52 Valkosusi-II’s financed by US Military Aid, which incidentally also funded the acquisition of the M/52 Valkosusi-II’s by Poland, North Germany and the four small Baltic States as part of the ongoing Cold War between the US and the USSR. In addition, both Finland and Škoda Works sold arms and tanks to Israel in the years after WW2. Even prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, as the Haganah searched for weapons, its agents would establish ties with Finland’s Osasto Karhu, a department of the Etsivä Keskuspoliisi and it’s secretive and ruthless head, Esko Riekki. Working as he did directly for the President of Finland until his retirement in 1958, it can only be surmised that these sales had Presidential approval, although it must be said that Riekki was not noted for his deference to authority, even when serving under Mannerheim during the war years, nor was he noted for leaving paper trails.
While little or no documentation exists, circumstantial evidence does point to Riekki being instrumental in arranging the sale of 10 of the surviving Finnish Army Hotchkiss H35 tanks, together with a further 15 Renault R35’s and an indeterminate number of Sherman’s (of which the Finn’s possessed large stockpiles, many of them damaged but repairable; these Shermans were sold to Israel by the ton as “scrap metal”, hence the lack of specific numbers). Also sold to Israel as “scrap metal” were large numbers of WW2-era Soviet and German rifles, machineguns, artillery, tanks (including a number of T-34’s which the Finns “just happened to have lying around”) and assorted ammunition for which the Finnish Army had no need. While these were the only direct Finnish arms sales to Israel at this time, they were large in volume and came at a time when the Israeli armed forces needed every weapon they could lay their hands on.
Indirectly, the Israeli’s would go on to acquire large numbers of the M/52 Valkosusi-II’s from Škoda Works in the late 1950’s. As tensions had mounted with Eqypt through the early 1950’s, Israel had made an application (which was refused) to the US in 1955 to purchase 60 M47 tanks (and applied again in 1958, this time to purchase 100 M47 tanks but the answer was again the same). Škoda Works had by this time fulfilled all extent orders for the Valkosusi-II’s and, looking to keep the production line going, was in search of orders. An approach by the Israeli’s met with a positive response, the Czech government raised no objections (and indeed, facilitated the order in every way possible). The end result was that an immediate order for 230 M/52 Valkosusi-II’s was closed, with an initial shipment of 100 taken from the Czech Army’s reserves (to be replaced with new tanks).
Thus, at the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956, the main IDF tanks were the French-supplied AMX-13, the M/52 Valkosusi-II’s and WW2-era US tanks. And finally, in the early 1960’s, Israel signed a deal with Škoda Works for the purchase of 150 M/60 Valkosusi-III tanks. A further 120 were ordered in 1966 and delivered over the next two years. The Valkosusi-III incorporated a number of modifications including a new 553hp gas turbine engine, a Tampella-Skoda 105mm L/60 main gun with an autoloader allowing a rate of fire of 15 rounds/minute and a crew of 3 (driver, gunner, commander). There was also provision for an extra crew member, a rear driver/radio operator, who faced the rear of the tank equipped with a complete setup for driving. This allowed the tank to be driven backwards at the same speed as forwards, keeping its frontal armour pointed at the enemy.
The Patria and Škoda Works partnership would sell Valkosusi-II and III’s in small numbers elsewhere but by the early 1970’s, the cost of developing a new Main Battle Tank far exceeded the financing available to either Patria or Škoda Works and, without government backing or guaranteed orders in large volume, both companies withdrew from the MBT market, bringing the end to an era.
Reference and thanks: a special mention of http://www.ointres.se/strv_74.htm for many of the photos re-used.
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The name "Valkoinensusi" is pretty neat and all, but it shouldn't be conjoined. If you want to write it as a single word, "Valkeasusi" or maybe "Valkosusi" is the way to go.
The German Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The German Tanks of World War One
The development of tanks in World War I began as an attempt to break the stalemate which trench warfare had brought to the Western Front. The British and French both began experimenting in 1915, and deployed tanks in battle from 1916 and 1917 respectively. The Germans, on the other hand, were slower to develop tanks, rather they concentrated on anti-tank weapons. The initial German response to the modest initial successes of the Allied tanks was the A7V, which, like some other tanks of the period, was based on caterpillar tracks of the type found on the American Holt Tractors. Initially unconvinced that tanks were a serious threat, the High Command ordered just twenty A7Vs, which took part in a handful of actions between March and October, 1918.
The first German Tank – the A7V
The A7V is certainly a front-runner for the ugliest and least capable tank ever to have been built and gone into action. Powered by two Daimler engines, the tank was first demonstrated in the Spring Offensive of 1918. Internally, the Sturmpanzerwagen was cramped, smelly and noisy. No fewer than 18 men were called upon to man the machine to its full "potential". With the 57 mm main gun at front, internal operators had access to two 7.92 mm machine guns at the rear along with a further four along the sides of the steel beast - two to a side. Each machine gun would need to be manned by a further two personnel per gun - a firer and an ammunition re-supplier. The engine sat in the lower-middle of the design with the main gear components resting under the rear. A crew of two would man the front 57 mm main gun, one firing whilst the other loaded the weapon. Two drivers sat in the upper center bulge area operating a steering wheel and lever controls. Stowage was allotted for individual crew weapons in the form of rifles. During final design the rear-facing cannon was removed and the number of machine-guns was increased to six. Grab ropes were provided throughout as the design had plenty of headroom space for the average soldier, though travel made for an uneasy and overall bumpy ride.
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German A7V Tank from WW1
In theory, the idea of an armored box bristling with all types of deadly hardware seemed sound. In practice, however, the large design was far from perfect. The vehicle was excessively heavy, making it impractical to be used on uneven terrain. The system was slow as well, often meaning that it could be outpaced by the very infantry it was to assist. The short tracks of the tractor system also made the vehicle relatively unsafe and uncontrollable in some cases. It weighed 33 tons overall and with it's short under-slung tracks and low ground clearance, it had almost no capability to overcome obstacles or cross broken, shell-hole filled and muddy ground – the typical terrain of the Western Front.
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The A7V – internal layout
If the A7V has one saving grace, it was that the all-around armor protection for the crew was second to none - even when compared to the British designs - over an inch in some areas. A hundred of these tanks were ordered although only 20 were ever produced, and the first of these were ready in October 1917. There were numerous differences between individual tanks since all parts were handmade and made to fit given tank. The Schwerer Kampfwagen A7V was first used at St Quentin on 21 March 1918. Although some of its features, such as the sprung tracks and the thicker armour, made it better than British tanks at that time, the A7V was less successful as a battle vehicle. The main problems concerned its mechanical reliability and the difficulty it encountered crossing enemy trenches due to its track design and minimal ground clearance.
An original A7V captured by Australian troops in 1918 can be seen in the museum in Brisbane, Queensland in Australia. One of only 20 built, it is the last surviving example of the first German military tank and while on display, it's not in running order.
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The A7V tank "Mephisto" being dragged into the Queenland Museum in 1919
The tank was lost at the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux on 24 April 1918. The battle for the area saw the Australian, British and German forces in a fluid situation, moving around the tank which had been disabled after falling into a ditch and still had dead crew inside.
The 26th Battalion of the 7th Brigade, mostly from Queensland, hatched a plan to capture it so it could not be reused by the Germans. In July 1918 after launching an artillery barrage, the Infantry moved forward and dragged it back to their lines; the Germans were still in sight of the tank and firing at them. They had to don gas masks after poison gas was deployed. The tank was then graffitied by Australian troops, with a painting of the AIF rising sun emblem. Machinations began to take the tank back to Australia, but the British wanted to keep it for the Imperial War Museum. It was quickly put on a ship destined for Sydney with the Australian infantry that captured it. The ship was supposed to deliver it to Sydney, with plans for it to go to the war memorial in Canberra's display, but it was diverted to Brisbane and unloaded there. Two steam traction engines moved it from the ship to the museum, dragging it on its tracks.
The Queensland Museum, where it was housed, changed location a number of times, and the tank at one point was housed outside, where it was exposed to the elements, and parts were removed from it by the public. After many years it was eventually moved inside the museum and put behind glass in a temperature controlled environment, protecting it from the public. Following the 2011 Brisbane Floods, Mephisto was removed from the Queensland Museum to an undisclosed location for restoration work. It was claimed that the vehicle would be returned to the museum during 2012. However, in March 2013 it was revealed that the vehicle was temporarily housed at the Workshops Rail Museum at North Ipswich where it was placed on temporary display. It will return to the Queensland Museum in 2015.
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The A7V tank "Mephisto" in the Queensland Museum, Brisbane, Australia
The A7V's suffered from numerous design faults and already towards the end of the First World War it was clear that the A7V was a failure, being too slow and clumsy in action and slow to build. Germany actually used more captured British tanks than A7Vs.
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Captured British Mk4 Male tank in use by the German Army
In fact, most "German" tanks in service over 1917-1918 were British tanks captured at Cambrai and other locations. Some 100 of these were repaired, overhauled at Charleroi (by Bavarian Army Motor Vehicle Park 20) and rearmed with Russian 57mm Sokol / Belgian 57mm Maxim Nordenfeld guns in place of British 6pdr guns (Male tanks) and 7.92mm Maxim 08 machine guns (Female tanks). Spare parts were obtained from battle damaged tanks unfit for repair. Captured tanks were grouped in four captured tank companies – Sturmpanzerwagenabteilungen (Beute). Captured British Mark A Whippets also equipped an entire German captured tank company and some French tanks (including Renault FT-17 light tanks) captured during the German offensive in November of 1918 were also used.
The K-Wagen
As it became clear that the tank could play a significant role on the battlefield, Germany began working on designs for both heavy and light tanks. And when they designed a "heavy" tank, they meant "heavy". In WW1, anticipating the outrageously super-heavy tank designs of WW2, German designers came up with the K-wagen, designed by Joseph Vollmer, a reserve captain and engineer working for the Verkehrstechnische Prüfungskommission ("Transport-technologies Board of Examiners" of the army) and a Captain Weger (Wegner?). On June 28 1917 the War Ministry approved the draft design and in December 1917 ordered ten examples built, five to be built by the Riebe ball-bearing factory in Berlin and five by Wegman and Co. of Kassel.
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Drawing of a K-wagen
The vehicle originally weighed 165 tons but this was reduced to a more practicable 120 tons by shortening the length. The huge size and mass of the K-Wagen made it impossible to transport, so it was decided that it would be split into sections for transport by rail, to be reassembled behind the front line near where it was to be used.
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K-wagen in the factory
The hull of the K-Wagen consisted of six modules that could be transported separately by rail: the control room, the fighting room, the engine room, the transmission room and the two sponsons. Modified U-Boot communications and control equipment was to be used. The commander gave orders to the crew by means of electric lights: fire control was comparable to that of a destroyer, the Germans seeing the vehicle as a veritable "landship". The drivers would have had to steer the vehicle blindly, directed by the commander.
The first of these K-Wagen tanks were planned to enter service in 1919. The hull was boxy and mounted with sponsons. Armor protection ranged from 10 to 30mm and the entire tank weighted 148-150 tons. The vehicle was to be 12.7m long, 3.0m wide (6.0m wide with sponsons) and 3.0m high. It featured roller-type tracks and was powered by two Daimler-Benz 6 cylinder aircraft engines (each producing 650hp) with electric-magnetic clutch transmission. Maximum speed was 7.5km/h. K-Wagen’s armament consisted of four 77mm guns (two mounted in each sponson) with 800 rounds of ammunition and seven 7.92mm Maxim 08/15 machine guns with 21,000 rounds of ammunition.
At the beginning of the project the incorporation of flamethrowers was considered but later rejected. It was to be operated by the crew of 22 men. Production was delayed, because of material shortages and only two were under construction in November of 1918 at the Riebe-Kugellager factory at Berlin. One of the tanks, "Ribe", was complete at the end of the war, but it never left the factory. Both were eventually scrapped by the Allied Control Commission.
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K-wagen in the factory
It was also decided that lighter tanks were required which could spearhead assaults and which could be mass-produced. A number of different types were designed and a small number of prototypes were under construction at the end of the war.
The Leichte Kampfwagen (Light Cavalry Tank) LK.I
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Leichte Kampfwagen LK-I
The LK.I was designed by Joseph Vollmer (he of the K-wagen) and was influenced by the captured British Mark A Whippet Medium Tanks. It was based on a Daimler car chassis, using the existing axles for sprocket and idler wheels. It's design followed a typical automobile layout, with the engine at the front and the driving compartment in the rear. It was the first German tank to be mounted with a turret (rear mounted) armed with a 7.92mm Maxim 08/15 machine gun.
Armor protection was 8 to 14mm and entire tank weighted 6.89 tons. It was 5.08m long, 1.95m wide and 2.52m high. The LK.I was powered by single Daimler-Benz Otto Model 1910 4-cylinder 50-60hp gasoline engine with an operational range of 70km and a maximum speed of 14 km/h. It carried 140 litres of gasoline and was operated by a 3 man crew. Only (2?) prototypes were produced in mid-1918, while 800 were ordered. A prototype of the LK.I was demonstrated in Berlin in early 1918 but was seen as being underpowered.
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Deutscher Leichter Kampfpanzer L. K. I.
The Leichte Kampfwagen (Light Cavalry Tank) LK.II
The LK.II was a further development of the LK.I and had the same layout as the LK.I. Instead of a rear mounted turret, it was mounted with a superstructure (barbette) armed with a 37mm Krupp or Russian 57mm Sokol gun. Armor protection was 8 to 14mm and its weight increased to 8.75 tons. It was also powered by single Daimler-Benz Otto Model 1910 4-cylinder 55-60hp gasoline engine was operated by 3 men crew. Maximum speed was 14 to 18km/h with range of 65-70km.It was 5.06 meters long, 1.95 meters wide and 2.52 meters high. Another version was planned armed with one or two 7.92mm Maxim 08/15 machine guns mounted in a rear mounted turret but this remained as a design only.
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A WW1 German Leichte Kampfwagen LK II light Tank can be found at the Deutsches Panzermuseum in the small military town of Munster, Germany
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Another view of the Leichte Kampfwagen LK II light Tank in Munster, Germany
Two prototypes of the LK II were produced in June of 1918 and both the LK.I and the LK.II were demonstrated on June 13. Both projects were recommended for further development of a machine-gun version with a rotating turret. After the Battle of Amiens began, Krupp (although they did not have ready yet a real model) received an urgent order for 65 tanks. On October 2 1918, chassis testing of competing machines was carried out at Marienfelde. As a result the "Krupp" order for the LK.I was canceled. The choice fell on the LK-II. It was planned to producethe first 10 LK.II tanks in December 1918, and in April 1919 this number was to increase to 200 per month. Only a third of the tanks had to be machine-gun-equipped, the remaining two-thirds would be armed with cannon.
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LK.II prototype - this early prototype shows more similarities to the LK.I than the later versions
In the LK.II, the contours of the hull have changed somewhat from the LK.I. Slanted "cheekbones" are apparent on the engine covering, between the straight sides and the flat roof. Behind the engine compartment and hull are a driver's compartment with three viwwing ports. The fixed turret had straight sides and a sloping rear wall. In the fixed turret were the gunner and loader, working in a standing position. Hatches were placed as in the LK-I, but the size was increased. In the roof of the cabin was a hatch with a hinged lid, which served for viewing and ventilation. On the straight sides, the front plate and the roof of the engine compartment were blinds with inclined upper sheets - these were armoured covers with hinged lids for easier engine maintenance.
The 37 mm gun was mounted on a vertical support. The design of the gun shield as a whole was similar to the 57-mm gun installed on the A7V tank. The Gun Mount weighed 500 kg and was supplied with a telescopic sight and handwheel traverse. The horizontal aiming angle was ± 30 °. The side door openings were provided with a port for firing an MG.08 / 15 machinegun. Otto engines were to have been of two types - either 40 or 50 hp. Starting the engine could be performed from inside or outside of the tank using a crank handle or an electric starter. Two gas tank with a total capacity of 170 liters were placed on either side of the engine, between the engine and the sides, the tank bottom was 8-mm armor. Gasoline flow was made under pressure from the exhaust gases. For reliable engine power at all inclinations of the machine a float chamber was used. To prevent flooding of the engine oil circulation system. a closed lubrication oil tank was used. Radiator cooling was by a fan. Air was sucked out and ejected through the vents in the sides and roof of the engine compartment. The exhaust pipe was on the left side.
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LK.II prototype - this early prototype shows more similarities to the LK.I than the later versions
LK.II Transmission included: a plate clutch (main clutch); 4-speed car-type gearbox; drive shaft with bevel gears, cam or disc clutch drum or band brakes; two transverse half-line with the drive bevel gear at one end and on the other the cylinder. To increase traction and the capability to climb steep slopes the drive train intermediate transmission speed was lowered in 2,14-2,16 times. When off, the intermediate transmission speed was from 3.5 to 14 km / h when activated - of 1.6 to 6.5 km / h.
Steering was via manipulation of the caterpillar tracks using a rocker arm with three positions. The driver could adjust the turning radius. The minimum turning radius was 1.7 m. The transmission was under the floor of the fighting compartment. The layout of the transmission mechanism is consistent with the small width of the tank. The ventilation system ensured that the temperature of the air inside the tank remained slightly above the surrounding atmosphere.
The estimated cost of construction for the LK-II was 65,000-70,000 DM in 1918 prices. In 1917, an order was prepared for 1,000 tanks, but for his performance did not come from, although the troops during 1918 there were demands for more mobile tanks light type. The first LK-II was built only in the autumn of 1918. Only in October 1918 was J. Vollmer was able to deliver two light tanks, which were finished with the extensive use of automotive components and assemblies - this was much more promising in terms of speed of production and was 10 times cheaper. The massive use of light LK-II type tanks would have a much greater success than heavy, but their construction was limited to a few prototypes.
After the war, the German company manufacturing the tanks hid the parts from the Allied Control Commission. In early 1919, Germany made an agreement with Hungary, for whom they secretly built 14 LK-II tanks (see more on these LK.II's exported to Hungary and their fate below). Another batch of LK-II tanks was build for Sweden. The deal was made by the Steffen & Heyman company. Sweden also received German specialists to help with assembly. The Swedish government secretly purchased the parts for the 10 tanks for 100,000 (or 200,000, the amount is uncertain) Swedish Kronas and shipped the parts to Sweden labelled as boiler plates and agricultural equipment. The tanks were then assembled in Sweden as the Stridsvagn m/21, which was essentially an improved version of the LK.II prototype.
The Stridsvagn m/21 was armed with a single 6.5mm machine gun. In August 1922 trials began at Svea Livgarde in Stockholm. The tanks were painted army grey in and out. The engine was started by hand cranking which could also be done from the fighting compartment. External lighting was an acetylene gas light. In the autumn of 1923 five tanks participated successfully in a large manoeuvre. The trials continued from 1924 to 1927. The main objective was cross country mobility, but also armament and communication.
In 1929, five m/21's were rebuilt as the Strv m/21-29 variant, armed with a 37mm gun or two machine guns and powered by a more powerful Scania-Vabis engine. Modifications also included heavier armour. One of these Stridsvagn m/21-29's was driven by Heinz Guderian during a visit to Sweden in 1929. The Stridsvagn m/21-21 remained in service with the Swedish Army until 1938 and today a single example can be seen at the Deutsches Panzermuseum at Munster, Germany. Both a Stridsvagn m/21 and a Stridsvagn m/21-29 are displayed at the Axvall Tank Museum in Sweden.
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Stridsvagn m/21 (Strv m/21) was a Swedish version of the German LK II light tank, here seen at the Arsenalen Tank Museum, Sweden
For photographes of the Swedish Army Stridsvagn m/21 and additional information, my thanks and credit to http://blog.arsenalen.se/ from whom I sourced many the the m/21 photos below. Following are some photograph's of the Swedish Army's Stridsvagn m/21's back in the day...
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
All photograph's above of the Stridsvagn M21 are sourced from http://blog.arsenalen.se/en/2013/07/originalbilder/
The Hungarian Leichte Kampfwagen LK.II
Sometime in the early 1920's a mysterious shipment arrived in Hungary. The 14 vehicles, which were listed as tractors, almost immediately disappeared from under the watchful gaze of the Allied Control Commission. Very few people had knowledge of the shipment and the carefully hidden parts reemerged only in 1927, after the departure of the Allied Control Commission from Hungary. At least most of them ...
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A Magyar "vontatók" - a German LK.II in Hungarian Army Service
In 1928 the first tank squadron of the Hungarian Army was founded - and in the coming years this unit would be equipped with the contents of the mysterious cargo, after they were assembled. But only 6 of the 14 tanks shipped to Hungary eventually returned to service; Perhaps the other eight were destroyed during their time in hiding, but it is also possible that due to the secrecy of their shipment and concealment that certain parts or assemblies were simply lost (see the last paragraph in this context).
Since under the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary was still permitted to have tanks, vehicles of the original "V" (tractor) wore the name, is also seen them in Roman numerals. Also because of the prohibition of the century worked within the Police Newbie School (Ruis) militia purposes, because some armored vehicles were allowed to keep operating. The otherwise unarmed tanks were fitted with a standard 8mm 7.12 M. Schwarzlose machine gun and it was using these tanks that gave the inaugural Hungarian armored arm officers their first experiences.
Difficulties with bringing the tanks into service are indicated by the fact that the new numbers do not follow the original sequence (V-12, according to the records was the number I tank, the other numbers indicate that V-14, V-11, V-7, V-6 and V-3 were received). Power was provided by a Mercedes-Benz engine, while according to the literature of the LK's original engines; NAG-made engines should have been installed - perhaps the original engines were ruined while in hiding and needed replacement. Everything points to the original 14 tanks suffering serious damage, possibly suffered due to poor storage and having been transported on rail cars traveling back and forth to keep them concealed from the Allied Control Commission.
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Hungarian poster reflecting Hungary’s suffering at the hands of her neighbours after her involuntary disarmament after WW1 - the Hungarians were unable to take any effective measures to prevent the break-up of their country and even today, 100 years later, many millions of Hungarians still live outside Hungary's borders
The exact model of the mysterious tank remains a puzzle to this day. Some state that the shipment was of Swedish m/21 tanks. More likely, however, is that they were shipment of surviving German LK-II tanks, of which Sweden also had a few. The most likely scenario acording to the archival research of Lieutenant Nicholas Eder is that according to the records, the first two LK-II's arrived in the spring of 1920, while the other 12 were shipped into the country after the German Army disarmament began, probably in pieces. No information on the procurement and delivery exists, but the Swedes may have played a role as intermediariesin this case. The most interesting part of the story is of the two LK.II tanks purchased for testing; This suggests that at least two LK.II's were assembled and functional within Hungary in the early 1920's.
Following the signing of the Peace Treaty, the possession of tanks by Hungary became illegal, but the military refused to give them up. Instead they entered into the popular 1920's military sport of the "Hide". In the coming years, parts of the disassembled vehicles were secretly hidden in the most isolated of rural farms, for example, or placed in railway freight wagons which traveled to and fro across the country, sometimes allegedly just behind the passenger car transporting the Control Commission agents ... After 1928 the situation improved and it was possible to secretly assemble the tanks, more or less obsolete as they already were - but they were the only tanks Hungary had. They emerged from hiding have suffered from the harsh conditions of their storage - problems included corrosion and some parts having completely disappeared. Now, almost 100 years later, there is no record of the cicumstances but it is known that the Technical Department prepared drawings of the missing items. They may have been intended to be manufactured line, but if not, this may have contributed to less than half of the tanks being restored for sevice.
Finally, in 1930, the new armoured unit received five of the tanks for training, but by now they were hopelessly out of date and technically unreliable. Later in the same year. Hungary secretly made arrangements to buy tanks from a new ally - Italy. These were FIAT 3000 B tanks, derived from the Renault FT17. They weren't that modern, but they were better than the old LK.II's and they were brand new. The increasingly close relationship between the two countries seemed a favorable omen with respect to possible future purchases of tanks. Thus, as the FIAT models arrived, the old LK.II's were gradually withdrawn from service in 1933 and all were shipped off to the scrap metal plants. Within a couple of years they had all slowly disappeared.
These tanks of mysterious origin thus left without a trace in the same way they were received. However, the story has one last and final twist still in store, just as in a novel or film. In 1939, the 2nd light tank company had been newly formed and a few bored soldiers began exploring their new home. The found an abandoned and boarded-up shed, inside of which was found a mysterious tank of an unknown type. Neither the soldiers nor their direct superiors knew the type of tank, so Captain Mészöly made enquriees. The response was that this was a type of tank that the army had scrapped years ago, and none remained. With this information, Captain Mészöly and his men in good conscience dismantled and sold the tank as scrap metal with the money received enriching the pot of the light tank company. In this way, the only remaining Hungarian LK-II met it's final and sadly unceremonious end.
How did this tank survive until 1939,and why was it left assembled in the shed? This question will probably never receive an answer. More than likely it was one of the two tanks received for the 1920 trial, which was then hidden away and (after the death or retirement of witnesses) simply forgotten about.
(The above sourced from http://militiahungarorum.roncskutatas.hu/1867_f_j_h_s_l.html and translated using Google translate so forgive any screw-ups in the translation - and if anyone whose fluent in Hungarian and English wants to take the time to correct any mistakes - please do).
The Leichte Kampfwagen (Light Cavalry Tank) LK.III
The LK.III was to be an improved and redesigned version of the LK.II tank with a front mounted turret and rear mounted engine. It was no longer based on a Daimler car chassis, but rather on specially designed components. The main armament was to be either the Russian 57mm Sokol gun or the 20mm Becker Flieger Kanone. 1000 were ordered, but not even a prototype was completed before November of 1918.
Landsverk and the German connection
The Stridsvagn m/21 led to the Swedish army and government remaining open to further cooperation. However, in 1920 Landsverk, at the time a major Swedish heavy machinery manufacturer, was on the verge of going bankrupt. Working through a Netherlands front company, the German company Gutehoffnungshutte Aktenverein purchased half the stock and by 1925 had acquired more than 60%. Landsverk continued to manufacture trucks and tractors together with railroad and harbour equipment. It also developed a sideline in the manufacture of armoured vehicles, with German engineers, technicians and designs playing a significant part. Numbers of the resulting armoured vehicles were exported to various countries. However, as far as the German Army was concerned, Swedish society was too open to permit anything more than military tourism (such as Guderain in 1929 being given access to a Swedish tank, the first time had had drive one).
Sturmpanzerwagen Oberschlesien
It was also decided that a lighter tank was required which could spearhead assaults and which could be mass-produced - this was designated the Sturmpanzerwagen Oberschlesien. The basic plan involved a 19 ton vehicle with a crew of 5 – a far cry from the 33 ton A7V and it's 18 man crew. The program was intended to supply large numbers of fast mobile armoured vehicles which could be mass-produced at low cost under war-time conditions.
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Sturmpanzerwagen Oberschlesien
Thirteen companies bid for the contract and in the middle of 1918 construction of a design by Captain Müller was assigned to the Oberschlesien Eisenwerk of Gleiwitz (in Upper Silesia), which had partially completed two prototypes by October 1918. It was a radical design for a fast-moving, lightly armored assault tank. The Oberschlesien included a track which was placed under the tank and only wrapped around half of it. The design sacrificed armor for the sake of speed and only required an Argus gasoline-fueled 180 hp engine for the 19 ton body, giving it a projected road speed of 10 mph and a cross-country speed of 5.5 mph. Range was estimated at 35-37 miles. The tank featured such advanced features as a main cannon mounted on top of the tank in a central revolving turret, separate fighting and engine compartments, a rear-mounted engine and a low track run.
For its time, the Oberschlesien was a rather modern-looking tank, though its combat effectiveness and actual performance can only be guessed at. Neither of the ordered test models nor the improved "Oberschlesien II" already planned were finished before the end of the war.
The German Tanks of World War One
The development of tanks in World War I began as an attempt to break the stalemate which trench warfare had brought to the Western Front. The British and French both began experimenting in 1915, and deployed tanks in battle from 1916 and 1917 respectively. The Germans, on the other hand, were slower to develop tanks, rather they concentrated on anti-tank weapons. The initial German response to the modest initial successes of the Allied tanks was the A7V, which, like some other tanks of the period, was based on caterpillar tracks of the type found on the American Holt Tractors. Initially unconvinced that tanks were a serious threat, the High Command ordered just twenty A7Vs, which took part in a handful of actions between March and October, 1918.
The first German Tank – the A7V
The A7V is certainly a front-runner for the ugliest and least capable tank ever to have been built and gone into action. Powered by two Daimler engines, the tank was first demonstrated in the Spring Offensive of 1918. Internally, the Sturmpanzerwagen was cramped, smelly and noisy. No fewer than 18 men were called upon to man the machine to its full "potential". With the 57 mm main gun at front, internal operators had access to two 7.92 mm machine guns at the rear along with a further four along the sides of the steel beast - two to a side. Each machine gun would need to be manned by a further two personnel per gun - a firer and an ammunition re-supplier. The engine sat in the lower-middle of the design with the main gear components resting under the rear. A crew of two would man the front 57 mm main gun, one firing whilst the other loaded the weapon. Two drivers sat in the upper center bulge area operating a steering wheel and lever controls. Stowage was allotted for individual crew weapons in the form of rifles. During final design the rear-facing cannon was removed and the number of machine-guns was increased to six. Grab ropes were provided throughout as the design had plenty of headroom space for the average soldier, though travel made for an uneasy and overall bumpy ride.
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German A7V Tank from WW1
In theory, the idea of an armored box bristling with all types of deadly hardware seemed sound. In practice, however, the large design was far from perfect. The vehicle was excessively heavy, making it impractical to be used on uneven terrain. The system was slow as well, often meaning that it could be outpaced by the very infantry it was to assist. The short tracks of the tractor system also made the vehicle relatively unsafe and uncontrollable in some cases. It weighed 33 tons overall and with it's short under-slung tracks and low ground clearance, it had almost no capability to overcome obstacles or cross broken, shell-hole filled and muddy ground – the typical terrain of the Western Front.
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The A7V – internal layout
If the A7V has one saving grace, it was that the all-around armor protection for the crew was second to none - even when compared to the British designs - over an inch in some areas. A hundred of these tanks were ordered although only 20 were ever produced, and the first of these were ready in October 1917. There were numerous differences between individual tanks since all parts were handmade and made to fit given tank. The Schwerer Kampfwagen A7V was first used at St Quentin on 21 March 1918. Although some of its features, such as the sprung tracks and the thicker armour, made it better than British tanks at that time, the A7V was less successful as a battle vehicle. The main problems concerned its mechanical reliability and the difficulty it encountered crossing enemy trenches due to its track design and minimal ground clearance.
An original A7V captured by Australian troops in 1918 can be seen in the museum in Brisbane, Queensland in Australia. One of only 20 built, it is the last surviving example of the first German military tank and while on display, it's not in running order.
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The A7V tank "Mephisto" being dragged into the Queenland Museum in 1919
The tank was lost at the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux on 24 April 1918. The battle for the area saw the Australian, British and German forces in a fluid situation, moving around the tank which had been disabled after falling into a ditch and still had dead crew inside.
The 26th Battalion of the 7th Brigade, mostly from Queensland, hatched a plan to capture it so it could not be reused by the Germans. In July 1918 after launching an artillery barrage, the Infantry moved forward and dragged it back to their lines; the Germans were still in sight of the tank and firing at them. They had to don gas masks after poison gas was deployed. The tank was then graffitied by Australian troops, with a painting of the AIF rising sun emblem. Machinations began to take the tank back to Australia, but the British wanted to keep it for the Imperial War Museum. It was quickly put on a ship destined for Sydney with the Australian infantry that captured it. The ship was supposed to deliver it to Sydney, with plans for it to go to the war memorial in Canberra's display, but it was diverted to Brisbane and unloaded there. Two steam traction engines moved it from the ship to the museum, dragging it on its tracks.
The Queensland Museum, where it was housed, changed location a number of times, and the tank at one point was housed outside, where it was exposed to the elements, and parts were removed from it by the public. After many years it was eventually moved inside the museum and put behind glass in a temperature controlled environment, protecting it from the public. Following the 2011 Brisbane Floods, Mephisto was removed from the Queensland Museum to an undisclosed location for restoration work. It was claimed that the vehicle would be returned to the museum during 2012. However, in March 2013 it was revealed that the vehicle was temporarily housed at the Workshops Rail Museum at North Ipswich where it was placed on temporary display. It will return to the Queensland Museum in 2015.
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The A7V tank "Mephisto" in the Queensland Museum, Brisbane, Australia
The A7V's suffered from numerous design faults and already towards the end of the First World War it was clear that the A7V was a failure, being too slow and clumsy in action and slow to build. Germany actually used more captured British tanks than A7Vs.
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Captured British Mk4 Male tank in use by the German Army
In fact, most "German" tanks in service over 1917-1918 were British tanks captured at Cambrai and other locations. Some 100 of these were repaired, overhauled at Charleroi (by Bavarian Army Motor Vehicle Park 20) and rearmed with Russian 57mm Sokol / Belgian 57mm Maxim Nordenfeld guns in place of British 6pdr guns (Male tanks) and 7.92mm Maxim 08 machine guns (Female tanks). Spare parts were obtained from battle damaged tanks unfit for repair. Captured tanks were grouped in four captured tank companies – Sturmpanzerwagenabteilungen (Beute). Captured British Mark A Whippets also equipped an entire German captured tank company and some French tanks (including Renault FT-17 light tanks) captured during the German offensive in November of 1918 were also used.
The K-Wagen
As it became clear that the tank could play a significant role on the battlefield, Germany began working on designs for both heavy and light tanks. And when they designed a "heavy" tank, they meant "heavy". In WW1, anticipating the outrageously super-heavy tank designs of WW2, German designers came up with the K-wagen, designed by Joseph Vollmer, a reserve captain and engineer working for the Verkehrstechnische Prüfungskommission ("Transport-technologies Board of Examiners" of the army) and a Captain Weger (Wegner?). On June 28 1917 the War Ministry approved the draft design and in December 1917 ordered ten examples built, five to be built by the Riebe ball-bearing factory in Berlin and five by Wegman and Co. of Kassel.
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Drawing of a K-wagen
The vehicle originally weighed 165 tons but this was reduced to a more practicable 120 tons by shortening the length. The huge size and mass of the K-Wagen made it impossible to transport, so it was decided that it would be split into sections for transport by rail, to be reassembled behind the front line near where it was to be used.
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K-wagen in the factory
The hull of the K-Wagen consisted of six modules that could be transported separately by rail: the control room, the fighting room, the engine room, the transmission room and the two sponsons. Modified U-Boot communications and control equipment was to be used. The commander gave orders to the crew by means of electric lights: fire control was comparable to that of a destroyer, the Germans seeing the vehicle as a veritable "landship". The drivers would have had to steer the vehicle blindly, directed by the commander.
The first of these K-Wagen tanks were planned to enter service in 1919. The hull was boxy and mounted with sponsons. Armor protection ranged from 10 to 30mm and the entire tank weighted 148-150 tons. The vehicle was to be 12.7m long, 3.0m wide (6.0m wide with sponsons) and 3.0m high. It featured roller-type tracks and was powered by two Daimler-Benz 6 cylinder aircraft engines (each producing 650hp) with electric-magnetic clutch transmission. Maximum speed was 7.5km/h. K-Wagen’s armament consisted of four 77mm guns (two mounted in each sponson) with 800 rounds of ammunition and seven 7.92mm Maxim 08/15 machine guns with 21,000 rounds of ammunition.
At the beginning of the project the incorporation of flamethrowers was considered but later rejected. It was to be operated by the crew of 22 men. Production was delayed, because of material shortages and only two were under construction in November of 1918 at the Riebe-Kugellager factory at Berlin. One of the tanks, "Ribe", was complete at the end of the war, but it never left the factory. Both were eventually scrapped by the Allied Control Commission.
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K-wagen in the factory
It was also decided that lighter tanks were required which could spearhead assaults and which could be mass-produced. A number of different types were designed and a small number of prototypes were under construction at the end of the war.
The Leichte Kampfwagen (Light Cavalry Tank) LK.I
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Leichte Kampfwagen LK-I
The LK.I was designed by Joseph Vollmer (he of the K-wagen) and was influenced by the captured British Mark A Whippet Medium Tanks. It was based on a Daimler car chassis, using the existing axles for sprocket and idler wheels. It's design followed a typical automobile layout, with the engine at the front and the driving compartment in the rear. It was the first German tank to be mounted with a turret (rear mounted) armed with a 7.92mm Maxim 08/15 machine gun.
Armor protection was 8 to 14mm and entire tank weighted 6.89 tons. It was 5.08m long, 1.95m wide and 2.52m high. The LK.I was powered by single Daimler-Benz Otto Model 1910 4-cylinder 50-60hp gasoline engine with an operational range of 70km and a maximum speed of 14 km/h. It carried 140 litres of gasoline and was operated by a 3 man crew. Only (2?) prototypes were produced in mid-1918, while 800 were ordered. A prototype of the LK.I was demonstrated in Berlin in early 1918 but was seen as being underpowered.
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Deutscher Leichter Kampfpanzer L. K. I.
The Leichte Kampfwagen (Light Cavalry Tank) LK.II
The LK.II was a further development of the LK.I and had the same layout as the LK.I. Instead of a rear mounted turret, it was mounted with a superstructure (barbette) armed with a 37mm Krupp or Russian 57mm Sokol gun. Armor protection was 8 to 14mm and its weight increased to 8.75 tons. It was also powered by single Daimler-Benz Otto Model 1910 4-cylinder 55-60hp gasoline engine was operated by 3 men crew. Maximum speed was 14 to 18km/h with range of 65-70km.It was 5.06 meters long, 1.95 meters wide and 2.52 meters high. Another version was planned armed with one or two 7.92mm Maxim 08/15 machine guns mounted in a rear mounted turret but this remained as a design only.
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A WW1 German Leichte Kampfwagen LK II light Tank can be found at the Deutsches Panzermuseum in the small military town of Munster, Germany
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Another view of the Leichte Kampfwagen LK II light Tank in Munster, Germany
Two prototypes of the LK II were produced in June of 1918 and both the LK.I and the LK.II were demonstrated on June 13. Both projects were recommended for further development of a machine-gun version with a rotating turret. After the Battle of Amiens began, Krupp (although they did not have ready yet a real model) received an urgent order for 65 tanks. On October 2 1918, chassis testing of competing machines was carried out at Marienfelde. As a result the "Krupp" order for the LK.I was canceled. The choice fell on the LK-II. It was planned to producethe first 10 LK.II tanks in December 1918, and in April 1919 this number was to increase to 200 per month. Only a third of the tanks had to be machine-gun-equipped, the remaining two-thirds would be armed with cannon.
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LK.II prototype - this early prototype shows more similarities to the LK.I than the later versions
In the LK.II, the contours of the hull have changed somewhat from the LK.I. Slanted "cheekbones" are apparent on the engine covering, between the straight sides and the flat roof. Behind the engine compartment and hull are a driver's compartment with three viwwing ports. The fixed turret had straight sides and a sloping rear wall. In the fixed turret were the gunner and loader, working in a standing position. Hatches were placed as in the LK-I, but the size was increased. In the roof of the cabin was a hatch with a hinged lid, which served for viewing and ventilation. On the straight sides, the front plate and the roof of the engine compartment were blinds with inclined upper sheets - these were armoured covers with hinged lids for easier engine maintenance.
The 37 mm gun was mounted on a vertical support. The design of the gun shield as a whole was similar to the 57-mm gun installed on the A7V tank. The Gun Mount weighed 500 kg and was supplied with a telescopic sight and handwheel traverse. The horizontal aiming angle was ± 30 °. The side door openings were provided with a port for firing an MG.08 / 15 machinegun. Otto engines were to have been of two types - either 40 or 50 hp. Starting the engine could be performed from inside or outside of the tank using a crank handle or an electric starter. Two gas tank with a total capacity of 170 liters were placed on either side of the engine, between the engine and the sides, the tank bottom was 8-mm armor. Gasoline flow was made under pressure from the exhaust gases. For reliable engine power at all inclinations of the machine a float chamber was used. To prevent flooding of the engine oil circulation system. a closed lubrication oil tank was used. Radiator cooling was by a fan. Air was sucked out and ejected through the vents in the sides and roof of the engine compartment. The exhaust pipe was on the left side.
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LK.II prototype - this early prototype shows more similarities to the LK.I than the later versions
LK.II Transmission included: a plate clutch (main clutch); 4-speed car-type gearbox; drive shaft with bevel gears, cam or disc clutch drum or band brakes; two transverse half-line with the drive bevel gear at one end and on the other the cylinder. To increase traction and the capability to climb steep slopes the drive train intermediate transmission speed was lowered in 2,14-2,16 times. When off, the intermediate transmission speed was from 3.5 to 14 km / h when activated - of 1.6 to 6.5 km / h.
Steering was via manipulation of the caterpillar tracks using a rocker arm with three positions. The driver could adjust the turning radius. The minimum turning radius was 1.7 m. The transmission was under the floor of the fighting compartment. The layout of the transmission mechanism is consistent with the small width of the tank. The ventilation system ensured that the temperature of the air inside the tank remained slightly above the surrounding atmosphere.
The estimated cost of construction for the LK-II was 65,000-70,000 DM in 1918 prices. In 1917, an order was prepared for 1,000 tanks, but for his performance did not come from, although the troops during 1918 there were demands for more mobile tanks light type. The first LK-II was built only in the autumn of 1918. Only in October 1918 was J. Vollmer was able to deliver two light tanks, which were finished with the extensive use of automotive components and assemblies - this was much more promising in terms of speed of production and was 10 times cheaper. The massive use of light LK-II type tanks would have a much greater success than heavy, but their construction was limited to a few prototypes.
After the war, the German company manufacturing the tanks hid the parts from the Allied Control Commission. In early 1919, Germany made an agreement with Hungary, for whom they secretly built 14 LK-II tanks (see more on these LK.II's exported to Hungary and their fate below). Another batch of LK-II tanks was build for Sweden. The deal was made by the Steffen & Heyman company. Sweden also received German specialists to help with assembly. The Swedish government secretly purchased the parts for the 10 tanks for 100,000 (or 200,000, the amount is uncertain) Swedish Kronas and shipped the parts to Sweden labelled as boiler plates and agricultural equipment. The tanks were then assembled in Sweden as the Stridsvagn m/21, which was essentially an improved version of the LK.II prototype.
The Stridsvagn m/21 was armed with a single 6.5mm machine gun. In August 1922 trials began at Svea Livgarde in Stockholm. The tanks were painted army grey in and out. The engine was started by hand cranking which could also be done from the fighting compartment. External lighting was an acetylene gas light. In the autumn of 1923 five tanks participated successfully in a large manoeuvre. The trials continued from 1924 to 1927. The main objective was cross country mobility, but also armament and communication.
In 1929, five m/21's were rebuilt as the Strv m/21-29 variant, armed with a 37mm gun or two machine guns and powered by a more powerful Scania-Vabis engine. Modifications also included heavier armour. One of these Stridsvagn m/21-29's was driven by Heinz Guderian during a visit to Sweden in 1929. The Stridsvagn m/21-21 remained in service with the Swedish Army until 1938 and today a single example can be seen at the Deutsches Panzermuseum at Munster, Germany. Both a Stridsvagn m/21 and a Stridsvagn m/21-29 are displayed at the Axvall Tank Museum in Sweden.
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Stridsvagn m/21 (Strv m/21) was a Swedish version of the German LK II light tank, here seen at the Arsenalen Tank Museum, Sweden
For photographes of the Swedish Army Stridsvagn m/21 and additional information, my thanks and credit to http://blog.arsenalen.se/ from whom I sourced many the the m/21 photos below. Following are some photograph's of the Swedish Army's Stridsvagn m/21's back in the day...
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
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Swedish Army Stridsvagn M-21
All photograph's above of the Stridsvagn M21 are sourced from http://blog.arsenalen.se/en/2013/07/originalbilder/
The Hungarian Leichte Kampfwagen LK.II
Sometime in the early 1920's a mysterious shipment arrived in Hungary. The 14 vehicles, which were listed as tractors, almost immediately disappeared from under the watchful gaze of the Allied Control Commission. Very few people had knowledge of the shipment and the carefully hidden parts reemerged only in 1927, after the departure of the Allied Control Commission from Hungary. At least most of them ...
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A Magyar "vontatók" - a German LK.II in Hungarian Army Service
In 1928 the first tank squadron of the Hungarian Army was founded - and in the coming years this unit would be equipped with the contents of the mysterious cargo, after they were assembled. But only 6 of the 14 tanks shipped to Hungary eventually returned to service; Perhaps the other eight were destroyed during their time in hiding, but it is also possible that due to the secrecy of their shipment and concealment that certain parts or assemblies were simply lost (see the last paragraph in this context).
Since under the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary was still permitted to have tanks, vehicles of the original "V" (tractor) wore the name, is also seen them in Roman numerals. Also because of the prohibition of the century worked within the Police Newbie School (Ruis) militia purposes, because some armored vehicles were allowed to keep operating. The otherwise unarmed tanks were fitted with a standard 8mm 7.12 M. Schwarzlose machine gun and it was using these tanks that gave the inaugural Hungarian armored arm officers their first experiences.
Difficulties with bringing the tanks into service are indicated by the fact that the new numbers do not follow the original sequence (V-12, according to the records was the number I tank, the other numbers indicate that V-14, V-11, V-7, V-6 and V-3 were received). Power was provided by a Mercedes-Benz engine, while according to the literature of the LK's original engines; NAG-made engines should have been installed - perhaps the original engines were ruined while in hiding and needed replacement. Everything points to the original 14 tanks suffering serious damage, possibly suffered due to poor storage and having been transported on rail cars traveling back and forth to keep them concealed from the Allied Control Commission.
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Hungarian poster reflecting Hungary’s suffering at the hands of her neighbours after her involuntary disarmament after WW1 - the Hungarians were unable to take any effective measures to prevent the break-up of their country and even today, 100 years later, many millions of Hungarians still live outside Hungary's borders
The exact model of the mysterious tank remains a puzzle to this day. Some state that the shipment was of Swedish m/21 tanks. More likely, however, is that they were shipment of surviving German LK-II tanks, of which Sweden also had a few. The most likely scenario acording to the archival research of Lieutenant Nicholas Eder is that according to the records, the first two LK-II's arrived in the spring of 1920, while the other 12 were shipped into the country after the German Army disarmament began, probably in pieces. No information on the procurement and delivery exists, but the Swedes may have played a role as intermediariesin this case. The most interesting part of the story is of the two LK.II tanks purchased for testing; This suggests that at least two LK.II's were assembled and functional within Hungary in the early 1920's.
Following the signing of the Peace Treaty, the possession of tanks by Hungary became illegal, but the military refused to give them up. Instead they entered into the popular 1920's military sport of the "Hide". In the coming years, parts of the disassembled vehicles were secretly hidden in the most isolated of rural farms, for example, or placed in railway freight wagons which traveled to and fro across the country, sometimes allegedly just behind the passenger car transporting the Control Commission agents ... After 1928 the situation improved and it was possible to secretly assemble the tanks, more or less obsolete as they already were - but they were the only tanks Hungary had. They emerged from hiding have suffered from the harsh conditions of their storage - problems included corrosion and some parts having completely disappeared. Now, almost 100 years later, there is no record of the cicumstances but it is known that the Technical Department prepared drawings of the missing items. They may have been intended to be manufactured line, but if not, this may have contributed to less than half of the tanks being restored for sevice.
Finally, in 1930, the new armoured unit received five of the tanks for training, but by now they were hopelessly out of date and technically unreliable. Later in the same year. Hungary secretly made arrangements to buy tanks from a new ally - Italy. These were FIAT 3000 B tanks, derived from the Renault FT17. They weren't that modern, but they were better than the old LK.II's and they were brand new. The increasingly close relationship between the two countries seemed a favorable omen with respect to possible future purchases of tanks. Thus, as the FIAT models arrived, the old LK.II's were gradually withdrawn from service in 1933 and all were shipped off to the scrap metal plants. Within a couple of years they had all slowly disappeared.
These tanks of mysterious origin thus left without a trace in the same way they were received. However, the story has one last and final twist still in store, just as in a novel or film. In 1939, the 2nd light tank company had been newly formed and a few bored soldiers began exploring their new home. The found an abandoned and boarded-up shed, inside of which was found a mysterious tank of an unknown type. Neither the soldiers nor their direct superiors knew the type of tank, so Captain Mészöly made enquriees. The response was that this was a type of tank that the army had scrapped years ago, and none remained. With this information, Captain Mészöly and his men in good conscience dismantled and sold the tank as scrap metal with the money received enriching the pot of the light tank company. In this way, the only remaining Hungarian LK-II met it's final and sadly unceremonious end.
How did this tank survive until 1939,and why was it left assembled in the shed? This question will probably never receive an answer. More than likely it was one of the two tanks received for the 1920 trial, which was then hidden away and (after the death or retirement of witnesses) simply forgotten about.
(The above sourced from http://militiahungarorum.roncskutatas.hu/1867_f_j_h_s_l.html and translated using Google translate so forgive any screw-ups in the translation - and if anyone whose fluent in Hungarian and English wants to take the time to correct any mistakes - please do).
The Leichte Kampfwagen (Light Cavalry Tank) LK.III
The LK.III was to be an improved and redesigned version of the LK.II tank with a front mounted turret and rear mounted engine. It was no longer based on a Daimler car chassis, but rather on specially designed components. The main armament was to be either the Russian 57mm Sokol gun or the 20mm Becker Flieger Kanone. 1000 were ordered, but not even a prototype was completed before November of 1918.
Landsverk and the German connection
The Stridsvagn m/21 led to the Swedish army and government remaining open to further cooperation. However, in 1920 Landsverk, at the time a major Swedish heavy machinery manufacturer, was on the verge of going bankrupt. Working through a Netherlands front company, the German company Gutehoffnungshutte Aktenverein purchased half the stock and by 1925 had acquired more than 60%. Landsverk continued to manufacture trucks and tractors together with railroad and harbour equipment. It also developed a sideline in the manufacture of armoured vehicles, with German engineers, technicians and designs playing a significant part. Numbers of the resulting armoured vehicles were exported to various countries. However, as far as the German Army was concerned, Swedish society was too open to permit anything more than military tourism (such as Guderain in 1929 being given access to a Swedish tank, the first time had had drive one).
Sturmpanzerwagen Oberschlesien
It was also decided that a lighter tank was required which could spearhead assaults and which could be mass-produced - this was designated the Sturmpanzerwagen Oberschlesien. The basic plan involved a 19 ton vehicle with a crew of 5 – a far cry from the 33 ton A7V and it's 18 man crew. The program was intended to supply large numbers of fast mobile armoured vehicles which could be mass-produced at low cost under war-time conditions.
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Sturmpanzerwagen Oberschlesien
Thirteen companies bid for the contract and in the middle of 1918 construction of a design by Captain Müller was assigned to the Oberschlesien Eisenwerk of Gleiwitz (in Upper Silesia), which had partially completed two prototypes by October 1918. It was a radical design for a fast-moving, lightly armored assault tank. The Oberschlesien included a track which was placed under the tank and only wrapped around half of it. The design sacrificed armor for the sake of speed and only required an Argus gasoline-fueled 180 hp engine for the 19 ton body, giving it a projected road speed of 10 mph and a cross-country speed of 5.5 mph. Range was estimated at 35-37 miles. The tank featured such advanced features as a main cannon mounted on top of the tank in a central revolving turret, separate fighting and engine compartments, a rear-mounted engine and a low track run.
For its time, the Oberschlesien was a rather modern-looking tank, though its combat effectiveness and actual performance can only be guessed at. Neither of the ordered test models nor the improved "Oberschlesien II" already planned were finished before the end of the war.
German Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The Armistice & Aftermath
After the Armistice, all tanks in German hands were confiscated. Almost all were eventually scrapped, and the various postwar treaties forbade the former Central Powers from building or possessing tanks.
German Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The post-World War I Treaty of Versailles of 1919 prohibited the design, manufacture and deployment of tanks within the Reichswehr. When Imperial Germany fell to the Allies, the victors pushed for severe restrictions on the country's war-making capabilities and Germany took the brunt of the blame to the west and was forced into signing the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. Limitations for the post-WW1 German army included a 100,000-strong infantry army, absolutely no tanks of any kind and just a few armored vehicles. The German Army became a shell of its former self. Paragraph Twenty-four of the treaty provided for a 100,000-mark fine and imprisonment of up to six months for anybody who "[manufactured] armoured vehicles, tanks or similar machines, which may be turned to military use".
Despite the manpower and technical limitations imposed upon the German Army by the Treaty of Versailles, the Reichswehr established a clandestine General Staff to study World War I and to develop future strategies and tactics. Hans von Seeckt became Commander-in-Chief and took to heart the lessons learned in the Great War. He was instrumental in rewriting the German Army's doctrine. Infantry still remained the heart and soul of any planned offensive, but the tank would become the spearhead of actions that could shatter enemy defenses through speed, force and firepower.
Tactics involved the splitting up of enemy formations and counteractions involving pincer movements to surround and ultimately decimate the enemy. By 1926, German Army doctrine had been rewritten to fulfill this vision. While the Germans had not used large numbers of tanks in WW1, an emphasis on mobility was at the heart of German military doctrine and was a continuation of the highly successful storm-troop tactics of 1918. This, as the German Army began to examine the possibilities of tanks, thinking was very much in line with an emphasis on mobility which in turn was a continuation of the legacy of Hans von Seeckt. Officers such as Heinz Guderain were conformist to Prussian military thought, bringing to fruition ideas which were acceptable to the men around them, rather than non-conformists proposing radical change.
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General Oswald Lutz (6 November 1876 – 26 February 1944) was a German General who oversaw the motorization of the German Army in the late 1920s and early 1930s and was appointed as the first General der Panzertruppe of the Wehrmacht in 1935.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s German tank theory was pioneered by two figures: General Oswald Lutz and his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Guderian. Guderian became the more influential of the two and his ideas were widely publicized. Like his contemporary Sir Percy Hobart, Guderian initially envisioned an armored corps (panzerkorps) composed of several types of tanks. This included a slow infantry tank, armed with a small-caliber cannon and machine guns. The infantry tank, according to Guderian, was to be heavily armored to defend against enemy anti-tank guns and artillery. He also envisioned a fast breakthrough tank, similar to the British cruiser tank, which was to be armored against enemy anti-tank weapons and have a large 75-millimeter (2.95 in) main gun. Lastly, Germany would need a heavy tank, armed with a massive 150-millimeter (5.9 in) cannon to defeat enemy fortifications, and even stronger armor. Such a tank would require a weight of 70 to 100 tonnes and was completely impractical given the manufacturing capabilities of the day.
In the early 1930s, the German Army called upon a few German firms to put together some funded prototype light and medium tanks. At this time, the Army did not have a formal plan of action in terms of what it realistically needed. Light tanks could be made available in large quantities for a relatively low price while medium tanks afforded firepower but came at a price. At any rate, the German industrial infrastructure - both the post-war limitations and the economic damage caused by the crash of 1929 and the Great Depression - made the call easy for the Germany Army - the quest would start with the development of light tanks starting in the late 1920's, with German industry was discretely encouraged to look into tank design while equally discrete cooperation was undertaken with the Soviet Union.
In 1931, Major-General Oswald Lutz was appointed the "Inspector of Motor Transport" in the German Army with Heinz Guderian as his Chief of Staff; they began building the German Armored Forces and put in place a program to design and build a light training tank with which to train future personnel of Panzer Divisions. And through the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Germans also closely co-operated with the Soviet Union in the development of armored vehicle doctrine at Kama, near Kazan in USSR. There was also minor military cooperation with Sweden, including the extraction of technical data that proved invaluable to early German tank design.
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Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt (22 April 1866 – 27 December 1936)
Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt (22 April 1866 – 27 December 1936) was a German military officer who served as Chief of Staff to August von Mackensen, and was a central figure in planning the victories Mackensen achieved for Germany in the east during the First World War. With the Eleventh Army, Seeckt helped direct the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive of 2 May – 27 June 1915, where he was credited with engineering Mackensen's breakthrough which split the two Russian armies opposing them. The Russians never fully recovered. Here Seeckt implemented a change in handling the thrust of the offensive, pushing reserve formations through breaks in the Russian defenses. This was a break from the established method of securing flanks by advancing along a uniform front, using reserve formations to assist in overcoming strong points. By pressing the reserves forward into the Russian rear areas the Russian positions were destabilized, resulting in a collapse of the Russian defensive line. In 1917, Seeckt was sent to the Ottoman Empire to replace Colonel Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorff as Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Army, where he would remain until the war ended.
During the years of the Weimar Republic he was chief of staff for the Reichswehr from 1919 to 1920 and commander in chief of the German Army from 1920 until he resigned in October 1926 (after permitting Prince Wilhelm, the grandson of the former emperor to attend army manoeuvres in the uniform of the old imperial First Foot Guards without first seeking government approval). During this period he engaged in the reorganization of the army and laid the foundation for the doctrine, tactics, organization, and training of the German army. Seeckt envisioned Germany winning the next war by a series of highly mobile operations featuring combined arms operations of artillery, infantry, armor, and air power working together to concentrate superior firepower to crush the enemy at crucial points. By the time Seeckt left the German Army in 1926 the Reichswehr had a clear, standardized operational doctrine, as well as a precise theory on the future methods of combat which greatly influenced the military campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht during the first half of the Second World War.
From 1930 up until his death in 1936, von Seeckt was repeatedly in Finland as a military consultant with Paamaja (Finland's Supreme Headquarters) and guest lecturer to the Finnish military, where he continually stressed the need to train in combined arms operations. He became an enthusiastic supporter of Mannerheim's goal of making the Finnish Army a combat force which could make up for what it lacked in quantity with the high quality of it's professional and reservist soldiers and of it's weapons - as well as of it's doctrine. Seeckt urged Mannerheim (and, unofficially, influential members of the Finnish government and of Finnish political circles on the right) to further fortify the Karelian Isthmus, and to adopt policies to put in place sufficient arms and munitions manufacturing capability to ensure Finland was as self-sufficient as possible in armaments manufacturing. While Seeckt had worked with the Soviet Union in the past for purely practical reasons, he was strongly anti-communist and was dedicated to strengthening Germany. To this end, he continually urged stronger ties between Finland and Germany (to no avail as it turned out) after he had seen for himself the continually improving capabilities of the Finnish Armed Forces. By 1935, he would report that "…the Finnish Army, man for man, is better equipped and trained to a higher standard than even the soldiers of the Heer…".
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Von Seeckt with a Finnish Army guard of honor on the occasion of his 70th birthday, Helsinki, Finland, 22 April 1936
At a planning meeting in February 1934, von Seeckt's plan for a 20 Division (60 Regimental Battle Group /Prikaati) force was adopted and a 5 year plan to reach the necessary force level was also agreed to. In March 1934, Mannerheim asked von Seeckt to remain in Finland on his personal staff as a Military Advisor and also to continue to lecture at the Finnish Defence Forces Schools for Staff Officers and for Officer training - and to assist with revisions to the overall military training curriculum. In this capacity, von Seeckt would have a marked effect on Finnish officer and NCO training, leading to the training standards of the Finnish Army becoming the toughest in the world, "…dare I say it, even tougher than the Reichswehr," as he commented on a number of occasions. His 1921 book, "Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms" would become one of the core texts for Finnish Army Officers in training through the 1930's.
In this, von Seeckt strongly influenced the ogoing development of the Finnish doctrine that would become known as the Ukkosota, the "Thunder War": highly mobile operations featuring combined arms operations of artillery, infantry, armor, and air power working together to concentrate superior firepower to crush the enemy at crucial points. Von Seeckt served officially as a Lecturer at the Finnish Defence Forces Staff College, and unofficially as a military consultant to Marshal Mannerheim, up until his death in Berlin (whilst visiting home, where he expressed concerns about Hitler's increasing power) on 27 December 1936. The British Ambassador to Finland initially expressed some concern at the role von Seeckt was playing within Finland, but a number of meetings with von Seeckt eventually convinced him otherwise. He came to view Seeckt as far too much an embarrassingly correct man to be involved in any covert German machinations with regard to Finland. The Ambassador added: " .. the thoughts of General Seeckt towards Finland were generous and his views much more far reaching than one would expect from a man in such a tight fitting uniform and with such a pedantic exterior."
By all accounts, von Seeckt apparently greatly enjoyed his time in Finland, being heard on one occasion to say that he had no regrets over turning down the offer of an advisory position in China as he felt he had achieved far more rewarding results in Finland than even with the German Army. He developed a deep respect for the Finnish Army and its senior officers and a close friendship with both Marshal Mannerheim and with that other frequent lecturer at the Finnish Staff College from late 1933 on, retired British Major General John Frederick Charles Fuller. From 1934 to von Seeckt's death in late 1936, Mannerheim, Fuller and von Seeckt could often be seen in Helsinki eating lunch together. They would spend many evenings, together with other members of Mannerheim's coterie, discussing strategy, tactics and technical and scientific developments with possible military ramifications.
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J F C Fuller
In much of this, Fuller apparently poured forth a constant stream of thoughts and ideas – besides lecturing at the Staff College and to Finnish Army Officers Training Course, he also used his time in Helsinki to embark upon a second career as a writer, ultimately penning some 45 authoritative books and hundreds of popular-press articles and scholarly papers. He wrote about everything from war to yoga (the latter extremely avant-garde at the time). For all his personal foibles and failings, Fuller was a visionary – and in Helsinki, he was a visionary in the right place, at the right time, and with a critical and farsighted audience that analysed and examined his visions, sorting the kernels of wisdom from the chaff.
In the early 1930's Fuller predicted, as Anthony Trythall wrote, that "….future armies would be surrounded by swarms of motorized guerillas, irregulars or regular troops making use of the multitude of civilian motorcars that would be available." Fuller also mused that one day "a manless flying machine" would change the face of war. Early on he was intrigued by the development of radio, not only for communication but also as a way to control robot weapons. He also thought then-primitive rocket technology would one day lead to the development of superb anti-aircraft weapons. And as early as the 1920's, Fuller was a proponent of amphibious warfare. He envisioned a naval fleet "which belches forth war on every strand, which vomits forth armies as never did the horse of Troy." On the negative side of the balance sheet, Fuller also championed the military use of poison gas, particularly when spread by airplanes.
Many of these "visions" were picked up by the Finnish military: indeed, von Seeckt himself is believed have been influential in the Finnish military's rapid adoption of amphibious warfare following disciussions on the topic with Fuller – certainly the timeframe for the founding of the Rannikkojaakarit seems to close to their recorded discussions on this topic to be a coincidence. Likewise the Ilmavoimat's adoption of the "pigeon-guided glide-bomb" seems to have been partially influenced by Fuller's thoughts on robot-controlled weapons. Fuller's thoughts on rocket technology almost certainly led to the almost-at-the-last-minute introduction of the Finnish Army's rocket artillery of WW2 – the infamous "Mannerheiminurut", or Mannerheim's Organ.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bWt81vhIyY
The TJ-R150 Taisteluajoneuvo, first used by the Finnish Army during the Winter War, was a fearsome weapon - with its unmistakable sound giving rise to its nickname of "Mannerheiminurut."
Fuller's contribution to the education of Finnish Officers through the last half of the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's can be summarized in a quotation still found on plaques in classrooms at the Finnish Officer's School: "We shall teach each other: first, because we have a vast amount of experience behind us, and secondly, in my opinion it is only through free criticism of each other's ideas that truth can be thrashed about.... During your course here no one is going to compel you to work, for the simple reason that a man who requires to be driven is not worth driving...thus you will become your own students and until you learn how to teach yourselves, you will never be taught by others…." Teaching was something Fuller was familiar with – from 1920, he had served a three-year tour as a professor at the British Army Staff College and he had enjoyed this period of his life.
On Fuller's retirement from the British Army in 1933, the attractive offer from Finland had appealed to him, giving him the opportunity to lecture whilst also continuing with his writing. It was in fact in this period that he completed and published "Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship, an outstanding contribution to the body of knowledge concerning the strategic leadership of the American Civil War. Fuller, von Seeckt, Manerheim and that architect of the Finnish Army's doctrine of Ukkosota, Kenraaliluutnantti Aksel Airo, all found themselves on common ground in their endorsement of Clausewitz's five strategic principles: these were principles which became deeply embedded in the Ukkosota:
- First and most important is to employ all the forces that we can make available with the utmost energy.
- The second is to concentrate our force at the point were the decisive blows are to be struck, to run the risk even of being at a disadvantage at other points, in order to make sure of the result at the decisive point, the success at that point will compensate for all defeats a secondary points.
- The third principle is not to lose time...by rapidity many measures of the enemy are nipped in the bud and public opinion is gained in our favor.
- The fourth is surprise...it is the most powerful element of victory.
- And the last is to follow up successive gains with the utmost energy. The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the only means of gathering up the fruits of victory.
Sourced from: http://www.alternativefinland.com/wp-co ... fuller.jpg
J F C Fuller as a young man, he retired in 1933 as a Major-General and thereafter served as a consultant and guest lecturer at the Finnish military's Staff College (1934-46)
Many other of Fuller's maxims found their way into the Ukkosota, including these:
"…If...we can strike a crushing blow first, even if we only crush a small force of the enemy, we not only gain a physical victory...but a moral victory. Finding is the first step towards maneuvering; just as hitting is the first step in holding. Only when an enemy is held, is liberty of maneuver gained and liberty of movement carries with it freedom of action, which is the aim of all generalship."
"Uncertainty arises from fear of the unknown...It teaches us that the rear demoralizes the front; that to surprise the front we must attack the rear. First the rear of the front, secondly the rear of the reserves, thirdly the rear of the command and so on back to the initial will of the people who desire victory and dread defeat." (Note that in this, Fuller to a certain extent inspired the setting up of that first Finnish Army Special Forces unit, Osasto Nyrkki, whose objective was very specifically to create disruption and havoc in the enemy rear at a strategic level).
"There are two main causes for military shortsightedness: the first is the worship of traditions, and the second is our incapacity to see world forces in their true relationship...."
In 1934, Fuller would attempt an initial answer to the following key strategic question facing Finland's defence forces: "How are we going to secure Finland by means of our small army, small airforce and small navy?" Fuller's guidance on how to overcome Finland's constraints on resources was: "As you cannot increase the size of your military forces; consequently there is only one thing to do, reduce the size of the world to fit your force." Reducing the size of the world to fit Finland's forces would be accomplished by "increasing the present speed of military movement so that your securities, through enhanced mobility, may be brought to balance your liabilities." In its essence, Fuller advocated using speed, superior weapons, concentration of forces at key decision points and firepower to offset the Soviet Union's overwhelming advantage in manpower.
If Fuller had a fatal flaw as a tactician, it was that he derided the importance of putting infantry "boots on the ground." To Fuller, combat was simply a matter of wool uniforms versus steel armor — and that seemed to him a no-brainer. In this, Fuller had failed to consider the development of effective antitank weaponry – a deficiency which the Finnish Army inadvertently corrected on one of Fuller's visits to Spain during the Spanish Civil War, where he made three visits as a war correspondent, writing dramatic, anti-Republican articles for the Sunday Dispatch. He had the good fortune to be visiting Pohjan Pohjat at the front and was an observer to a Republican tank attack which was ripped to shreds by two batteries of Pohjan Pohjat's Bofors 76mm AA guns in their anti-tank role. As a direct result, he contributed heavily to the debate within the Finnish military that led to the rapid and large-scale adoption of these guns as an "antidote" to the numerical strength of Soviet armoured formations – and indeed, it would be the Finnish Army's plethora of anti-tank guns which would break the back of Soviet armour in the Winter War – as it would be the Finnish Artillery and Rocket Artillery that broke the back of the Soviet infantry attacks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyLj8xZ1a08
It would be the Finnish Artillery that broke the back of the massed Soviet infantry in the Winter War (please excuse the incorrect dates in the video clip used - these are from an alternative history movie where Finland is portrayed as fighting alongside Germany against the Soviet Union...)
In later years, Mannerheim and Fuller continued that tradition of lunches that had first begun with von Seeckt. Often they were to be seen eating together at Helsinki's Savoy Restaurant http://www.ravintolasavoy.fi/en, which opened on what happened to be Mannerheim's seventieth birthday, June 4, 1937. This extraordinarily beautiful restaurant — with its hedged terrace jutting out over the trees lining Helsinki's Esplanade shopping street — was the creation of Alvar Aalto, surely one of Finland's, and Europe's most influential and honored architects and designers. The décor is of carved and rounded, stained and polished, birch; the seating padded with black leather. Ceilings and walls are of olive-wood-grained blocks. Aalto's free-form vases, known throughout the world, adorn the restaurant. The lighting fixtures, the serving stations, even the coat racks are Aalto's — the same now as when the Savoy opened so many decades ago.
Sourced from: http://www.alternativefinland.com/wp-co ... la-001.jpg
The corner table at the Ravintola Savoy - here, Mannerheim, von Seeckt and Fuller would spend many a lunch.....
At the far end of the restaurant is a corner banquette, and on the two walls that meet in that corner there is an etching of Marshal Mannerheim and a small bronze plaque identifying the bench as his customary luncheon seat. There, the Marshal and "Boney" Fuller would first drink a brimming glass of schnapps (the glasses having been carefully frozen beforehand according to the Marshall's instructions), after which they would eat a lunch of vorshmack (for which Fuller, under Mannerheim's tutelage, had acquired a taste), often followed by fillet of perch, grilled, brushed with butter, and served with grated horseradish and succeeded by a a dessert of apple baked in a ramekin with vanilla sauce and a touch of Madeira.
While Fuller was impatient with what he considered the inability of Britain as a democracy to adopt military reforms, he considered Finland to be an example of "…. what a democracy with a people firmly committed to a common goal can achieve by way of preparation for war". And in this belief that a major European war was coming, Fuller and Marshall Mannerheim were completely in accord. Between 1934 and 1930, when not visiting and lecturing in Finland, Fuller would spend some time back in Brtain and here, he became loosely involved with Sir Oswald Mosley and the British Fascist movement as well as joining the clandestine far right group the Nordic League. As a member of the British Union of Fascists he was asked to sit on the party's Policy Directorate but while considered one of Mosley's closest allies, he chose to decline, citing the demands on his time imposed by his lecturing work at the Finnish Staff College and at the Finnish Army's Officer Training School.
Fuller's guest lecturer position at the Finnish Staff College was somewhat of a joke within the British military in the late 1930's – while Fuller had his admirers, he also had many detractors and his vigorous, expressive and opinionated personality did not go down well with many. There was certainly considerable amusement among his detractors at his position "lecturing on bone-headed theories to a second rate military in a minor country of importance to no-one" as one such detractor put it. The last laugh would however be Fuller's, when "his" military soundly thrashed both the Soviet Union and Germany, something Fuller would make no bones about rubbing in when in 1947 he published his magnificent opus, "The Generalship of Marshal Mannerheim" (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1947).
Both Fuller and von Seeckt would be major contributors to the ongoing development of the Finnish battle doctrine of Ukkosota and both would be great admirers of the Finnish Army. Indeed, in the late summer of 1939, on the eve of the Winter War, at a reception after Fuller had watched a parade of the fully mechanized 21st Panssaaridivisoona through Helsinki, Kenraalimajuri Ruben Lagus, commander of the 21st, would greet Fuller with a handshake, saying "I hope you were pleased with your children." Fuller is said to have replied, "Lagus, they have grown up so quickly that I no longer recognize them."
Fuller was not recalled to service by the British Army on the outbreak of WW2 – indeed, he was the only retired officer of his rank in the British Army not invited to return to service during the war. While he did request a service position, he was not heart-broken when this was declined. Instead, he chose to return to Finland and would spend the years 1939-1945 continuing to lecture at Finnish Army Officers Training Courses and at the Finnish Staff College, as well as preparing detailed analyses of Soviet (and later, German) tactics and performance.
And now we leave von Seeckt and Fuller and return to the German Tanks of the Interwar Decades once more…….
The Armistice & Aftermath
After the Armistice, all tanks in German hands were confiscated. Almost all were eventually scrapped, and the various postwar treaties forbade the former Central Powers from building or possessing tanks.
German Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The post-World War I Treaty of Versailles of 1919 prohibited the design, manufacture and deployment of tanks within the Reichswehr. When Imperial Germany fell to the Allies, the victors pushed for severe restrictions on the country's war-making capabilities and Germany took the brunt of the blame to the west and was forced into signing the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. Limitations for the post-WW1 German army included a 100,000-strong infantry army, absolutely no tanks of any kind and just a few armored vehicles. The German Army became a shell of its former self. Paragraph Twenty-four of the treaty provided for a 100,000-mark fine and imprisonment of up to six months for anybody who "[manufactured] armoured vehicles, tanks or similar machines, which may be turned to military use".
Despite the manpower and technical limitations imposed upon the German Army by the Treaty of Versailles, the Reichswehr established a clandestine General Staff to study World War I and to develop future strategies and tactics. Hans von Seeckt became Commander-in-Chief and took to heart the lessons learned in the Great War. He was instrumental in rewriting the German Army's doctrine. Infantry still remained the heart and soul of any planned offensive, but the tank would become the spearhead of actions that could shatter enemy defenses through speed, force and firepower.
Tactics involved the splitting up of enemy formations and counteractions involving pincer movements to surround and ultimately decimate the enemy. By 1926, German Army doctrine had been rewritten to fulfill this vision. While the Germans had not used large numbers of tanks in WW1, an emphasis on mobility was at the heart of German military doctrine and was a continuation of the highly successful storm-troop tactics of 1918. This, as the German Army began to examine the possibilities of tanks, thinking was very much in line with an emphasis on mobility which in turn was a continuation of the legacy of Hans von Seeckt. Officers such as Heinz Guderain were conformist to Prussian military thought, bringing to fruition ideas which were acceptable to the men around them, rather than non-conformists proposing radical change.
Sourced from: http://www.alternativefinland.com/wp-co ... utz-12.jpg
General Oswald Lutz (6 November 1876 – 26 February 1944) was a German General who oversaw the motorization of the German Army in the late 1920s and early 1930s and was appointed as the first General der Panzertruppe of the Wehrmacht in 1935.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s German tank theory was pioneered by two figures: General Oswald Lutz and his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Heinz Guderian. Guderian became the more influential of the two and his ideas were widely publicized. Like his contemporary Sir Percy Hobart, Guderian initially envisioned an armored corps (panzerkorps) composed of several types of tanks. This included a slow infantry tank, armed with a small-caliber cannon and machine guns. The infantry tank, according to Guderian, was to be heavily armored to defend against enemy anti-tank guns and artillery. He also envisioned a fast breakthrough tank, similar to the British cruiser tank, which was to be armored against enemy anti-tank weapons and have a large 75-millimeter (2.95 in) main gun. Lastly, Germany would need a heavy tank, armed with a massive 150-millimeter (5.9 in) cannon to defeat enemy fortifications, and even stronger armor. Such a tank would require a weight of 70 to 100 tonnes and was completely impractical given the manufacturing capabilities of the day.
In the early 1930s, the German Army called upon a few German firms to put together some funded prototype light and medium tanks. At this time, the Army did not have a formal plan of action in terms of what it realistically needed. Light tanks could be made available in large quantities for a relatively low price while medium tanks afforded firepower but came at a price. At any rate, the German industrial infrastructure - both the post-war limitations and the economic damage caused by the crash of 1929 and the Great Depression - made the call easy for the Germany Army - the quest would start with the development of light tanks starting in the late 1920's, with German industry was discretely encouraged to look into tank design while equally discrete cooperation was undertaken with the Soviet Union.
In 1931, Major-General Oswald Lutz was appointed the "Inspector of Motor Transport" in the German Army with Heinz Guderian as his Chief of Staff; they began building the German Armored Forces and put in place a program to design and build a light training tank with which to train future personnel of Panzer Divisions. And through the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Germans also closely co-operated with the Soviet Union in the development of armored vehicle doctrine at Kama, near Kazan in USSR. There was also minor military cooperation with Sweden, including the extraction of technical data that proved invaluable to early German tank design.
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Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt (22 April 1866 – 27 December 1936)
Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt (22 April 1866 – 27 December 1936) was a German military officer who served as Chief of Staff to August von Mackensen, and was a central figure in planning the victories Mackensen achieved for Germany in the east during the First World War. With the Eleventh Army, Seeckt helped direct the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive of 2 May – 27 June 1915, where he was credited with engineering Mackensen's breakthrough which split the two Russian armies opposing them. The Russians never fully recovered. Here Seeckt implemented a change in handling the thrust of the offensive, pushing reserve formations through breaks in the Russian defenses. This was a break from the established method of securing flanks by advancing along a uniform front, using reserve formations to assist in overcoming strong points. By pressing the reserves forward into the Russian rear areas the Russian positions were destabilized, resulting in a collapse of the Russian defensive line. In 1917, Seeckt was sent to the Ottoman Empire to replace Colonel Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorff as Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Army, where he would remain until the war ended.
During the years of the Weimar Republic he was chief of staff for the Reichswehr from 1919 to 1920 and commander in chief of the German Army from 1920 until he resigned in October 1926 (after permitting Prince Wilhelm, the grandson of the former emperor to attend army manoeuvres in the uniform of the old imperial First Foot Guards without first seeking government approval). During this period he engaged in the reorganization of the army and laid the foundation for the doctrine, tactics, organization, and training of the German army. Seeckt envisioned Germany winning the next war by a series of highly mobile operations featuring combined arms operations of artillery, infantry, armor, and air power working together to concentrate superior firepower to crush the enemy at crucial points. By the time Seeckt left the German Army in 1926 the Reichswehr had a clear, standardized operational doctrine, as well as a precise theory on the future methods of combat which greatly influenced the military campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht during the first half of the Second World War.
From 1930 up until his death in 1936, von Seeckt was repeatedly in Finland as a military consultant with Paamaja (Finland's Supreme Headquarters) and guest lecturer to the Finnish military, where he continually stressed the need to train in combined arms operations. He became an enthusiastic supporter of Mannerheim's goal of making the Finnish Army a combat force which could make up for what it lacked in quantity with the high quality of it's professional and reservist soldiers and of it's weapons - as well as of it's doctrine. Seeckt urged Mannerheim (and, unofficially, influential members of the Finnish government and of Finnish political circles on the right) to further fortify the Karelian Isthmus, and to adopt policies to put in place sufficient arms and munitions manufacturing capability to ensure Finland was as self-sufficient as possible in armaments manufacturing. While Seeckt had worked with the Soviet Union in the past for purely practical reasons, he was strongly anti-communist and was dedicated to strengthening Germany. To this end, he continually urged stronger ties between Finland and Germany (to no avail as it turned out) after he had seen for himself the continually improving capabilities of the Finnish Armed Forces. By 1935, he would report that "…the Finnish Army, man for man, is better equipped and trained to a higher standard than even the soldiers of the Heer…".
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Von Seeckt with a Finnish Army guard of honor on the occasion of his 70th birthday, Helsinki, Finland, 22 April 1936
At a planning meeting in February 1934, von Seeckt's plan for a 20 Division (60 Regimental Battle Group /Prikaati) force was adopted and a 5 year plan to reach the necessary force level was also agreed to. In March 1934, Mannerheim asked von Seeckt to remain in Finland on his personal staff as a Military Advisor and also to continue to lecture at the Finnish Defence Forces Schools for Staff Officers and for Officer training - and to assist with revisions to the overall military training curriculum. In this capacity, von Seeckt would have a marked effect on Finnish officer and NCO training, leading to the training standards of the Finnish Army becoming the toughest in the world, "…dare I say it, even tougher than the Reichswehr," as he commented on a number of occasions. His 1921 book, "Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms" would become one of the core texts for Finnish Army Officers in training through the 1930's.
In this, von Seeckt strongly influenced the ogoing development of the Finnish doctrine that would become known as the Ukkosota, the "Thunder War": highly mobile operations featuring combined arms operations of artillery, infantry, armor, and air power working together to concentrate superior firepower to crush the enemy at crucial points. Von Seeckt served officially as a Lecturer at the Finnish Defence Forces Staff College, and unofficially as a military consultant to Marshal Mannerheim, up until his death in Berlin (whilst visiting home, where he expressed concerns about Hitler's increasing power) on 27 December 1936. The British Ambassador to Finland initially expressed some concern at the role von Seeckt was playing within Finland, but a number of meetings with von Seeckt eventually convinced him otherwise. He came to view Seeckt as far too much an embarrassingly correct man to be involved in any covert German machinations with regard to Finland. The Ambassador added: " .. the thoughts of General Seeckt towards Finland were generous and his views much more far reaching than one would expect from a man in such a tight fitting uniform and with such a pedantic exterior."
By all accounts, von Seeckt apparently greatly enjoyed his time in Finland, being heard on one occasion to say that he had no regrets over turning down the offer of an advisory position in China as he felt he had achieved far more rewarding results in Finland than even with the German Army. He developed a deep respect for the Finnish Army and its senior officers and a close friendship with both Marshal Mannerheim and with that other frequent lecturer at the Finnish Staff College from late 1933 on, retired British Major General John Frederick Charles Fuller. From 1934 to von Seeckt's death in late 1936, Mannerheim, Fuller and von Seeckt could often be seen in Helsinki eating lunch together. They would spend many evenings, together with other members of Mannerheim's coterie, discussing strategy, tactics and technical and scientific developments with possible military ramifications.
Sourced from: http://www.alternativefinland.com/wp-co ... uller.jpeg
J F C Fuller
In much of this, Fuller apparently poured forth a constant stream of thoughts and ideas – besides lecturing at the Staff College and to Finnish Army Officers Training Course, he also used his time in Helsinki to embark upon a second career as a writer, ultimately penning some 45 authoritative books and hundreds of popular-press articles and scholarly papers. He wrote about everything from war to yoga (the latter extremely avant-garde at the time). For all his personal foibles and failings, Fuller was a visionary – and in Helsinki, he was a visionary in the right place, at the right time, and with a critical and farsighted audience that analysed and examined his visions, sorting the kernels of wisdom from the chaff.
In the early 1930's Fuller predicted, as Anthony Trythall wrote, that "….future armies would be surrounded by swarms of motorized guerillas, irregulars or regular troops making use of the multitude of civilian motorcars that would be available." Fuller also mused that one day "a manless flying machine" would change the face of war. Early on he was intrigued by the development of radio, not only for communication but also as a way to control robot weapons. He also thought then-primitive rocket technology would one day lead to the development of superb anti-aircraft weapons. And as early as the 1920's, Fuller was a proponent of amphibious warfare. He envisioned a naval fleet "which belches forth war on every strand, which vomits forth armies as never did the horse of Troy." On the negative side of the balance sheet, Fuller also championed the military use of poison gas, particularly when spread by airplanes.
Many of these "visions" were picked up by the Finnish military: indeed, von Seeckt himself is believed have been influential in the Finnish military's rapid adoption of amphibious warfare following disciussions on the topic with Fuller – certainly the timeframe for the founding of the Rannikkojaakarit seems to close to their recorded discussions on this topic to be a coincidence. Likewise the Ilmavoimat's adoption of the "pigeon-guided glide-bomb" seems to have been partially influenced by Fuller's thoughts on robot-controlled weapons. Fuller's thoughts on rocket technology almost certainly led to the almost-at-the-last-minute introduction of the Finnish Army's rocket artillery of WW2 – the infamous "Mannerheiminurut", or Mannerheim's Organ.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bWt81vhIyY
The TJ-R150 Taisteluajoneuvo, first used by the Finnish Army during the Winter War, was a fearsome weapon - with its unmistakable sound giving rise to its nickname of "Mannerheiminurut."
Fuller's contribution to the education of Finnish Officers through the last half of the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's can be summarized in a quotation still found on plaques in classrooms at the Finnish Officer's School: "We shall teach each other: first, because we have a vast amount of experience behind us, and secondly, in my opinion it is only through free criticism of each other's ideas that truth can be thrashed about.... During your course here no one is going to compel you to work, for the simple reason that a man who requires to be driven is not worth driving...thus you will become your own students and until you learn how to teach yourselves, you will never be taught by others…." Teaching was something Fuller was familiar with – from 1920, he had served a three-year tour as a professor at the British Army Staff College and he had enjoyed this period of his life.
On Fuller's retirement from the British Army in 1933, the attractive offer from Finland had appealed to him, giving him the opportunity to lecture whilst also continuing with his writing. It was in fact in this period that he completed and published "Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship, an outstanding contribution to the body of knowledge concerning the strategic leadership of the American Civil War. Fuller, von Seeckt, Manerheim and that architect of the Finnish Army's doctrine of Ukkosota, Kenraaliluutnantti Aksel Airo, all found themselves on common ground in their endorsement of Clausewitz's five strategic principles: these were principles which became deeply embedded in the Ukkosota:
- First and most important is to employ all the forces that we can make available with the utmost energy.
- The second is to concentrate our force at the point were the decisive blows are to be struck, to run the risk even of being at a disadvantage at other points, in order to make sure of the result at the decisive point, the success at that point will compensate for all defeats a secondary points.
- The third principle is not to lose time...by rapidity many measures of the enemy are nipped in the bud and public opinion is gained in our favor.
- The fourth is surprise...it is the most powerful element of victory.
- And the last is to follow up successive gains with the utmost energy. The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the only means of gathering up the fruits of victory.
Sourced from: http://www.alternativefinland.com/wp-co ... fuller.jpg
J F C Fuller as a young man, he retired in 1933 as a Major-General and thereafter served as a consultant and guest lecturer at the Finnish military's Staff College (1934-46)
Many other of Fuller's maxims found their way into the Ukkosota, including these:
"…If...we can strike a crushing blow first, even if we only crush a small force of the enemy, we not only gain a physical victory...but a moral victory. Finding is the first step towards maneuvering; just as hitting is the first step in holding. Only when an enemy is held, is liberty of maneuver gained and liberty of movement carries with it freedom of action, which is the aim of all generalship."
"Uncertainty arises from fear of the unknown...It teaches us that the rear demoralizes the front; that to surprise the front we must attack the rear. First the rear of the front, secondly the rear of the reserves, thirdly the rear of the command and so on back to the initial will of the people who desire victory and dread defeat." (Note that in this, Fuller to a certain extent inspired the setting up of that first Finnish Army Special Forces unit, Osasto Nyrkki, whose objective was very specifically to create disruption and havoc in the enemy rear at a strategic level).
"There are two main causes for military shortsightedness: the first is the worship of traditions, and the second is our incapacity to see world forces in their true relationship...."
In 1934, Fuller would attempt an initial answer to the following key strategic question facing Finland's defence forces: "How are we going to secure Finland by means of our small army, small airforce and small navy?" Fuller's guidance on how to overcome Finland's constraints on resources was: "As you cannot increase the size of your military forces; consequently there is only one thing to do, reduce the size of the world to fit your force." Reducing the size of the world to fit Finland's forces would be accomplished by "increasing the present speed of military movement so that your securities, through enhanced mobility, may be brought to balance your liabilities." In its essence, Fuller advocated using speed, superior weapons, concentration of forces at key decision points and firepower to offset the Soviet Union's overwhelming advantage in manpower.
If Fuller had a fatal flaw as a tactician, it was that he derided the importance of putting infantry "boots on the ground." To Fuller, combat was simply a matter of wool uniforms versus steel armor — and that seemed to him a no-brainer. In this, Fuller had failed to consider the development of effective antitank weaponry – a deficiency which the Finnish Army inadvertently corrected on one of Fuller's visits to Spain during the Spanish Civil War, where he made three visits as a war correspondent, writing dramatic, anti-Republican articles for the Sunday Dispatch. He had the good fortune to be visiting Pohjan Pohjat at the front and was an observer to a Republican tank attack which was ripped to shreds by two batteries of Pohjan Pohjat's Bofors 76mm AA guns in their anti-tank role. As a direct result, he contributed heavily to the debate within the Finnish military that led to the rapid and large-scale adoption of these guns as an "antidote" to the numerical strength of Soviet armoured formations – and indeed, it would be the Finnish Army's plethora of anti-tank guns which would break the back of Soviet armour in the Winter War – as it would be the Finnish Artillery and Rocket Artillery that broke the back of the Soviet infantry attacks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uyLj8xZ1a08
It would be the Finnish Artillery that broke the back of the massed Soviet infantry in the Winter War (please excuse the incorrect dates in the video clip used - these are from an alternative history movie where Finland is portrayed as fighting alongside Germany against the Soviet Union...)
In later years, Mannerheim and Fuller continued that tradition of lunches that had first begun with von Seeckt. Often they were to be seen eating together at Helsinki's Savoy Restaurant http://www.ravintolasavoy.fi/en, which opened on what happened to be Mannerheim's seventieth birthday, June 4, 1937. This extraordinarily beautiful restaurant — with its hedged terrace jutting out over the trees lining Helsinki's Esplanade shopping street — was the creation of Alvar Aalto, surely one of Finland's, and Europe's most influential and honored architects and designers. The décor is of carved and rounded, stained and polished, birch; the seating padded with black leather. Ceilings and walls are of olive-wood-grained blocks. Aalto's free-form vases, known throughout the world, adorn the restaurant. The lighting fixtures, the serving stations, even the coat racks are Aalto's — the same now as when the Savoy opened so many decades ago.
Sourced from: http://www.alternativefinland.com/wp-co ... la-001.jpg
The corner table at the Ravintola Savoy - here, Mannerheim, von Seeckt and Fuller would spend many a lunch.....
At the far end of the restaurant is a corner banquette, and on the two walls that meet in that corner there is an etching of Marshal Mannerheim and a small bronze plaque identifying the bench as his customary luncheon seat. There, the Marshal and "Boney" Fuller would first drink a brimming glass of schnapps (the glasses having been carefully frozen beforehand according to the Marshall's instructions), after which they would eat a lunch of vorshmack (for which Fuller, under Mannerheim's tutelage, had acquired a taste), often followed by fillet of perch, grilled, brushed with butter, and served with grated horseradish and succeeded by a a dessert of apple baked in a ramekin with vanilla sauce and a touch of Madeira.
While Fuller was impatient with what he considered the inability of Britain as a democracy to adopt military reforms, he considered Finland to be an example of "…. what a democracy with a people firmly committed to a common goal can achieve by way of preparation for war". And in this belief that a major European war was coming, Fuller and Marshall Mannerheim were completely in accord. Between 1934 and 1930, when not visiting and lecturing in Finland, Fuller would spend some time back in Brtain and here, he became loosely involved with Sir Oswald Mosley and the British Fascist movement as well as joining the clandestine far right group the Nordic League. As a member of the British Union of Fascists he was asked to sit on the party's Policy Directorate but while considered one of Mosley's closest allies, he chose to decline, citing the demands on his time imposed by his lecturing work at the Finnish Staff College and at the Finnish Army's Officer Training School.
Fuller's guest lecturer position at the Finnish Staff College was somewhat of a joke within the British military in the late 1930's – while Fuller had his admirers, he also had many detractors and his vigorous, expressive and opinionated personality did not go down well with many. There was certainly considerable amusement among his detractors at his position "lecturing on bone-headed theories to a second rate military in a minor country of importance to no-one" as one such detractor put it. The last laugh would however be Fuller's, when "his" military soundly thrashed both the Soviet Union and Germany, something Fuller would make no bones about rubbing in when in 1947 he published his magnificent opus, "The Generalship of Marshal Mannerheim" (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1947).
Both Fuller and von Seeckt would be major contributors to the ongoing development of the Finnish battle doctrine of Ukkosota and both would be great admirers of the Finnish Army. Indeed, in the late summer of 1939, on the eve of the Winter War, at a reception after Fuller had watched a parade of the fully mechanized 21st Panssaaridivisoona through Helsinki, Kenraalimajuri Ruben Lagus, commander of the 21st, would greet Fuller with a handshake, saying "I hope you were pleased with your children." Fuller is said to have replied, "Lagus, they have grown up so quickly that I no longer recognize them."
Fuller was not recalled to service by the British Army on the outbreak of WW2 – indeed, he was the only retired officer of his rank in the British Army not invited to return to service during the war. While he did request a service position, he was not heart-broken when this was declined. Instead, he chose to return to Finland and would spend the years 1939-1945 continuing to lecture at Finnish Army Officers Training Courses and at the Finnish Staff College, as well as preparing detailed analyses of Soviet (and later, German) tactics and performance.
And now we leave von Seeckt and Fuller and return to the German Tanks of the Interwar Decades once more…….
German Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The Großtraktor
In 1925, the Weapons Office produced conceptual requirements for a 16-ton vehicle with a top speed of 25mph, 14mm of armour and a turret mounted 75mm gun. Three firms responded and as early as 1926 these three German companies (Rheinmetall-Borsig, Daimler-Benz and Krupp) each produced a single prototype armed with a large 75-millimeter cannon (the Großtraktor, "large tractor", was so codenamed to veil the true purpose of the vehicle). Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig had a lengthy history of arms production while Daimler-Benz was an automobile manufacturer. None of these companies gave the project a high priority.
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Krupp Grosstraktor I
The Großtraktor was designed as a heavy breakthrough vehicle. The prototype vehicles had differences; however what follows was true of at least one or more of the models. The main armament was the same short 7.5 cm gun initially used on the Panzer IV; with secondary armaments including multiple machine guns. The approximate weight was 16 tons. The engine was a six-cylinder engine, in the 250-260 hp range.
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Rheinmetall-Borsig-Großtraktor
The following may have applied only to the Rheinmetall-Borsig and Krupp designs: a machine gun was placed at the rear of the tank, behind the turret; and the tank commander sat not in the turret, but in the hull to the right of the driver (Zaloga 13-14). The Großtraktor prototypes were constructed of mild steel and two were tested at the Kama testing facility near Kazan in the USSR, called by the Germans Panzertruppenschule Kama (Armoured Troops School Kama and used from 1926 to 1933).
One result of the experimentation in Kazan was that the German Army Motorization Department felt compelled to field two tank types corresponding to the Großtraktor and the Leichttraktor; codenamed the BW and ZW. The BW reference being for Battalionführerwagen, or the Battalion commander’s vehicle; which was intended to be a fire support vehicle. The BW was to accompany the ZW, the Zugführerwagen, or Section commander’s vehicle intended to act as the core battle tank (Zaloga 13-14). The work on the Großtraktor led to the Neubaufahrzeug, a similar heavy tank design. The prototypes were decommissioned in 1937; at least one ended up as a memorial to early armored regiments.
The Schlepper Self-propelled Guns
In 1927, the Germans designed two self-propelled guns based on fully tracked Hamomag tractors (commercial Hanomag tractors were already in use with the army). The first was the 3.7cm WD Schlepper 25PS, which was a lightly armored 25hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 37mm PaK L/45 gun. The gun had a limited traverse of 30 degrees maximum. The vehicle also carried single machine gun for defence.
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The 3.7cm WD Schlepper 25PS, which was a lightly armored 25hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 37mm PaK L/45 gun.
The second was the 7.7cm WD Schlepper 50PS, which was a 50hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 77mm K light gun. The gun had a full 360 degrees traverse.Both self-propelled guns were accepted into service with the German Army in 1927. Small numbers of vehicles were produced and used mainly for testing.
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The 7.7cm WD Schlepper 50PS, which was a 50hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 77mm K light gun.
The Leichttraktor
The Leichttraktor (VK-31) was a German experimental tank, which, as part of its cover, was described as a light tractor, which translated in to German was “Leichttraktor”. Work started on the VK-31 two years after the heavy Grosstraktor. A request for tender for a tracked combat vehicle up to 12 tons in weight was released by the Reichswehr on March 28, 1928. Prototypes were to be constructed by 1930 and cost less than 50 000 Reichsmarks. The winner would receive an order for at least 17 tanks. The request was delivered to Daimler-Benz, Krupp, and Rheinmetall-Borsig in May of 1928. By that time, the weight requirement had been restricted to 7.5 tons. Additional requirements included 14 mm of front and side armour and a crew of 4. The armament of the VK-31 was to be a 37 mm KwKL/45 main gun and a 7.92 mm Dreyse machine gun. The crew of the VK 31 in both firms designs consisted of four people: the driver, commander, radio operator and loader.
The tank also had to have a radio to provide voice communication with a range of 2-3 km and a morse capability of up to 7 km. Chemical protection was also required, in case of a gas attack. Maximum highway speed was to be 25-30 kph (40 kph by some sources) and 20 kph off-road. A range of 150 km or 6 hours of continuous movement was specified. The tank also had to be able to ford water 0.6 m deep, a 1.5 m wide ditch and climb a 60% (31°) slope for up to 1 km at a minimum speed of 3 kmh. To improve cross-country performance, ground pressure should not exceed 0.5 kg/sq.m. The specification was approved on 19 July 1928.
Daimler-Benz refused to participate, leaving Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig in the competition. Both companies co-operated to develop a "Kleintraktor" (renamed "Leichttraktor", or light tractor) together, and their results were consequently very similar, with the engine at the front and a turret at the rear. Not having much experience with tank suspensions, Rheinmetall engineers used the tracks from an existing tractor. Each side had 12 road wheels, two wheels per bogey, one tension idler, and two support idlers, a front directing, and a rear leading wheel. In order to protect this system, a side screen was retained, with three openings to clean the mud out of the suspension. The hull was a combination of welded and bolted, with armoured steel 4-10 mm thick. The layout was inherited from a tractor. The front, which had the transmission, also housed a Daimler-Benz M36 engine, 36 hp in power. The middle part had the control compartment (the driver sat on the left side). The driver had a small rectangular turret with vision ports above his head.
Krupp engineers did not trust tractors and built their own chassis. Krupp's prototype vehicle was slightly longer and taller, which allowed two hatches on the side for entrance and evacuation. The Krupp tank had 6 small diameter road wheels per side, with a vertical spring suspension, grouped in two groups of three, with the front-most and rear-most wheels slightly larger than the others. There were also two idlers, a front directing, and a rear leading wheel. Rheinmetall was responsible for both turrets. All VK 31s had radio stations. Four prototypes with different armament, crew, weight, and suspension features were manufactured (numbers 37 & 38 by Krupp, and numbers 39 and 40 by Rheinmetall.
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Leichttraktor - Rheinmetall, Kama, 1929
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Back view of the Leichttraktor (Rheinmetall), Kama, 1930
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Leichttraktor (Rheinmetall) interior, Kama, 1929
The four prototypes were shipped to the Soviet-German joint testing ground and tank training ground (known to the Germans as Panzertruppenschule Kama) near Kazan. The facility had been established under the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo - agreed to between the USSR and Germany in 1922 under conditions of high secrecy and security. The testing facility was used from 1926 throught to 1933 and was codenamed "Kama" (from a combination of the words Kazan and the surname of Reichswehr Oberstleutenant Malbrandt, who had been assigned to select the location for testing. The facility was consequently codenamed KaMa – for Kazan-Malbrandt). All four Leichttraktor (VK-31) prototypes were shipped to Kama where the Special Technical Commission (TEKO) created to exchange experience in the area of tank design and construction, began its work.
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"Leichttraktor", Krupp, 1929
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"Leichttraktor", Krupp, 1929
By 1933, each prototype had traveled between 1,660 and 1,865 km. Soviet specialists agreed that these vehicles are not of any interest to the RKKA. However, Soviet engineers were interested in the suspension and the turret layout (particularly the coaxial machine gun), as well as the tanks' radios. German specialists were not impressed by the technical and tactical data either. Installing the engine in front of the tank to some extent saved the crew from death or injury in combat, but the thickness of the armor was obviously not enough, and could not keep out shells and larger caliber bullets. Further modernization and up-armouring was not possible without increasing weight, and reducing the already unimpressive mobility of the tanks. In addition, because of the shortcomings of the cooling system, the enginese frequently overheated and the durability the tracks was extremely low.
All four Leichttraktors were shipped back to Germany in 1933, when KaMa was closed down. In 1934, the tanks were moved to Munster for the winter. From 1935 to the start of WWII, they were used as training vehicles in Pultos. One source mentions that Rheinmetall won a production order of 289 vehicles around 1928 but that the order was subsequently cancelled as better lighter tank designs (the Kleintraktor, which would go on to be rather more well known as the Panzerkampfwagen I) came along; however, there is no source for this statement that 289 were ordered mentioned.
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Leichttraktor, Kama, 1929
In 1933 another prototype light tank was built which could be classified as a self-propelled gun. Instead of a turret, a fixed PaK L / 45 caliber 37 mm (antitank variant) gun was installed with vertical guidance adjustment from -10 ° to + 30 °. The crew was reduced to three. It has been mentioned that this modification was a Rheinmetall prototype, but judging from the chassis it was a modification of a Krupp prototype. Unfortunately, the details of the tests of this machine are unknown.
The Neubaufahrzeug
As was mentioned in the post on British Tanks, during the 1920s and 1930s, a number of countries experimented with very large, multi-turreted tanks. The British built a single example of the Vickers A1E1 Independent in 1926. This inspired the Soviet T-35, which was built in limited numbers from 1933. Likewise, in Germany development of the Neubaufahrzeug (German for "new construction vehicle") started in 1933 when the then Reichswehr gave a contract for the development of a Großtraktor ("heavy tractor") to both Rheinmetall and Krupp. Großtraktor was a codename for the development of a heavy tank, Germany being still forbidden to develop tanks under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The Rheinmetall and Krupp designs resembled each other to a great extent, the main difference being the weapons placement. The original design had a main turret armed with a 75 mm KwK L/24 main gun and secondary 37 mm KwK L/45. Rheinmetall's design mounted the second gun above the 75 mm KwK L/24, while the Krupp design had it mounted next to the 75 mm KwK L/24. Both designs had a secondary turret mounted to the front and the rear of the main turret.
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Neubaufahrzeug, german heavy tank of 1933
Rheinmetall's design was designated the PzKpfw NbFz V (PanzerKampfwagen NeubauFahrzeug V), and the Krupp design the PzKpfw NbFz VI. It was intended that these designs would fulfill the role of heavy tank in the armored forces, but the design proved to be too complex and unreliable for this role. Nevertheless, development continued in order for the nascent German military to gain experience with multi-turreted tanks. In 1934 Rheinmetall built two mild steel prototypes with a partially welded hull, both with their own turret design. Three more prototypes were built with proper armor and the Krupp turret in 1935 and 1936. The first prototype had the original Rheinmetall turret with tandem guns (the 37mm Tankkanone L/45 was installed over a 75mm KwK L/24), and a horse-shoe FuG turret antenna. The other four were given the Krupp turret (with coaxial guns).
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Neubaufahrzeug in Norway, Olso harbor, 19 March 1940
The two secondary turret were mounted in a lozenge configuration, one on the front left and the other one the right rear. The driver's compartment was next to the front turret, with the main fighting compartment behind. There were two rear hatches for the original BMW engine (Type A), replaced with four hatches for the more powerful, gasoline Maybach HL 108 TR of 120rpm, both fed by a 457 liter capacity fuel tank. Transmission was with a crash gearbox, 5 speed forward, no reverse. The modified coil (leaf) spring suspension system was composed of a set of five paired road wheels bogies pivoted to Christie type torsion arms and two front single road wheels suspended independently (similar to the British A1E1 and Russian T28). They were protected by side skirts with mud chutes in échelon (under each return roller), with two access doors to the suspension. The Turrets were also provided with large, one piece side hatches for access. The commander's cupola was at the rear end of the turret. Provision for ammunition was 80 rounds for the main gun, 50 for the coaxial 37mm, and around 6000 for the two Mg.34 Mgs. Armour was no thicker than other Panzers of the time, - in other words it was just enough to provide minimal protection against infantry weapons, light AT guns and shrapnel.
Soon after delivery, the three late prototypes were extensively tested at the proving grounds at Putloss while the two earlier versions took part in army manoeuvers. However, by the end of 1936, it was decided to cancel all further development of the series, with priority being given to the construction of the light and medium Panzer I, II, II and IV. Nevertheless, they were displayed in propaganda events, shows and on newsreels, including the International Automobile Exposition in Berlin in 1939. They were deployed in Norway, being landed at Oslo harbour on 19 April, 19 1940 and taking part in local operations. Although handicapped by their slow speed, they were still an impressive sight, and by far the most heavily armed German tank ever fielded in operations, combining the firepower of a Panzer III and IV and two Panzer I's in a single package. This unit was later posted toAkershus Fortress (Oslo) in Norway in 1941 and their eventual fate is unclear, although they were captured in Norway by 1945 and apparently scrapped afterwards. The two others may have taken part in operations in Ukraine and Rumania.
The Panzerkampfwagen I
Soon after rising to power in Germany, Adolf Hitler approved the creation of Germany's first panzer divisions. Simplifying an earlier proposal, Guderian suggested the design of a main combat vehicle which would later be developed into the Panzer III, and a breakthrough tank, the Panzer IV. No existing design appealed to Guderian and so, as a stopgap, the German Army ordered a preliminary design for a vehicle with which to train German tank crews. This became the Panzer I, which was itended not just to train Germany's panzer troops, but to prepare Germany's industry for the mass production of tanks in the near future: a difficult engineering challenge for that time.
The Panzer I's design history can be traced back to 1932's Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper (La S) (Agricultural Tractor) armored fighting vehicle. The La S was intended not just to train Germany's panzer troops, but to prepare Germany's industry for the mass production of tanks in the near future: a difficult engineering feat for the time. In July of 1932, Krupp revealed a prototype of the Landswerk Krupp A, or LKA, with a sloped front glacis plate and large central casemate, a design heavily influenced by the British Carden Loyd tankette. The tank was armed with two obsolescent 7.92-millimeter (.312 in) MG-13 Dreyse machine guns. Machine guns were known to be largely useless against even the lightest tank armor of the time, restricting the Panzer I to a training and anti-infantry role by design.
A mass-produced version of the LKA was designed by a joint team from Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Krupp, MAN, and Rheinmetall, exchanging the casemate for a rotating turret. This version was accepted into service after testing in 1934. Although these tanks were referred to as the La S and LKA well beyond the start of production, the official designation, assigned in 1938, was Panzerkampfwagen I Ausführung. A ('Model A' or, more accurately, 'Batch A'). The first fifteen tanks, produced between February and March 1934, did not include the rotating turret and were used for crew training. Following these, production was switched to the combat version of the tank.
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Panzerkampfwagen I Ausführung. A on display at the Deutsches Panzermuseum Munster, Germany
The Ausf. A was under-armored, with steel plate of only 13 millimeters (0.51 in) at its thickest. The tank had several design flaws, including suspension problems (which made the vehicle pitch at high velocities) and engine overheating. The driver was positioned inside the hull at the front and used conventional steering levers to control the tank, while the commander was positioned in the turret where he also acted as gunner. The two crewmen could communicate by means of a voice tube. Machine gun ammunition was stowed in five bins, containing numbers of 25-round magazines. Author Lucas Molina Franco suggests that 833 Panzerkampfwagen I Ausf. A tanks were built in total, while authors Bryan Perrett offers the number of 300 and Terry Gander 818 units.
Many of the problems in the Ausf. A were corrected with the introduction of the Ausf. B. The engine was replaced by the water-cooled, six-cylinder Maybach NL 38 TR, developing 98 horsepower (73 kW), and the gearbox was changed to a more reliable model. The larger engine required the extension of the vehicle's chassis by 40 cm (16 in), and this allowed the improvement of the tank's suspension, adding another bogie wheel and raising the tensioner. The tank's weight increased by 0.4 tons. Production of the Ausf. B began in August 1935 and finished in early 1937 - Franco writes that 840 were constructed but notes that only 675 of these were combat models, while Perrett suggests a total number of 1,500 (offsetting the low number of Ausf. A, he proposes) and Gander a total of 675.
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Panzerkampfwagen I on parade
Lessons learned from Panzerkampfwagen I provided the German designers and manufacturers with valuable experience in designing and producing next generation of new panzers that were soon to come. Although the Panzerkampfwagen I was not a superb combat tank, it proved to be an excellent training tank and most of the panzer crews would be trained on Panzerkampfwagen I's until the end of the war. The Germans also built the SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen – this was the German Army's first purpose-designed command tank, converted from the Panzer I Ausf B, and was the primary German command tank in service at the beginning of World War II - 200 of these were manufactured
The SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen
The SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen was the German Army's first purpose-designed command tank, and the primary German command tank in service at the beginning of World War II. Converted from the Panzer I Ausf. B, the SdKfz 265 was to see considerable action during the early years of the War. The SdKfz 265 was designed to fulfil a growing need within the German Army for a command tank, following the realization that the leaders of a massive panzer formation would themselves have to travel in a tank of some type. This vehicle would have to carry extra equipment and personnel to assist the field commander in his duties. In 1935 Krupp offered a command tank design based on the existing Panzer I Ausf B training tank chassis. The Ausf. B was a turretless chassis version of the Panzer I designed solely to train tank drivers, and lent itself easily to conversion into a command vehicle.
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Panzerbefehlswagen
To increase space for a radio operator the rotating turret of the PzKpfw IB was eliminated and replaced with a larger fixed "box" superstructure. This allowed room for map boards, paperwork and a more powerful FuG6 radio transmitter in addition to the earlier FuG2 radio (Panzer I's had only FuG2 radio receivers). Despite these modifications the vehicle's interior remained small, a factor leading to its rapid replacement by conversions of larger tanks. The cramped quarters also made operation of the vehicle's single ball-mounted MG13 or MG34 machine gun virtually impossible. Because of this, most SdKfz 265 were also equipped with pistol ports, and many had their machine guns removed entirely. A large frame antenna was mounted to the hull of many early version SdKfz 265's. The antenna gave the upgraded radio transmitter units better range and reception.
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Panzerbefehlswagen Panzer I Ausf. B Sd.Kfz. 265
Because it would be necessary for a command tank to keep up with the tanks under its command, the original 60 hp Krupp M305 gasoline engine of the Panzer I was replaced by the more powerful 100 hp Maybach NL38TR gasoline engine, resulting in a design that was 3 km/h faster, despite weighing 300 kg more than the Panzer I. Increased fuel capacity also gave the SdKfz 265 a range of 290 kilometres, nearly 160 kilometres further than the Panzer I. Despite its ungainly appearance, the SdKfz 265 was only 1.97 m high, only 25 cm taller than the original Panzer IB. About 190 SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen conversions were produced by Daimler-Benz between 1935 and 1937, and were produced at the same time as the Ausf B. Between 1935 and 1940 the SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen was the standard command tank of the German Panzer divisions. Each Panzer division contained sixteen tank companies, grouped into four battalions, two regiments or one brigade, for a total of twenty-three headquarters. Each headquarters would be issued at least one command tank.
At least four saw service in Spain in the Spanish Civil War.
The Panzerkampfwagen I and the Spanish Civil War
On 18 July 1936, Spain dissolved into civil war. After the chaos of the initial military coup and the subsequent uprising of the various leftist, anarchist and communist movements, two sides coalesced and began to consolidate their position—the Popular Front (the Republicans) and the Spanish Nationalists. In an early example of a proxy war, both sides quickly received support from other countries, most notably the Soviet Union (supporting the Republicans) and Germany & Italy (supporting the Nationalists); both sides saw, in addition to political gains, an opportunity to test their tactics and equipment.
The first shipment of foreign tanks, 50 Soviet T-26s, arrived on 15 October. The shipment was under the surveillance of Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine and Germany immediately responded a few days later. The first 32 PzKpfw I' Ausf A's along with single a Kleiner Panzer Befehlswagen I arrived in October 1936. This first shipment was followed by four more shipments of Panzer I Ausf. B's and 4 Kleiner Panzer Befehlswagen I's for a total of 122 vehicles (different sources quote differing totals). The tanks saw service with the "Condor Legion" (within Major Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma’s Panzer Abteilung 88, also known as Abteilung Drohne). Pz.Abt.88 with its 3 companies was based at Cubas near Toledo, where German instructors trained Spanish tank crews,
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German PzKpfw I in Spain
The first tank battle of the Civil War ook place during the defence of Madrid in October 1936 when, in an attempt to stem the Nationalist tide and gain crucial time for Madrid's defence, Soviet armor was deployed south of the city under the command of Colonel Krivoshein before the end of October. At this time, several T-26 tanks under the command of Captain Paul Arman were thrown into a Republican counterattack directed towards the town of Torrejon de Velasco in an attempt to cut off the Nationalist advance north. Despite initial success, poor communication between the Soviet Republican armor and Spanish Republican infantry caused the isolation of Captain Arman's force and the subsequent destruction of a number of tanks. This battle also marked the first use of the molotov cocktail against tanks. Ritter von Thoma's Panzer I's fought for the Nationalists only days later on 30 October, and immediately experienced problems. As the Nationalist armor advanced, it was engaged by the Commune de Paris battalion, equipped with Soviet BA-10 armored cars. The 45-millimeter gun with which the BA-10 was armed was more than sufficient to knock out the poorly armored Panzer I's at ranges below 500 meters (550 yd).
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At one point, von Thoma offered up to 500 pesetas for each T-26 captured.
Although the Panzer I would participate in almost every major Nationalist offensive of the war, the Nationalist army began to deploy more and more captured T-26 tanks to offset their disadvantage in protection and firepower. At one point, von Thoma offered up to 500 pesetas for each T-26 captured. Although the Panzer I was initially able to knock out the T-26 at close range—150 meters (165 yd) or less—using an armor-piercing 7.92 millimeter bullets, the Republican tanks began to engage at ranges where they were immune to the machine guns of the Panzer I.
The Panzer I was upgraded in order to increase its lethality. On 8 August 1937, Generalísimo Francisco Franco expressed the need for a Panzer I armed with a 20-millimeter gun. Ultimately, the piece chosen was the Breda Model 1935, due to the simplicity of the design over competitors such as the German Flak 30. Furthermore, the 20 mm Breda was capable of penetrating 40 millimeters of armor at 250 meters (1.57 inches at 275 yd), which was more than sufficient to penetrate the frontal armor of the T-26. Prototypes were ready by September 1937 and an order was placed after successful results. The mounting of the Breda in the Panzer I required the original turret to be opened at the top and then extended. Four of these tanks were modified at the Armament Factory of Seville, but further production was canceled as it was decided sufficient numbers of Republican T-26 tanks had been captured to fulfill the Nationalist leadership's request for more lethal tanks. The Breda modification was not particularly liked by German crews, as the unprotected gap in the turret, designed to allow the tank's commander to aim, was found to be a dangerous weak point.
Overall, in the Spanish Civil War, the Panzerkampfwagen I tanks proved to be outclassed by Soviet T-26 and BT-5's provided to the "Republicans".
Finnish Volunteers in Spain and the Panzerkampfwagen I
In the early 1930's, as we have seen, the Finnish Army started planning for the creation and maintenance of a modern armoured force. While Paamaja (the Finnish Army's Supreme Headquarters) established a framework for the first large-scale Panssaari units, only limited guidance on tactical doctrine was provided. The staff of the early Panssaari units and of the Combined Arms Experimental Brigade were tasked with the development of detailed tactical doctrine for combined arms warfare from 1932 on. The Spanish Civil War provided a live test-bed for testing and evolution of this tactical doctrine on an ongoing basis over four years of continuous fighting.
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Panzer I's of Pohjan Pohjat's Panssaaripataljoon participating in the Nationalist victory parade through Madrid
As has been mentioned, the Finnish Volunteer Brigade in Spain (Pohjan Pohjat) would include a Panssaripataljoona (Panzer Battalion). Initially, this Battalion was equipped with Italian-supplied CV33 and CV35 tanks, but would soon include a company of German-supplied Panzerkampfwagen I Ausf B's and later still numbers of captured Republican T-26's (and some Finnish tanks). Two SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen command tanks were also supplied by the Germans to the Finnish volunteers. Later in the Spanish Civil War, the Finnish Army would indirectly equip a small number of the volunteer Panssari troops with an assortment of Vicker's 6-ton tanks and Skoda LT34's. The Pohjan Pohjat volunteers would acquire a great deal of experience with these tank designs in combat over four years of fighting in the Civil War. The tanks themselves were evaluated for strengths, weaknesses and flaws, various modifications were tested out and combat doctrine and tactics evolved through trial, error and conscious experimentation.
The value of this experience for the Finnish Army cannot be overstated. Officers, NCO's and men were rotated through the volunteer unit, gaining experience for themselves and providing a pool of trained and experienced men built up over the four years of fighting that the volunteers participated in. Equipment, weapons and clothing were tested under battle, revealing many flaws. Tactics evolved rapidly in the maelstrom of war, with mistakes and improvements continuously documented, assessed and the results and reports fed back to Paamaja (the Finnish Army Supreme Headquarters) and to the Combined Arms Experimental Brigade where they were further evaluated. As a result, Finnish Army Doctrine continuously improved. The importance of "battle-training", logistics, maintenance and standardization was highlighted, as were the importance of good communications and the integrated command of all arms on the battlefield.
As a result of experience in Spain, the Finnish Army would come to place an even greater emphasis than it had been making on both tank and anti-tank warfare, in particular on the use of effective anti-tank guns and on the use of tanks and armoured vehicles in the breakthrough and exploitation phases of battle. Finnish Officers however expected any war with the USSR to include far more heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft than were available to the Republican forces in Spain. They reported that, realistically, the lack of training, equipment and mobility limited the Republican forces in comparison to the Red Army, but that comparisons could be made, in particular with the Republican attacks regardless of casualties. Particular attention was also paid to the interrogation of any captured Russian "advisors", a small number of whom fell into the hands of Pohjan Pohjat, who were ever eager to hold lengthy and informative "discussions" with the Russians.
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The ineffectiveness of the Italian Carro Veloce (Fast Tank) CV33 and CV35 tanks was rapidly identified. The CV33 was nothing more than a tankette, its armour was totally inadequate against infantry anti-tank weapons and the crew (of 2 men) suffered from the lack of spare parts. Other drawbacks were its slow speed (despite its light weight the CV never reached more than 45km/h), the fact that the starter mechanism was placed outside the vehicle. Due to its small size and vulnerability, Italian soldiers dubbed the CV33 the "sardine box" or "iron casket"
With regard to tank warfare, the Russian tanks often proved to be to well armoured for the light anti-tank weapons initially provided to Pohjan Pohjat, although the Bofors 37mm proved to be generally effective when correctly positioned and used. The deadly effectiveness of the Bofors 76mm AA gun in an anti-tank role was however emphasized and as a direct result, from 1937 on the Finnish Army made a major effort to build up the numbers of 76mm anti-tank guns in service with Infantry and Panssaari units in Finland. The ineffectiveness of the Italian CV33 and CV35 tanks was rapidly identified, with similar criticisms made of the German-supplied Panzerkampfwagen I's. They were too lightly armoured and their machineguns were ineffective against enemy tanks, which could engage them at ranges where they were immune to the machine guns of the Panzer I and the Italian CV's.
The Bofors 37mm-equipped LT34's and Vickers 6-ton tanks were reported as being far more effective, as were the captured Russian tanks, although again, the armour was soon identified as being too light and other design and reliability deficiencies were also highlighted. The importance of command tanks and of armoured carriers for supporting infantry and logistical supplies was also stressed (Pohjan Pohjat improvised a number of armoured carriers for infantry from captured Soviet armoured cars and tanks. Regarding logistics, Pohjan Pohjat rapidly pieced together logistics columns to support the tank units – after initial experiences running out of fuel, Eversti Hans Kalm, Pohjan Pohjat's commanding officer, would integrate logistics units into the armoured units, carrying up to a weeks worth of fuel, ammunition and food within the fighting units. There were many more such lessons taken back to Finland over the four years that the Finnish volunteer unit spent in Spain, each of them of value.
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Eversti Hans Kalm, Pohjan Pohjat's charismatic commanding officer and in the Winter War, CO of the 22nd Panssaaridivisoona
Among these lessons were the strategic locating of armour plate on the tank itself – extra armour on the front of the tank increased survivability while thinner armour could be used elsewhere. Sloped armour also added protection, while using welded armour was preferable to riveted or bolted armour (when the tank was hit, rivets and bolts had a tendency to break and ricochet around inside the hull to the detriment of the crew). Face-hardened steel also gave the crews (and the tank) an advantage. Good radio communication both between tanks, and between the tanks and supporting infantry, artillery and anti-tank guns was an essential to success. The importance of close-coordination between all arms. Leading from the front, where commanders were on top of the current tactical situation at all times. Speed of movement and flexibility in decision making. And much much more.
Pohjan Pohjat reports also emphasized the importance of using armour for flanking attacks rather than frontal assaults, emphasizing the war of maneuver and the need for armour, infantry, artillery and close air support to operate as a well-coordinated whole in order to gain the greatest effect whilst minimalizing casualties. In this, the importance of the Spanish Civil War experience of Pohjan Pohjat cannot be understated, providing the Finnish Army as it did with valuable insights into the art of war and into their equipment, weapons and tactics at both the small and large unit level. For the Finnish Army, the Spanish Civil War was a crucible in which tactical experimentation, existing and new weapons and improved training methods were forged into a new and far stronger alloy, an impenetrable shield on which the sword of the Red Army would shatter so disastrously in 1939/1940.
The Panzerkampfwagen II
In 1934, delays in the design and production of the Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks (covered next) were becoming apparent. The Panzer II came about in a German Ordnance Department requirement enacted in 1934, this time proposing a 10-ton light tank development with 20mm cannon and 7.92mm machine gun armament. As was the case in developing the Panzer I, it became common practice for the new Germany, now wholly under Hitler, to skirt the rules of the Versailles Treaty and develop its systems of war under various peaceful disguises such as farm equipment. As such, this new light tank design fell under the designation of "Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper 100" (or "LaS 100") under the guise that it was a farm tractor.
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PzKpfw II prototype - Krupp
Designs for a stopgap tank were solicited from Krupp, MAN, Henschel, and Daimler-Benz. The final design was based on the Panzer I, but larger, and with a turret mounting a 20 mm anti-tank gun. The Panzer II was designed before the experience of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 showed that shell-proof armor was required for tanks to survive on a modern battlefield. Prior to that, armor was designed to stop only machine gun fire and high explosive shell fragments. The Panzer II A, B, and C had 14 mm of slightly sloped homogenous steel armor on the sides, front, and back, with 10 mm of armor on the top and bottom. Many IIC were given increased armor in the front. Starting with the D model, the front armor was increased to 30 mm. The Model F had 35 mm front armour and 20 mm side armor. This amount of armor could be penetrated by a towed antitank weapons, such as the Soviet 45mm and French canon de 25 and canon de 47. The Panzer II was around 50% heavier than the I and added a 20 mm Solothurn cannon as main armament as well as increasing maximum armour to 30 mm. Production began in 1935, but it took another eighteen months for the first combat-ready tank to be delivered. By July 1937, the Panzer II was cleared and ready for production.
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PzKpfw II Ausf. a
Most tank versions of the Panzer II were armed with a 2 cm KwK 30 L/55 autocannon. Some later versions used the similar 2 cm KwK 38 L/55. This autocannon was based on the 2 cm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun, and was capable of firing at a rate of 600 rounds per minute (280 rounds per minute sustained) from 10-round magazines. A total of 180 shells were carried. The Panzer II also had a 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr 34 machine gun mounted coaxially with the main gun. All production versions of the Panzer II were fitted with a 140 PS, gasoline-fuelled six-cylinder Maybach HL 62 TRM engine and ZF transmissions. Models A, B, and C had a top speed of 40 km/h (25 mph). Models D and E had a torsion bar suspension and a better transmission, giving a top road speed of 55 km/h (33 mph) but the cross country speed was much lower than previous models, so the Model F reverted to the previous leaf spring type suspension. All versions had a range of 200 km (120 mi).
The Panzer II had a crew of three men. The driver sat in the forward hull. The commander sat in a seat in the turret, and was responsible for aiming and firing the guns, while a loader/radio operator stood on the floor of the tank under the turret. Production began in 1935, but it took another eighteen months for the first combat-ready tank to be delivered. Some 1,856 were manufactured between 1935 and 1943 and by 1939, some 1,226 Panzer IIs were in use. While larger, better-armed and better-armoured than the Panzer I, the Panzer II was still a light training tank that could also be used in a reconnaissance or policing role as well as providing priceless training to tank crews. Underpowered, under-armored and lightly armed, the Panzer II experienced its hardships particularly against anti-tank weaponry at close ranges. Nevertheless, war was on the horizon so time was of the essence and the more lethal Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs were still being developed and would not be mass-produced in time for the coming battles.
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PzKpfw II Ausf. C in France, May 1940
According to some sources, the Panzer II was also sent to Spain from 1937, where it proved more capable against infantry than the Panzer I, but no better when faced with capable anti-tank guns or other tanks. However, no Panzer II's were seen in Spain by the Finnish volunteers of Pohjan Pohjat.
The Finnish Army expressed interest in the Panzer II and indeed, in 1937 a small team evaluated the tank in Germany with a view to a possible purchase (as they evaluated other tanks from other countries). However, their assessment was that the tank was best suited to be used in a reconnaissance role and while it was comparable to other light tanks such as the Soviet T-26 and the French R-35 or H-35 (or indeed the Finnish Army's own Vickers 6-ton or Czech-manufactured LT34 tanks), the 20mm gun was too light to be effective. In light of early experience in the Spanish Civil War, the Panzer II's armour was also seen as being too thin and not offering any protection against anything other than rifle and machinegun bullets and shell fragments. However, all of this was a moot point as the Finnish team was advised that all Panzer II's being built were going straight to the German Army and an export sale to the Finns would not be considered. The Finn's thus saw no point in pursuing the matter further and no further approaches to the Germans were made with regard to this tank. At the time, with Czechoslovakia supplying Finland with tanks, no need was seen to attempt to push harder with the Germans.
The Großtraktor
In 1925, the Weapons Office produced conceptual requirements for a 16-ton vehicle with a top speed of 25mph, 14mm of armour and a turret mounted 75mm gun. Three firms responded and as early as 1926 these three German companies (Rheinmetall-Borsig, Daimler-Benz and Krupp) each produced a single prototype armed with a large 75-millimeter cannon (the Großtraktor, "large tractor", was so codenamed to veil the true purpose of the vehicle). Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig had a lengthy history of arms production while Daimler-Benz was an automobile manufacturer. None of these companies gave the project a high priority.
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Krupp Grosstraktor I
The Großtraktor was designed as a heavy breakthrough vehicle. The prototype vehicles had differences; however what follows was true of at least one or more of the models. The main armament was the same short 7.5 cm gun initially used on the Panzer IV; with secondary armaments including multiple machine guns. The approximate weight was 16 tons. The engine was a six-cylinder engine, in the 250-260 hp range.
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Rheinmetall-Borsig-Großtraktor
The following may have applied only to the Rheinmetall-Borsig and Krupp designs: a machine gun was placed at the rear of the tank, behind the turret; and the tank commander sat not in the turret, but in the hull to the right of the driver (Zaloga 13-14). The Großtraktor prototypes were constructed of mild steel and two were tested at the Kama testing facility near Kazan in the USSR, called by the Germans Panzertruppenschule Kama (Armoured Troops School Kama and used from 1926 to 1933).
One result of the experimentation in Kazan was that the German Army Motorization Department felt compelled to field two tank types corresponding to the Großtraktor and the Leichttraktor; codenamed the BW and ZW. The BW reference being for Battalionführerwagen, or the Battalion commander’s vehicle; which was intended to be a fire support vehicle. The BW was to accompany the ZW, the Zugführerwagen, or Section commander’s vehicle intended to act as the core battle tank (Zaloga 13-14). The work on the Großtraktor led to the Neubaufahrzeug, a similar heavy tank design. The prototypes were decommissioned in 1937; at least one ended up as a memorial to early armored regiments.
The Schlepper Self-propelled Guns
In 1927, the Germans designed two self-propelled guns based on fully tracked Hamomag tractors (commercial Hanomag tractors were already in use with the army). The first was the 3.7cm WD Schlepper 25PS, which was a lightly armored 25hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 37mm PaK L/45 gun. The gun had a limited traverse of 30 degrees maximum. The vehicle also carried single machine gun for defence.
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The 3.7cm WD Schlepper 25PS, which was a lightly armored 25hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 37mm PaK L/45 gun.
The second was the 7.7cm WD Schlepper 50PS, which was a 50hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 77mm K light gun. The gun had a full 360 degrees traverse.Both self-propelled guns were accepted into service with the German Army in 1927. Small numbers of vehicles were produced and used mainly for testing.
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The 7.7cm WD Schlepper 50PS, which was a 50hp Hanomag WD tractor with a pedestal mounted 77mm K light gun.
The Leichttraktor
The Leichttraktor (VK-31) was a German experimental tank, which, as part of its cover, was described as a light tractor, which translated in to German was “Leichttraktor”. Work started on the VK-31 two years after the heavy Grosstraktor. A request for tender for a tracked combat vehicle up to 12 tons in weight was released by the Reichswehr on March 28, 1928. Prototypes were to be constructed by 1930 and cost less than 50 000 Reichsmarks. The winner would receive an order for at least 17 tanks. The request was delivered to Daimler-Benz, Krupp, and Rheinmetall-Borsig in May of 1928. By that time, the weight requirement had been restricted to 7.5 tons. Additional requirements included 14 mm of front and side armour and a crew of 4. The armament of the VK-31 was to be a 37 mm KwKL/45 main gun and a 7.92 mm Dreyse machine gun. The crew of the VK 31 in both firms designs consisted of four people: the driver, commander, radio operator and loader.
The tank also had to have a radio to provide voice communication with a range of 2-3 km and a morse capability of up to 7 km. Chemical protection was also required, in case of a gas attack. Maximum highway speed was to be 25-30 kph (40 kph by some sources) and 20 kph off-road. A range of 150 km or 6 hours of continuous movement was specified. The tank also had to be able to ford water 0.6 m deep, a 1.5 m wide ditch and climb a 60% (31°) slope for up to 1 km at a minimum speed of 3 kmh. To improve cross-country performance, ground pressure should not exceed 0.5 kg/sq.m. The specification was approved on 19 July 1928.
Daimler-Benz refused to participate, leaving Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig in the competition. Both companies co-operated to develop a "Kleintraktor" (renamed "Leichttraktor", or light tractor) together, and their results were consequently very similar, with the engine at the front and a turret at the rear. Not having much experience with tank suspensions, Rheinmetall engineers used the tracks from an existing tractor. Each side had 12 road wheels, two wheels per bogey, one tension idler, and two support idlers, a front directing, and a rear leading wheel. In order to protect this system, a side screen was retained, with three openings to clean the mud out of the suspension. The hull was a combination of welded and bolted, with armoured steel 4-10 mm thick. The layout was inherited from a tractor. The front, which had the transmission, also housed a Daimler-Benz M36 engine, 36 hp in power. The middle part had the control compartment (the driver sat on the left side). The driver had a small rectangular turret with vision ports above his head.
Krupp engineers did not trust tractors and built their own chassis. Krupp's prototype vehicle was slightly longer and taller, which allowed two hatches on the side for entrance and evacuation. The Krupp tank had 6 small diameter road wheels per side, with a vertical spring suspension, grouped in two groups of three, with the front-most and rear-most wheels slightly larger than the others. There were also two idlers, a front directing, and a rear leading wheel. Rheinmetall was responsible for both turrets. All VK 31s had radio stations. Four prototypes with different armament, crew, weight, and suspension features were manufactured (numbers 37 & 38 by Krupp, and numbers 39 and 40 by Rheinmetall.
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Leichttraktor - Rheinmetall, Kama, 1929
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Back view of the Leichttraktor (Rheinmetall), Kama, 1930
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Leichttraktor (Rheinmetall) interior, Kama, 1929
The four prototypes were shipped to the Soviet-German joint testing ground and tank training ground (known to the Germans as Panzertruppenschule Kama) near Kazan. The facility had been established under the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo - agreed to between the USSR and Germany in 1922 under conditions of high secrecy and security. The testing facility was used from 1926 throught to 1933 and was codenamed "Kama" (from a combination of the words Kazan and the surname of Reichswehr Oberstleutenant Malbrandt, who had been assigned to select the location for testing. The facility was consequently codenamed KaMa – for Kazan-Malbrandt). All four Leichttraktor (VK-31) prototypes were shipped to Kama where the Special Technical Commission (TEKO) created to exchange experience in the area of tank design and construction, began its work.
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"Leichttraktor", Krupp, 1929
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"Leichttraktor", Krupp, 1929
By 1933, each prototype had traveled between 1,660 and 1,865 km. Soviet specialists agreed that these vehicles are not of any interest to the RKKA. However, Soviet engineers were interested in the suspension and the turret layout (particularly the coaxial machine gun), as well as the tanks' radios. German specialists were not impressed by the technical and tactical data either. Installing the engine in front of the tank to some extent saved the crew from death or injury in combat, but the thickness of the armor was obviously not enough, and could not keep out shells and larger caliber bullets. Further modernization and up-armouring was not possible without increasing weight, and reducing the already unimpressive mobility of the tanks. In addition, because of the shortcomings of the cooling system, the enginese frequently overheated and the durability the tracks was extremely low.
All four Leichttraktors were shipped back to Germany in 1933, when KaMa was closed down. In 1934, the tanks were moved to Munster for the winter. From 1935 to the start of WWII, they were used as training vehicles in Pultos. One source mentions that Rheinmetall won a production order of 289 vehicles around 1928 but that the order was subsequently cancelled as better lighter tank designs (the Kleintraktor, which would go on to be rather more well known as the Panzerkampfwagen I) came along; however, there is no source for this statement that 289 were ordered mentioned.
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Leichttraktor, Kama, 1929
In 1933 another prototype light tank was built which could be classified as a self-propelled gun. Instead of a turret, a fixed PaK L / 45 caliber 37 mm (antitank variant) gun was installed with vertical guidance adjustment from -10 ° to + 30 °. The crew was reduced to three. It has been mentioned that this modification was a Rheinmetall prototype, but judging from the chassis it was a modification of a Krupp prototype. Unfortunately, the details of the tests of this machine are unknown.
The Neubaufahrzeug
As was mentioned in the post on British Tanks, during the 1920s and 1930s, a number of countries experimented with very large, multi-turreted tanks. The British built a single example of the Vickers A1E1 Independent in 1926. This inspired the Soviet T-35, which was built in limited numbers from 1933. Likewise, in Germany development of the Neubaufahrzeug (German for "new construction vehicle") started in 1933 when the then Reichswehr gave a contract for the development of a Großtraktor ("heavy tractor") to both Rheinmetall and Krupp. Großtraktor was a codename for the development of a heavy tank, Germany being still forbidden to develop tanks under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The Rheinmetall and Krupp designs resembled each other to a great extent, the main difference being the weapons placement. The original design had a main turret armed with a 75 mm KwK L/24 main gun and secondary 37 mm KwK L/45. Rheinmetall's design mounted the second gun above the 75 mm KwK L/24, while the Krupp design had it mounted next to the 75 mm KwK L/24. Both designs had a secondary turret mounted to the front and the rear of the main turret.
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Neubaufahrzeug, german heavy tank of 1933
Rheinmetall's design was designated the PzKpfw NbFz V (PanzerKampfwagen NeubauFahrzeug V), and the Krupp design the PzKpfw NbFz VI. It was intended that these designs would fulfill the role of heavy tank in the armored forces, but the design proved to be too complex and unreliable for this role. Nevertheless, development continued in order for the nascent German military to gain experience with multi-turreted tanks. In 1934 Rheinmetall built two mild steel prototypes with a partially welded hull, both with their own turret design. Three more prototypes were built with proper armor and the Krupp turret in 1935 and 1936. The first prototype had the original Rheinmetall turret with tandem guns (the 37mm Tankkanone L/45 was installed over a 75mm KwK L/24), and a horse-shoe FuG turret antenna. The other four were given the Krupp turret (with coaxial guns).
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Neubaufahrzeug in Norway, Olso harbor, 19 March 1940
The two secondary turret were mounted in a lozenge configuration, one on the front left and the other one the right rear. The driver's compartment was next to the front turret, with the main fighting compartment behind. There were two rear hatches for the original BMW engine (Type A), replaced with four hatches for the more powerful, gasoline Maybach HL 108 TR of 120rpm, both fed by a 457 liter capacity fuel tank. Transmission was with a crash gearbox, 5 speed forward, no reverse. The modified coil (leaf) spring suspension system was composed of a set of five paired road wheels bogies pivoted to Christie type torsion arms and two front single road wheels suspended independently (similar to the British A1E1 and Russian T28). They were protected by side skirts with mud chutes in échelon (under each return roller), with two access doors to the suspension. The Turrets were also provided with large, one piece side hatches for access. The commander's cupola was at the rear end of the turret. Provision for ammunition was 80 rounds for the main gun, 50 for the coaxial 37mm, and around 6000 for the two Mg.34 Mgs. Armour was no thicker than other Panzers of the time, - in other words it was just enough to provide minimal protection against infantry weapons, light AT guns and shrapnel.
Soon after delivery, the three late prototypes were extensively tested at the proving grounds at Putloss while the two earlier versions took part in army manoeuvers. However, by the end of 1936, it was decided to cancel all further development of the series, with priority being given to the construction of the light and medium Panzer I, II, II and IV. Nevertheless, they were displayed in propaganda events, shows and on newsreels, including the International Automobile Exposition in Berlin in 1939. They were deployed in Norway, being landed at Oslo harbour on 19 April, 19 1940 and taking part in local operations. Although handicapped by their slow speed, they were still an impressive sight, and by far the most heavily armed German tank ever fielded in operations, combining the firepower of a Panzer III and IV and two Panzer I's in a single package. This unit was later posted toAkershus Fortress (Oslo) in Norway in 1941 and their eventual fate is unclear, although they were captured in Norway by 1945 and apparently scrapped afterwards. The two others may have taken part in operations in Ukraine and Rumania.
The Panzerkampfwagen I
Soon after rising to power in Germany, Adolf Hitler approved the creation of Germany's first panzer divisions. Simplifying an earlier proposal, Guderian suggested the design of a main combat vehicle which would later be developed into the Panzer III, and a breakthrough tank, the Panzer IV. No existing design appealed to Guderian and so, as a stopgap, the German Army ordered a preliminary design for a vehicle with which to train German tank crews. This became the Panzer I, which was itended not just to train Germany's panzer troops, but to prepare Germany's industry for the mass production of tanks in the near future: a difficult engineering challenge for that time.
The Panzer I's design history can be traced back to 1932's Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper (La S) (Agricultural Tractor) armored fighting vehicle. The La S was intended not just to train Germany's panzer troops, but to prepare Germany's industry for the mass production of tanks in the near future: a difficult engineering feat for the time. In July of 1932, Krupp revealed a prototype of the Landswerk Krupp A, or LKA, with a sloped front glacis plate and large central casemate, a design heavily influenced by the British Carden Loyd tankette. The tank was armed with two obsolescent 7.92-millimeter (.312 in) MG-13 Dreyse machine guns. Machine guns were known to be largely useless against even the lightest tank armor of the time, restricting the Panzer I to a training and anti-infantry role by design.
A mass-produced version of the LKA was designed by a joint team from Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Krupp, MAN, and Rheinmetall, exchanging the casemate for a rotating turret. This version was accepted into service after testing in 1934. Although these tanks were referred to as the La S and LKA well beyond the start of production, the official designation, assigned in 1938, was Panzerkampfwagen I Ausführung. A ('Model A' or, more accurately, 'Batch A'). The first fifteen tanks, produced between February and March 1934, did not include the rotating turret and were used for crew training. Following these, production was switched to the combat version of the tank.
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Panzerkampfwagen I Ausführung. A on display at the Deutsches Panzermuseum Munster, Germany
The Ausf. A was under-armored, with steel plate of only 13 millimeters (0.51 in) at its thickest. The tank had several design flaws, including suspension problems (which made the vehicle pitch at high velocities) and engine overheating. The driver was positioned inside the hull at the front and used conventional steering levers to control the tank, while the commander was positioned in the turret where he also acted as gunner. The two crewmen could communicate by means of a voice tube. Machine gun ammunition was stowed in five bins, containing numbers of 25-round magazines. Author Lucas Molina Franco suggests that 833 Panzerkampfwagen I Ausf. A tanks were built in total, while authors Bryan Perrett offers the number of 300 and Terry Gander 818 units.
Many of the problems in the Ausf. A were corrected with the introduction of the Ausf. B. The engine was replaced by the water-cooled, six-cylinder Maybach NL 38 TR, developing 98 horsepower (73 kW), and the gearbox was changed to a more reliable model. The larger engine required the extension of the vehicle's chassis by 40 cm (16 in), and this allowed the improvement of the tank's suspension, adding another bogie wheel and raising the tensioner. The tank's weight increased by 0.4 tons. Production of the Ausf. B began in August 1935 and finished in early 1937 - Franco writes that 840 were constructed but notes that only 675 of these were combat models, while Perrett suggests a total number of 1,500 (offsetting the low number of Ausf. A, he proposes) and Gander a total of 675.
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Panzerkampfwagen I on parade
Lessons learned from Panzerkampfwagen I provided the German designers and manufacturers with valuable experience in designing and producing next generation of new panzers that were soon to come. Although the Panzerkampfwagen I was not a superb combat tank, it proved to be an excellent training tank and most of the panzer crews would be trained on Panzerkampfwagen I's until the end of the war. The Germans also built the SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen – this was the German Army's first purpose-designed command tank, converted from the Panzer I Ausf B, and was the primary German command tank in service at the beginning of World War II - 200 of these were manufactured
The SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen
The SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen was the German Army's first purpose-designed command tank, and the primary German command tank in service at the beginning of World War II. Converted from the Panzer I Ausf. B, the SdKfz 265 was to see considerable action during the early years of the War. The SdKfz 265 was designed to fulfil a growing need within the German Army for a command tank, following the realization that the leaders of a massive panzer formation would themselves have to travel in a tank of some type. This vehicle would have to carry extra equipment and personnel to assist the field commander in his duties. In 1935 Krupp offered a command tank design based on the existing Panzer I Ausf B training tank chassis. The Ausf. B was a turretless chassis version of the Panzer I designed solely to train tank drivers, and lent itself easily to conversion into a command vehicle.
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Panzerbefehlswagen
To increase space for a radio operator the rotating turret of the PzKpfw IB was eliminated and replaced with a larger fixed "box" superstructure. This allowed room for map boards, paperwork and a more powerful FuG6 radio transmitter in addition to the earlier FuG2 radio (Panzer I's had only FuG2 radio receivers). Despite these modifications the vehicle's interior remained small, a factor leading to its rapid replacement by conversions of larger tanks. The cramped quarters also made operation of the vehicle's single ball-mounted MG13 or MG34 machine gun virtually impossible. Because of this, most SdKfz 265 were also equipped with pistol ports, and many had their machine guns removed entirely. A large frame antenna was mounted to the hull of many early version SdKfz 265's. The antenna gave the upgraded radio transmitter units better range and reception.
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Panzerbefehlswagen Panzer I Ausf. B Sd.Kfz. 265
Because it would be necessary for a command tank to keep up with the tanks under its command, the original 60 hp Krupp M305 gasoline engine of the Panzer I was replaced by the more powerful 100 hp Maybach NL38TR gasoline engine, resulting in a design that was 3 km/h faster, despite weighing 300 kg more than the Panzer I. Increased fuel capacity also gave the SdKfz 265 a range of 290 kilometres, nearly 160 kilometres further than the Panzer I. Despite its ungainly appearance, the SdKfz 265 was only 1.97 m high, only 25 cm taller than the original Panzer IB. About 190 SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen conversions were produced by Daimler-Benz between 1935 and 1937, and were produced at the same time as the Ausf B. Between 1935 and 1940 the SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen was the standard command tank of the German Panzer divisions. Each Panzer division contained sixteen tank companies, grouped into four battalions, two regiments or one brigade, for a total of twenty-three headquarters. Each headquarters would be issued at least one command tank.
At least four saw service in Spain in the Spanish Civil War.
The Panzerkampfwagen I and the Spanish Civil War
On 18 July 1936, Spain dissolved into civil war. After the chaos of the initial military coup and the subsequent uprising of the various leftist, anarchist and communist movements, two sides coalesced and began to consolidate their position—the Popular Front (the Republicans) and the Spanish Nationalists. In an early example of a proxy war, both sides quickly received support from other countries, most notably the Soviet Union (supporting the Republicans) and Germany & Italy (supporting the Nationalists); both sides saw, in addition to political gains, an opportunity to test their tactics and equipment.
The first shipment of foreign tanks, 50 Soviet T-26s, arrived on 15 October. The shipment was under the surveillance of Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine and Germany immediately responded a few days later. The first 32 PzKpfw I' Ausf A's along with single a Kleiner Panzer Befehlswagen I arrived in October 1936. This first shipment was followed by four more shipments of Panzer I Ausf. B's and 4 Kleiner Panzer Befehlswagen I's for a total of 122 vehicles (different sources quote differing totals). The tanks saw service with the "Condor Legion" (within Major Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma’s Panzer Abteilung 88, also known as Abteilung Drohne). Pz.Abt.88 with its 3 companies was based at Cubas near Toledo, where German instructors trained Spanish tank crews,
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German PzKpfw I in Spain
The first tank battle of the Civil War ook place during the defence of Madrid in October 1936 when, in an attempt to stem the Nationalist tide and gain crucial time for Madrid's defence, Soviet armor was deployed south of the city under the command of Colonel Krivoshein before the end of October. At this time, several T-26 tanks under the command of Captain Paul Arman were thrown into a Republican counterattack directed towards the town of Torrejon de Velasco in an attempt to cut off the Nationalist advance north. Despite initial success, poor communication between the Soviet Republican armor and Spanish Republican infantry caused the isolation of Captain Arman's force and the subsequent destruction of a number of tanks. This battle also marked the first use of the molotov cocktail against tanks. Ritter von Thoma's Panzer I's fought for the Nationalists only days later on 30 October, and immediately experienced problems. As the Nationalist armor advanced, it was engaged by the Commune de Paris battalion, equipped with Soviet BA-10 armored cars. The 45-millimeter gun with which the BA-10 was armed was more than sufficient to knock out the poorly armored Panzer I's at ranges below 500 meters (550 yd).
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At one point, von Thoma offered up to 500 pesetas for each T-26 captured.
Although the Panzer I would participate in almost every major Nationalist offensive of the war, the Nationalist army began to deploy more and more captured T-26 tanks to offset their disadvantage in protection and firepower. At one point, von Thoma offered up to 500 pesetas for each T-26 captured. Although the Panzer I was initially able to knock out the T-26 at close range—150 meters (165 yd) or less—using an armor-piercing 7.92 millimeter bullets, the Republican tanks began to engage at ranges where they were immune to the machine guns of the Panzer I.
The Panzer I was upgraded in order to increase its lethality. On 8 August 1937, Generalísimo Francisco Franco expressed the need for a Panzer I armed with a 20-millimeter gun. Ultimately, the piece chosen was the Breda Model 1935, due to the simplicity of the design over competitors such as the German Flak 30. Furthermore, the 20 mm Breda was capable of penetrating 40 millimeters of armor at 250 meters (1.57 inches at 275 yd), which was more than sufficient to penetrate the frontal armor of the T-26. Prototypes were ready by September 1937 and an order was placed after successful results. The mounting of the Breda in the Panzer I required the original turret to be opened at the top and then extended. Four of these tanks were modified at the Armament Factory of Seville, but further production was canceled as it was decided sufficient numbers of Republican T-26 tanks had been captured to fulfill the Nationalist leadership's request for more lethal tanks. The Breda modification was not particularly liked by German crews, as the unprotected gap in the turret, designed to allow the tank's commander to aim, was found to be a dangerous weak point.
Overall, in the Spanish Civil War, the Panzerkampfwagen I tanks proved to be outclassed by Soviet T-26 and BT-5's provided to the "Republicans".
Finnish Volunteers in Spain and the Panzerkampfwagen I
In the early 1930's, as we have seen, the Finnish Army started planning for the creation and maintenance of a modern armoured force. While Paamaja (the Finnish Army's Supreme Headquarters) established a framework for the first large-scale Panssaari units, only limited guidance on tactical doctrine was provided. The staff of the early Panssaari units and of the Combined Arms Experimental Brigade were tasked with the development of detailed tactical doctrine for combined arms warfare from 1932 on. The Spanish Civil War provided a live test-bed for testing and evolution of this tactical doctrine on an ongoing basis over four years of continuous fighting.
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Panzer I's of Pohjan Pohjat's Panssaaripataljoon participating in the Nationalist victory parade through Madrid
As has been mentioned, the Finnish Volunteer Brigade in Spain (Pohjan Pohjat) would include a Panssaripataljoona (Panzer Battalion). Initially, this Battalion was equipped with Italian-supplied CV33 and CV35 tanks, but would soon include a company of German-supplied Panzerkampfwagen I Ausf B's and later still numbers of captured Republican T-26's (and some Finnish tanks). Two SdKfz 265 Panzerbefehlswagen command tanks were also supplied by the Germans to the Finnish volunteers. Later in the Spanish Civil War, the Finnish Army would indirectly equip a small number of the volunteer Panssari troops with an assortment of Vicker's 6-ton tanks and Skoda LT34's. The Pohjan Pohjat volunteers would acquire a great deal of experience with these tank designs in combat over four years of fighting in the Civil War. The tanks themselves were evaluated for strengths, weaknesses and flaws, various modifications were tested out and combat doctrine and tactics evolved through trial, error and conscious experimentation.
The value of this experience for the Finnish Army cannot be overstated. Officers, NCO's and men were rotated through the volunteer unit, gaining experience for themselves and providing a pool of trained and experienced men built up over the four years of fighting that the volunteers participated in. Equipment, weapons and clothing were tested under battle, revealing many flaws. Tactics evolved rapidly in the maelstrom of war, with mistakes and improvements continuously documented, assessed and the results and reports fed back to Paamaja (the Finnish Army Supreme Headquarters) and to the Combined Arms Experimental Brigade where they were further evaluated. As a result, Finnish Army Doctrine continuously improved. The importance of "battle-training", logistics, maintenance and standardization was highlighted, as were the importance of good communications and the integrated command of all arms on the battlefield.
As a result of experience in Spain, the Finnish Army would come to place an even greater emphasis than it had been making on both tank and anti-tank warfare, in particular on the use of effective anti-tank guns and on the use of tanks and armoured vehicles in the breakthrough and exploitation phases of battle. Finnish Officers however expected any war with the USSR to include far more heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft than were available to the Republican forces in Spain. They reported that, realistically, the lack of training, equipment and mobility limited the Republican forces in comparison to the Red Army, but that comparisons could be made, in particular with the Republican attacks regardless of casualties. Particular attention was also paid to the interrogation of any captured Russian "advisors", a small number of whom fell into the hands of Pohjan Pohjat, who were ever eager to hold lengthy and informative "discussions" with the Russians.
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The ineffectiveness of the Italian Carro Veloce (Fast Tank) CV33 and CV35 tanks was rapidly identified. The CV33 was nothing more than a tankette, its armour was totally inadequate against infantry anti-tank weapons and the crew (of 2 men) suffered from the lack of spare parts. Other drawbacks were its slow speed (despite its light weight the CV never reached more than 45km/h), the fact that the starter mechanism was placed outside the vehicle. Due to its small size and vulnerability, Italian soldiers dubbed the CV33 the "sardine box" or "iron casket"
With regard to tank warfare, the Russian tanks often proved to be to well armoured for the light anti-tank weapons initially provided to Pohjan Pohjat, although the Bofors 37mm proved to be generally effective when correctly positioned and used. The deadly effectiveness of the Bofors 76mm AA gun in an anti-tank role was however emphasized and as a direct result, from 1937 on the Finnish Army made a major effort to build up the numbers of 76mm anti-tank guns in service with Infantry and Panssaari units in Finland. The ineffectiveness of the Italian CV33 and CV35 tanks was rapidly identified, with similar criticisms made of the German-supplied Panzerkampfwagen I's. They were too lightly armoured and their machineguns were ineffective against enemy tanks, which could engage them at ranges where they were immune to the machine guns of the Panzer I and the Italian CV's.
The Bofors 37mm-equipped LT34's and Vickers 6-ton tanks were reported as being far more effective, as were the captured Russian tanks, although again, the armour was soon identified as being too light and other design and reliability deficiencies were also highlighted. The importance of command tanks and of armoured carriers for supporting infantry and logistical supplies was also stressed (Pohjan Pohjat improvised a number of armoured carriers for infantry from captured Soviet armoured cars and tanks. Regarding logistics, Pohjan Pohjat rapidly pieced together logistics columns to support the tank units – after initial experiences running out of fuel, Eversti Hans Kalm, Pohjan Pohjat's commanding officer, would integrate logistics units into the armoured units, carrying up to a weeks worth of fuel, ammunition and food within the fighting units. There were many more such lessons taken back to Finland over the four years that the Finnish volunteer unit spent in Spain, each of them of value.
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Eversti Hans Kalm, Pohjan Pohjat's charismatic commanding officer and in the Winter War, CO of the 22nd Panssaaridivisoona
Among these lessons were the strategic locating of armour plate on the tank itself – extra armour on the front of the tank increased survivability while thinner armour could be used elsewhere. Sloped armour also added protection, while using welded armour was preferable to riveted or bolted armour (when the tank was hit, rivets and bolts had a tendency to break and ricochet around inside the hull to the detriment of the crew). Face-hardened steel also gave the crews (and the tank) an advantage. Good radio communication both between tanks, and between the tanks and supporting infantry, artillery and anti-tank guns was an essential to success. The importance of close-coordination between all arms. Leading from the front, where commanders were on top of the current tactical situation at all times. Speed of movement and flexibility in decision making. And much much more.
Pohjan Pohjat reports also emphasized the importance of using armour for flanking attacks rather than frontal assaults, emphasizing the war of maneuver and the need for armour, infantry, artillery and close air support to operate as a well-coordinated whole in order to gain the greatest effect whilst minimalizing casualties. In this, the importance of the Spanish Civil War experience of Pohjan Pohjat cannot be understated, providing the Finnish Army as it did with valuable insights into the art of war and into their equipment, weapons and tactics at both the small and large unit level. For the Finnish Army, the Spanish Civil War was a crucible in which tactical experimentation, existing and new weapons and improved training methods were forged into a new and far stronger alloy, an impenetrable shield on which the sword of the Red Army would shatter so disastrously in 1939/1940.
The Panzerkampfwagen II
In 1934, delays in the design and production of the Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks (covered next) were becoming apparent. The Panzer II came about in a German Ordnance Department requirement enacted in 1934, this time proposing a 10-ton light tank development with 20mm cannon and 7.92mm machine gun armament. As was the case in developing the Panzer I, it became common practice for the new Germany, now wholly under Hitler, to skirt the rules of the Versailles Treaty and develop its systems of war under various peaceful disguises such as farm equipment. As such, this new light tank design fell under the designation of "Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper 100" (or "LaS 100") under the guise that it was a farm tractor.
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PzKpfw II prototype - Krupp
Designs for a stopgap tank were solicited from Krupp, MAN, Henschel, and Daimler-Benz. The final design was based on the Panzer I, but larger, and with a turret mounting a 20 mm anti-tank gun. The Panzer II was designed before the experience of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 showed that shell-proof armor was required for tanks to survive on a modern battlefield. Prior to that, armor was designed to stop only machine gun fire and high explosive shell fragments. The Panzer II A, B, and C had 14 mm of slightly sloped homogenous steel armor on the sides, front, and back, with 10 mm of armor on the top and bottom. Many IIC were given increased armor in the front. Starting with the D model, the front armor was increased to 30 mm. The Model F had 35 mm front armour and 20 mm side armor. This amount of armor could be penetrated by a towed antitank weapons, such as the Soviet 45mm and French canon de 25 and canon de 47. The Panzer II was around 50% heavier than the I and added a 20 mm Solothurn cannon as main armament as well as increasing maximum armour to 30 mm. Production began in 1935, but it took another eighteen months for the first combat-ready tank to be delivered. By July 1937, the Panzer II was cleared and ready for production.
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PzKpfw II Ausf. a
Most tank versions of the Panzer II were armed with a 2 cm KwK 30 L/55 autocannon. Some later versions used the similar 2 cm KwK 38 L/55. This autocannon was based on the 2 cm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun, and was capable of firing at a rate of 600 rounds per minute (280 rounds per minute sustained) from 10-round magazines. A total of 180 shells were carried. The Panzer II also had a 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr 34 machine gun mounted coaxially with the main gun. All production versions of the Panzer II were fitted with a 140 PS, gasoline-fuelled six-cylinder Maybach HL 62 TRM engine and ZF transmissions. Models A, B, and C had a top speed of 40 km/h (25 mph). Models D and E had a torsion bar suspension and a better transmission, giving a top road speed of 55 km/h (33 mph) but the cross country speed was much lower than previous models, so the Model F reverted to the previous leaf spring type suspension. All versions had a range of 200 km (120 mi).
The Panzer II had a crew of three men. The driver sat in the forward hull. The commander sat in a seat in the turret, and was responsible for aiming and firing the guns, while a loader/radio operator stood on the floor of the tank under the turret. Production began in 1935, but it took another eighteen months for the first combat-ready tank to be delivered. Some 1,856 were manufactured between 1935 and 1943 and by 1939, some 1,226 Panzer IIs were in use. While larger, better-armed and better-armoured than the Panzer I, the Panzer II was still a light training tank that could also be used in a reconnaissance or policing role as well as providing priceless training to tank crews. Underpowered, under-armored and lightly armed, the Panzer II experienced its hardships particularly against anti-tank weaponry at close ranges. Nevertheless, war was on the horizon so time was of the essence and the more lethal Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs were still being developed and would not be mass-produced in time for the coming battles.
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PzKpfw II Ausf. C in France, May 1940
According to some sources, the Panzer II was also sent to Spain from 1937, where it proved more capable against infantry than the Panzer I, but no better when faced with capable anti-tank guns or other tanks. However, no Panzer II's were seen in Spain by the Finnish volunteers of Pohjan Pohjat.
The Finnish Army expressed interest in the Panzer II and indeed, in 1937 a small team evaluated the tank in Germany with a view to a possible purchase (as they evaluated other tanks from other countries). However, their assessment was that the tank was best suited to be used in a reconnaissance role and while it was comparable to other light tanks such as the Soviet T-26 and the French R-35 or H-35 (or indeed the Finnish Army's own Vickers 6-ton or Czech-manufactured LT34 tanks), the 20mm gun was too light to be effective. In light of early experience in the Spanish Civil War, the Panzer II's armour was also seen as being too thin and not offering any protection against anything other than rifle and machinegun bullets and shell fragments. However, all of this was a moot point as the Finnish team was advised that all Panzer II's being built were going straight to the German Army and an export sale to the Finns would not be considered. The Finn's thus saw no point in pursuing the matter further and no further approaches to the Germans were made with regard to this tank. At the time, with Czechoslovakia supplying Finland with tanks, no need was seen to attempt to push harder with the Germans.
German Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The Panzerkampfwagen III
Shortly after the Panzer I was conceived as a light training tank, the Army Weapons Department drew up plans for a medium tank with a maximum weight of 24,000 kilograms (53,000 lb) and a top speed of 35 kilometres per hour (21.75 mph) based on specifications laid down by Heinz Guderain. It was intended as the main tank of the German Panzer divisions, capable of engaging and destroying opposing tank forces. At the time (1934), it was widely held that tanks would be used in two ways; supporting infantry against other infantry and in direct combat against other tanks and lighter vehicles. It was the infantry, in prepared defences and equipped with anti-tank guns, that presented the biggest threat to armour. Tanks designed to operate with friendly infantry against the enemy generally carried more armour and were heavier. A separate class, known as cruisers or mediums, were intended to exploit gaps in the enemy lines where opposition had been removed, moving through and attacking the enemy's unprotected lines of communication and the rear areas. These designs were lighter and faster.
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The Krupp MKA prototype for the Pz.III series. This was not adopted,but features from it were later used in the Pz.IV.
The Pz III was built to this lighter standard, and was intended to be paired with the Panzer IV which would handle the infantry tank role. Daimler-Benz, Krupp, MAN, and Rheinmetall all produced prototypes for the Pz III. Testing of these took place in 1936 and 1937, leading to the Daimler-Benz design being chosen for production. The first Panzer III model, the Ausführung A. (Ausf. A), came off the assembly line in May 1937. Ten, two of which were unarmed, were produced in that year. Mass production of the Ausf. F version began in 1939, but early production was limited and numbers produced were small in the period with which we are concerned (up to 1940):
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung A – 1936 – 10 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung B – 1937 – 10 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung C – 1937/38 – 15 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung D – 1938/40 – 25 + 5 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung E – 1939/40 – 96 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung F – 1940 – 450 produced
Thus, as we can see from the above numbers, in the years in which Finland was building up their armoured forces, the Panzerkampfwagen III was very much a prototype with changes constantly being made. All early versions were unsuitable for large-scale production and each new model was an improved version of the previous one. Full production did not really start until 1939, at which time there was no appetite for exports. It would be December 1938 before production commenced in earnest with the Ausf. E series.
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The Pz.III Ausf. A - had five medium-size road wheels and was armed with a 3.7cm L/45 gun and co-axial mg - 10 were built.
Much of the early development work on the Panzer III was a quest for a suitable suspension. Several varieties of leaf-spring suspensions were tried on the Ausf. A through Ausf. D before the torsion-bar suspension of the Ausf. E was standardized. The Panzer III, along with the Soviet KV heavy tank, was one of the first tanks to use this suspension design. A distinct feature of the Panzer III, influenced by British Vickers tanks (1924), was the three-man turret. This meant that the commander was not distracted with another role in the tank (eg as gunner or loader) and could fully concentrate on maintaining awareness of the situation and directing the tank. As we have already seen, most tanks of this time did not have this capability, providing the Panzer III with a potential combat advantage.
For example the French Somua S-35 had a one-man turret crew, while the original Soviet T-34 had a two-man turret. The practical importance of this feature is signified by the fact that not only all the further German tank designs inherited it, but also later into the war, most of the Allied tanks' designs either quickly switched to the three-man turret, or were abandoned as obsolete. The Panzer III also had no turret basket, merely a foot rest platform for the gunner. The Panxer II was to be operated by the crew of five men, with commander, gunner and loader in the turret and the driver and radio operator in the hull front. The communication between crewmembers was through the use of intercom system. The Panzer III was the first of German Panzers to be equipped with intercom system for in-tank communications.
The Panzer III design was made up of four sections – hull, turret, and front superstructure with the opening for the turret and rear superstructure with the engine deck. Each section was of a welded construction and all four were bolted together. The hull was divided into two main compartments divided by a bulkhead. The front compartment housed the gearbox and steering mechanism and the rear one both the fighting and engine compartment. Basic hull, turret, superstructure and crew layout remained unchanged throughout the production life of the Panzer III series.
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Daimler Benz PzKpfw III production line
The early versions of the Panzer III, the Ausf. A through C, had 15 millimetres (0.59 in) of homogeneous steel armor on all sides with 10 millimetres (0.39 in) on the top and 5 millimetres (0.20 in) on the bottom. This was quickly determined to be insufficient, and was upgraded to 30 millimetres (1.18 in) on the front, sides and rear in the Ausf. D, E, F, and G models, with the H model having a second 30-millimetre (1.18 in) layer of face-hardened steel applied to the front and rear hull. The Ausf. J model had a solid 50-millimetre (1.97 in) plate on the front and rear, while the Ausf. J¹, L, and the M models had an additional layer of 20 millimetres (0.79 in) of armor on the front hull and turret. This additional frontal armor gave the Panzer III frontal protection from most British and Soviet anti-tank guns at all but close ranges. The sides were still vulnerable to many enemy weapons, including anti-tank rifles at close ranges.
The Panzer III was intended to fight other tanks. In the initial design stage a 50-millimetre cannon was specified. However, the infantry at the time were being equipped with the 37-millimetre (1.46 in) PaK 36, and it was thought that, in the interest of standardization, the tanks should carry the same armament. As a compromise, the turret ring was made large enough to accommodate a 50-millimetre cannon should a future upgrade be required (this single decision would later assure the Panzer III a prolonged life in the German Army). The Ausf. A to early Ausf. F were equipped with a 3.7 cm KwK 36 L/45, which proved adequate during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. All early models up to and including the Ausf. F had two 7.92-millimetre (0.31 in) Maschinengewehr 34 machine guns mounted coaxially with the main gun, and a similar weapon in a hull mount.
The Panzer III Ausf. A through C were powered by a 250 PS (184 kW), 12-cylinder Maybach HL 108 TR engine, giving a top speed of 32 km/h (20 mph) and a range of 150 km (93 mi). All later models were powered by the 300 PS (221 kW), 12-cylinder Maybach HL 120 TRM engine. Top speed varied, depending on the transmission and weight, but was around 40 km/h (25 mph). The range was generally around 155 km (96 mi).
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Panzerkampfwagen III ausf. D
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The Panzer III Ausf. F was the first version to go into large-scale production.
In the Polish and French campaigns, the Panzer III formed only a small part of the German armored forces. Only a few hundred Ausf. A through F were available in these campaigns, most armed with the 37-millimetre (1.46 in) gun. They were the best medium tank available to the Germans and outclassed in both firepower and armor most of their opponents, such as the Polish 7TP, French R-35 and H-35 light tanks and the Soviet T-26 light tank and BT cavalry tanks
Relations between the Finnish Army and the German Army through the 1930's were generally good, if not close. The "Jaeger" officers who held many of the higher positions in the Finnish Army remembered the help given to Finland by the Germans in her fight for independence. There were ongoing ties at a professional level and Finnish requests for information, usually made informally, were almost always accommodated. Thus, German officers such as Guderain were aware of Finland's ongoing efforts in building up their own armoured forces and of course, von Seeckt's ongoing presence in Finland up until his untimely death also facilitated ongoing contacts. The Finns were thus well informed on the Panzer III design and construction project and had the opportunity to closely examine all the various models. The Finns did not however regard the Panzer III as in any way superior to their own Patria M/38 Sotavaunut, although they did make note of various design features incorporated into the different German prototypes as they were built.
The Panzerkampfwagen IV
The Panzer IV was the brainchild of German general and armored warfare theorist General Heinz Guderian. In concept, it was designed as an infantry support tank and intended to be used against enemy anti-tank guns and fortifications. Ideally, each tank battalion in a panzer division was to have three medium companies of Panzer IIIs and one heavy company of Panzer IVs. On 11 January 1934, the German army wrote the specifications for a "medium tractor", and issued them to a number of defense companies.
The Panzer IV would be armed with a short-barreled 75-millimetre (2.95 in) howitzer as its main gun, with a weight limit of 24 tonnes (26.46 short tons). Development was carried out under the name Begleitwagen ("accompanying vehicle"), or BW, to disguise its actual purpose, given that Germany was still theoretically bound by the Treaty of Versailles. MAN, Krupp, and Rheinmetall-Borsig each developed prototypes, with Krupp's being selected for further development.
The prototype required a crew of five men; the hull contained the engine bay to the rear, with the driver and radio operator, who doubled as the hull machine gunner, seated at the front-left and front-right, respectively. In the turret, the tank commander sat beneath his roof hatch, while the gunner was situated to the left of the gun breech and the loader to the right. The turret was offset 66.5 mm (2.62 in) to the left of the chassis center line, while the engine was moved 152.4 mm (6.00 in) to the right. This allowed the torque shaft to clear the rotary base junction, which provided electrical power to turn the turret, while connecting to the transmission box mounted in the hull between the driver and radio operator. Due to the asymmetric layout, the right side of the tank contained the bulk of its stowage volume, which was taken up by ready-use ammunition lockers. Production began in 1936.
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung A – 1937 – 35 produced
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung B – 1938 – 42 produced
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung C – 1938/39 – 140 produced
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung D – 1939/40 – 248 produced
The Panzer IV was originally intended to be used only on a limited scale, so initially Krupp was its sole manufacturer. Prior to the Polish campaign, only 217 Panzer IVs were produced.
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Panzerkampfwagen IV ausf B tanks
The first mass-produced version of the Panzer IV was the Ausführung A in 1936. It was powered by Maybach's HL 108TR, producing 250 PS (183.87 kW), and used the SGR 75 transmission with five forward gears and one reverse, achieving a maximum road speed of 31 kilometres per hour (19.26 mph. Main armamentwas the Kampfwagenkanone 37 L/24 (KwK 37 L/24) 75 mm tank gun, which was a low-velocity gun mainly designed to fire high-explosive shells. Against armored targets, firing the Panzergranate (armor-piercing shell) at 430 metres per second (1,410 ft/s) the KwK 37 could penetrate 43 millimetres (1.69 in), inclined at 30 degrees, at ranges of up to 700 metres (2,300 ft). A 7.92 mm (0.31 in) MG 34 machine gun was mounted coaxially with the main gun in the turret, while a second machine gun of the same type was mounted in the front plate of the hull. The Ausf. A was protected by 14.5 mm of steel armor on the front plate of the chassis, and 20 mm on the turret. This was only capable of stopping artillery fragments, small-arms fire, and light anti-tank projectiles.
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Panzer IV Ausf C
The Ausf. B included the replacement of the original engine with the more powerful 300 PS (220.65 kW) Maybach HL 120TR, and the transmission with the new SSG 75 transmission, with six forward gears and one reverse gear. Despite a weight increase to 16 t (18 short tons), this improved the tank's speed to 39 kilometres per hour (24 mph). The glacis plate was augmented to a maximum thickness of 30 millimetres (1.18 in), and the hull-mounted machine gun was replaced by a covered pistol port. The Ausf. C saw the turret armor increased to 30 mm (1.18 in), which brought the tank's weight to 18.14 t (20.00 short tons). The Ausf. D reintroduced the hull machine gun and changed the turret's internal gun mantlet to an external one. Again, protection was upgraded, this time by increasing side armor to 20 mm.
As with the Panzer II, the Finns were well informed on the Panzer IV design and construction project and had the opportunity to closely examine the early models. However, the Panzer IV was designed as an infantry support tank and this was of interest – particularly as this was a tank model the Finns had decided to exchew on the basis of cost. The Finnish Army could only afford one primary tank design (although they would end up with two, as we will see, although both would fill the same role). Given the large numbers of tanks in service with the Red Army, and their knowledge, such as it was, of Red Army doctrine and Tukhachevsky's "deep operations" theory, the Finns had decided to concentrate on the "battle tank" capable of effectively fighting other tanks. Thus, while the Finns were interested in the Panzer IV, it was not a design they were interested in from a purchasing viewpoint, although again, they did make note of various design features incorporated into the different German prototypes as they were built.
Summary
The Finnish military had ongoing links to Germany through the 1930's, some open, such as the employment of von Seekt as a Guest Lecturer, some more in the nature of "back-channel" unofficial links. Regardless, there were officers within the Finnish military who were well aware of the details of the German military buildup and whose job it was in some cases to track the development and availability of German military equipment. The Finns were well aware of the German armoured vehicle experiments and at different stages had evaluated most of the equipment and weapons the Germans used. While the Finns expressed interest in procuring weapons of various types from the Germans on a number of occasions, the pressures of German rearmament requirements meant that the Germans were rarely interested (or able) to sell to the Finns the weapons that they were interested in.
Tanks were just another of these items, and although the Finns were interested in the Panzer III and IV's in particular, they never did acquire any German tanks over the course of the Winter War – the German Army's demands were seemingly limitless while exports were limited. In the end, from the mid 1930's through to October 1938, the main source of tanks for the Finnish Army would be Czechoslovakia. Finnish military procurement plans for the nacent Panssaaridivissoona took a severe blow in October 1938 when Czechoslovakia as a source of supply was eliminated as France and Britain acceded to Hitler's demands. Finland, well aware of Czechoslovakia's military-industrial capabilities, did its small best to influence events. However, it is not even certain that the Finn's attempts to enlighten the French and British leaders responsible ever reached their ears. Indeed, it was the events of October 1938 that sparked Finland into a series of emergency measures intended to increase the country's military capabilities almost regardless of cost. And it was these moves that, in all likeliehood, ensured that Finland had the military capability to take on the Red Army over 1939-1940 and prevail, albeit at heavy cost.
The loss of the Czechoslovakian military and industrial assets would come back to bite Britain and France in 1940 as France fell to the German onslaught. In September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland and went to war with France and Britain, German Panzer forces consisted of roughly 3,500 tanks:
1,445 Panzer I tanks
1,226 Panzer II tanks
98 Panzer III tanks
211 Panzer IV tanks
215 Command Tanks of various models
244 Czech Pz35(t) tanks
153 Czech Pz38(t) tanks
Indeed, the scarcity of the Panzer III and IV's makes it seem questionable as to whether an attack on France would have gone ahead without the additional tanks Germany had taken over from the Czechoslovak armed forces – the 400 odd Pz35(t) and Pz38(t) tanks made up a significant proportion of the German tank force used against the French and British in 1940. By then however, Finnish interest was a moot point as Finland was itself fighting for survival against the Soviet onslaught – without any German tanks.
Next: Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades
The Panzerkampfwagen III
Shortly after the Panzer I was conceived as a light training tank, the Army Weapons Department drew up plans for a medium tank with a maximum weight of 24,000 kilograms (53,000 lb) and a top speed of 35 kilometres per hour (21.75 mph) based on specifications laid down by Heinz Guderain. It was intended as the main tank of the German Panzer divisions, capable of engaging and destroying opposing tank forces. At the time (1934), it was widely held that tanks would be used in two ways; supporting infantry against other infantry and in direct combat against other tanks and lighter vehicles. It was the infantry, in prepared defences and equipped with anti-tank guns, that presented the biggest threat to armour. Tanks designed to operate with friendly infantry against the enemy generally carried more armour and were heavier. A separate class, known as cruisers or mediums, were intended to exploit gaps in the enemy lines where opposition had been removed, moving through and attacking the enemy's unprotected lines of communication and the rear areas. These designs were lighter and faster.
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The Krupp MKA prototype for the Pz.III series. This was not adopted,but features from it were later used in the Pz.IV.
The Pz III was built to this lighter standard, and was intended to be paired with the Panzer IV which would handle the infantry tank role. Daimler-Benz, Krupp, MAN, and Rheinmetall all produced prototypes for the Pz III. Testing of these took place in 1936 and 1937, leading to the Daimler-Benz design being chosen for production. The first Panzer III model, the Ausführung A. (Ausf. A), came off the assembly line in May 1937. Ten, two of which were unarmed, were produced in that year. Mass production of the Ausf. F version began in 1939, but early production was limited and numbers produced were small in the period with which we are concerned (up to 1940):
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung A – 1936 – 10 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung B – 1937 – 10 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung C – 1937/38 – 15 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung D – 1938/40 – 25 + 5 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung E – 1939/40 – 96 produced
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausführung F – 1940 – 450 produced
Thus, as we can see from the above numbers, in the years in which Finland was building up their armoured forces, the Panzerkampfwagen III was very much a prototype with changes constantly being made. All early versions were unsuitable for large-scale production and each new model was an improved version of the previous one. Full production did not really start until 1939, at which time there was no appetite for exports. It would be December 1938 before production commenced in earnest with the Ausf. E series.
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The Pz.III Ausf. A - had five medium-size road wheels and was armed with a 3.7cm L/45 gun and co-axial mg - 10 were built.
Much of the early development work on the Panzer III was a quest for a suitable suspension. Several varieties of leaf-spring suspensions were tried on the Ausf. A through Ausf. D before the torsion-bar suspension of the Ausf. E was standardized. The Panzer III, along with the Soviet KV heavy tank, was one of the first tanks to use this suspension design. A distinct feature of the Panzer III, influenced by British Vickers tanks (1924), was the three-man turret. This meant that the commander was not distracted with another role in the tank (eg as gunner or loader) and could fully concentrate on maintaining awareness of the situation and directing the tank. As we have already seen, most tanks of this time did not have this capability, providing the Panzer III with a potential combat advantage.
For example the French Somua S-35 had a one-man turret crew, while the original Soviet T-34 had a two-man turret. The practical importance of this feature is signified by the fact that not only all the further German tank designs inherited it, but also later into the war, most of the Allied tanks' designs either quickly switched to the three-man turret, or were abandoned as obsolete. The Panzer III also had no turret basket, merely a foot rest platform for the gunner. The Panxer II was to be operated by the crew of five men, with commander, gunner and loader in the turret and the driver and radio operator in the hull front. The communication between crewmembers was through the use of intercom system. The Panzer III was the first of German Panzers to be equipped with intercom system for in-tank communications.
The Panzer III design was made up of four sections – hull, turret, and front superstructure with the opening for the turret and rear superstructure with the engine deck. Each section was of a welded construction and all four were bolted together. The hull was divided into two main compartments divided by a bulkhead. The front compartment housed the gearbox and steering mechanism and the rear one both the fighting and engine compartment. Basic hull, turret, superstructure and crew layout remained unchanged throughout the production life of the Panzer III series.
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Daimler Benz PzKpfw III production line
The early versions of the Panzer III, the Ausf. A through C, had 15 millimetres (0.59 in) of homogeneous steel armor on all sides with 10 millimetres (0.39 in) on the top and 5 millimetres (0.20 in) on the bottom. This was quickly determined to be insufficient, and was upgraded to 30 millimetres (1.18 in) on the front, sides and rear in the Ausf. D, E, F, and G models, with the H model having a second 30-millimetre (1.18 in) layer of face-hardened steel applied to the front and rear hull. The Ausf. J model had a solid 50-millimetre (1.97 in) plate on the front and rear, while the Ausf. J¹, L, and the M models had an additional layer of 20 millimetres (0.79 in) of armor on the front hull and turret. This additional frontal armor gave the Panzer III frontal protection from most British and Soviet anti-tank guns at all but close ranges. The sides were still vulnerable to many enemy weapons, including anti-tank rifles at close ranges.
The Panzer III was intended to fight other tanks. In the initial design stage a 50-millimetre cannon was specified. However, the infantry at the time were being equipped with the 37-millimetre (1.46 in) PaK 36, and it was thought that, in the interest of standardization, the tanks should carry the same armament. As a compromise, the turret ring was made large enough to accommodate a 50-millimetre cannon should a future upgrade be required (this single decision would later assure the Panzer III a prolonged life in the German Army). The Ausf. A to early Ausf. F were equipped with a 3.7 cm KwK 36 L/45, which proved adequate during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. All early models up to and including the Ausf. F had two 7.92-millimetre (0.31 in) Maschinengewehr 34 machine guns mounted coaxially with the main gun, and a similar weapon in a hull mount.
The Panzer III Ausf. A through C were powered by a 250 PS (184 kW), 12-cylinder Maybach HL 108 TR engine, giving a top speed of 32 km/h (20 mph) and a range of 150 km (93 mi). All later models were powered by the 300 PS (221 kW), 12-cylinder Maybach HL 120 TRM engine. Top speed varied, depending on the transmission and weight, but was around 40 km/h (25 mph). The range was generally around 155 km (96 mi).
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Panzerkampfwagen III ausf. D
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The Panzer III Ausf. F was the first version to go into large-scale production.
In the Polish and French campaigns, the Panzer III formed only a small part of the German armored forces. Only a few hundred Ausf. A through F were available in these campaigns, most armed with the 37-millimetre (1.46 in) gun. They were the best medium tank available to the Germans and outclassed in both firepower and armor most of their opponents, such as the Polish 7TP, French R-35 and H-35 light tanks and the Soviet T-26 light tank and BT cavalry tanks
Relations between the Finnish Army and the German Army through the 1930's were generally good, if not close. The "Jaeger" officers who held many of the higher positions in the Finnish Army remembered the help given to Finland by the Germans in her fight for independence. There were ongoing ties at a professional level and Finnish requests for information, usually made informally, were almost always accommodated. Thus, German officers such as Guderain were aware of Finland's ongoing efforts in building up their own armoured forces and of course, von Seeckt's ongoing presence in Finland up until his untimely death also facilitated ongoing contacts. The Finns were thus well informed on the Panzer III design and construction project and had the opportunity to closely examine all the various models. The Finns did not however regard the Panzer III as in any way superior to their own Patria M/38 Sotavaunut, although they did make note of various design features incorporated into the different German prototypes as they were built.
The Panzerkampfwagen IV
The Panzer IV was the brainchild of German general and armored warfare theorist General Heinz Guderian. In concept, it was designed as an infantry support tank and intended to be used against enemy anti-tank guns and fortifications. Ideally, each tank battalion in a panzer division was to have three medium companies of Panzer IIIs and one heavy company of Panzer IVs. On 11 January 1934, the German army wrote the specifications for a "medium tractor", and issued them to a number of defense companies.
The Panzer IV would be armed with a short-barreled 75-millimetre (2.95 in) howitzer as its main gun, with a weight limit of 24 tonnes (26.46 short tons). Development was carried out under the name Begleitwagen ("accompanying vehicle"), or BW, to disguise its actual purpose, given that Germany was still theoretically bound by the Treaty of Versailles. MAN, Krupp, and Rheinmetall-Borsig each developed prototypes, with Krupp's being selected for further development.
The prototype required a crew of five men; the hull contained the engine bay to the rear, with the driver and radio operator, who doubled as the hull machine gunner, seated at the front-left and front-right, respectively. In the turret, the tank commander sat beneath his roof hatch, while the gunner was situated to the left of the gun breech and the loader to the right. The turret was offset 66.5 mm (2.62 in) to the left of the chassis center line, while the engine was moved 152.4 mm (6.00 in) to the right. This allowed the torque shaft to clear the rotary base junction, which provided electrical power to turn the turret, while connecting to the transmission box mounted in the hull between the driver and radio operator. Due to the asymmetric layout, the right side of the tank contained the bulk of its stowage volume, which was taken up by ready-use ammunition lockers. Production began in 1936.
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung A – 1937 – 35 produced
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung B – 1938 – 42 produced
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung C – 1938/39 – 140 produced
Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausführung D – 1939/40 – 248 produced
The Panzer IV was originally intended to be used only on a limited scale, so initially Krupp was its sole manufacturer. Prior to the Polish campaign, only 217 Panzer IVs were produced.
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Panzerkampfwagen IV ausf B tanks
The first mass-produced version of the Panzer IV was the Ausführung A in 1936. It was powered by Maybach's HL 108TR, producing 250 PS (183.87 kW), and used the SGR 75 transmission with five forward gears and one reverse, achieving a maximum road speed of 31 kilometres per hour (19.26 mph. Main armamentwas the Kampfwagenkanone 37 L/24 (KwK 37 L/24) 75 mm tank gun, which was a low-velocity gun mainly designed to fire high-explosive shells. Against armored targets, firing the Panzergranate (armor-piercing shell) at 430 metres per second (1,410 ft/s) the KwK 37 could penetrate 43 millimetres (1.69 in), inclined at 30 degrees, at ranges of up to 700 metres (2,300 ft). A 7.92 mm (0.31 in) MG 34 machine gun was mounted coaxially with the main gun in the turret, while a second machine gun of the same type was mounted in the front plate of the hull. The Ausf. A was protected by 14.5 mm of steel armor on the front plate of the chassis, and 20 mm on the turret. This was only capable of stopping artillery fragments, small-arms fire, and light anti-tank projectiles.
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Panzer IV Ausf C
The Ausf. B included the replacement of the original engine with the more powerful 300 PS (220.65 kW) Maybach HL 120TR, and the transmission with the new SSG 75 transmission, with six forward gears and one reverse gear. Despite a weight increase to 16 t (18 short tons), this improved the tank's speed to 39 kilometres per hour (24 mph). The glacis plate was augmented to a maximum thickness of 30 millimetres (1.18 in), and the hull-mounted machine gun was replaced by a covered pistol port. The Ausf. C saw the turret armor increased to 30 mm (1.18 in), which brought the tank's weight to 18.14 t (20.00 short tons). The Ausf. D reintroduced the hull machine gun and changed the turret's internal gun mantlet to an external one. Again, protection was upgraded, this time by increasing side armor to 20 mm.
As with the Panzer II, the Finns were well informed on the Panzer IV design and construction project and had the opportunity to closely examine the early models. However, the Panzer IV was designed as an infantry support tank and this was of interest – particularly as this was a tank model the Finns had decided to exchew on the basis of cost. The Finnish Army could only afford one primary tank design (although they would end up with two, as we will see, although both would fill the same role). Given the large numbers of tanks in service with the Red Army, and their knowledge, such as it was, of Red Army doctrine and Tukhachevsky's "deep operations" theory, the Finns had decided to concentrate on the "battle tank" capable of effectively fighting other tanks. Thus, while the Finns were interested in the Panzer IV, it was not a design they were interested in from a purchasing viewpoint, although again, they did make note of various design features incorporated into the different German prototypes as they were built.
Summary
The Finnish military had ongoing links to Germany through the 1930's, some open, such as the employment of von Seekt as a Guest Lecturer, some more in the nature of "back-channel" unofficial links. Regardless, there were officers within the Finnish military who were well aware of the details of the German military buildup and whose job it was in some cases to track the development and availability of German military equipment. The Finns were well aware of the German armoured vehicle experiments and at different stages had evaluated most of the equipment and weapons the Germans used. While the Finns expressed interest in procuring weapons of various types from the Germans on a number of occasions, the pressures of German rearmament requirements meant that the Germans were rarely interested (or able) to sell to the Finns the weapons that they were interested in.
Tanks were just another of these items, and although the Finns were interested in the Panzer III and IV's in particular, they never did acquire any German tanks over the course of the Winter War – the German Army's demands were seemingly limitless while exports were limited. In the end, from the mid 1930's through to October 1938, the main source of tanks for the Finnish Army would be Czechoslovakia. Finnish military procurement plans for the nacent Panssaaridivissoona took a severe blow in October 1938 when Czechoslovakia as a source of supply was eliminated as France and Britain acceded to Hitler's demands. Finland, well aware of Czechoslovakia's military-industrial capabilities, did its small best to influence events. However, it is not even certain that the Finn's attempts to enlighten the French and British leaders responsible ever reached their ears. Indeed, it was the events of October 1938 that sparked Finland into a series of emergency measures intended to increase the country's military capabilities almost regardless of cost. And it was these moves that, in all likeliehood, ensured that Finland had the military capability to take on the Red Army over 1939-1940 and prevail, albeit at heavy cost.
The loss of the Czechoslovakian military and industrial assets would come back to bite Britain and France in 1940 as France fell to the German onslaught. In September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland and went to war with France and Britain, German Panzer forces consisted of roughly 3,500 tanks:
1,445 Panzer I tanks
1,226 Panzer II tanks
98 Panzer III tanks
211 Panzer IV tanks
215 Command Tanks of various models
244 Czech Pz35(t) tanks
153 Czech Pz38(t) tanks
Indeed, the scarcity of the Panzer III and IV's makes it seem questionable as to whether an attack on France would have gone ahead without the additional tanks Germany had taken over from the Czechoslovak armed forces – the 400 odd Pz35(t) and Pz38(t) tanks made up a significant proportion of the German tank force used against the French and British in 1940. By then however, Finnish interest was a moot point as Finland was itself fighting for survival against the Soviet onslaught – without any German tanks.
Next: Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades
Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades - Part 1
World War I, Italy and Italian Tanks
In the years that led up to World War One, Italy had nominally sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance. Despite this, in the years before the war, Italy had made diplomatic overtures towards the United Kingdom and France. This was because the Italian government had grown convinced that support of Austria (the traditional enemy of Italy during the 19th century Risorgimento) would not gain Italy the territories she wanted: Trieste, Istria, Zara and Dalmatia, all Austrian possessions. In fact, a secret agreement signed with France in 1902 for all intents and purposes nullified Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance.
Antonio Salandra was a conservative Italian politician who served as the 33rd Prime Minister of Italy between 1914 and 1916.
A few days after the outbreak of the war, on 3 August 1914, the government, led by the conservative Antonio Salandra, declared that Italy would not commit its troops, maintaining that the Triple Alliance had only a defensive stance and Austria-Hungary had been the aggressor. In reality, both Salandra and the minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidney Sonnino, began to probe which side would grant the best reward for Italy's entrance in the war. The diplomatic moves led to the London Pact (26 April 1915), signed by Sonnino without the approval of the Italian Parliament. According to the Pact, after victory Italy was to get Trentino and the South Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, the entire Austrian Littoral (with Trieste), Gorizia and Gradisca (Eastern Friuli) and Istria (but without Fiume), parts of western Carniola (Idrija and Ilirska Bistrica) and north-western Dalmatia with Zara and most of the islands, but without Split. Other agreements concerned the sovereignty of the port of Valona, the province of Antalya in Turkey and part of the German colonies in Africa.
Giovanni Giolitti (October 27, 1842 – July 17, 1928) was an Italian statesman and Prime Minister of Italy five times between 1892 and 1921. He did not support Italy's intervention in WW1 initially.
Under the London Pact, Italy joined the Triple Entente. On 3 May 1915 Italy officially revoked the Triple Alliance. In the following days Giolitti and the neutralist majority of the Parliament opposed declaring war, while nationalist crowds demonstrated in public areas for it. On 13 May 1915 Salandra offered his resignation to King Victor Emmanuel III, but Giolitti, fearful of nationalist disorder that might break into open rebellion, declined the position of prime minister. Salandra remained in office, and got his declaration of war against Austria-Hungary on 23 May 1915. (Italy declared war on Germany fifteen months later.) Italy thus entered the war with the support of only a minority of its population and politicians.
As Italy entered WW1 on 23 May 1915, the situation of her forces in the African colonies was critical. Italian Somaliland, in the east was far from pacified. In Cyrenaica, the Italian forces were confined to widely separated points on the coast. In Tripolitania and the Fezzan, the story has a different beginning. In August 1914, during their campaign against the Ottoman Empire the Italian forces had conquered most of western Libya. In November 1914, this advance had turned into a general retreat, and on 7 April and 28 April, they suffered two reverses at Wadi Marsit (near Mizda) and al-Qurdabiya (near Sirte) respectively. By August 1915, the situation in Tripolitania was similar to that of Cyrenaica. The conquest of all of Libya would not be resumed until January 1922, well after the end of WW1.
In the European war, Italy's participation met with an equal lack of success. Britain and France had wanted Italy to join the war on their side so that a new front could be opened up in the south. The plan was to split the Central Powers further so that their military strength on the Western and Eastern Fronts could be weaked weakened. The logic was sound. Success however required military victories by the Italian Army and this was, against the politician's expectations, not forthcoming.
Between the start of WW1 and May 1915, Italy had done little or nothing to prepare the Italian Army for entry into the War, despite the interest of the politicians in joining in on one side or the other. Indeed, at the time of Italy's entry into WW1, the Italian military was suffering from equipment and munition shortages as a result of the Italo-Turkish War in Libya (1911–1912). Between 1915 and 1917 Italian troops managed to penetrate a mere 10 miles into Austrian territory, with the fighting largely confined to small area along the northeastern border where Italy's border pushed up against Austria-Hungary. The Austrians occupied the hills and the mountains while the Italians attempted to move north from the plains and valleys.
Map of the Italian Front (1915-1917). Blue areas show where major battles occurred, although the blue area in the east (right) was where 12 Battles of the Isonzo were fought.
Neither side one a strategic advantage, although casualties were heavy. Indeed, on 13 December 1916, known as "White Friday", 10,000 soldiers were killed by avalanches in the Dolomites. The frontline was close to the centers of population in northern Italy and the cities of Venice, Verona and Milan were close enough to the fighting to be in danger if a major breakthrough by the Ausro-Hungarian Army occurred. In May and August 1917, the exhausted Italians launched the Tenth and Eleventh Battles of the Isonzo. The Austrians also were near breaking and the Italians managed to capture some ground, but were unable to break through. At this point, the Austrians asked for German help. Having decisively repulsed the Russians, the Germans sent six divisions and prepared for what would be the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo (also called the Battle of Caporetto after the Italian town of that name-- now called Kobarid and part of Slovenia).
Mutinies and plummeting morale crippled the Italian Army from within. On 24 October 1917 the Austrians and Germans launched the Battle of Caporetto, pushing the Italians back 15 miles in the first day. By the time it was over in November, they had pushed the Italians back nearly 100 miles in one of the most spectacular advances of the war. The Italians suffered some 300,000 casualties, mostly taken prisoner, and lost all of their artillery. Unfortunately for the attackers, they outran their supply capability and thus the offensive ended 20 miles short of Venice in November.
The Arditi would jump inside the trench while the enemy was huddling down, and use their daggers at close quarters to suppress enemy resistance.
France, Britain and the US all began sending assistance to Italy and in the spring of 1918, Germany pulled out its troops for use in its upcoming Spring Offensive on the Western Front. In June 1918 the Austrians attacked in the Battle of the Piave River. The Italians repulsed the attack but launched no counter-offensive until October-November 1918. By October 1918, Italy had finally gathered together enough soldiers to mount an offensive. The attack targeted Vittorio Veneto, across the Piave. The Italian Army broke through a gap near Sacile and poured in reinforcements that crushed the Austrian defensive line. On 3 November, 300,000 Austrian soldiers surrendered. On 3 November, Austria-Hungary sent a flag of truce to the Italian Commander to ask again for an armistice and terms of peace. An armistice was signed and took effect on 4 November, at three o'clock in the afternoon.
The war has since become known as the "War in snow and ice", as most of the 600 km frontline ran through the highest mountains and glaciers of the Alps. 12 meters (40 feet) of snow were a usual occurrence during the winter of 1915/16 and thousands of soldiers died in avalanches. The remains of these soldiers are still being uncovered today. Climbing and skiing became essential skills for the troops of both sides and soon Ski Battalions and special climbing units were formed. It was during these years that the Alpini, their spirit and their mules became famous, although at the cost of over 12,000 casualties out of a total of 40,000 mobilized Alpinis. The Arditi units also became famous within Italy.
The task of Arditi units was not to clear the way for regular infantry to attack enemy lines, but to completely overrun enemy positions. The most daring volunteers were chosen, particularly those who were not bothered by loud incoming artillery fire close by. The men also studied fencing and were masters of hand-to-hand combat. Once ready, they were sent to the front armed with a dagger and hand grenades. Most didn't carry rifles or carbines because they would be cumbersome to fire in the confined spaces of a trench.
Italian Alpini in WW1
The Arditi approached enemy trenches while they were being shelled by Italian artillery. Just as the barrage was lifted they would jump inside the trench while the enemy was huddling down, and use their daggers at close quarters to suppress enemy resistance. These primitive tactics were surprisingly effective. Arditi had to hold the positions they conquered for 24 hours and then would be replaced by the regular infantry. Arditi might lose 25% to 30% of their numbers during such an attack. Their motto was "O la vittoria, o tutti accoppati" meaning "We either win, or we all die"
Italian alpine troops following the first world war remained an elite force: In 1935 the government of Italy reorganized its Armed Forces, creating six Alpine divisions and forming two new Alpini regiments. As a result of the unusual relationship between Italy and Finland that had developed through the 1930's, one of these Alpini Divisions would be conducting a Winter Warfare Exercise in Finland in late 1939 when the Winter War broke out. Mussolini permitted this Alpini Division together with Italian Air Force and naval units that had been sent to Finland to fight as volunteers under Finnish command through the entire Winter War.
Italy's World War One Tanks
During World War I, Italy did not field any armoured units in combat, due to a lack of tanks. In 1915, Captain Luigi Cassali proposed a project to build an armored vehicle equipped with two machine gun turrets. However, the project was not accepted. However, an officer serving with the Italian forces in France observed French tanks in operation as early as September 1916 and convinced the High Command to try the new vehicles. This was artillery officer Captain Alfredo Bennicelli, who was also a Count and a Senator – factors which probably helped him sell the idea.
Count Alfredo Bennicelli (Major in Artillery) climbing in or out of a Renault FT-17. Bennicelli was involved in numerous actions on the French Front and was a big proponent of tanks. Bennicelli tested French tanks and found them superior to British ones and in particular liked the FT series and had some FT's sent to Italy for testing.
The Italian General Staff ordered a single French Schneider CA-1 for extensive trials in 1916 but the design was ultimately rejected. A similar study for an indigenous model started the same year when FIAT, by then the industrial giant of Italy, proposed a new design, the FIAT 2000. An initial order to design and produce the first Italian tank model was awarded to the FIAT automobile company in 1916 based on the design they had put forward. The prototype of the new tank was displayed to a military commission on 21 June 1917; its mechanical systems were complete but its superstructure was added later, being represented on the prototype by a wooden mockup with a conical open turret and dummy gun. The final configuration of the superstructure was not completed until 1918. This, the first Italian designed and built tank, was the Fiat 2000.
Two Fiat 2000 prototypes formed a part of Italy's very first armoured unit, which was formed only weeks before the end of WW1. This was the "Sezione speciale carri armati" (Armored Vehicles Special Section), formed up on September 1, 1918 in Verona : the. This unit was later denominated "Reparto speciale di marcia carri d'assalto" ( Special Forward Assault Tank Unit) and, after WWI ended, the "Batteria autonoma carri d'assalto" (Autonomous Assault Tanks Battery"), and comprised six Renault FT 17's and the two Fiat 2000 prototypes.
The Fiat 2000 Tank
The FIAT 2000 was a substantial vehicle, of comparable dimensions to the British Mark V tanks, and weighing 40 tons as compared to the Mark V's 28 tons. This tank was often called "the heaviest World War I tank" but this is not strictly accurate, since the FIAT 2000 never actually saw combat in World War I. Also, the modest order for 50 tanks was never completed: the only Fiat 2000 tanks produced were the two prototypes. Despite the fact that this was Italy's first attempt to design and build a tank, Fiat appeared to have gotten it more or less right.
Fiat 2000 Tank - prototype
The layout of the FIAT 2000 differed to the other tanks then in use, especially the British ones. The engine was separated from the crew; not be being placed behind or in front of the crew compartment, but below it. It’s possible that the purpose of the original design with the mechanicals separated from the upper structure was to allow the hull to be used as the basis for other vehicle types such as SPG’s, but this is speculation without any evidence either way.
Fiat 2000 Tank interior layout showing crew positions and mechanicals
The overall crew was 10 men. Armament originally consisted of the turret mounted gun and ten machineguns (three on each side and four in front), but this left the rear of the tank undefended and tended to contaminate the interior with propellant fumes, so it was decided to install a ventilator in the roof and alter the machinegun positions to two on each side, three at the rear, and two in front. The driver was seated at the front in an armoured compartment, with very good overall vision through a large port forward and small lateral loopholes. The tank commander was positioned in the upper part of the tank, which was completely separated from the engine and transmission compartment (another innovation). The 3 rear machine gunners had to handle their weapons from a kneeling position, which was not particularly comfortable. However the 4 other machine gunners could fire from either a seated or an upright position. The 7 machineguns were provided with 7,000 rounds of ammunition in total. The main gunner and the loader were seated at the back of the turret.
Fiat 2000 Prototype Hull on trial - June 1917
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the tank's weaponry was the turret; apart from the Renault FT, this was the first tank to have a rotating turret mounted above the hull. The turret was made of four pieces rivetted together, had room for two crew members and could traverse a full 360°. On the issue of armament the above-mentioned Major Bennicelli (the man also responsible for bringing the Renault FT-17 to Italy) seems to have been pushing for a 75mm gun or 76mm. Major Bennicelli being an artillery man was probably choosing the 75/27CK or similar type of gun he would have been familiar with. A later plan on 1st May 1918 planned to install an improved 77mm gun but in the end the chosen gun was the 65/17 howitzer (of 65mm caliber with a barrel 17 calibers long) with 45 rounds. Thanks to the tall turret and the space available beneath it, the gun's elevation was -10/+75°. The Fiat 2000 was actually the first tank to be equipped with a fully rotating turret (before even the French FT 17).
One source states that a 14mm heavy machine gun was also planned to be fitted with the main gun but this cannot be verified due to lack of clear documentation and the time that has now passed. This may also have arisen because of some confusion over the naming of the machinegun – the type fitted was the 6.5mm FIAT 14, which maye have led to this mistake. The secondary armament as above mentioned consisted of 7 x 6.5mm machine-guns. Four of them were placed at the corners of the hull and could swivel over a 110° angle. Two other machine-guns were placed in the center of the side walls and the last was placed in the center of the rear. Two machine-guns could fire towards front, three to each side and three towards the rear of the tank. The machine-guns however could fire only a few degrees of negative elevation, thus creating dead space around the circumference of the vehicle.
2nd Prototype late 1917 to early 1918 with upper structure partially completed and first model cylindrical turret
The tracks were longer than the hull, but were lower in comparison to the wrap-around type found on the British "rhomboidal" tanks and thus lower in weight. The armour was of a clean design, being made of riveted vanadium steel plates. It was 15 mm thick on the sides and 20 mm on the front. Fiat spent a lot of money on these prototypes and used the best quality vanadium armour plate available from the steel works at Terni. This vanadium armour plate was intended for Italian warships such as the "Christopher Columbus" and was significantly more expensive than standard armour. Large armoured skirts made from 20mm plate also covered the 4 bogied suspension units on each side, although a weakness was noted with track chains being exposed to enemy fire. The sloped shielding on the front and upper part of the tank hull offered additional protection (the sloped shielding offered better protection than vertical shielding, because it can in many cases deflect the enemy projectile).
Fiat 2000 Tank prototype during trials
However, the excessive height of the tank made it an easy target. The steering was conventional and turns were made by reducing power to one of the tracks. The tank could also be slowed down by means of the side brake. The excellent suspension of the FIAT-2000 consisted of four oscillating carriages equipped each of two road-wheels with leaf springs. The steel tracks at only 450mm broad were very narrow for the weight of the tank, and ground pressue was thus considerable. This proved detrimental to cross-country travel.
Completed Fiat 2000 at public parade probably Rome either 1918 or 1919
The FIAT-2000 was propelled by a very advanced engine, the FIAT Aviazione A12 aviation type water-cooled 240 hp engine with 6 cylinders located at the rear of the tank and driving the tracks through a transverse transmission. The fuel capacity was 600-1,000 liters, but this gave only 75 km range on paved roads. Each cylinder was equipped with two valves and two exhausts. Engine cooling was via both ventilator and radiator. The electric system included the magnetos, two dynamos and a starter motor. The engine actuated with principal clutch, a gear box with reducer. Frin the gear box, the movement was transmitted to the axle transversely. On this axle the discs were assembled clutch and sprocket-wheels.
Fiat 2000 on active service in Libya: photo shows Pietro Giorgetti (left), an aviation engineer and motor mechanic with the 89a Squadriglia S.V.A. in front of a tank Fiat 2000. (Ref http://www.earlyaviators.com/egiorge1.htm)
After WW1 ended, the FIAT 2000 was displayed as one of the weapons used "to defeat the enemy" and the two prototypes completed were sent to Libya to fight guerrilla forces, together with other tanks bought from France, in a special unit, the Tank battery (1° Batteria autonoma carri d'assalto). The only known account of their combat use comes from ‘Le Forze Armate’ saying that they were both to be used for the reconquest of Giarabub but that one broke down at Porto Bardia and the other some distance from the action leaving the actual battle to be carried out with only Fiat 3000s and a variety of armoured cars and trucks. Col. Pederzini states that one of the Fiat 2000′s was later dismantled in Benghazi prior to 1935 for unstated reasons.
Whether they saw any action elsewhere in Libya is not known at this time but the late Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi showed them in action on his stamps. In Libya, the FIAT tank proved capable of an average speed of 4 km/h, and so, after two months its career ended, being unable to keep up with rapid movement of the enemy.
Libyan stamps showing the Fiat 2000 in battle
One remained in Tripoli and the other was sent to Italy in the spring of 1919, where it performed before the King at Rome Stadium. The tank put on a convincing display: it climbed a 1.1 m wall, then faced another 3.5 m wall, which it knocked down with its weight. Then a trench of 3 m width was successfully crossed and several trees were knocked down. This impressive performance failed to revive interest in the heavy tank and so it was in the end abandoned.
The surviving FIAT 2000 at Rome was left in a depot for several years, until it was sent on the orders of Colonel Maltese to Forte Tiburtino, risking catching fire during the trip. In 1934 it was seen again in a Campo Dux parade, having been repainted and even rearmed, with two 37/40 mm guns instead of the forward machine guns. It’s possible that at this time the engine was also improved but this is also not entirey clear. It was later reportedly transformed into a monument at Bologna, after that its fate is unknown, like that of the other Fiat 2000 tank. So ended the life of what was a truly interesting and distinctive armoured fighting vehicle.
Next: Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades Part 2 - The Fiat 3000 Tank
World War I, Italy and Italian Tanks
In the years that led up to World War One, Italy had nominally sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance. Despite this, in the years before the war, Italy had made diplomatic overtures towards the United Kingdom and France. This was because the Italian government had grown convinced that support of Austria (the traditional enemy of Italy during the 19th century Risorgimento) would not gain Italy the territories she wanted: Trieste, Istria, Zara and Dalmatia, all Austrian possessions. In fact, a secret agreement signed with France in 1902 for all intents and purposes nullified Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance.
Antonio Salandra was a conservative Italian politician who served as the 33rd Prime Minister of Italy between 1914 and 1916.
A few days after the outbreak of the war, on 3 August 1914, the government, led by the conservative Antonio Salandra, declared that Italy would not commit its troops, maintaining that the Triple Alliance had only a defensive stance and Austria-Hungary had been the aggressor. In reality, both Salandra and the minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidney Sonnino, began to probe which side would grant the best reward for Italy's entrance in the war. The diplomatic moves led to the London Pact (26 April 1915), signed by Sonnino without the approval of the Italian Parliament. According to the Pact, after victory Italy was to get Trentino and the South Tyrol up to the Brenner Pass, the entire Austrian Littoral (with Trieste), Gorizia and Gradisca (Eastern Friuli) and Istria (but without Fiume), parts of western Carniola (Idrija and Ilirska Bistrica) and north-western Dalmatia with Zara and most of the islands, but without Split. Other agreements concerned the sovereignty of the port of Valona, the province of Antalya in Turkey and part of the German colonies in Africa.
Giovanni Giolitti (October 27, 1842 – July 17, 1928) was an Italian statesman and Prime Minister of Italy five times between 1892 and 1921. He did not support Italy's intervention in WW1 initially.
Under the London Pact, Italy joined the Triple Entente. On 3 May 1915 Italy officially revoked the Triple Alliance. In the following days Giolitti and the neutralist majority of the Parliament opposed declaring war, while nationalist crowds demonstrated in public areas for it. On 13 May 1915 Salandra offered his resignation to King Victor Emmanuel III, but Giolitti, fearful of nationalist disorder that might break into open rebellion, declined the position of prime minister. Salandra remained in office, and got his declaration of war against Austria-Hungary on 23 May 1915. (Italy declared war on Germany fifteen months later.) Italy thus entered the war with the support of only a minority of its population and politicians.
As Italy entered WW1 on 23 May 1915, the situation of her forces in the African colonies was critical. Italian Somaliland, in the east was far from pacified. In Cyrenaica, the Italian forces were confined to widely separated points on the coast. In Tripolitania and the Fezzan, the story has a different beginning. In August 1914, during their campaign against the Ottoman Empire the Italian forces had conquered most of western Libya. In November 1914, this advance had turned into a general retreat, and on 7 April and 28 April, they suffered two reverses at Wadi Marsit (near Mizda) and al-Qurdabiya (near Sirte) respectively. By August 1915, the situation in Tripolitania was similar to that of Cyrenaica. The conquest of all of Libya would not be resumed until January 1922, well after the end of WW1.
In the European war, Italy's participation met with an equal lack of success. Britain and France had wanted Italy to join the war on their side so that a new front could be opened up in the south. The plan was to split the Central Powers further so that their military strength on the Western and Eastern Fronts could be weaked weakened. The logic was sound. Success however required military victories by the Italian Army and this was, against the politician's expectations, not forthcoming.
Between the start of WW1 and May 1915, Italy had done little or nothing to prepare the Italian Army for entry into the War, despite the interest of the politicians in joining in on one side or the other. Indeed, at the time of Italy's entry into WW1, the Italian military was suffering from equipment and munition shortages as a result of the Italo-Turkish War in Libya (1911–1912). Between 1915 and 1917 Italian troops managed to penetrate a mere 10 miles into Austrian territory, with the fighting largely confined to small area along the northeastern border where Italy's border pushed up against Austria-Hungary. The Austrians occupied the hills and the mountains while the Italians attempted to move north from the plains and valleys.
Map of the Italian Front (1915-1917). Blue areas show where major battles occurred, although the blue area in the east (right) was where 12 Battles of the Isonzo were fought.
Neither side one a strategic advantage, although casualties were heavy. Indeed, on 13 December 1916, known as "White Friday", 10,000 soldiers were killed by avalanches in the Dolomites. The frontline was close to the centers of population in northern Italy and the cities of Venice, Verona and Milan were close enough to the fighting to be in danger if a major breakthrough by the Ausro-Hungarian Army occurred. In May and August 1917, the exhausted Italians launched the Tenth and Eleventh Battles of the Isonzo. The Austrians also were near breaking and the Italians managed to capture some ground, but were unable to break through. At this point, the Austrians asked for German help. Having decisively repulsed the Russians, the Germans sent six divisions and prepared for what would be the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo (also called the Battle of Caporetto after the Italian town of that name-- now called Kobarid and part of Slovenia).
Mutinies and plummeting morale crippled the Italian Army from within. On 24 October 1917 the Austrians and Germans launched the Battle of Caporetto, pushing the Italians back 15 miles in the first day. By the time it was over in November, they had pushed the Italians back nearly 100 miles in one of the most spectacular advances of the war. The Italians suffered some 300,000 casualties, mostly taken prisoner, and lost all of their artillery. Unfortunately for the attackers, they outran their supply capability and thus the offensive ended 20 miles short of Venice in November.
The Arditi would jump inside the trench while the enemy was huddling down, and use their daggers at close quarters to suppress enemy resistance.
France, Britain and the US all began sending assistance to Italy and in the spring of 1918, Germany pulled out its troops for use in its upcoming Spring Offensive on the Western Front. In June 1918 the Austrians attacked in the Battle of the Piave River. The Italians repulsed the attack but launched no counter-offensive until October-November 1918. By October 1918, Italy had finally gathered together enough soldiers to mount an offensive. The attack targeted Vittorio Veneto, across the Piave. The Italian Army broke through a gap near Sacile and poured in reinforcements that crushed the Austrian defensive line. On 3 November, 300,000 Austrian soldiers surrendered. On 3 November, Austria-Hungary sent a flag of truce to the Italian Commander to ask again for an armistice and terms of peace. An armistice was signed and took effect on 4 November, at three o'clock in the afternoon.
The war has since become known as the "War in snow and ice", as most of the 600 km frontline ran through the highest mountains and glaciers of the Alps. 12 meters (40 feet) of snow were a usual occurrence during the winter of 1915/16 and thousands of soldiers died in avalanches. The remains of these soldiers are still being uncovered today. Climbing and skiing became essential skills for the troops of both sides and soon Ski Battalions and special climbing units were formed. It was during these years that the Alpini, their spirit and their mules became famous, although at the cost of over 12,000 casualties out of a total of 40,000 mobilized Alpinis. The Arditi units also became famous within Italy.
The task of Arditi units was not to clear the way for regular infantry to attack enemy lines, but to completely overrun enemy positions. The most daring volunteers were chosen, particularly those who were not bothered by loud incoming artillery fire close by. The men also studied fencing and were masters of hand-to-hand combat. Once ready, they were sent to the front armed with a dagger and hand grenades. Most didn't carry rifles or carbines because they would be cumbersome to fire in the confined spaces of a trench.
Italian Alpini in WW1
The Arditi approached enemy trenches while they were being shelled by Italian artillery. Just as the barrage was lifted they would jump inside the trench while the enemy was huddling down, and use their daggers at close quarters to suppress enemy resistance. These primitive tactics were surprisingly effective. Arditi had to hold the positions they conquered for 24 hours and then would be replaced by the regular infantry. Arditi might lose 25% to 30% of their numbers during such an attack. Their motto was "O la vittoria, o tutti accoppati" meaning "We either win, or we all die"
Italian alpine troops following the first world war remained an elite force: In 1935 the government of Italy reorganized its Armed Forces, creating six Alpine divisions and forming two new Alpini regiments. As a result of the unusual relationship between Italy and Finland that had developed through the 1930's, one of these Alpini Divisions would be conducting a Winter Warfare Exercise in Finland in late 1939 when the Winter War broke out. Mussolini permitted this Alpini Division together with Italian Air Force and naval units that had been sent to Finland to fight as volunteers under Finnish command through the entire Winter War.
Italy's World War One Tanks
During World War I, Italy did not field any armoured units in combat, due to a lack of tanks. In 1915, Captain Luigi Cassali proposed a project to build an armored vehicle equipped with two machine gun turrets. However, the project was not accepted. However, an officer serving with the Italian forces in France observed French tanks in operation as early as September 1916 and convinced the High Command to try the new vehicles. This was artillery officer Captain Alfredo Bennicelli, who was also a Count and a Senator – factors which probably helped him sell the idea.
Count Alfredo Bennicelli (Major in Artillery) climbing in or out of a Renault FT-17. Bennicelli was involved in numerous actions on the French Front and was a big proponent of tanks. Bennicelli tested French tanks and found them superior to British ones and in particular liked the FT series and had some FT's sent to Italy for testing.
The Italian General Staff ordered a single French Schneider CA-1 for extensive trials in 1916 but the design was ultimately rejected. A similar study for an indigenous model started the same year when FIAT, by then the industrial giant of Italy, proposed a new design, the FIAT 2000. An initial order to design and produce the first Italian tank model was awarded to the FIAT automobile company in 1916 based on the design they had put forward. The prototype of the new tank was displayed to a military commission on 21 June 1917; its mechanical systems were complete but its superstructure was added later, being represented on the prototype by a wooden mockup with a conical open turret and dummy gun. The final configuration of the superstructure was not completed until 1918. This, the first Italian designed and built tank, was the Fiat 2000.
Two Fiat 2000 prototypes formed a part of Italy's very first armoured unit, which was formed only weeks before the end of WW1. This was the "Sezione speciale carri armati" (Armored Vehicles Special Section), formed up on September 1, 1918 in Verona : the. This unit was later denominated "Reparto speciale di marcia carri d'assalto" ( Special Forward Assault Tank Unit) and, after WWI ended, the "Batteria autonoma carri d'assalto" (Autonomous Assault Tanks Battery"), and comprised six Renault FT 17's and the two Fiat 2000 prototypes.
The Fiat 2000 Tank
The FIAT 2000 was a substantial vehicle, of comparable dimensions to the British Mark V tanks, and weighing 40 tons as compared to the Mark V's 28 tons. This tank was often called "the heaviest World War I tank" but this is not strictly accurate, since the FIAT 2000 never actually saw combat in World War I. Also, the modest order for 50 tanks was never completed: the only Fiat 2000 tanks produced were the two prototypes. Despite the fact that this was Italy's first attempt to design and build a tank, Fiat appeared to have gotten it more or less right.
Fiat 2000 Tank - prototype
The layout of the FIAT 2000 differed to the other tanks then in use, especially the British ones. The engine was separated from the crew; not be being placed behind or in front of the crew compartment, but below it. It’s possible that the purpose of the original design with the mechanicals separated from the upper structure was to allow the hull to be used as the basis for other vehicle types such as SPG’s, but this is speculation without any evidence either way.
Fiat 2000 Tank interior layout showing crew positions and mechanicals
The overall crew was 10 men. Armament originally consisted of the turret mounted gun and ten machineguns (three on each side and four in front), but this left the rear of the tank undefended and tended to contaminate the interior with propellant fumes, so it was decided to install a ventilator in the roof and alter the machinegun positions to two on each side, three at the rear, and two in front. The driver was seated at the front in an armoured compartment, with very good overall vision through a large port forward and small lateral loopholes. The tank commander was positioned in the upper part of the tank, which was completely separated from the engine and transmission compartment (another innovation). The 3 rear machine gunners had to handle their weapons from a kneeling position, which was not particularly comfortable. However the 4 other machine gunners could fire from either a seated or an upright position. The 7 machineguns were provided with 7,000 rounds of ammunition in total. The main gunner and the loader were seated at the back of the turret.
Fiat 2000 Prototype Hull on trial - June 1917
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the tank's weaponry was the turret; apart from the Renault FT, this was the first tank to have a rotating turret mounted above the hull. The turret was made of four pieces rivetted together, had room for two crew members and could traverse a full 360°. On the issue of armament the above-mentioned Major Bennicelli (the man also responsible for bringing the Renault FT-17 to Italy) seems to have been pushing for a 75mm gun or 76mm. Major Bennicelli being an artillery man was probably choosing the 75/27CK or similar type of gun he would have been familiar with. A later plan on 1st May 1918 planned to install an improved 77mm gun but in the end the chosen gun was the 65/17 howitzer (of 65mm caliber with a barrel 17 calibers long) with 45 rounds. Thanks to the tall turret and the space available beneath it, the gun's elevation was -10/+75°. The Fiat 2000 was actually the first tank to be equipped with a fully rotating turret (before even the French FT 17).
One source states that a 14mm heavy machine gun was also planned to be fitted with the main gun but this cannot be verified due to lack of clear documentation and the time that has now passed. This may also have arisen because of some confusion over the naming of the machinegun – the type fitted was the 6.5mm FIAT 14, which maye have led to this mistake. The secondary armament as above mentioned consisted of 7 x 6.5mm machine-guns. Four of them were placed at the corners of the hull and could swivel over a 110° angle. Two other machine-guns were placed in the center of the side walls and the last was placed in the center of the rear. Two machine-guns could fire towards front, three to each side and three towards the rear of the tank. The machine-guns however could fire only a few degrees of negative elevation, thus creating dead space around the circumference of the vehicle.
2nd Prototype late 1917 to early 1918 with upper structure partially completed and first model cylindrical turret
The tracks were longer than the hull, but were lower in comparison to the wrap-around type found on the British "rhomboidal" tanks and thus lower in weight. The armour was of a clean design, being made of riveted vanadium steel plates. It was 15 mm thick on the sides and 20 mm on the front. Fiat spent a lot of money on these prototypes and used the best quality vanadium armour plate available from the steel works at Terni. This vanadium armour plate was intended for Italian warships such as the "Christopher Columbus" and was significantly more expensive than standard armour. Large armoured skirts made from 20mm plate also covered the 4 bogied suspension units on each side, although a weakness was noted with track chains being exposed to enemy fire. The sloped shielding on the front and upper part of the tank hull offered additional protection (the sloped shielding offered better protection than vertical shielding, because it can in many cases deflect the enemy projectile).
Fiat 2000 Tank prototype during trials
However, the excessive height of the tank made it an easy target. The steering was conventional and turns were made by reducing power to one of the tracks. The tank could also be slowed down by means of the side brake. The excellent suspension of the FIAT-2000 consisted of four oscillating carriages equipped each of two road-wheels with leaf springs. The steel tracks at only 450mm broad were very narrow for the weight of the tank, and ground pressue was thus considerable. This proved detrimental to cross-country travel.
Completed Fiat 2000 at public parade probably Rome either 1918 or 1919
The FIAT-2000 was propelled by a very advanced engine, the FIAT Aviazione A12 aviation type water-cooled 240 hp engine with 6 cylinders located at the rear of the tank and driving the tracks through a transverse transmission. The fuel capacity was 600-1,000 liters, but this gave only 75 km range on paved roads. Each cylinder was equipped with two valves and two exhausts. Engine cooling was via both ventilator and radiator. The electric system included the magnetos, two dynamos and a starter motor. The engine actuated with principal clutch, a gear box with reducer. Frin the gear box, the movement was transmitted to the axle transversely. On this axle the discs were assembled clutch and sprocket-wheels.
Fiat 2000 on active service in Libya: photo shows Pietro Giorgetti (left), an aviation engineer and motor mechanic with the 89a Squadriglia S.V.A. in front of a tank Fiat 2000. (Ref http://www.earlyaviators.com/egiorge1.htm)
After WW1 ended, the FIAT 2000 was displayed as one of the weapons used "to defeat the enemy" and the two prototypes completed were sent to Libya to fight guerrilla forces, together with other tanks bought from France, in a special unit, the Tank battery (1° Batteria autonoma carri d'assalto). The only known account of their combat use comes from ‘Le Forze Armate’ saying that they were both to be used for the reconquest of Giarabub but that one broke down at Porto Bardia and the other some distance from the action leaving the actual battle to be carried out with only Fiat 3000s and a variety of armoured cars and trucks. Col. Pederzini states that one of the Fiat 2000′s was later dismantled in Benghazi prior to 1935 for unstated reasons.
Whether they saw any action elsewhere in Libya is not known at this time but the late Libyan dictator Colonel Gaddafi showed them in action on his stamps. In Libya, the FIAT tank proved capable of an average speed of 4 km/h, and so, after two months its career ended, being unable to keep up with rapid movement of the enemy.
Libyan stamps showing the Fiat 2000 in battle
One remained in Tripoli and the other was sent to Italy in the spring of 1919, where it performed before the King at Rome Stadium. The tank put on a convincing display: it climbed a 1.1 m wall, then faced another 3.5 m wall, which it knocked down with its weight. Then a trench of 3 m width was successfully crossed and several trees were knocked down. This impressive performance failed to revive interest in the heavy tank and so it was in the end abandoned.
The surviving FIAT 2000 at Rome was left in a depot for several years, until it was sent on the orders of Colonel Maltese to Forte Tiburtino, risking catching fire during the trip. In 1934 it was seen again in a Campo Dux parade, having been repainted and even rearmed, with two 37/40 mm guns instead of the forward machine guns. It’s possible that at this time the engine was also improved but this is also not entirey clear. It was later reportedly transformed into a monument at Bologna, after that its fate is unknown, like that of the other Fiat 2000 tank. So ended the life of what was a truly interesting and distinctive armoured fighting vehicle.
Next: Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades Part 2 - The Fiat 3000 Tank
Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades - Part 2
The first Italian Tank of the Interwar Decades – The Fiat 3000
In 1918, France sent 100 Renault FT17 tanks to Italy so that Italian troops could get acquainted and trained with tracked combat vehicles while Italian industry began to build tanks in quantity for the Italian Army. At this time, in 1918, Fiat and Ansaldo were the only industrial concerns in Italy that were large enough to undertake tank production. The Italians produced a slightly improved version of the Renault DT, the Fiat 3000, a tank which would go on to be the standard tank of the emerging Italian armored units after World War I. Unfortuntely for the Italian Army in WW1, none would enter service before the War ended.
Front right side view of Fiat 3000 Model 21
The Fiat 3000 was based on the French Renault FT. Design improvements included side skirt armour, a redesigned turret with twin 6.5mm machineguns and a more powerful motor mounted in a lower, transverse position. This and the fact that the Fiat 3000 was lighter than the FT17 resulted in, among other things, a much improved speed (it was three times as fast as the FT17). All facings were given angled surfaces. Overall, the Fiat 3000 was a little larger than the FT17. With a Fiat 4-cylinder 50hp gasoline engine delivering 65hp, maximum speed was 15mph (compared to 5mph for the French and American versions) while range was 59 miles. It was apparent at the time that even with the more powerful engine, the Fiat 3000 was underpowered for cross-country movement. This fixation with high road speed rather than cross-country speed was to be a design characteristic of Italian tanks up to and through WW2.
It is safe to say that during the early 1920’s, the FIAT 3000 was one of the very best tanks in the world. The design was accepted, the Italian Army planned widespread use of the new weapons and 1,400 were ordered, with deliveries to begin in May 1919. The end of WW1 caused the original order to be cancelled and only 100 were delivered, with the first prototype completed in June 1920 and tested during 1921. The first of the production models began to enter service in 1923 and were officially designated as the Carro d’Assalto Fiat 3000, Model 21 (“Fiat 3000 Assault Tank Model 21″). Tests revealed that the armament, consisting of two 6.5 mm machine guns (with 5,000 rounds), was inadequate, and adoption of a 37 mm gun as main armament was urged.
Fiat 3000 Model 30’s on transporters
From as early as 1922 the tankers wanted a more powerful armament. An improved model was tested in 1929 and introduced in 1930 with the designation of Carro d’Assalto Fiat 3000, Model 30. This was armed with a 37mm gun in place of the twin machine guns and had a prominent cupola on the turret. It also differed from the Model 21 in that it had a more powerful engine (65hp), exhaust silencers and towing eyes, improved suspension, a different engine compartment silhouette, and the external stores were stowed differently. Some Model 30’s were also produced with two 6.5 mm machine guns as the main armament, as on the Model 21, in lieu of the 37 mm gun.
Hungarian Army Fiat 3000 Tank
A final version, the Fiat 3000B Modified (L5-21), was a 1936 modification armed with twin 37mm guns. However, due to poor gearing the tank’s speed actually dropped with these later models (Ansaldo’s president, Ugo Cavallero, faced charges of selling the army poor material but used his connections to Mussolini to avoid conviction).
A limited number of Fiat 3000 Model 21’s were exported to Albania, Latvia and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) prior to 1930. Ironically, most of the 595 tanks fielded by the Italians in Ethiopia were CV31-33 tankettes, which were opposed by three Fiat 3000 Model 21’s previously sold to the Ethiopian government. Three other Fiat 3000 tanks were sold to the Hungarian government in 1936; these tanks fought during the Slovak–Hungarian War of March-April 1939. The designations of these tanks were changed prior to the outbreak of World War II, in accordance with the identification system that was adopted throughout the war by the Italians. The Model 21 was redesignated the L.5/21, and the Model 30 was redesignated the L.5/30.
Fiat 3000 Latvijas armijā 20-to gadu beigās / Latvian Army Fiat 3000 Tanks
Fiat 3000 Model 21, photo dated 1928 – Latvian Army exercise
The Fiat 3000 (Model 21) was first used in action in February 1926 in Libya, when a tank company was sent to be part of the counter insurgency operations and co-operated in the reconquest of the Oasis of Giarabub. The performance of the armored contingent did not live up to expectations. In fact, the tanks did slowed down the columns, raising the ire of the commander, Graziani towards the tank units – one broke down at Porto Bardia, the other broke down “long before reaching the place of use”. Conversely, the Lancia 1Z armoured cars gave a good impression, poroving their speed and agility in the desert conditions.
Italy formed the Reggimento Carri Armati, or Tank Regiment, in 1927 with five small tank battalions (20 tanks per battalion) equipped with the 100 Fiat 3000 Model 21’s built from 1921. The 48 Fiat 3000B models delivered in 1930 appear to have been mixed in among the older models. Some saw action against the Ethiopians in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War in 1935. The Italians did not employ any of these tanks in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, however. By 1940 the 131st Centauro and 133rd Littorio Armored Divisions each had two medium tank battalions still fielding the Fiat 3000 or 3000B, now called the L5/21 or L5/30 respectively in the new Italian system. Centauro took its L5 tanks to Albania in April 1939 when the Italians invaded and overthrew their former puppet-king. The division also deployed some of them against the Greeks in October 1940, though it left over half of them in its depots as the engines had completely worn out.
Fiat 3000 Tanks, 1936
The 132nd Ariete armored division had been formed and trained with the old Fiat 3000’s (inherited from the 2nd Armored Brigade) but turned them over to Littorio in 1939, to await new production M11/39 medium tanks. Littorio took the old Fiat’s into battle in June 1940 when it attacked the French in Piccolo San Bernardo Pass, but they saw little action on the battlefield, again due to mechanical failures. In the spring of 1941, Littorio received new M13/40 medium tanks and passed the remaining Fiat 3000 relics on to training units. They were also among the last Italian tanks to oppose the Allies in July 1943 when the Allies landed in Sicily. Two Italian tank companies on the island were still equipped with the Fiat 3000’s. One company was dug in and their vehicles were used as fixed fortifications, while the other company was used in a mobile role at the Battle of Gela, with few of the tanks surviving the Allied advance.
However, through the 1920’s it’s safe to say that Italy was similar to those other countries with tank units (Britain, France and the United States), with their units being a continuation of WW1 formations. France primarily had the Renault FT17 tanks, the US had Renault-style Ford 6-ton tanks and Russia was also building modified Renaults. Britain had a new post-war design, the Vickers MkI and MkII series but these were not appreciably superior to the Fiat 3000. Britain had 160 of these tanks in four battalions, Italy had 100 in five battalions. Italy was thus one of the small number of countries that had established and sizable armoured formations as of the late 1920’s.
Through the 1920’s, the Italian Army did little to develop any doctrine of tank warfare. Tanks were seen as being for infantry support and nothing more and training was only for this limited role. There were no strong advocates for the use of armour as they existed in Britain or France – Liddell-Hart and Fuller being examples. They had no Italian counterparts. Perhaps the only innovative military thinker in Italy was Guilo Douhet, and he was an advocate of airpower alone (and in fact had been “…imprisoned in 1917 for overly aggressive advocacy of his views on military matters”). Such books or articles on tanks that were opublished followed the official doctrine for use of tanks, although some did discuss the problems concerning using tanks in the mountainous border areas of Italy.
With no advocates of innovation and of doctrinal development, armoured warfare doctrine within the Italian Army remained static until around 1928 and would not in fact change much until 1935-36. The tank was an infantry support vehicle and remained so within the Italian Army for many years.
Next: Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades - Part 3 - Tank Development during the 1930's
The first Italian Tank of the Interwar Decades – The Fiat 3000
In 1918, France sent 100 Renault FT17 tanks to Italy so that Italian troops could get acquainted and trained with tracked combat vehicles while Italian industry began to build tanks in quantity for the Italian Army. At this time, in 1918, Fiat and Ansaldo were the only industrial concerns in Italy that were large enough to undertake tank production. The Italians produced a slightly improved version of the Renault DT, the Fiat 3000, a tank which would go on to be the standard tank of the emerging Italian armored units after World War I. Unfortuntely for the Italian Army in WW1, none would enter service before the War ended.
Front right side view of Fiat 3000 Model 21
The Fiat 3000 was based on the French Renault FT. Design improvements included side skirt armour, a redesigned turret with twin 6.5mm machineguns and a more powerful motor mounted in a lower, transverse position. This and the fact that the Fiat 3000 was lighter than the FT17 resulted in, among other things, a much improved speed (it was three times as fast as the FT17). All facings were given angled surfaces. Overall, the Fiat 3000 was a little larger than the FT17. With a Fiat 4-cylinder 50hp gasoline engine delivering 65hp, maximum speed was 15mph (compared to 5mph for the French and American versions) while range was 59 miles. It was apparent at the time that even with the more powerful engine, the Fiat 3000 was underpowered for cross-country movement. This fixation with high road speed rather than cross-country speed was to be a design characteristic of Italian tanks up to and through WW2.
It is safe to say that during the early 1920’s, the FIAT 3000 was one of the very best tanks in the world. The design was accepted, the Italian Army planned widespread use of the new weapons and 1,400 were ordered, with deliveries to begin in May 1919. The end of WW1 caused the original order to be cancelled and only 100 were delivered, with the first prototype completed in June 1920 and tested during 1921. The first of the production models began to enter service in 1923 and were officially designated as the Carro d’Assalto Fiat 3000, Model 21 (“Fiat 3000 Assault Tank Model 21″). Tests revealed that the armament, consisting of two 6.5 mm machine guns (with 5,000 rounds), was inadequate, and adoption of a 37 mm gun as main armament was urged.
Fiat 3000 Model 30’s on transporters
From as early as 1922 the tankers wanted a more powerful armament. An improved model was tested in 1929 and introduced in 1930 with the designation of Carro d’Assalto Fiat 3000, Model 30. This was armed with a 37mm gun in place of the twin machine guns and had a prominent cupola on the turret. It also differed from the Model 21 in that it had a more powerful engine (65hp), exhaust silencers and towing eyes, improved suspension, a different engine compartment silhouette, and the external stores were stowed differently. Some Model 30’s were also produced with two 6.5 mm machine guns as the main armament, as on the Model 21, in lieu of the 37 mm gun.
Hungarian Army Fiat 3000 Tank
A final version, the Fiat 3000B Modified (L5-21), was a 1936 modification armed with twin 37mm guns. However, due to poor gearing the tank’s speed actually dropped with these later models (Ansaldo’s president, Ugo Cavallero, faced charges of selling the army poor material but used his connections to Mussolini to avoid conviction).
A limited number of Fiat 3000 Model 21’s were exported to Albania, Latvia and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) prior to 1930. Ironically, most of the 595 tanks fielded by the Italians in Ethiopia were CV31-33 tankettes, which were opposed by three Fiat 3000 Model 21’s previously sold to the Ethiopian government. Three other Fiat 3000 tanks were sold to the Hungarian government in 1936; these tanks fought during the Slovak–Hungarian War of March-April 1939. The designations of these tanks were changed prior to the outbreak of World War II, in accordance with the identification system that was adopted throughout the war by the Italians. The Model 21 was redesignated the L.5/21, and the Model 30 was redesignated the L.5/30.
Fiat 3000 Latvijas armijā 20-to gadu beigās / Latvian Army Fiat 3000 Tanks
Fiat 3000 Model 21, photo dated 1928 – Latvian Army exercise
The Fiat 3000 (Model 21) was first used in action in February 1926 in Libya, when a tank company was sent to be part of the counter insurgency operations and co-operated in the reconquest of the Oasis of Giarabub. The performance of the armored contingent did not live up to expectations. In fact, the tanks did slowed down the columns, raising the ire of the commander, Graziani towards the tank units – one broke down at Porto Bardia, the other broke down “long before reaching the place of use”. Conversely, the Lancia 1Z armoured cars gave a good impression, poroving their speed and agility in the desert conditions.
Italy formed the Reggimento Carri Armati, or Tank Regiment, in 1927 with five small tank battalions (20 tanks per battalion) equipped with the 100 Fiat 3000 Model 21’s built from 1921. The 48 Fiat 3000B models delivered in 1930 appear to have been mixed in among the older models. Some saw action against the Ethiopians in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War in 1935. The Italians did not employ any of these tanks in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, however. By 1940 the 131st Centauro and 133rd Littorio Armored Divisions each had two medium tank battalions still fielding the Fiat 3000 or 3000B, now called the L5/21 or L5/30 respectively in the new Italian system. Centauro took its L5 tanks to Albania in April 1939 when the Italians invaded and overthrew their former puppet-king. The division also deployed some of them against the Greeks in October 1940, though it left over half of them in its depots as the engines had completely worn out.
Fiat 3000 Tanks, 1936
The 132nd Ariete armored division had been formed and trained with the old Fiat 3000’s (inherited from the 2nd Armored Brigade) but turned them over to Littorio in 1939, to await new production M11/39 medium tanks. Littorio took the old Fiat’s into battle in June 1940 when it attacked the French in Piccolo San Bernardo Pass, but they saw little action on the battlefield, again due to mechanical failures. In the spring of 1941, Littorio received new M13/40 medium tanks and passed the remaining Fiat 3000 relics on to training units. They were also among the last Italian tanks to oppose the Allies in July 1943 when the Allies landed in Sicily. Two Italian tank companies on the island were still equipped with the Fiat 3000’s. One company was dug in and their vehicles were used as fixed fortifications, while the other company was used in a mobile role at the Battle of Gela, with few of the tanks surviving the Allied advance.
However, through the 1920’s it’s safe to say that Italy was similar to those other countries with tank units (Britain, France and the United States), with their units being a continuation of WW1 formations. France primarily had the Renault FT17 tanks, the US had Renault-style Ford 6-ton tanks and Russia was also building modified Renaults. Britain had a new post-war design, the Vickers MkI and MkII series but these were not appreciably superior to the Fiat 3000. Britain had 160 of these tanks in four battalions, Italy had 100 in five battalions. Italy was thus one of the small number of countries that had established and sizable armoured formations as of the late 1920’s.
Through the 1920’s, the Italian Army did little to develop any doctrine of tank warfare. Tanks were seen as being for infantry support and nothing more and training was only for this limited role. There were no strong advocates for the use of armour as they existed in Britain or France – Liddell-Hart and Fuller being examples. They had no Italian counterparts. Perhaps the only innovative military thinker in Italy was Guilo Douhet, and he was an advocate of airpower alone (and in fact had been “…imprisoned in 1917 for overly aggressive advocacy of his views on military matters”). Such books or articles on tanks that were opublished followed the official doctrine for use of tanks, although some did discuss the problems concerning using tanks in the mountainous border areas of Italy.
With no advocates of innovation and of doctrinal development, armoured warfare doctrine within the Italian Army remained static until around 1928 and would not in fact change much until 1935-36. The tank was an infantry support vehicle and remained so within the Italian Army for many years.
Next: Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades - Part 3 - Tank Development during the 1930's
Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades - Part 3
Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades – Tank development during the 1930’s
Two major industrial concerns pretty much monopolized Italian tank production – Fiat and Ansaldo. Fiat was an automobile manufacturer, and produced the engines and suspensions for all Italian tanks manufactured after 1930. It had also bilt the first two Italian tanks, the Fiat 2000 and the Fiat 3000. Ansaldo was a shipbuilding and heavy construction company, and carried out the design work and built the chassis for all post-1930 Italian tanks. Both companies had a close relationship with the Fascist government of Italy. Ansaldo in particular was heavily dependent on government contracts, building many of the ships for the new Italian navy. But at the end of the 1920’s, neither company had many any attempt at independent tank design, and the only initiative, such as it was, had come from the government.
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Generale Ottavio Zoppi (1870-1962), a leading advocate of the “celeri” concept, photo from 1933
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Carro Veloce 29 Tankette – the Vickers Carden-Loyd Mk. VI.
However, by 1930 Mussolini had consolidated his hold on power and began forging ahead with new plans. The theme of these plans was modernization, with the Italian Armed Forces to be the equal of any in the world. The organization and use of tank units also began to be examined. And the idea of a “war of maneuver began to be explored. A new type of unit, the “celeri” (fast) division was created – a combination of cavalry and bersaglieri fighting in integrated units, first openly communicated in the influential book “I Celeri” written by Generale Ottavio Zoppi. To equip these new “celeri” units, new tank units were formed in 1933.
These new tank units were to be equipped with the Carden Loyd CV-29, which was first introduced in 1929. In 1928, an Italian army commission had viewed public demonstrations of a new British fast one-man tankette designed by Major Giffard LeQuesne, which later became the first Carden-Loyd tankette design. The slightly later Carden-Loyd Mk.VI tankette, distributed by Vickers, was an instant success, widely sold and produced under licence abroad by a number of countries. It was fast, versatile, and cheap. A single Mk VI was obtained from the British Army and tested in northern Italy. In 1929, the Italian Army then bought 25 Mk VI’s from Vickers, the last four of which were assembled in Italy by the OTO factory. The CV-29 was small and suitable for use in the mountainous terrain of Italy’s borders. Its small size meant it could more on narrow mountain tracks and cross narrow bridges. The CV-29 was however used only for training and experimentation.
Carro Veloce (CV) 33
In 1933, Ansaldo and Fiat were awarded contracts to build re-designed MK VI’s under license, these were designated the CV-33. About 300 CV-33’s were built. They had a crew of 2, armour was 6-14mm thick, they were armed with a single 6.5mm machinegun and powered by a Fiat 43hp engine giving a road speed of 26mph and an operational range of 78 miles. In 1938 these were redesignated the L3.33. They saw action in China, Spain, France, the Balkans, North Africa, Italian East Africa, Italy, and Russia. The CV-33 was sold abroad to Austria, Afganistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Hungary, Nationalist Spain, Nicaragua, Iraq and other countries.
The Carro Veloce (CV) 33 tankette (later the L3/33)
The Carro Veloce (CV) 35 tankette (later the L3/35)
In 1935, a slightly improved model of the CV-33 was introduced and designated the CV-35. The primary differences were that the armour was bolted rather than riveted and the single 6.5 mm machine gun was replaced with twin 8 mm machine guns. Other than the number and type of machine guns, the differences between the L3/35 and the L3/33 were few. Both featured riveted and welded construction. The vehicle’s commander/gunner sat on the left and the driver sat on the right. The engine was mounted transversely in the rear. A circular radiator was mounted behind the engine. The transmission went to the front to the final drive. The Vickers-Carden-Lloyd type suspension had two three-wheel bogies on leaf spring and a single unsprung wheel on each side. There was an acacia wood trail that the top run of the tracks went on. Many older CV-33s were retrofitted to meet the specifications of the CV-35. In 1938, the vehicles were redesignated L3/33 (“L” for Leggero or ‘light’) and the L3/35.
The Carro Veloce (CV) 35 tankette (later the L3/35)
The L3/ 38 tankette
In 1938, a further development of the L3 design was designated the L3/38. The L3/38 had torsion bar suspension and two versions of a single mounted 13.2 mm machine gun. Italy retrofitted at least 12 L3/35s to meet the specifications of the L3/38. The converted L3/35s with the L3/38’s torsion bar suspension saw limited service in September 1943 until June 1944. These L3/38s versions of the L3/35s were armed with a single 13.2 mm Breda M31 machine gun.
L3/38 Tankette
In 1937 Brazil ordered 24 L3/38s which were delivered in 1938. The L3/38s exported to Brazil were designated “CV33/II”. The Roman numeral “II” represents the second version of the original L3/33 version. The L3/35 version exported to Brazil would be “CV33/I” (the CV33 or L3/33 and the CV33/I or L3/35 export versions to Brazil had no torsion bar suspension). The CV33/II Brazilian export was armed with a single 13.2 mm Madsen machine gun.
CV 33 / CV 35 Variants
The overall limited size and power-to-weight ratio of this vehicle prevented extensive modifications, but several different armaments were tested and there were a number of variants. There was also an aircraft carried version, the Aviotrasportabile (a single Savoia-Marchetti SM.82 aircraft was modified to carry a L3/33 recessed under the fuselage for experiments with airborne armour).
The “L3 cc” anti-tank (controcarro) was an L3 with a Solothurn 20 mm anti-tank rifle mounted in place of its normal machine gun armament. Only a few were so modified, and they saw action only in North Africa. The Solothurn rifle could penetrate up to 18 mm of armor at 300 m (328 yards) which was effective against lightly armoured vehicles.
L3 cc (on the left) and an L3/35 (on the right) outside Bardia, Greece in 1941.
The “L3 Lf” (Lancia fiamme, “flamethrower”) flame tank was another variant of the L3 tankette with development began in 1935. The flamethrower nozzle replaced one of the machine guns, and the flame fuel was carried in an armoured trailer towed by the vehicle. Later versions had the fuel carried in a box-shaped tank mounted above the L3’s engine compartment. The vehicle weighed 3.2 tons, and the armoured trailer carried 500 litres (110 gallons) of fuel. It had a range of 40 yards, though other sources report a 100 meters (330 feet) range. The L3 Lf saw action in the Second Italo–Abyssinian War, Spain, France, Russia, the Balkans, Italian North Africa and Italian East Africa. From 1936 each CV/L3 company had a single L3 Lf platoon.
L3 Lf in action
L3 Centro Radio command tank: the basic L3 platform was also employed as a command vehicle using the Marelli RF1 CA radio in platoon and company command vehicles. The L3 was considered too small to be effectively employed as a regimental level command radio vehicle so this task fell to the later and slightly larger L6/40 CR (Centro Radio = Radio Center).
L3 Centro Radio command tank
L3 Passerella bridge layer: the few L3 Passerella (bridge layer) vehicles constructed were assigned to units at Armoured Brigade levels. The 7 meter (23 feet) long bridge was stripped down into sections on a trailer towed by the L3 itself for travel. On arriving at the combat zone, this bridge was assembled on the front of the tank, suspended by cables from two small cranes located over the crew’s superstructure. The crew laid the completed bridge over the obstacle from within the vehicle. A trained L3 Passerella crew took seven minutes to lay out this bridge.
CV 33 Passerella Bridge Layer Tank
Planned variants which did not progress beyond the prototype stage included the Carro Veloce Recupero (an unarmed armoured recovery vehicle with a rear tow bar, did not progress beyond the prototype stage) and the Semovente L3 da 47/32 (a tank destroyer with a 47 mm L/32 gun mounted in the hull, based on the L3/35. At least one built but did not enter service).
Exports
The CV-33 and CV-35 were sold abroad to Austria, Afganistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Hungary, Nationalist Spain, Nicaragua, Iraq, Venezuela and other countries. Many foreign buyers substituted other machine guns as the main armament. The Hungarians added a raised commander’s vision cupola on some of the L3s they acquired. In 1938, the Brazilian Army bought several L3/35 tankettes which remained in active service until 1945 when some units were resold to the Dominican Republic. Venezuela bought two units in 1934 for evaluation in infantry support operations, because of several incidents on the border with Colombia, like other weapons acquired from the Italian mission they did not survive past World War II.
Austrian Fiat-Ansaldo CV-35 tankettes in Wien 1935
In 1934, the Hungarian government purchased large quantities of CV33’s. They modified some with a turret housing either a 13.2-mm machine gun, an automatic 20 mm gun or a flamethrower, while others were rearmed with a Czech SPARK 7.92-mm machine gun or Brno ZB vz.26/ZB vz.30. The transaction and delivery was kept secret and the armament and modifications were made locally. In August 1935, 30 modified CV33’s were delivered (designated 37M). The second batch arrived in 1936, with 121 CV35’s (38M). Seven new tank companies (18 CV33 and CV35 each) were allocated between the 1st and the 2nd cavalry and 2 motorized brigades. In April 1941, these took part in the Yugoslavian campaign, after which they were deployed to guard and patrol the borders. However in summer 1941, 65 Hungarian tankettes were sent to the Eastern Front, being part of the 1st Mobile Corps under the command of Major-General Bela Miklos Danloki, attached to the Army Group “Center” as two motorized and one cavalry brigades. They operated in Ukraine. By all accounts these were all lost by December 1941 and the survivors returned to training units back home.
Combat History
In addition to seeing action in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish Civil War, the Slovak-Hungarian War, and the Anglo-Iraqi War, the L3 was used almost everywhere that Italian troops fought during World War II. L3s were found on the Italian/French border, North Africa, Italian East Africa, the Balkans, USSR, Sicily, and Italy. The combat performance of the L3s during the interwar period was poor. On at least two occasions during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, L3s were put out of action by massed infantry attacks. In the Spanish Civil War, L3s of the Corps of Volunteer Troops (Corpo Truppe Volontarie, or CTV) were totally out-classed by the T-26 and BT-5 tanks provided to the Republican forces by the Soviet Union. Fortunately for the Hungarians, the L3s were not a factor in their brief war with Slovakia.
On Italy’s entry into WW2, large numbers of the L3 tankettes equipped Italian armoured units
On 10 June 1940, when Italy entered World War II, the Royal Italian Army (Regio Esercito) possessed only about one-hundred M11/39 medium tanks in two tank battalions. L3 tankettes still equipped all three Italian armoured divisions, they equipped the tank battalions in the motorized divisions, they equipped the light tank squadron group in each “Fast” (Celeri) division, and they equipped numerous independent tank battalions. Though numerous, Italy’s tankettes proved to be outclassed from the start and also proved to be of low tactical value. They were vulnerable to the British Boys anti-tank rifles. Other than those used for occupation duties in the Balkans and elsewhere, few L3s remained in front line service past the end of 1940. After the Italian armistice with the Allies in 1943, L3 tankettes were used by German Army forces and by the pro-Nazi National Republican Army of the Italian Social Republic. L3/35 were also used by the Chinese Nationalist Army and fought against the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Italian Tanks on the verge of WW2 - the Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39
The Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39 was an Italian medium tank first produced prior to World War II. The official Italian designation was Carro Armato (“armoured vehicle”) M11/39. The designation for the M11/39 is as follows: “M” for Medio (Italian: “medium”), followed by the weight in tons (11) and the year of adoption (1939). The M11/39 originated with a Regia Esercito 1931 specification asking for a “Carro di Rotura” (Breakthrough tank). Ansaldo-Fossati responded with a first prototype, heavily influenced by the British Vickers 6-ton design in 1932. A second prototype however was delivered and later, in 1937, a final prototype was delivered. Also it was fitted with a RF 1 CA radio, not retained for the production. The 1937-38 prototypes were succcesfully trialed and the army placed an order for 96 units, to be delivered by the end of 1939. FIAT delivered the engine and transmission, but Ansaldo was responsible for the final assembly.
Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39
The design of the M11/39 was influenced by the British Vickers 6-Ton, an influence reflected particularly in the track and suspension design. One innovative aspect of the design was the placement of the final reduction gears inside the front-mounted drive sprockets, eliminating the need for enlarged final drive housings in the bow armour. The M11/39’s career was cut short due to several weaknesses in its design. The most important was the placement of the main 37 mm armament in the hull. The 37 mm gun was in a fixed position with traverse restricted to 15° to left or right. The only other armament was a dual 8 mm machine guns in a rotating turret. While only one man operated the machine guns, the turret was small with manual controls. Conceptually, the intent was that the main gun be used against heavy targets while the turret armament would be used for all-round defence against infantry. The layout was similar to the American Grant/Lee tanks, which as of 1939 were in the future. The original intent had been to place the 37 mm/L40 armament in the turret, but there was insufficient space. A redesign of the M11/39, in order to mount the main gun in the turret, was commenced, finally resulting in the development of the M13/40.
Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39
In addition to the poor gun positioning, the M11/39 had other shortcomings: its endurance and performance were both poor, it was relatively slow, its mechanical reliability was very poor, while the armour, although superior to the Vickers design, was insufficient for a medium tank as of 1939: there was only 30mm of armour on the frontal glacis and turret, 14.5 mm on the sides, 8mm on the rear, and only 6mm for the top, turret roof and bottom. The armour was also bolt-on plating, on a riveted construction amd the 30mm thickness was designed to withstand only 20 mm gun fire. All M11/39s were designed to carry a radio, but none of the production vehicles were so fitted.
Entrances for the crew were situated on the turret, on the main gun roof top, and by a large hatch on the left side. There were also air intakes on the rear superstructure and turret, as well as pistol ports on the hull, sides and rear. The driver and main gunner were both located in the forward hull compartment, while the commander was alone in his turret. There was no intercom. The FIAT Fiat SPA 8T, watercooled diesel engine gave a net HP of 105 bhp (125 hp max.). It was fed by a main fuel tank (145 liters), and a reserve tank (45 liters). Located at the rear, it drove the front drive sprocket through a long transmission arm. The idler wheels were adjustable. The bogies comprised four sets of paired roadwheels, sprung with a classic semi-elliptic leaf spring.
Production started in April 1939 and the first batch was delivered to the Ariete Division, 32nd Tank Regiment in August, and later to the 4th tank regiment. Initial plans were to equip each armoured batallion with 31 of these tanks. Production ran until mid-1940, when the M11/39 was replaced by the much-improved M13/40. The M11/39 hull design, with modifications, was used in the development of the more successful Fiat M13/40. Finland never considered the M11/39. By the time it entered services, Finland's own indigenous tank production was underway.
Finnish Experience with Italian Tanks
When Finland first began considering expanding it’s small armoured force, circa 1932, the Italian Army was primarily equipped with the old Fiat 3000 tanks (similar to the Renault FT-17’s used by the Finns at this time) and with small numbers of the new CV-29’s – a model with which the Finnish Army as already familiar. Italian doctrine for the use of tanks had remained static, and while the Finnish Military Attache in Rome and Finnish Officers attending staff courses in Italy kept abreast of developments in Italy, there was little that could be learnt with regard to the use of tanks in combat.
With the Spanish Civil War, the Finnish Volunteers in Spain, Pohjan Pohjat, acquired a great deal of experience with Italian equipment (the volunteers were supplied with equipment by the Italians) and from the start, a small Panssaaripataljoona (Panzer Battalion) was a part of Pohjan Pohjat. This pataljoona was initially equipped with Italian L3/35 and L3 lf tankettes, as well as with L3 Centro Radio command tanks. Pohjan Pohjat found these tankettes to be outclassed against any other tanks from the start. They were also vulnerable to anything heavier than a rifle and proved to be of low tactical value, having to be used cautiously in combat to avoid heavy losses.
Finnish volunteers of Pohjan Pohjat advancing in Spain with an L3/35 from the unit’s Panssaaripataljoona
Pohjan Pohjat’s Panssaaripataljoona far preferred using the few German tanks that they managed to acquire, and above all the small numbers of captured Soviet tanks and armoured cars with which they eventually equipped themselves. Reports back to Finland repeatedly emphasized the essential uselessness of the Italian L3’s in detail. The Finnish Army would not at any time buy or use any Italian tankettes, although much of value was otherwise learnt from the fighting in Spain.
Next: The Enemy: Russian Tanks of the Interwar Decades
Italian Tanks of the Interwar Decades – Tank development during the 1930’s
Two major industrial concerns pretty much monopolized Italian tank production – Fiat and Ansaldo. Fiat was an automobile manufacturer, and produced the engines and suspensions for all Italian tanks manufactured after 1930. It had also bilt the first two Italian tanks, the Fiat 2000 and the Fiat 3000. Ansaldo was a shipbuilding and heavy construction company, and carried out the design work and built the chassis for all post-1930 Italian tanks. Both companies had a close relationship with the Fascist government of Italy. Ansaldo in particular was heavily dependent on government contracts, building many of the ships for the new Italian navy. But at the end of the 1920’s, neither company had many any attempt at independent tank design, and the only initiative, such as it was, had come from the government.
Generale Ottavio Zoppi (1870-1962), a leading advocate of the “celeri” concept, photo from 1933
Carro Veloce 29 Tankette – the Vickers Carden-Loyd Mk. VI.
However, by 1930 Mussolini had consolidated his hold on power and began forging ahead with new plans. The theme of these plans was modernization, with the Italian Armed Forces to be the equal of any in the world. The organization and use of tank units also began to be examined. And the idea of a “war of maneuver began to be explored. A new type of unit, the “celeri” (fast) division was created – a combination of cavalry and bersaglieri fighting in integrated units, first openly communicated in the influential book “I Celeri” written by Generale Ottavio Zoppi. To equip these new “celeri” units, new tank units were formed in 1933.
These new tank units were to be equipped with the Carden Loyd CV-29, which was first introduced in 1929. In 1928, an Italian army commission had viewed public demonstrations of a new British fast one-man tankette designed by Major Giffard LeQuesne, which later became the first Carden-Loyd tankette design. The slightly later Carden-Loyd Mk.VI tankette, distributed by Vickers, was an instant success, widely sold and produced under licence abroad by a number of countries. It was fast, versatile, and cheap. A single Mk VI was obtained from the British Army and tested in northern Italy. In 1929, the Italian Army then bought 25 Mk VI’s from Vickers, the last four of which were assembled in Italy by the OTO factory. The CV-29 was small and suitable for use in the mountainous terrain of Italy’s borders. Its small size meant it could more on narrow mountain tracks and cross narrow bridges. The CV-29 was however used only for training and experimentation.
Carro Veloce (CV) 33
In 1933, Ansaldo and Fiat were awarded contracts to build re-designed MK VI’s under license, these were designated the CV-33. About 300 CV-33’s were built. They had a crew of 2, armour was 6-14mm thick, they were armed with a single 6.5mm machinegun and powered by a Fiat 43hp engine giving a road speed of 26mph and an operational range of 78 miles. In 1938 these were redesignated the L3.33. They saw action in China, Spain, France, the Balkans, North Africa, Italian East Africa, Italy, and Russia. The CV-33 was sold abroad to Austria, Afganistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Hungary, Nationalist Spain, Nicaragua, Iraq and other countries.
The Carro Veloce (CV) 33 tankette (later the L3/33)
The Carro Veloce (CV) 35 tankette (later the L3/35)
In 1935, a slightly improved model of the CV-33 was introduced and designated the CV-35. The primary differences were that the armour was bolted rather than riveted and the single 6.5 mm machine gun was replaced with twin 8 mm machine guns. Other than the number and type of machine guns, the differences between the L3/35 and the L3/33 were few. Both featured riveted and welded construction. The vehicle’s commander/gunner sat on the left and the driver sat on the right. The engine was mounted transversely in the rear. A circular radiator was mounted behind the engine. The transmission went to the front to the final drive. The Vickers-Carden-Lloyd type suspension had two three-wheel bogies on leaf spring and a single unsprung wheel on each side. There was an acacia wood trail that the top run of the tracks went on. Many older CV-33s were retrofitted to meet the specifications of the CV-35. In 1938, the vehicles were redesignated L3/33 (“L” for Leggero or ‘light’) and the L3/35.
The Carro Veloce (CV) 35 tankette (later the L3/35)
The L3/ 38 tankette
In 1938, a further development of the L3 design was designated the L3/38. The L3/38 had torsion bar suspension and two versions of a single mounted 13.2 mm machine gun. Italy retrofitted at least 12 L3/35s to meet the specifications of the L3/38. The converted L3/35s with the L3/38’s torsion bar suspension saw limited service in September 1943 until June 1944. These L3/38s versions of the L3/35s were armed with a single 13.2 mm Breda M31 machine gun.
L3/38 Tankette
In 1937 Brazil ordered 24 L3/38s which were delivered in 1938. The L3/38s exported to Brazil were designated “CV33/II”. The Roman numeral “II” represents the second version of the original L3/33 version. The L3/35 version exported to Brazil would be “CV33/I” (the CV33 or L3/33 and the CV33/I or L3/35 export versions to Brazil had no torsion bar suspension). The CV33/II Brazilian export was armed with a single 13.2 mm Madsen machine gun.
CV 33 / CV 35 Variants
The overall limited size and power-to-weight ratio of this vehicle prevented extensive modifications, but several different armaments were tested and there were a number of variants. There was also an aircraft carried version, the Aviotrasportabile (a single Savoia-Marchetti SM.82 aircraft was modified to carry a L3/33 recessed under the fuselage for experiments with airborne armour).
The “L3 cc” anti-tank (controcarro) was an L3 with a Solothurn 20 mm anti-tank rifle mounted in place of its normal machine gun armament. Only a few were so modified, and they saw action only in North Africa. The Solothurn rifle could penetrate up to 18 mm of armor at 300 m (328 yards) which was effective against lightly armoured vehicles.
L3 cc (on the left) and an L3/35 (on the right) outside Bardia, Greece in 1941.
The “L3 Lf” (Lancia fiamme, “flamethrower”) flame tank was another variant of the L3 tankette with development began in 1935. The flamethrower nozzle replaced one of the machine guns, and the flame fuel was carried in an armoured trailer towed by the vehicle. Later versions had the fuel carried in a box-shaped tank mounted above the L3’s engine compartment. The vehicle weighed 3.2 tons, and the armoured trailer carried 500 litres (110 gallons) of fuel. It had a range of 40 yards, though other sources report a 100 meters (330 feet) range. The L3 Lf saw action in the Second Italo–Abyssinian War, Spain, France, Russia, the Balkans, Italian North Africa and Italian East Africa. From 1936 each CV/L3 company had a single L3 Lf platoon.
L3 Lf in action
L3 Centro Radio command tank: the basic L3 platform was also employed as a command vehicle using the Marelli RF1 CA radio in platoon and company command vehicles. The L3 was considered too small to be effectively employed as a regimental level command radio vehicle so this task fell to the later and slightly larger L6/40 CR (Centro Radio = Radio Center).
L3 Centro Radio command tank
L3 Passerella bridge layer: the few L3 Passerella (bridge layer) vehicles constructed were assigned to units at Armoured Brigade levels. The 7 meter (23 feet) long bridge was stripped down into sections on a trailer towed by the L3 itself for travel. On arriving at the combat zone, this bridge was assembled on the front of the tank, suspended by cables from two small cranes located over the crew’s superstructure. The crew laid the completed bridge over the obstacle from within the vehicle. A trained L3 Passerella crew took seven minutes to lay out this bridge.
CV 33 Passerella Bridge Layer Tank
Planned variants which did not progress beyond the prototype stage included the Carro Veloce Recupero (an unarmed armoured recovery vehicle with a rear tow bar, did not progress beyond the prototype stage) and the Semovente L3 da 47/32 (a tank destroyer with a 47 mm L/32 gun mounted in the hull, based on the L3/35. At least one built but did not enter service).
Exports
The CV-33 and CV-35 were sold abroad to Austria, Afganistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Hungary, Nationalist Spain, Nicaragua, Iraq, Venezuela and other countries. Many foreign buyers substituted other machine guns as the main armament. The Hungarians added a raised commander’s vision cupola on some of the L3s they acquired. In 1938, the Brazilian Army bought several L3/35 tankettes which remained in active service until 1945 when some units were resold to the Dominican Republic. Venezuela bought two units in 1934 for evaluation in infantry support operations, because of several incidents on the border with Colombia, like other weapons acquired from the Italian mission they did not survive past World War II.
Austrian Fiat-Ansaldo CV-35 tankettes in Wien 1935
In 1934, the Hungarian government purchased large quantities of CV33’s. They modified some with a turret housing either a 13.2-mm machine gun, an automatic 20 mm gun or a flamethrower, while others were rearmed with a Czech SPARK 7.92-mm machine gun or Brno ZB vz.26/ZB vz.30. The transaction and delivery was kept secret and the armament and modifications were made locally. In August 1935, 30 modified CV33’s were delivered (designated 37M). The second batch arrived in 1936, with 121 CV35’s (38M). Seven new tank companies (18 CV33 and CV35 each) were allocated between the 1st and the 2nd cavalry and 2 motorized brigades. In April 1941, these took part in the Yugoslavian campaign, after which they were deployed to guard and patrol the borders. However in summer 1941, 65 Hungarian tankettes were sent to the Eastern Front, being part of the 1st Mobile Corps under the command of Major-General Bela Miklos Danloki, attached to the Army Group “Center” as two motorized and one cavalry brigades. They operated in Ukraine. By all accounts these were all lost by December 1941 and the survivors returned to training units back home.
Combat History
In addition to seeing action in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish Civil War, the Slovak-Hungarian War, and the Anglo-Iraqi War, the L3 was used almost everywhere that Italian troops fought during World War II. L3s were found on the Italian/French border, North Africa, Italian East Africa, the Balkans, USSR, Sicily, and Italy. The combat performance of the L3s during the interwar period was poor. On at least two occasions during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, L3s were put out of action by massed infantry attacks. In the Spanish Civil War, L3s of the Corps of Volunteer Troops (Corpo Truppe Volontarie, or CTV) were totally out-classed by the T-26 and BT-5 tanks provided to the Republican forces by the Soviet Union. Fortunately for the Hungarians, the L3s were not a factor in their brief war with Slovakia.
On Italy’s entry into WW2, large numbers of the L3 tankettes equipped Italian armoured units
On 10 June 1940, when Italy entered World War II, the Royal Italian Army (Regio Esercito) possessed only about one-hundred M11/39 medium tanks in two tank battalions. L3 tankettes still equipped all three Italian armoured divisions, they equipped the tank battalions in the motorized divisions, they equipped the light tank squadron group in each “Fast” (Celeri) division, and they equipped numerous independent tank battalions. Though numerous, Italy’s tankettes proved to be outclassed from the start and also proved to be of low tactical value. They were vulnerable to the British Boys anti-tank rifles. Other than those used for occupation duties in the Balkans and elsewhere, few L3s remained in front line service past the end of 1940. After the Italian armistice with the Allies in 1943, L3 tankettes were used by German Army forces and by the pro-Nazi National Republican Army of the Italian Social Republic. L3/35 were also used by the Chinese Nationalist Army and fought against the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Italian Tanks on the verge of WW2 - the Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39
The Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39 was an Italian medium tank first produced prior to World War II. The official Italian designation was Carro Armato (“armoured vehicle”) M11/39. The designation for the M11/39 is as follows: “M” for Medio (Italian: “medium”), followed by the weight in tons (11) and the year of adoption (1939). The M11/39 originated with a Regia Esercito 1931 specification asking for a “Carro di Rotura” (Breakthrough tank). Ansaldo-Fossati responded with a first prototype, heavily influenced by the British Vickers 6-ton design in 1932. A second prototype however was delivered and later, in 1937, a final prototype was delivered. Also it was fitted with a RF 1 CA radio, not retained for the production. The 1937-38 prototypes were succcesfully trialed and the army placed an order for 96 units, to be delivered by the end of 1939. FIAT delivered the engine and transmission, but Ansaldo was responsible for the final assembly.
Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39
The design of the M11/39 was influenced by the British Vickers 6-Ton, an influence reflected particularly in the track and suspension design. One innovative aspect of the design was the placement of the final reduction gears inside the front-mounted drive sprockets, eliminating the need for enlarged final drive housings in the bow armour. The M11/39’s career was cut short due to several weaknesses in its design. The most important was the placement of the main 37 mm armament in the hull. The 37 mm gun was in a fixed position with traverse restricted to 15° to left or right. The only other armament was a dual 8 mm machine guns in a rotating turret. While only one man operated the machine guns, the turret was small with manual controls. Conceptually, the intent was that the main gun be used against heavy targets while the turret armament would be used for all-round defence against infantry. The layout was similar to the American Grant/Lee tanks, which as of 1939 were in the future. The original intent had been to place the 37 mm/L40 armament in the turret, but there was insufficient space. A redesign of the M11/39, in order to mount the main gun in the turret, was commenced, finally resulting in the development of the M13/40.
Fiat-Ansaldo M11/39
In addition to the poor gun positioning, the M11/39 had other shortcomings: its endurance and performance were both poor, it was relatively slow, its mechanical reliability was very poor, while the armour, although superior to the Vickers design, was insufficient for a medium tank as of 1939: there was only 30mm of armour on the frontal glacis and turret, 14.5 mm on the sides, 8mm on the rear, and only 6mm for the top, turret roof and bottom. The armour was also bolt-on plating, on a riveted construction amd the 30mm thickness was designed to withstand only 20 mm gun fire. All M11/39s were designed to carry a radio, but none of the production vehicles were so fitted.
Entrances for the crew were situated on the turret, on the main gun roof top, and by a large hatch on the left side. There were also air intakes on the rear superstructure and turret, as well as pistol ports on the hull, sides and rear. The driver and main gunner were both located in the forward hull compartment, while the commander was alone in his turret. There was no intercom. The FIAT Fiat SPA 8T, watercooled diesel engine gave a net HP of 105 bhp (125 hp max.). It was fed by a main fuel tank (145 liters), and a reserve tank (45 liters). Located at the rear, it drove the front drive sprocket through a long transmission arm. The idler wheels were adjustable. The bogies comprised four sets of paired roadwheels, sprung with a classic semi-elliptic leaf spring.
Production started in April 1939 and the first batch was delivered to the Ariete Division, 32nd Tank Regiment in August, and later to the 4th tank regiment. Initial plans were to equip each armoured batallion with 31 of these tanks. Production ran until mid-1940, when the M11/39 was replaced by the much-improved M13/40. The M11/39 hull design, with modifications, was used in the development of the more successful Fiat M13/40. Finland never considered the M11/39. By the time it entered services, Finland's own indigenous tank production was underway.
Finnish Experience with Italian Tanks
When Finland first began considering expanding it’s small armoured force, circa 1932, the Italian Army was primarily equipped with the old Fiat 3000 tanks (similar to the Renault FT-17’s used by the Finns at this time) and with small numbers of the new CV-29’s – a model with which the Finnish Army as already familiar. Italian doctrine for the use of tanks had remained static, and while the Finnish Military Attache in Rome and Finnish Officers attending staff courses in Italy kept abreast of developments in Italy, there was little that could be learnt with regard to the use of tanks in combat.
With the Spanish Civil War, the Finnish Volunteers in Spain, Pohjan Pohjat, acquired a great deal of experience with Italian equipment (the volunteers were supplied with equipment by the Italians) and from the start, a small Panssaaripataljoona (Panzer Battalion) was a part of Pohjan Pohjat. This pataljoona was initially equipped with Italian L3/35 and L3 lf tankettes, as well as with L3 Centro Radio command tanks. Pohjan Pohjat found these tankettes to be outclassed against any other tanks from the start. They were also vulnerable to anything heavier than a rifle and proved to be of low tactical value, having to be used cautiously in combat to avoid heavy losses.
Finnish volunteers of Pohjan Pohjat advancing in Spain with an L3/35 from the unit’s Panssaaripataljoona
Pohjan Pohjat’s Panssaaripataljoona far preferred using the few German tanks that they managed to acquire, and above all the small numbers of captured Soviet tanks and armoured cars with which they eventually equipped themselves. Reports back to Finland repeatedly emphasized the essential uselessness of the Italian L3’s in detail. The Finnish Army would not at any time buy or use any Italian tankettes, although much of value was otherwise learnt from the fighting in Spain.
Next: The Enemy: Russian Tanks of the Interwar Decades
Will Kürlich Kerl
Banned
Nice, very informative update, CanKiwi!
Just curious. How many pages is this TL so far on Microsoft Word?
Just curious. How many pages is this TL so far on Microsoft Word?
Thanks
Sizewise, my document archives aren't that well organized, but a rough count right now gives me around maybe a couple of thousand Word pages (that's with just URL's for the photos). Might be more than that, but as an approximation.... hate to think what the word count is.....
Daewonsu
Banned
Thanks
Sizewise, my document archives aren't that well organized, but a rough count right now gives me around maybe a couple of thousand Word pages (that's with just URL's for the photos). Might be more than that, but as an approximation.... hate to think what the word count is.....
More than half a million words.