With the stream of german troops coming in russia germany achieved numerical superiority over the western allies in 1918. This numerical advantage was however wasted in the poorly planned luddendorf offensive. What if the german spring offensive of 1918 had clear realistic and strategic goals and not just a grab of no man's land?
WI: A Well planned German offensive in 1918
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Hans Delbruck said Germany should have finished off Italy in 1918, instead of launching an offensive in the West. I think this is a better idea then attack in the west for the billionth time.
This may also interest you: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=70739
This may also interest you: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=70739
It isn't so much that the offensive was poorly planned, its just that the allies managed to stop it before its intended goal of seizing Amiens and seriously reducing allied logistic mobility in the area. (With a view to further offensives exploiting that advantage)
We've had a number of discussion on this forum about possible improvements to the German actions, mostly centred on wether it was correct to us second echelon forces to widen the salient and secure the flanks or wether they should have used them as follow on forces to push a narrower salient those few extra miles towards Amiens.
IMO, the failure must be credited as much to the allies performance as to the Germans.
Its not easy to come up with a better plan. Staying on the defensive wouldn't prevent defeat, only postpone it, and a bigger offensive in Italy, for example, would be a logistic nightmare.
The simple fact that they managed a in depth breakthrough in a WW1 western front context has to count for something, and without tanks it was difficult to do better.
Deleted member 1487
Part of the problem was that Amiens wasn't a goal until the offensive already failed and then became one by default; Ludendorff literally said 'we'll chop a hole, the rest will follow; that's how we did it in Russia'. He had no plan other than to break open Allied lines and watch them collapse; when they didn't he had to capture anything prestigious, which was Amiens. Even after the offensive failed, he still didn't realize the importance of it to the Allies and how close he came to capturing it and seriously damaging the Allied war effort; had it been the objective from day one and he didn't waste so much effort and lives trying to break through to Arras and Albert he could have taken Amiens and pretty much opened up the chance to win the war; instead he fell short and doomed Germany to defeat. The ultimate blame for the defeat falls on Ludendorff and his lack of direction, plus his understanding of the importance of Amiens to the Allies.
Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_Offensive
The Allies did nothing special in their defensive operations, the offensive was lost on the German side, not won by the Allies.
The German 1918 Offensive was basically just a scaled predecessor to the Battle of the Bulge. By January 1918 the end result of the war was decided, the British blockade was biting and the US entry meant France's financial problems were solved and the Allies now had basically endless manpower. Germany could have taken Amiens and pushed all the way to Paris and it wouldn't have changed the final result.
Deleted member 1487
On this you are very wrong. 1918 and 1944/45 were very different situations. Very. Had the Germans taken Amiens, the situation would be very dire for the Entente; if Paris fell the war is won, because the French would not fight on, even if the US is in France in strength.
This. Also while the Germans had numerical superiority, the Entente had technical superiority and the French army was simply the best in term of overall quality. For every tank the German had, the French had hundreds. While the French had less artillery than the Germans, they still fired the same number of shells. The French could move two armies 200km per days while there was virtually no trucks in all Germany. If Ludendorf concentrated on Amiens from the start, the French would simply concentrate their troops to defend it while it would have created a even more vulnerable salient than OTL.
I think you are seriously overestimating the importance of France to the war effort in 1918. We can all agree that while France wasn't in as dire a position as Austria or Russia by 1918 it was exhausted, but just as France paid a minimal role in 44/45 it could have got away with doing the same thing in 1918. Recognising that pre-1918 France had been the dominant partner in the West thanks to the American entry into war, Britain finally reaching it's warfighting capacity and the French weakening post the Nievelle mutinies that was no longer true. Now Amiens and Paris are both key logistical hubs and the impact of losing them on allied morale would be terrible but in both US and especially Britain there was a desire to see the war through to a victorious conclusion and as long as they can keep in the fight, even if it's just propping up a Free French-esque remnant in Western France then Allied victory is assured.
Because while the Allies didn't realise it victory was inevitable by winter 1918/9 thanks to the British Blockade. The German war machine was running on empty by autumn 1918 as starvation and resource shortages took hold. It didn't matter what victories the German Army won in the field if the Home Front collapses and like Russia in 1917 the German Home Front was going to collapse. There is no brilliant strategy or plan that can run a war economy on 800 calories a day.
The manner in which the breakthrough occurred and the evolving situation would always dictate the later stages of the operation. It was acceptable given the many unpredictable factors for the Germans to keep their option open. You do that often in planning. You plan carefully up to a phase line and prepare multiple alternatives for follow on stages.
The expected result, by that time, was after all for failing to make the hole, as the allies had found out so many times before.
Michael wasn't Bragation, but it was far better managed than any large scale allied offensive up until than.
And the allies did do a decent job of managing the defence. Much better than their successors in 1940.
But we've had this exact discussion before, so no point in replaying it.
Luddendorf had to deal with very limiting logistical and mobility factors, plan with a good margin of flank safety due to the lack of mobile enough reserves, and play the psychological card. (Allied non panicky response to the initial breakthrough made a dash to the Channel less attractive as a war winning move, for example)
The plan wasn't perfect, the conduct of operations was flawed, but not actually bellow par for real war conditions. Luddendorf is an easy guy to hate, but often criticised to harshly.
The expected result, by that time, was after all for failing to make the hole, as the allies had found out so many times before.
Michael wasn't Bragation, but it was far better managed than any large scale allied offensive up until than.
And the allies did do a decent job of managing the defence. Much better than their successors in 1940.
But we've had this exact discussion before, so no point in replaying it.
Luddendorf had to deal with very limiting logistical and mobility factors, plan with a good margin of flank safety due to the lack of mobile enough reserves, and play the psychological card. (Allied non panicky response to the initial breakthrough made a dash to the Channel less attractive as a war winning move, for example)
The plan wasn't perfect, the conduct of operations was flawed, but not actually bellow par for real war conditions. Luddendorf is an easy guy to hate, but often criticised to harshly.
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Battle of the Bulge was far less ambitious and relevant. Michael posed a threat, Watch on the Rhine presented a target.
This basically. Germany was collapsing on itself. There had simply been too many men killed, too few crops harvested, etc.
Not to mention the offensives OTL killed so many German soldiers they couldn't reach the manpower needed to fight the next year by calling up the next TWO conscript groups.
but now that germany was at peace with russia couldn't they import food from the soviet union?
so is the general consensus that it was impossible for germany to win the war after 1917?
they were just playing for time, and it was running out?
they were just playing for time, and it was running out?
Earliest they could get an amount to even start making up for the blockade is Autumn 1919. They don't have that long.
That would require both that the Soviet Union not be a warzone, and that much better transportation infrastructure existed. As it was, the Germans did basically loot the Ukraine's farmland in 1918, but they just couldn't transport it back to Germany in sufficient quantities to help.
I'd say so. Nobody in the war was willing to break unless basically forced, and the entry of the US basically handed the Entente a blank check plus unlimited additional manpower. That ensured they would hold on to counterstrike and new weaponry and tactics meant that that counterattack would be highly effective.
No, they couldn't. Firstly, the Soviet Union was in full revolution, Whites vs. Reds, etc. Second, the newly conquered territories were barely consolidated, with the consequent disruptions in planting. The earliest they could have received food from there in any decent quantity would have been in the autumn of 1919. Third, their logistics network was disintegrating because too many men had been called up & too many horses killed.
so then use put the extra divisions from the east on defensive duty and then hold out for a year till the food rolls in.
How do you get the food to Germany? Who's holding the Ukraine? Is there enough stability for the peasants to plant crops? Harvest them?
Even if that was militarily possible (and it's not considering the growing technological and numerical Allied advantage) and even if they could import food from the East (Russia was experiencing Civil War and Mass Starvation at this point) what exactly is the German Army and the German people going to eat between winter 1918 and Autumn 1919? The Germans had just about managed to get through to harvest 1918 with only 500,000 deaths from starvation and thanks to fertilizers, manpower, equipment etc. shortages the 1918 harvest was dreadful, added to that the ongoing breakdown of the transport net and rural hoarding meant they couldn't distribute it, creating the dreadful situation of people dying of starvation in the cities in August 1918 even as crops were being harvested in the countryside.
Even in OTL with the war ending in Nov 1918 a total of around 800,000 Germans died from starvation in 1918-9. Without the lifting of the blockade and American food imports you can increase that by an order of magnitude by the end of 1919. Anyway it wouldn't get that far because unlike Nazi Germany the leaders of Imperial Germany were semi-sane and would have surrendered.
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