WI: A Well planned German offensive in 1918

[Tallil2long]

You're right, but it could be done on the first push if the initial offensive was weighted to take Amiens; IOTL it wasn't, rather far too much effort was wasted north of the British 5th army reinforcing failure instead of success between the Somme and Oise.

Okay, noted. However, if the Germans diminish their (wasted) efforts north of 5th Army, won't that free up some British reserves who can now be committed around Amiens?

Of course, getting them there in time with their supporting artillery will be a challenge...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Okay, noted. However, if the Germans diminish their (wasted) efforts north of 5th Army, won't that free up some British reserves who can now be committed around Amiens?

Of course, getting them there in time with their supporting artillery will be a challenge...

Its the same argument about why the rest of the British army that was unengaged in France couldn't participate: they were needed to screen the Germans, plus the already disrupted rail network would have a hard time getting them in place. If the Germans made the Somme-Oise front the center instead of South of the offensive, then the Allies will still have the same problem of OTL of thinking Paris was the target, but even more forcefully, which would disrupt appropriate reactions, as per OTL. Ultimately the potential counter attack force assembling would have gotten more men, but that would be preempted by the German Hazebrouck attack, just like IOTL when the initial counter attack on the Michael bulge was postponed due to the 2nd German offensive in the North. The Allies were pretty well confused and disrupted by the German offensive IOTL, so they would need to figure out Amiens was the target early on to react as you mention; IOTL they were convinced it was several other things, so left forces in place in other sectors that would have been helpful against Michael; here would be no different, even if what those forces were would be different. Plus on the open ground, not in defensive positions, those reinforcements would be far less effective than IOTL if they did show up.

Basically though with the German 18th army weighted as the main focus of the attack, the OTL breakthrough between the Somme and Oise had several options for an ultimate objective, which IOTL nearly paralyzed the Allied reaction due to the French and British assuming different things, no one assuming Amiens was the target until the Germans belatedly went after it. So ITTL the 18th army would hook north eventually as it barreled straight ahead and grab it on the march, as it was pretty much undefended at several points IOTL and a quicker advance from a better supported 18th army would ensure it would fall without much of a fight if any; then they can use the huge supply dump there to settle in and set up defenses, meaning the need to reopen supply lines behind the 18th army isn't nearly as critical as IOTL due to the vast supplies falling into the Germans' hands. For the British setting up a counter attack would take time and they would need to be certain the Germans were halted before they would go into their methodical planning for an offensive mode; they didn't really do major counter attacks on the fly.

 

[Saphroneth]

Its the same argument about why the rest of the British army that was unengaged in France couldn't participate: they were needed to screen the Germans, plus the already disrupted rail network would have a hard time getting them in place. If the Germans made the Somme-Oise front the center instead of South of the offensive, then the Allies will still have the same problem of OTL of thinking Paris was the target, but even more forcefully, which would disrupt appropriate reactions, as per OTL. Ultimately the potential counter attack force assembling would have gotten more men, but that would be preempted by the German Hazebrouck attack, just like IOTL when the initial counter attack on the Michael bulge was postponed due to the 2nd German offensive in the North. The Allies were pretty well confused and disrupted by the German offensive IOTL, so they would need to figure out Amiens was the target early on to react as you mention; IOTL they were convinced it was several other things, so left forces in place in other sectors that would have been helpful against Michael; here would be no different, even if what those forces were would be different. Plus on the open ground, not in defensive positions, those reinforcements would be far less effective than IOTL if they did show up.

Basically though with the German 18th army weighted as the main focus of the attack, the OTL breakthrough between the Somme and Oise had several options for an ultimate objective, which IOTL nearly paralyzed the Allied reaction due to the French and British assuming different things, no one assuming Amiens was the target until the Germans belatedly went after it. So ITTL the 18th army would hook north eventually as it barreled straight ahead and grab it on the march, as it was pretty much undefended at several points IOTL and a quicker advance from a better supported 18th army would ensure it would fall without much of a fight if any; then they can use the huge supply dump there to settle in and set up defenses, meaning the need to reopen supply lines behind the 18th army isn't nearly as critical as IOTL due to the vast supplies falling into the Germans' hands. For the British setting up a counter attack would take time and they would need to be certain the Germans were halted before they would go into their methodical planning for an offensive mode; they didn't really do major counter attacks on the fly.

Doesn't this rely exactly on the British and French reacting slow, late and in the wrong way, though? Would that plan fly in the first place? ("Let's throw most of our precious reserve at a major objective, steal the supplies there and use them to dig in"...)
(Would it be decrypted/spied out by the British SigInt if there was a plan there to be found?)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Doesn't this rely exactly on the British and French reacting slow, late and in the wrong way, though? Would that plan fly in the first place? ("Let's throw most of our precious reserve at a major objective, steal the supplies there and use them to dig in"...)
(Would it be decrypted/spied out by the British SigInt if there was a plan there to be found?)

You mean act just as they did IOTL because they couldn't decide on anything due to lack of a unified command structure, which was improvised on the fly during the battle? Had the Allies acted properly in the first place the British 5th army wouldn't have been in a position to be blasted right through IOTL. Also what SigInt did the British have on the German in 1918? This isn't WW2; understand there was no Ultra, just some captured German naval codes in 1914.

Pretty much all offensives in this war relied on the enemy making mistakes and IOTL they made several very bad ones in 1918, such as holding back hundreds of thousands of conscripts in Britain and left the 5th army weak from the 3rd Ypres, while also extending their front line beyond anything any Allied army held, ordered a new defensive doctrine, and had no prepared defenses in their sector.

 

[Saphroneth]

You mean act just as they did IOTL because they couldn't decide on anything due to lack of a unified command structure, which was improvised on the fly during the battle? Had the Allies acted properly in the first place the British 5th army wouldn't have been in a position to be blasted right through IOTL. Also what SigInt did the British have on the German in 1918? This isn't WW2; understand there was no Ultra, just some captured German naval codes in 1914.

Pretty much all offensives in this war relied on the enemy making mistakes and IOTL they made several very bad ones in 1918, such as holding back hundreds of thousands of conscripts in Britain and left the 5th army weak from the 3rd Ypres, while also extending their front line beyond anything any Allied army held, ordered a new defensive doctrine, and had no prepared defenses in their sector.

Yes, I am aware the Entente made mistakes. But my point is - to a planner, it's going to look like the "straight for this objective" plan relies on the enemy not defending it, while keeping the options open so you can react to what the enemy does is more flexible.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Yes, I am aware the Entente made mistakes. But my point is - to a planner, it's going to look like the "straight for this objective" plan relies on the enemy not defending it, while keeping the options open so you can react to what the enemy does is more flexible.

The beauty of the Oise-Somme axis is that you have multiple options if Amiens doesn't work out. Besides, it not straight at the city, its to the north of the advance, so the attack on it isn't telegraphed, but still easily obtainable. If that doesn't work out for some reason there are options to the south, but none as valuable as Amiens. Really the 1918 offensives were a desperate last gamble that offered victory if obtained, so there really isn't any other option but go for it and hope for the best; you win big if you take it and lose any other way, including sitting still and trying to negotiate. So Germany could only attack and go after Amiens and get victory, so they have no choice but to try what Zabecki suggests.

Edit: besides going by OTL Ludendorff didn't have a plan other than to chop and hole and hope the Allies fell apart while he drove to the sea; Zabecki's idea actually anchors the offensive on a concrete objective.

 

[Saphroneth]

So, what's the plan if the Germans take this lynchpin town, and then the Allies don't simply fold but instead start to use the tactics of OTL Hundred Days Offensive? IIRC by this point the Allies' production advantage was really starting to tell and they had tanks, tanks everywhere.

 

[Tallil2long]

Its the same argument about why the rest of the British army that was unengaged in France couldn't participate: they were needed to screen the Germans, plus the already disrupted rail network would have a hard time getting them in place. If the Germans made the Somme-Oise front the center instead of South of the offensive, then the Allies will still have the same problem of OTL of thinking Paris was the target, but even more forcefully, which would disrupt appropriate reactions, as per OTL. Ultimately the potential counter attack force assembling would have gotten more men, but that would be preempted by the German Hazebrouck attack, just like IOTL when the initial counter attack on the Michael bulge was postponed due to the 2nd German offensive in the North. The Allies were pretty well confused and disrupted by the German offensive IOTL, so they would need to figure out Amiens was the target early on to react as you mention; IOTL they were convinced it was several other things, so left forces in place in other sectors that would have been helpful against Michael; here would be no different, even if what those forces were would be different. Plus on the open ground, not in defensive positions, those reinforcements would be far less effective than IOTL if they did show up.

Basically though with the German 18th army weighted as the main focus of the attack, the OTL breakthrough between the Somme and Oise had several options for an ultimate objective, which IOTL nearly paralyzed the Allied reaction due to the French and British assuming different things, no one assuming Amiens was the target until the Germans belatedly went after it. So ITTL the 18th army would hook north eventually as it barreled straight ahead and grab it on the march, as it was pretty much undefended at several points IOTL and a quicker advance from a better supported 18th army would ensure it would fall without much of a fight if any; then they can use the huge supply dump there to settle in and set up defenses, meaning the need to reopen supply lines behind the 18th army isn't nearly as critical as IOTL due to the vast supplies falling into the Germans' hands. For the British setting up a counter attack would take time and they would need to be certain the Germans were halted before they would go into their methodical planning for an offensive mode; they didn't really do major counter attacks on the fly.

Okay, fair points.

Can we form a rough estimate of the British ability to screen Amiens?

I believe there were 8 divisions in BEF GHQ reserve. Some of those I assume were thrown directly in to help Gough's army in the first couple of days.

Meanwhile, I assume Haig would be stripping a small handful of divisions (not many, for the reasons you noted) from other armies, either for immediate commitment or to maintain his reserve.

So, the questions I have are:
1) on what day of the offensive might the Germans be expected to turn directly for Amiens?
2) how soon afterward would the British identify Amiens as the objective?
3) how many fresh divisions could the British throw in at that point?
4) how long would it take them all to arrive?
5) at what rate might they arrive?

(I seem to recall that the French never did succeed in getting men around in front of the German salient, so while they will be reinforcing the southern face of the salient, we won't be seeing them around Amiens)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So, what's the plan if the Germans take this lynchpin town, and then the Allies don't simply fold but instead start to use the tactics of OTL Hundred Days Offensive? IIRC by this point the Allies' production advantage was really starting to tell and they had tanks, tanks everywhere.

Tanks are useless without supplies being able to get to the front. The British would have used up a lot of supplies and lost a ton in March 1918, while not getting sufficient resupply due to Amiens being lost. The French would have panicked and pulled back to defend Paris as was their plan if Amiens was lost, not to counter attack it. So as per OTL Georgette is launched, but ITTL its focused on Hazebrouck; that really disrupted any plans to attack the Michael salient, which was then put off until August 1918 IOTL. The French and British are split and fighting separate wars now. Production is hurt in France by the loss of Bethune coal. The Brits have their logistics collapsed, Ypres is withdrawn from due to supply issue, Belgium cuts deal because their last corner of Belgium is lost, which is their red line to exit the war.

Now France is all on its own and preparing for a push on Paris, rather than counter attacking, because its morale is at rock bottom. Combined arms offensives are on hold until the US 1st army is ready; now its about surviving the German offensive; their morale was already shakey, so several more powerful offensives than IOTL due to the British logistics issues freeing up a lot of Germans means the French are pretty much going to fold like cheap lawn chairs if they are on their own a suffer defeats like IOTL, but worse.

 

[Tallil2long]

So, what's the plan if the Germans take this lynchpin town, and then the Allies don't simply fold but instead start to use the tactics of OTL Hundred Days Offensive? IIRC by this point the Allies' production advantage was really starting to tell and they had tanks, tanks everywhere.

First, how will the British do that? With amiens gone, they are only getting about half their normal supplies -- not enough for major offensive ops.

Plus, the BEF started out that Spring under strength, and would have lost many in the German offensive.

And while there are perhaps 250,000 uncommitted soldiers in Britain, feeding them into the existing front just makes the supply problem worse, by temporarily taking up capacity at the available ports and by... well, needing to be fed.

Haig can't attack unless he gets those soldiers, but he can hardly supply them if he does.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Okay, fair points.

Can we form a rough estimate of the British ability to screen Amiens?

I believe there were 8 divisions in BEF GHQ reserve. Some of those I assume were thrown directly in to help Gough's army in the first couple of days.

Meanwhile, I assume Haig would be stripping a small handful of divisions (not many, for the reasons you noted) from other armies, either for immediate commitment or to maintain his reserve.

So, the questions I have are:
1) on what day of the offensive might the Germans be expected to turn directly for Amiens?
2) how soon afterward would the British identify Amiens as the objective?
3) how many fresh divisions could the British throw in at that point?
4) how long would it take them all to arrive?
5) at what rate might they arrive?

(I seem to recall that the French never did succeed in getting men around in front of the German salient, so while they will be reinforcing the southern face of the salient, we won't be seeing them around Amiens)

Honestly I did some work on this years ago and don't remember off hand; I can't find my notes and I don't have Zabecki's book with me. The Brits IIRC had about 6-8 divisions with the weak 4th army after the 5th army was disbanded. About 10-14 days IIRC are required for Amiens to be captured if Zabecki's plan is followed. By the time the British identify the Amiens issue its pretty much too late as the Germans would have taken it before they could react. The British can screen Amiens after it's lost with some reserves, but won't be able to mount a major counter offensive until after Goergette by which time its far too late and effectively impossible without the French, who are not going to help due to fears about Paris. IOTL it took 5 days from the end of Michael to launch Georgette, which would be quicker than the British could set up their own major offensive to take back Amiens from the North, roughly as per OTL, minus the fact that Amiens never fell and IOTL British logistics were much better than ITTL. One of the chief issues ITTL is that with Amiens down the British ability to set up a counter attack logistically is even more difficult, because now rail lines have to go to supply armies sitting still to the north that IOTL were used to move forces around; that's the beauty of Amiens falling, it limits the British ability to then react due to the need to use remaining rail lines just to keep static forces supplies, not move then around and build up supplies for a counter attack.

They either have to abandon their positions around Arras to pull back and reorient their supply lines or have their flank open and lack enough supply to launch an attack from the British 3rd army to the North West of Amiens, or they have to attack with one minor rail line directly to the north with the weak 4th army, which will take weeks to set up and bring up reserves, however if they do that then they lose that rail line's ability to supply the now badly disrupted 3rd army defending Arras via Abbeville. Georgette gets rolling much faster than the British can adjust and move. With the fall of Hazebrouck the the 3rd army has to retreat due to losing its supply lines to the north, which then throws off everything the 4th army was setting up as its now impossible to supply that attack and keep the 3rd army in place; not only that, but the loss then of Arras puts the 4th army's flank in the air, so it cannot focus on attacking.

 

[Tallil2long]

@Wiking

I'm guessing you mean The German 1918 Offensives: A Study of the Operational Level of War?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

@Wiking

I'm guessing you mean The German 1918 Offensives: A Study of the Operational Level of War?

Yep. I wish I had those maps in digital formats; the ones in the British official history are even better, which are the ones the Zabecki used; I got them via inter-library loan years ago and they fully back up Zabecki's thesis, while actually showing on the maps what the train capacity for all the lines north of the Somme were plus the breakdowns of port capacities, how much could be moved via rail lines from the ports (i.e. ports could not be used to capacity due to limited rail line capacity and their being worn down by wartime use, while how much could be used via inland water ways. Amiens and Hazebrouck would have been catastrophic losses.

 

[Saphroneth]

First, how will the British do that? With amiens gone, they are only getting about half their normal supplies -- not enough for major offensive ops.

Plus, the BEF started out that Spring under strength, and would have lost many in the German offensive.

And while there are perhaps 250,000 uncommitted soldiers in Britain, feeding them into the existing front just makes the supply problem worse, by temporarily taking up capacity at the available ports and by... well, needing to be fed.

Haig can't attack unless he gets those soldiers, but he can hardly supply them if he does.

I said Allies - not British. As in, the Americans, and the French. Since the French haven't been hit by TTL Michel, they're going to be more intact - and guess where all those supplies at the ports are going to go?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I said Allies - not British. As in, the Americans, and the French. Since the French haven't been hit by TTL Michel, they're going to be more intact - and guess where all those supplies at the ports are going to go?

The French weren't hit by Michael IOTL. ITTL Michael will actually hit them harder because the German 7th army would be part of the attack to the south of the Oise to cover the flank. IOTL the 18th army north of the Oise was the flank guard and it had the most success when it wasn't supposed to go anywhere near that deep.

The port supplies will go to defending Paris, not counter attacking, as that was the OTL plan in case Amiens fell.

 

[Karelian]

So, let's for the sake of argument assume that Germany manages to capture Amiens in 1918. French forces pull back to defend Paris, British forces in the Continent withdraw from Ypres, Belgium may start to seek terms...I'd still say that Germany will lose the war, it will only take longer. Buildup of US troops was steadily continuing, and despite these setbacks the French position is far from hopeless, as they have a major new ally who is committed to push in more troops. Germany has indeed won an impressive operational victory, but her best manpower reserves are now exhausted.

A moderate peace offer now might open a way to negotiated peace in the West, but I just don't see how the men leading Germany in 1918 would be capable of formulating such a policy. More likely it's business as usual until Thompson-armed Entente stormtroopers start to slowly push the exhausted Germans back, and their allies in Vienna, Konstantinople and Sofia start to seek terms on their own.

A better German offensive in 1918 would thus at best prolong the war, but would be unlikely to change the ultimate outcome.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So, let's for the sake of argument assume that Germany manages to capture Amiens in 1918. French forces pull back to defend Paris, British forces in the Continent withdraw from Ypres, Belgium may start to seek terms...I'd still say that Germany will lose the war, it will only take longer. Buildup of US troops was steadily continuing, and despite these setbacks the French position is far from hopeless, as they have a major new ally who is committed to push in more troops. Germany has indeed won an impressive operational victory, but her best manpower reserves are now exhausted.

A moderate peace offer now might open a way to negotiated peace in the West, but I just don't see how the men leading Germany in 1918 would be capable of formulating such a policy. More likely it's business as usual until Thompson-armed Entente stormtroopers start to slowly push the exhausted Germans back, and their allies in Vienna, Konstantinople and Sofia start to seek terms on their own.

A better German offensive in 1918 would thus at best prolong the war, but would be unlikely to change the ultimate outcome.

It all comes down to French morale after the British start withdrawing to the coast; do they ask for a deal or try and ride it out? The germans can draw on extra manpower they lacked IOTL, plus lots of Entente supplies; it would appear that they are facing an unbeatable foe, because at this point the Russians have been defeated and as far as the Allies know they have more reserves. So there are at least three offensive from OTL, but now backed up by a lot more artillery and men and less pressure from the North. If the Germans get close to Paris the French are going to be under tremendous pressure from the public and may well fold; if they don't and ride out 1918 then you're right, but if they offer terms or ask for an armistice then the war is over, Germany won in Europe.

A moderate German offer of peace after Hazebrouk falls and Belgium asks for terms would virtually be guaranteed to work, but Ludendorff was playing for all the marbles. It comes down the French morale, nothing else. If the Clemenceau government falls during the German offensives, then they've lost.

 

[Tallil2long]

I said Allies - not British. As in, the Americans, and the French. Since the French haven't been hit by TTL Michel, they're going to be more intact - and guess where all those supplies at the ports are going to go?

Well, the Americans just weren't ready. They wouldn't be able to go on the offensive for months, just from logistical and organizational reasons alone, let alone training.

The French, if they see the British in dire straits, will hit back at Amiens as quickly as possible. By which I mean within a very few days after Amiens falls, while the situation still seems fairly fluid.

But it won't be a steamroller offensive, no matter what. Those took weeks to prepare. It'll be an army drawn from the Reserve, rushed in with no heavy artillery or tanks. In fact, they'll be lucky to have all their divisional artillery, since every hour of waiting gives the Germans time to dig in and organize, bring up ammo and reserves, and open supply routes.
(incidentally, Barrie Pitt says that the French were able to get only two divisions up per day up to bolster Gough's flank, and those without heavy guns)

If the quick counter-thrust nonetheless works (and I would expect it to have a chance), then the Entente still has a mess on their hands, but at least they're back in business.

If it doesn't, then the French have to start thinking. The BEF presumably is evacuating, presumably to return somewhere else in a few months. In the meantime, the French might want to conserve their troops. The Germans might have more offensives up their sleeve, and the French will essentially have to face them alone. They'll also have to extend their front to cover the Somme. The Americans can help by taking a few stretches of the line, but they're green, green, green, and have few divs ready for even defensive commitment.

I don't think the French will be in any shape to launch any big offensives, and would be fools to try.

And of course, they'll be experiencing a huge crisis in confidence. Will they sue for peace? It's possible.

[The above is my best guess. People who know more can probably poke it full of holes.]

 

[edgeworthy]

Perhaps the real reason?

I'm a bit surprised that no one has brought this up yet, especially since we've had a bit of the obligatory Ludendorff bashing ...

... simple human nature!

Somehow the fact that that Erich Ludendorff lost his two sons during the Spring Offensive seems to get overlooked by just about everyone, there isn't even a mention of this in his Wikipedia biography.
You would imagine that this would have some effect even on a man described as "Schlieffen’s devoted disciple who was a glutton for work and a man of granite character. He was deliberately friendless and forbidding, and remained little known or liked. Lacking a trail of reminiscences or anecdotes as he grew in eminence, Ludendorff was a man without a shadow."
However, John Lee (p. 45) states that while Ludendorff was with his Fusiliers, "he became the perfect regimental commander ... the younger officers came to adore him."

It is entirely possible that events were influenced by this, his oft quoted "Black day of the German Army" statement could easily be what now would be seen as a symptom of PTSD???

 

[Deleted member 1487]

[The above is my best guess. People who know more can probably poke it full of holes.]

The big problem is that the French could not move that fast and were very risk adverse at this point; they would take a while to get troops into position, but were not about rushing to a quick counter attack, especially with all those German troops to the South of the city; it would be difficult to loop around the bulge to the West and come at Amiens with a major detour via the Le Havre-Amiens line. That would take at least a week to set up and the only viable quick counter attack option would be via the north from the Brits. Basically unless the Brits hold it early on or take it back and hold it with a lucky counter attack in the first day, its the Germans to hold as long as they want especially once Georgette starts in Flanders. France could eventually counter attack if they weren't panicking from Amiens falling, but IOTL their panic had them fall back on Paris, not rush to counter attack the Germans. They were in full turtle mode at this point; they were dead serious about waiting for the Americans to be ready before attacking.