My first real time line. Please, tell me what you think! Suggestions, criticism, etc. are all welcome here.
On February 5, 1937, the President sent Congress his design for reorganizing the judiciary. Roosevelt declared that a deficiency of personnel had resulted in overcrowded federal court dockets; in a single year, he asserted, the Supreme Court had denied 87 per cent of petitions for hearings on appeal, without citing his reasons. In part, this could be attributed to "the capacity of the judges themselves," a problem which raised "the question of aged or infirm judges--a subject of delicacy and yet one which requires frank discussion. . . ." To "vitalize the courts," Roosevelt recommended that when a federal judge who had served at least ten years waited more than six months after his seventieth birthday to resign or retire, the President might add a new judge to the bench. He could appoint as many but no more than six new justices to the Supreme Court and forty-four new judges to the lower federal tribunals. The President's proposal present Court reorganization as not as a political ruse but as a devotion to a principle: the retirement of aged justices in the interest of efficiency.
- From Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932-1940 by William E. Leuchtenburg, Harper Torchbooks, 1963 [1]
"At first, I had my doubts about what the President was trying to do, I really did, but he won me over as the discussions on Court reorganization went on. I'll tell you, though, if he'd just sprung it on me, I don't know if we'd have been able to pass the legislation. It was hard enough to keep enough of the party in line to pass the bill in the first place."
- Senate Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson, as quoted shortly before his death in Controversy: The New Deal v. The Supreme Court by John M. Forrest [2], Random House, 1994
"Boys, here's where I cash in my chips." [3]
- House Judiciary Committee Chair Hatton W. Summers (D-TX), upon approving the President's Court reorganization bill.
"I want—as all Americans want—an independent judiciary as proposed by the framers of the Constitution. That means a Supreme Court that will enforce the Constitution as written—that will refuse to amend the Constitution by the arbitrary exercise of judicial power—amendment by judicial say-so. It does not mean a judiciary so independent that it can deny the existence of facts universally recognized."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat No. 9, March 9th, 1937. [4]
"The sheer arrogance on the part of the Administration in Washington was sickening, to think that a fundamental constitutional issue could be so twisted in a partisan blood-bath was just that--sickening. Of course, the sheep in the countryside weren't opposed to it. Polls kept showing the public in favor of the Court packing bill, but only by a plurality. Congress was in the pocket of the Administration as well, with that man in the White House wining and dining with Robinson and Bankhead to shove this thing through. That was his ace in the hole, really. Had he not done that, I doubt he'd have gotten the support. We were all skeptical, and the Democrats were, especially. We might have been able to defeat the damn bill if Roosevelt didn't have such a great deal of control over Congress."
- Wallace Humphrey White, Jr., U.S. Senator from Maine, as quoted in Controversy: The New Deal v. The Supreme Court by John M. Forrest [2], Random House, 1994
"Thanks to your support, my friends, we have triumphed over the forces of reaction. Today is a new beginning for this great nation, for every single American. . . ."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech to members of Congress following the passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, on March 23rd, 1937.
Notes:
[1] Credit goes to the author. This is an actual passage from the book, minus my changing of 'packing' to 'reorganization' in the last line. I feel that a successful 'packing' is going to be looked upon more as a 'reorganization', because of less public opposition and more Congressional support.
[2] Author and book are completely fictional.
[3] Actual quote from Summers, though in OTL a response clarifying his opposition to the bill and to the President's agenda. Roosevelt's close lobbying with Congress members and transparency about the bill is recieved much better, allowing to its passage ITTL.
[4] Also an actual quote from Roosevelt's ninth fireside chat.
Rough Outline:
Instead of keeping his plan to reorganize the Supreme Court secret from members of Congress and the public, Roosevelt begins major talks with House Speaker Bankhead and Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, who offer support to the plan after assuring the President that they can keep enough votes in line to pass the bill.
Roosevelt's full frontal assault dissuades public opposition to the bill, allowing for Congress to push it on through without fear of political repurcussions, as Roosevelt has a plurality of public support on his side. The Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 passes in the Senate on March 15th and in the House on March 21st before being signed into law by the President on the 23rd of March, 1937.
Preview:
"In light of his victory, the President prepared to make his appointments to the Court. While Van Devanter had resigned, it was of no matter to the President; he was still going to be able to nominate six Justices to the Court as it was, owing to the age of half of the Court. As a sort of token for his support in authoring the legislation, Attorney General Homer Cummings would be nominated for Van Devanter's seat, while the other four additional seats would be given to Alabama Senator Hugo Black, Nebraska Senator George Norris, Jurist Stanley Reed, former NRA head Hugh Johnson (a pick mostly made to stifle criticism against the plan, which Johnson was originally against) and his conservative economic adviser, Felix Frankfurter. The latter's appointment to the Court is today seen as one of the reasons Roosevelt decided against balancing the budget in '37, with the lot of Keynesians he had on board in the administration advising against cutting spending. . . ."
- From Controversy: The New Deal v. The Supreme Court by John M. Forrest [2], Random House, 1994
On February 5, 1937, the President sent Congress his design for reorganizing the judiciary. Roosevelt declared that a deficiency of personnel had resulted in overcrowded federal court dockets; in a single year, he asserted, the Supreme Court had denied 87 per cent of petitions for hearings on appeal, without citing his reasons. In part, this could be attributed to "the capacity of the judges themselves," a problem which raised "the question of aged or infirm judges--a subject of delicacy and yet one which requires frank discussion. . . ." To "vitalize the courts," Roosevelt recommended that when a federal judge who had served at least ten years waited more than six months after his seventieth birthday to resign or retire, the President might add a new judge to the bench. He could appoint as many but no more than six new justices to the Supreme Court and forty-four new judges to the lower federal tribunals. The President's proposal present Court reorganization as not as a political ruse but as a devotion to a principle: the retirement of aged justices in the interest of efficiency.
- From Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932-1940 by William E. Leuchtenburg, Harper Torchbooks, 1963 [1]
"At first, I had my doubts about what the President was trying to do, I really did, but he won me over as the discussions on Court reorganization went on. I'll tell you, though, if he'd just sprung it on me, I don't know if we'd have been able to pass the legislation. It was hard enough to keep enough of the party in line to pass the bill in the first place."
- Senate Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson, as quoted shortly before his death in Controversy: The New Deal v. The Supreme Court by John M. Forrest [2], Random House, 1994
"Boys, here's where I cash in my chips." [3]
- House Judiciary Committee Chair Hatton W. Summers (D-TX), upon approving the President's Court reorganization bill.
"I want—as all Americans want—an independent judiciary as proposed by the framers of the Constitution. That means a Supreme Court that will enforce the Constitution as written—that will refuse to amend the Constitution by the arbitrary exercise of judicial power—amendment by judicial say-so. It does not mean a judiciary so independent that it can deny the existence of facts universally recognized."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat No. 9, March 9th, 1937. [4]
"The sheer arrogance on the part of the Administration in Washington was sickening, to think that a fundamental constitutional issue could be so twisted in a partisan blood-bath was just that--sickening. Of course, the sheep in the countryside weren't opposed to it. Polls kept showing the public in favor of the Court packing bill, but only by a plurality. Congress was in the pocket of the Administration as well, with that man in the White House wining and dining with Robinson and Bankhead to shove this thing through. That was his ace in the hole, really. Had he not done that, I doubt he'd have gotten the support. We were all skeptical, and the Democrats were, especially. We might have been able to defeat the damn bill if Roosevelt didn't have such a great deal of control over Congress."
- Wallace Humphrey White, Jr., U.S. Senator from Maine, as quoted in Controversy: The New Deal v. The Supreme Court by John M. Forrest [2], Random House, 1994
"Thanks to your support, my friends, we have triumphed over the forces of reaction. Today is a new beginning for this great nation, for every single American. . . ."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech to members of Congress following the passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, on March 23rd, 1937.
Notes:
[1] Credit goes to the author. This is an actual passage from the book, minus my changing of 'packing' to 'reorganization' in the last line. I feel that a successful 'packing' is going to be looked upon more as a 'reorganization', because of less public opposition and more Congressional support.
[2] Author and book are completely fictional.
[3] Actual quote from Summers, though in OTL a response clarifying his opposition to the bill and to the President's agenda. Roosevelt's close lobbying with Congress members and transparency about the bill is recieved much better, allowing to its passage ITTL.
[4] Also an actual quote from Roosevelt's ninth fireside chat.
Rough Outline:
Instead of keeping his plan to reorganize the Supreme Court secret from members of Congress and the public, Roosevelt begins major talks with House Speaker Bankhead and Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, who offer support to the plan after assuring the President that they can keep enough votes in line to pass the bill.
Roosevelt's full frontal assault dissuades public opposition to the bill, allowing for Congress to push it on through without fear of political repurcussions, as Roosevelt has a plurality of public support on his side. The Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937 passes in the Senate on March 15th and in the House on March 21st before being signed into law by the President on the 23rd of March, 1937.
Preview:
"In light of his victory, the President prepared to make his appointments to the Court. While Van Devanter had resigned, it was of no matter to the President; he was still going to be able to nominate six Justices to the Court as it was, owing to the age of half of the Court. As a sort of token for his support in authoring the legislation, Attorney General Homer Cummings would be nominated for Van Devanter's seat, while the other four additional seats would be given to Alabama Senator Hugo Black, Nebraska Senator George Norris, Jurist Stanley Reed, former NRA head Hugh Johnson (a pick mostly made to stifle criticism against the plan, which Johnson was originally against) and his conservative economic adviser, Felix Frankfurter. The latter's appointment to the Court is today seen as one of the reasons Roosevelt decided against balancing the budget in '37, with the lot of Keynesians he had on board in the administration advising against cutting spending. . . ."
- From Controversy: The New Deal v. The Supreme Court by John M. Forrest [2], Random House, 1994
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