Malaya What If

[Amir]

When I served in the Australian Army was just after our commitment to South Vietnam. We were always advised to well oil our weapons against rust in the tropics. We were advised never to drap ourselves with ammunition belts because it was obvious they would become contaminated with debris from the ground and because of the potential for accidents from being struck on the round's base as occurred to a Nasho (National Serviceman) during an exercise when another soldier flung another belt over his shoulder. We were advised to clean our boots daily to keep them in condition, and our webbing and backpack as well. Shame we had ended out commitment to South Vietnam a few years earlier and all the advice went out the window in the dry and arid conditions of the Australian Outback. We were advised basically the reverse as far as cleaning our weapons went.

Carry MG belts “bandito style” might look cool, but it’s a really bad idea, as you’ve shown. Talking to some people who served in US Infantry or as advisors during the Vietnam era, some units developed covers for MG belts made from inner tube to allow belts to be carried on the torso without exposing them to the elements or allowing brass to shine and make noise. Other units used the issue ammo cans and kept just a small 20-50 round initial belt on the gun. Regardless of method, cleaning and inspecting belts was a daily task for gun teams. Many troops carried an old toothbrush for use in cleaning the grime and muck off magazines and weapons. This included inspecting and cleaning munitions and pyrotechnics like grenades and flares to ensure they were not corroded or fouled. An interesting observation was that bayonets would rust into the scabbards and pistols would rust in wet leather holsters if left unattended.

In Malaya circa 1941-42, squads may not have the same challenges with belted ammunition, but daily maintenance and inspection is going to be necessary to ensure the efficiency of units operating in the field, especially those on the wet side of the peninsula, If the British are able to hold the initial IJA offensive, the impact of field discipline and maintenance in allowing the force to retain its effectiveness may make the difference between counteroffensive and stalemate.

 

[Admiral Jellicoe]

Quite a few pics from the Falklands of British troops festooned with ammo belts - see below. I assume this was because of the need to yomp the whole way across the island and carry everything

@David Flin might have probably the most informed commentary on this and the importance of keeping belts clean?

 

[JIM]

I

Quite a few pics from the Falklands of British troops festooned with ammo belts - see below. I assume this was because of the need to yomp the whole way across the island and carry everything

@David Flin might have probably the most informed commentary on this and the importance of keeping belts clean?

In this Photo the that is obviously a GPMG team No1 & his No2 with ready links, when I first joined if we were issued 50 or 100 round links to carry , we carried them under our jackets to keeps them out of the way and to keep them clean. The No2's would readily chuck them back at you if you gave them a belt covered in muck.

 

[Ramontxo]

Very interested in the answer, but minor nitpick they are in berets that mean that the war is over and they are marching in, or towards, Stanley

 

[pdf27]

Very interested in the answer, but minor nitpick they are in berets that mean that the war is over and they are marching in, or towards, Stanley

No webbing either, so nowhere else to put the ammunition!

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Quite a few pics from the Falklands of British troops festooned with ammo belts - see below. I assume this was because of the need to yomp the whole way across the island and carry everything

@David Flin might have probably the most informed commentary on this and the importance of keeping belts clean?

Possibly a posed shot - those troops trying to look cool for the journalists - does not seem to be much in the way of webbing on them and at least 2 of the chaps walking behind are unarmed?

 

[freelander]

Possibly a posed shot - those troops trying to look cool for the journalists - does not seem to be much in the way of webbing on them and at least 2 of the chaps walking behind are unarmed?

Helmets for War Berets for hearts and minds.

 

[Driftless]

In Malaya circa 1941-42, squads may not have the same challenges with belted ammunition, but daily maintenance and inspection is going to be necessary to ensure the efficiency of units operating in the field, especially those on the wet side of the peninsula, If the British are able to hold the initial IJA offensive, the impact of field discipline and maintenance in allowing the force to retain its effectiveness may make the difference between counteroffensive and stalemate.

Would the type of service history for small unit officers and NCOs have made a notable difference on the frequency and thoroughness of routine maintenance? Basically, the "Old Hands" grinding on the ranks to have all of your weapons functionally cleaned and functionally inspected as often as conditions alllow? (by functional, I mean does the equipment work to expected standard) To more recently called up reserve officers and NCOs, might that necessary work seem excessive?

 

[Amir]

In short, yes. It’s all a part of organizational culture.

Talking with relatives who either were themselves or who served in draftee manned units, attitudes towards maintenance and upkeep were initially driven from the top down. Much of the “chickensh*t” of initial entry training (polishing brass and boots, buffing floors, footlocker and kit inspections, etc) is designed to teach attention to detail and care of equipment through repetition, inspection, penalty, and reward. This is then transferred to the units, where it is either reinforced and honed or allowed to rot depending on the unit leadership. In 2AD and 101st, even though the units were manned by draftees and recruits, the senior NCOs and Field Grade Officers largely came from the regular force, and they set the tone for maintenance and upkeep with inspections and maintenance plans. This resulted in high standards of maintenance and individual training (To his dying day my uncle credited Patton’s predeployment training and maintenance plan with the division‘s successes in 42-43). In my uncle‘s words, “I might have been filthy, but my rifle, feet, and teeth were clean and the halftrack was always ready to go“.

Contrast that with experiences in a less well led unit. An uncle who served in an infantry unit in Korea during 50-51 told me about the state of maintenance upon joining his unit south of Taejon as a newly commissioned ROTC graduate. He stated that the wire in front of their position was haphazard, with pickets barely driven into the ground. Trip flares and mines had not been replaced. Belted ammo was stored on the ground in the dirt, and in some instances rifles were not zeroed to the user.

The unit had left Japan under strength in men and equipment, and had found that tires and hoses were dry rotted, rats had chewed holes in rubber hoses and into commo wire. All of this was either too late for replacement/repair, or was not discovered until arrival in Korea because of a lack of inspections and exercises in Japan. The pioneer tools assigned to the unit had not been able to be located in Japan, it turns out they had been “lost” and not replaced. In some instances mortar tubes were of doubtful serviceability due to erosion from their last combat use in 1945.

He said things improved quickly as more NCOs and Officers arrived and Soldiers and replacement equipment arrived in preparation for the September counterattack. Coupled with a change in attitude as soldiers realized that taking care of their equipment was literally a matter of life and death.

 

[vetinari]

I served in the Australian Army with WOs and Senior NCOs who had served for a long time before that, in Korea, Malaya and South Vietnam. They emphasised that we needed to maintain and clean our weapons, our vehicles and our rations first and our individual uniforms last. We did so. We may have looked a bit bedraggled but we were efficient and we were proud. We used to work long and and later than most units as a supply unit. We knew where everything was and how much of it we had. We could lay our hands on spare parts when we were asked to. When it came to ceremonial duties we performed very well. We polished our boots, our brass and made sure our hats were correct. Our drill was spot on.

 

[Amir]

The US Cavalry expression is “First the horse, then the saddle, then the man”. As Vetinari stated any well led, well disciplined, well trained unit is capable of executing any task assigned within their scope of capabilities.

Given what we’ve seen from some of the snapshots of more recently established units thus far in the narrative, the challenge may be less in manning and equipping and more on the discipline and leadership side of things. It will absolutely suck for unit to bust brush into some of their positions and the inclination will be to have a rest before establishing the defense. Hopefully the junior leaders are in place to get local security established, range cards and sectors of fire set up, an OP/LP or security patrols out and holes dug rather than letting the the rucksack flop take over and the “Z monster” attack.

 

[vetinari]

"Dig! Dig! Dig!" was our mantra, when we established a defensive position. When we first arrived, we would dig an 18in shellscrape, then within 24 hours we would dig a 2ft 6in position and by 48 hours we would enlarge it to 4 foot deep position, and in 60 hours include a sleeping bay. Of course, we'd often enlist the help of the Engineers with a digger to quickly accomplish what would take 5 days to dig. The point was, our defensive position came first. With Engineer Support we would dig in vehiclescrapes as quickly as possible. While this was happening. we'd have opened for business-as-usual and been taking demands for rations and stores and spares. We'd be mounting patrols of the area to make sure we owned it, not the enemy. The Australian Army had a long history of Active Patrolling to deny an area to the enemy dating back to WWI and it was emphasised where ever we went. Our stacks of stores were dispersed over a wide area and not manned 24 hours x 7 but were visited by patrols of a few men every few hours, just to be "sure" we still owned them.

 

[Amir]

Hopefully Gort will be able to appropriate and deliver the civilian owned pioneer tools and dimensional lumber in the area. A full sized mattock and shovel beat an entrenching tool any day when it comes to efficency while digging in. As does having nice precut lumber for revetting and overhead cover. Excavators, bulldozers, augers etc are another item that he will hopefully be able to get control of. As vetinari stated, equipment reduces to hours what it would take a unit days to do. Civilian labor is a potential security risk, but can also be used to expedite the process.

It will be interesting to see if the OTL difficulties in civil-military cooperation have been smoothed over enough to make such things happen.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Yep, plyofilm, tenite, resin impregnated/rubberized fabrics, rubber seals, or synthetic rubber were all used to make water proofed containers in WW2.

My maternal uncle (Infantryman, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment) carried a roll top waterproof satchel made from rubberized material from Fort Benning, Georgia in 1940 and back home in 1946 by way of North Africa, Sicily, and NW Europe with 2nd Armored Division. They scrounged plyofilm packaging (like the rifle bags in Saving Private Ryan) to store valuables and cigarettes in and kept old ammo cans to keep things like locally procured food dry and safe from rodents or pests. The US Army started issuing waterproof bags (pack liners) for food and other items to units in the Pacific during late 1942 in large part due to the experiences of the early battles in PNG and Guadalcanal.

It was common practice in US Army infantry units stationed in the Panama Mobile Force pre-WW2 to use locally made waterproof wallets/bags made from tarpaulin or other material to carry personal effects during jungle maneuvers. Rolled and tied seems to be the way they were closed. These became the pattern for the later WW2 issue bags. Another practice used by Infantrymen in Vietnam and elsewhere was the use of an old ammo can to carry moisture sensitive effects.

Obviously none of these methods lets you carry a lot of gear without a horrible weight penalty, but not a lot is really needed. During operations on Bougainville, for example, line infantrymen carried ammo and grenades, water and stripped down rations, small hygiene and weapons maintenance gear (toothbrush and powder/paste, foot powder, oil, rag, a cleaning rod split across several men), and a minimal clothing (spare socks and a sweater) along with tobacco for a three day patrol. They were able to return to a secure position where fires and resupply were possible to recover before the next operation.

Many of the current best practices for jungle warfare and sustainment stem from hard lessons learned during WW2 and the immediate postwar conflicts like the Malayan Emergency.

and

It's interesting to learn new things. I thought I knew pretty well the 1930s-to-50s history of flexible precursors for modern flexible plastic films, having worked in the medical device industry as a materials specialist for 25 years or so, but somehow I was unfamiliar with "pliofilm".

It's relevant to our story. It had limited OTL availability during 1941-42 due to the Japanese capture of most of the southeast Asian rubber tree plantations, with synthetic rubber variants and natural rubber versions from alternate rubber sources...US western-desert plant saps, South and Central American rubber plantations...allowing it to return to availability in 1943 or so. But, ITTL, maybe the Japanese won't capture all of the rubber plantations, or at last not for a longer time.

"Pliofilm" is a translucent elastomer-film made of (originally natural) rubber film, treated with chlorine. It's fairly strong and tough, at least by comparison to cellulose acetate and propionate films. It's somewhat expensive, mostly limiting its use to applications for which cost is secondary, at least once there were alternatives. It has the disadvantages (though not understood until much later) of contributing carcinogenic behavior to foods in contact with it due to the remnant benzene the pliofilm" contains, and...in the form of an "improved" toughened version developed later in WWII...causing chemical damage to many persons' skin that came in contact with it.

Here's a photo of...I think...British commandos carrying Pliofilm bags after D-Day:

Hi Amir and JWilly48519, I love your detail on this subject and era.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Thursday 04 December;

The patrol aircraft had nearly caught them out, it was only the sharp eyes of the lookout in the predawn light and the polished practice of the team that had enabled them to dive quick enough to avoid detection. Even so it was a sweaty moment for Lt Cdr Knox and the crew of HMS Regent. Patrol activity had significantly increased these past few days, the Japanese were up to something, a major exercise or something more? He would pull back ten miles and use the hydrophones for a while, he couldn’t risk remaining on the surface during the day, what with the regular patrol craft sweeps and the flights of aircraft overhead.

In Samah harbour, Hainan Island, they were ready, the last troops loaded overnight, sailing orders issued, and everyone had steam up. The light cruiser Sendai led, crawling forward at 8 knots, to allow those following to catch up, with several destroyers, who hurried the transports into their carefully planned sailing formations as they emerged from the anchorage. It took a good three hours for all 18 transports to come out, catch up and join formation. These ships were the pick of the Japanese Merchant Marine, all fast ships capable of 18 knots. Onboard was Lt Gen Yamashita and the first wave of the 25th Army, mostly of the 5th Infantry Division.

Following them out was the heavy cruiser Chokai, Flag of Vice Admiral Ozawa, commanding the Malaya Invasion Group, the close support forces, leading out the four heavy cruisers of CruDiv 7, commanded by Rear Adm Kurita in his flagship Kumano, with Mogami, Mikuma and Suzuya following. The 3rd Destroyer Sqn was attached, with four DesDivs, totalling 14 destroyers, some used as convoy escorts, others for fleet duties.

Also coming out with them were the auxiliary seaplane carriers Kamikawa Maru and Sanyo Maru carrying an assortment of seaplanes, including Aichi E13a ‘Jake’, Mitsubishi F1M ‘Pete’ and a number of the older Nakajima E8N ‘Dave’, to be used for CAP, anti-submarine patrols and maritime reconnaissance, plus the light cruiser Kinu, flagship of SubRon 4.

At a similar time, 650 Nmi’s to the north-east, the Main Body of the Southern Fleet was leaving Mako in the Pescadores Islands. They would provide distant cover for both the Malay and Philippine invasion forces, and later the Borneo invasion forces. Vice Admiral Kondo, CO of the Main Body, was also overall commander of the IJN in southern waters. He sailed in his flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago, along with her sister Takao, the two fast battleships Kongo and Haruna, and the eight destroyers from the 4th and 8th DesDivs.

The reason why these forces were so dispersed, was all part of the general deception plan, along with signals from dummy ships masquerading as the Kido Butai, all to try and achieve strategic surprise. However, many transports were having to gather in Cam Ranh Bay, their lack of speed meaning they had to be predisposed. With them were a number of smaller escorts, sub chasers, minesweepers and patrol craft.

Later that day, after nightfall HMS Regent surfaced and signalled in a report of large numbers of IJN units including heavy cruisers, along with transports leaving Samah, heading south. Further north off the Pescadores Islands HMS Rainbow did the same thing, her commander, Lt Cmdr Moore sending a similar report of increase patrol and air activity culminating in the sailing of lots of warships, including at least one battleship, to the southwest.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

The Japanese OOB is, as was historically, but the two British submarines are part of my timeline, HMS Regent, historically was on passage to Gibraltar from Malta, and was enjoying a successful career, while HMS Rainbow, unfortunalty had been lost as early as October 1940, over a year earlier, when it is believed she was rammed by the Italian merchant ship Antonietta Costa.

 

[kelgar04]

Still them flashing off a warning is a big difference also if they shadow the fleet they could probably send a few fish their way.

 

[duckie]

Still them flashing off a warning is a big difference also if they shadow the fleet they could probably send a few fish their way.

No shots, but the confirmed reports of warships leaving the harbour and radio intercepts saying that everybody is still in the harbour, we set the alarmbells going off.

Nobody is up to something good if they try to mislead you in the whereabouts of their forces.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

So the various Japanese invasion fleets have set sail, and this has been observed by the British and a report has been sent to Singapore. However the Japanese fleet heading towards Pearl Harbour hasn’t been observed, and thus unless they encounter a ship while in transit the early morning attack on Pearl, will come as a big a shock ITTL as it was in ours. The messages from the British submarines, once received and decoded will be presented to Admiral Phillips with his good morning pot of tea. He will along with his predecessor in post, arrange for an urgent meeting with the Governor, Lord Gort and AM Park. Once the meeting is over, cables will be sent to Hong Kong London and Manila informing them of what has been observed. Gort will also emphasise his desire to launch Operation Matador as soon as possible. All of the group will also want to bring their various commands to first degree readiness, and in the case of the Governor issue orders for the rounding up of the suspected Japanese spies and their local allies, and their placement in custody. Plus a strict censorship on all outgoing cables and mail, along with reporting restrictions on the radio and papers, along with restrictions on cables sent by by foreign representatives in Singapore, especially those from the Thai rep in Singapore. Plus while it is impossible to totally seal the border, it should be possible to close the major road crossings and the rail links until either Matador takes place or the Japanese invade Hong Kong. London will pass the information to Washington, but it up to them or Doug in the Philippines whether it’s passed onto Pearl. I doubt that the British are going to tell the submarines in the South China Sea to follow and attempt to attack the Japanese invasion fleets, but the submarines around Hong Kong will just be awaiting the word to commence hostilities against targets of opportunity. And the various surface vessels in Malaya will all be heading for their respective war stations, and the RAF search aircraft will be flying maximum missions. In an attempt to discover the destination of the Japanese fleets, and possibly be in position for a nighttime interception.

RR.

 

[Driftless]

So the various Japanese invasion fleets have set sail, and this has been observed by the British and a report has been sent to Singapore. However the Japanese fleet heading towards Pearl Harbour hasn’t been observed, and thus unless they encounter a ship while in transit the early morning attack on Pearl, will come as a big a shock ITTL as it was in ours. The messages from the British submarines, once received and decoded will be presented to Admiral Phillips with his good morning pot of tea. He will along with his predecessor in post, arrange for an urgent meeting with the Governor, Lord Gort and AM Park. Once the meeting is over, cables will be sent to Hong Kong London and Manila informing them of what has been observed. Gort will also emphasise his desire to launch Operation Matador as soon as possible. All of the group will also want to bring their various commands to first degree readiness, and in the case of the Governor issue orders for the rounding up of the suspected Japanese spies and their local allies, and their placement in custody. Plus a strict censorship on all outgoing cables and mail, along with reporting restrictions on the radio and papers, along with restrictions on cables sent by by foreign representatives in Singapore, especially those from the Thai rep in Singapore. Plus while it is impossible to totally seal the border, it should be possible to close the major road crossings and the rail links until either Matador takes place or the Japanese invade Hong Kong. London will pass the information to Washington, but it up to them or Doug in the Philippines whether it’s passed onto Pearl. I doubt that the British are going to tell the submarines in the South China Sea to follow and attempt to attack the Japanese invasion fleets, but the submarines around Hong Kong will just be awaiting the word to commence hostilities against targets of opportunity. And the various surface vessels in Malaya will all be heading for their respective war stations, and the RAF search aircraft will be flying maximum missions. In an attempt to discover the destination of the Japanese fleets, and possibly be in position for a nighttime interception.

RR.

Nice summary of the bazillion parts about to be put into motion in multiple directions. Macro fission about to happen