The biggest thing to help Hart would be to have his command severed from MacArthur's command. Basically make Mac in charge of the Land and Hart to command the sea command and let the Joint Chiefs make rulings on who commands what if its in doubt.
Helfrich was a vice-admiral. Doorman was a rear-admiral (in Dutch that is the beautiful rank of schout-bij-nacht) but Hart certainly didn't need to answer to him. Even if he had to, that shouldn't have been the problem, as Doorman had the same view of what ABDA should do as Hart had: evacuate to Australia.An admiral who must answer to an American General, a Dutch rear admiral and a President who fancies himself as a CNO, does not lend itself well to ultimate success. Did I forget to mention the behind the scenes maneuvers to keep the theatre in British or Dutch hands? Nevermind. Coxy already did. It's better to be a worn down American sixty four (64) year old than a dead 53-ish Dutch rear or British vice admiral, I suppose.
He was tired, and that made him defeatist. Don't get me wrong, Hart had every reason to be defeatist, it just made his tenure as commander of ABDAFLOAT untenable in the long run.Hart's mindset was never defeatist, he was tired
Helfrich played far from a glamorous role in this (or most other things for that matter), but you do have to understand the situation. The Dutch were just as forced to be part of ABDA as Hart was, and were only given the incredibly powerless ABDARM-command in return. Then you have the Britons who suffer from a severe case of Singaporitis, use your ships to escort their troop ships to Singapore, and when the ABDA-FLOAT commander turns up he seems to have given up on the defense of your country already and wants to retreat as many forces as possible to Australia, beginning with himself! This was not only the - always to be suspected - opinion and analysis of Helfrich, but also of Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborch.As to accepting ABDA command Hart was ordered by Washington to that post, but the Dutch fought and back stabbed him every inch of the way, especially politically.
See above. The British wanted all those ships for the defense of their troopships.The Dutch and British kept too many ships back for "convoy duty" assigning destroyers or cruisers to escort single ships all over the DEI and Eastern Indian Ocean . Hart was willing to lead and fight but needed to be allowed real command rather then command whatever the Dutch and British would make available, in addition to his own ships.
I dont think the Japanese deployed their older battleships so in this case they may have used Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise and Hyuga. If this is in a close escort role it doesnt matter about being fast if all you have to do is escort troop convoys and look intimidating. Surface action unlikely to go well and at this stage of the war then even air attack on a BB is moot given effectiveness of US torpsQuite what they would have done, I'm not sure, the IJN was stretched, ideally they would have used the Kongo class fast battleships, or battle cruisers (depends how you want to view them), Hiei and Kirishima to counter the USN cruiser sqn, but these were escorting the Kido Butai, and can't be spared. The other two of that class, Haruna and Kongo were in the South China sea ready to confront HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse, which the Japanese would view as a greater threat. So I'd say the Philippine invasion forces are delayed, awaiting on either the successful destruction of Force Z (they didn't know their air attack would be so successful) or the return of the Kido Butai, releasing the other pair.
That is what happened when war broke out. Hart received the official Orders about 0700 Manila time, " Japan has started hostilities, Conduct WPO-3C ( most current version) , Conduct unrestricted naval and submarine warfare against the Empire of Japan. Which is a bit ironic, since Hart's own orders to the Asiatic fleet issued about 0500 , were Japan has initiated hostilities, govern yourselves accordingly.The biggest thing to help Hart would be to have his command severed from MacArthur's command. Basically make Mac in charge of the Land and Hart to command the sea command and let the Joint Chiefs make rulings on who commands what if its in doubt.
Not possible this goes back to Adm. Yarnell's original request after the Panay sinking. Hart reiterated it in his Spring 1940 request for reinforcements. Even if Hart gets the air group they have to be Stationed in the Philippines, as no treaty existed between the USA and the Netherlands. Plus it would have violated the neutrality act.Would you accept Soerbaja instead of Luzon?
What happens if it is an allied task group , or a cruiser, instead of the Edsall or Pillsbury that comes upon Kido Butai at 15 miles? The carriers could see the destroyers during the fights.. at that range the carriers are in range of 8" guns and the edge of 6" range..Could such a force actually survive if the Japanese BBs and even carriers breath down on them?
Which would simply have been a gift to the Japanese unless this was accompanied by significant numbers of aircraft to operate from them and ground troops to protect them, neither of which were available absent a major change of priorities in Washington.What could or should have been done politicians willing and money available is build airfields at Cebu, Davo, Iloio, and improve DelMonte
yes and no; the Army controlled minefields, but the Navy , after the war warning , could mine approaches to it's bases, which it did. The landing beaches to within 16" gun range ( largest army coastal artillery) were army responsibility. With Mac Arthur restricting Harts subs and PBYs from actively patrolling near Formosa, Hart, cannot position his subs until too late. In addition most of the waters near the invasion beaches were about 100-200 foot deep and clear. Suicide for a sub. PT's did not have the range to make a speed run to and from the invasion beaches, and no tender to support them. OTL in the SW Pacific and Solomons, some of the 4 pipers repurposed as seaplane tenders were again repurposed as PT tenders. Hart's destroyers except the 2 damage at Cavite had all moved south out of Japanese air range.I think there were some long-standing control mandates about brown water responsibilities. The US Army had control of shore batteries and also Philippine littoral minefields (I believe). In OTL, did Mac also overrule naval attacks (subs, PTs, DDs) on the IJN invasion fleet at Lingayen Gulf, or was that a naval command decision?
that was the discussion for the airfields the placement of at least one or more carrier sized air groups of USN/USMC, on these fields. Of course Del Monte was USAAF. The locations I listed were already used by the USN as bases for PATWING 10 and it's tenders with some shore facilities.Which would simply have been a gift to the Japanese unless this was accompanied by significant numbers of aircraft to operate from them and ground troops to protect them, neither of which were available absent a major change of priorities in Washington.
The USN's pre-war position on the defence of the Philippines was that it was hopeless, and that they should not be sending their ships in harm's way in a futile attempt to avert the inevitable (hell, the USN didn't even want to deploy the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii). Some of the planners in Washington may well have agreed, but for political reasons neither the State Department, the Army nor the Philippine government could accept that, so An Effort Had To Be Made, though not of course an effort that risked irreparable losses. And anyway, the late-1930s US simply didn't have the divisions of regular troops and wings of aircraft that would be needed to defeat a major Japanese invasion of the Philippines. And even once the build-up started in 1939-40, the new (green) battalions and squadrons were being held back in the US for training, not sent to the far side of the world while the storm clouds darkened over the Atlantic. MacArthur's Philippine Army might have covered the gap - if it had been given another two years to train and organise.
And on top of this, the US was still hoping to avoid a war, while still putting the economic squeeze on Japan over the China war. This led the Americans (like the British) to drift into a policy of trying to deter the Japanese with a rather paper-tiger show of strength in the Pacific, while ordering their people on the spot to avoid provoking Japan with anything that might look like genuine war preparations, while crossing their fingers that none of it would prove necessary.
So the problem facing the US in the Philippines, TTL or ATL, is not "that corrupt buffoon MacArthur wilfully sabotaging the defence", it's that successfully defending the place is extremely hard and quite probably impossible barring a major change in US strategy several years in advance. By the time you get to late-1941, fiddling around with radar deployments and organisation and supply stocks is basically overhauling the lifeboats on the Titanic - you may make the upcoming disaster a bit less awful, but it's still going to be a disaster. And another handful of destroyers or bombers or artillery batteries aren't going to change very much.
I believe the older battleships were held back, both as a reserve, but more importantly, IMO because they were fuel hogs.I don't think the Japanese deployed their older battleships so in this case they may have used Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise and Hyuga. If this is in a close escort role it doesnt matter about being fast if all you have to do is escort troop convoys and look intimidating. Surface action unlikely to go well and at this stage of the war then even air attack on a BB is moot given effectiveness of US torps
What were Nagato and Mutsu up to at this point - were they deployed to Truk or at Harashisjima with the others?
Did the USN have any carrier-size air groups to spare in 1941, without stripping their carriers or training units? Likewise could the USAAF have spared a couple of air groups, if there had been facilities for them? I know that in 1940-1 they were expanding rapidly, but from a very low base, and I'm not sure how much was available when.that was the discussion for the airfields the placement of at least one or more carrier sized air groups of USN/USMC, on these fields. Of course Del Monte was USAAF. The locations I listed were already used by the USN as bases for PATWING 10 and it's tenders with some shore facilities.
Hi Admiral Jellicoe, I agree with Butchpfd that the older Japanese battleships were fuel hogs, but at this stage of the war, I don't think fuel economy was such a concern, capturing the Dutch East Indies was. However, the Japanese always looked upon the US Navy as their biggest threat, and the basic Japanese war plan was to grab the resources of South East Asia, form a defensive ring, and await the US onslaught. Despite the losses at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese still expected a very strong US fleet to come sailing across the Pacific, and they were very clear as to how they would defeat that, using the Kantai Kessen battle doctrine, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantai_Kessen. Having attrite the US forces with submarines, aircraft and night attacks with light forces, they would wade in with the battleship line, and those battleships had to be held back for that. The Kongo class was not considered essential for the battle line, they would be used as part of the night attacks, if they survived that, then they too would join the battle line, which meant they were also available for other uses. So we see them in the South China Sea, ready to engage Force Z, in the Solomon's and as fast escort to the Kido Butai.I dont think the Japanese deployed their older battleships so in this case they may have used Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise and Hyuga. If this is in a close escort role it doesnt matter about being fast if all you have to do is escort troop convoys and look intimidating. Surface action unlikely to go well and at this stage of the war then even air attack on a BB is moot given effectiveness of US torps
What were Nagato and Mutsu up to at this point - were they deployed to Truk or at Harashisjima with the others?
It might depend where the battle occurs.Could such a force actually survive if the Japanese BBs and even carriers breath down on them?
I believe that the effect is Island (English) vs. Continent (Dutch). I can't perceive the Adams family as being aristocrats. Neither would Washington of Jefferson!Interesting way of thinking, please explain?
I wonder how the European heritage have any efffect on the policy on the USA. I rather think time would have far greater effect on USA policy, there is more than a century between the men you mentioned.
The only heritage effect on the men you mentioned I can imagine is that the Roosevelt's were New Yorker entrepeneurs while the others where Southern Nobility, nearly arristocratic.
I believe that there were submarines present outside the Lingayen Gulf.I think there were some long-standing control mandates about brown water responsibilities. The US Army had control of shore batteries and also Philippine littoral minefields (I believe). In OTL, did Mac also overrule naval attacks (subs, PTs, DDs) on the IJN invasion fleet at Lingayen Gulf, or was that a naval command decision?
The forces were still about two weeks out at minimum, on 9 DEC 41. The Navy has written off the PI long ago. I'm just wondering if a squadron(s) of F4F and a squadron of SB2U might have an affect as CAP in the Java Sea. Better late than never?Not possible this goes back to Adm. Yarnell's original request after the Panay sinking. Hart reiterated it in his Spring 1940 request for reinforcements. Even if Hart gets the air group they have to be Stationed in the Philippines, as no treaty existed between the USA and the Netherlands. Plus it would have violated the neutrality act.
What could or should have been done politicians willing and money available is build airfields at Cebu, Davo, Iloio, and improve DelMonte
I read an archived article from a 1938 Manila paper. The Philippine Congress had approved a substantial amount for training the PI Army. This amount was to conduct a six month training period with upwards of 50,000 men called up to service. This was to be followed on the next fiscal year. I get the impression that it became a one off deal.So the problem facing the US in the Philippines, TTL or ATL, is not "that corrupt buffoon MacArthur wilfully sabotaging the defence", it's that successfully defending the place is extremely hard and quite probably impossible barring a major change in US strategy several years in advance. By the time you get to late-1941, fiddling around with radar deployments and organisation and supply stocks is basically overhauling the lifeboats on the Titanic - you may make the upcoming disaster a bit less awful, but it's still going to be a disaster. And another handful of destroyers or bombers or artillery batteries aren't going to change very much.
S - Boats were there, they were outside the 200 foot/ 35 fathom limit. the S- Boats even tried night surface attacks but, once the Japanese were inside the Gulf it was up to land and air to defend the P.I. The only way to prevent the invasion from closing was better recon. By the time of the invasion PATWING 10 had been halved ,with half of the planes surviving being the ones in the Southern islands.I believe that there were submarines present outside the Lingayen Gulf.