Even then this doesn't change Pearl Harbor and the fact that they are cut off. Just means they may inflict greater losses on the Japanese. They still won't holdout that much longer since the God Emperor will still want to defend the beaches even though he doesn't have the forces and so won't stock the peninsula properly. Starvation and disease will still take their toll. Due to better training and armament may last maybe another month at best.
I'll defer to Butchpfd here.

I do remember reading that GEN Homma was concerned after a January battle. His troops were devastated with dysentery and malaria, much like the USAFFE. His fear was that a counterattack would overwhelm his meagre forces. I believe that the 48th IJA division was being drawn off elsewhere, maybe Java? If the 48th has to return to the PI
will their be an additional bottleneck with Japanese merchant shipping?

As I understand, the logistics component to the USAFFE was envisioned to basing on the Bataan Peninsula. This was repurposed to forward positioning near Lingayen.
This would make sense, if you have a fully trained, equipped and experienced PI Army. That was not the case.

If reference is made to the Niehorster Orbats, then it is painfully apparent as to the predicament of the PI Reserve Divisions. The best trained Division regiments had 13 weeks service; Boot Camp plus AIT. The second best regiments are about one half the way thru Boot Camp. The third regiments are at the induction center.

This didn't happen in the OTL. However, the logistics are positioned on the Bataan Peninsula, as planned. Instead of bringing all the Luzon PI Reserve troops to Bataan, about 60,000 total, that number is reduced by a third to approximately 40,000. The supply situation is not as stressed. The majority of troops may not originate from Bataan Province, but they are native to Luzon. Perhaps they are better fed and less debilitated? GEN Homma's nightmare scenario unfolds.
 
I like that this scenario offers a comparison and contrast component. There is the modified timeline, where the Commonwealth is not as inept. On the other hand, the US holds mainly to course. The ABDA scenario has a chance for a limited success. The PI scenario has the forlorn hope to hold out for four to six months. Isandlwana or Little Bighorn come to mind as the final result.
Alamo would be a better analogy sacrificial hold out buying time for a later victory.
If Mac Arthur had followed the army plan of WPO, and planned on a delaying withdrawl rather then a meeting engagement at Lingayen Bay. with the rapid retreat of Mac Arthur's new troops leaving the rearguard to the regular units, 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, and some artillery .Clark Field, and Ft Stostenberg were abandoned, but not destroyed. Most military stores at Fort Stostenberg were for the 26th Cav ( It was their HQ and main supply depot) and the Philippine field artillery depot and training center. Also here were food stores and uniforms. Clark field was abandoned with aviation stores and fuel left for the Japanese.
Mac Arthur further refused to move any of the Army stores of food stocks in Manila be moved to Bataan until the 24th of December 1941 when he declared that Manila would be an Open City on the 26th. That meant all sores had to be moved by noon on the 26th, in reality less then a quarter was moved. Admiral Hart CinC AF was notified at the same time to move his remaining stores at Cavite and what he had in Manila including fuel. Hart was able to destroy his full stores at Sangley Point but not the huge oil stocks in Manila and had to move the Cavite supplies by gunboat and barge to Bataan. It was at best a "Chinese Fire Drill" and more realistically FUBAR..
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The Americans, British and Dutch all made serious mistakes IOTL, in the Far East and Pacific, both during the build up to hostilities and once hostilities had begun. Off the three only the Dutch have a reasonable excuse, as not only were they by far the weakest of the three, but their homeland had been invaded and conquered, and they were very much dependent on the largesse of the other two. Not having the industrial capabilities in the colony to produce complex military equipment, or the ability to draw on their homeland for additional personal. Britain was preoccupied with events elsewhere and only had limited resources to spare, while America had for a number of reasons neglected the defences of the Philippines. ITTL the British have by a combination of factors, primarily Winston being forced to pay more attention to the situation in the Far East, and the transfer of four men into command positions. Has been able to improve substantially its position, making use of what is available, even though out of date or obsolete in Europe, but is still functional in the area. This combined with numerous improvements macro and micro in the administration of zone, mean that the Japanese are going to have incredible luck to achieve anything like that success that they enjoyed IOTL. The Dutch have by cooperating with the British ensured that they as long as the British are successful in defending Malaya and Singapore they will be able to retain control over Sumatra and Java. As the forces that the Japanese require to assault Sumatra and Java, will be tied up in the campaign against the British in Malaya. Unfortunately for the Americans the combination of poor and divided military leadership, along with the lateness of their realisation of the need to do something about the Philippines, plus the demands of their support for the British war effort. Mean that there is very little to spare to aid the Philippines, and what is available is not being used in the best way. So will MacArthur make the same mistakes ITTL that he made IOTL, chances are he will, his own self belief doesn’t allow him to consider he might be wrong. And so the so the sort of worst case preparations that the British are making in Malaya and Singapore, are not being taken in the Philippines. He has done very little to improve prepare the Philippines for an invasion, nor has he set up the Bataan Peninsula to be the final hold out that is was meant to be. Had he constructed two or three defensive lines around the perimeter, placed a least six months of supplies for the entire military force in the Philippines, plus the majority of the spare ammunition available, and significant medical supplies. While establishing light forces to act behind the Japanese front line, as the British have done in Malaya, to provide intelligence and distract the Japanese. There is a very good chance that the Bataan redoubt could have been held for at least nine months, and seriously disrupted the Japanese plans. And this would have major consequences for the conflict in the Far East and Pacific, as between Malaya and the Philippines, the Japanese are going to have to allocate significant resources, that they need elsewhere.

RR.
 
I think what resources get allocated where will depend on which faction in the Army and Navy as well as between the two services has the better diplomacy/intimidation skills at that point in time.

I mean we tend to think Army Vs Navy in Imperial Japan but there were also internal factions that had their in power struggles in each group.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Alamo would be a better analogy sacrificial hold out buying time for a later victory.
If Mac Arthur had followed the army plan of WPO, and planned on a delaying withdrawl rather then a meeting engagement at Lingayen Bay. with the rapid retreat of Mac Arthur's new troops leaving the rearguard to the regular units, 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, and some artillery .Clark Field, and Ft Stostenberg were abandoned, but not destroyed. Most military stores at Fort Stostenberg were for the 26th Cav ( It was their HQ and main supply depot) and the Philippine field artillery depot and training center. Also here were food stores and uniforms. Clark field was abandoned with aviation stores and fuel left for the Japanese.
Mac Arthur further refused to move any of the Army stores of food stocks in Manila be moved to Bataan until the 24th of December 1941 when he declared that Manila would be an Open City on the 26th. That meant all sores had to be moved by noon on the 26th, in reality less then a quarter was moved. Admiral Hart CinC AF was notified at the same time to move his remaining stores at Cavite and what he had in Manila including fuel. Hart was able to destroy his full stores at Sangley Point but not the huge oil stocks in Manila and had to move the Cavite supplies by gunboat and barge to Bataan. It was at best a "Chinese Fire Drill" and more realistically FUBAR..
Hi Butchpfd, did WPO plan on an early movement of stores and supplies to Bataan, at a risk of tipping the Japanese off on American strategy?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The Americans, British and Dutch all made serious mistakes IOTL, in the Far East and Pacific, both during the build up to hostilities and once hostilities had begun. Off the three only the Dutch have a reasonable excuse, as not only were they by far the weakest of the three, but their homeland had been invaded and conquered, and they were very much dependent on the largesse of the other two. Not having the industrial capabilities in the colony to produce complex military equipment, or the ability to draw on their homeland for additional personal. Britain was preoccupied with events elsewhere and only had limited resources to spare, while America had for a number of reasons neglected the defences of the Philippines. ITTL the British have by a combination of factors, primarily Winston being forced to pay more attention to the situation in the Far East, and the transfer of four men into command positions. Has been able to improve substantially its position, making use of what is available, even though out of date or obsolete in Europe, but is still functional in the area. This combined with numerous improvements macro and micro in the administration of zone, mean that the Japanese are going to have incredible luck to achieve anything like that success that they enjoyed IOTL. The Dutch have by cooperating with the British ensured that they as long as the British are successful in defending Malaya and Singapore they will be able to retain control over Sumatra and Java. As the forces that the Japanese require to assault Sumatra and Java, will be tied up in the campaign against the British in Malaya. Unfortunately for the Americans the combination of poor and divided military leadership, along with the lateness of their realisation of the need to do something about the Philippines, plus the demands of their support for the British war effort. Mean that there is very little to spare to aid the Philippines, and what is available is not being used in the best way. So will MacArthur make the same mistakes ITTL that he made IOTL, chances are he will, his own self belief doesn’t allow him to consider he might be wrong. And so the so the sort of worst case preparations that the British are making in Malaya and Singapore, are not being taken in the Philippines. He has done very little to improve prepare the Philippines for an invasion, nor has he set up the Bataan Peninsula to be the final hold out that is was meant to be. Had he constructed two or three defensive lines around the perimeter, placed a least six months of supplies for the entire military force in the Philippines, plus the majority of the spare ammunition available, and significant medical supplies. While establishing light forces to act behind the Japanese front line, as the British have done in Malaya, to provide intelligence and distract the Japanese. There is a very good chance that the Bataan redoubt could have been held for at least nine months, and seriously disrupted the Japanese plans. And this would have major consequences for the conflict in the Far East and Pacific, as between Malaya and the Philippines, the Japanese are going to have to allocate significant resources, that they need elsewhere.

RR.
Hi Ramp-Rat, again, I tend to think a little differently on MacArthur's planning. As I said before he had little time to effect a decent defence, and with hindsight, knowing he only has until early December, we can say things should have been done differently, but if you or I were planning a timetable with a completion of late March, early April 1942, I think we'd be OK with his plan.

Onto the retreat and hold out in Bataan, this completely seems to have caught the Japanese out, and in part that might be due to MacArthur's delayed orders, as well as a Japanese need to follow timetables. Tha fact they held out as long as they did, can be put down to Japanese incompetence, but also a fantastic spirt of defiance from the American and Filipino soldiers. I'd be surprised to read they would have been expected to have held out as long as they did.
 

Driftless

Donor
Hi Butchpfd, did WPO plan on an early movement of stores and supplies to Bataan, at a risk of tipping the Japanese off on American strategy?
I don't think the general tenents of the WPO were much of a secret to the Japanese. The core ideas had been in place (in some form) since the US occupied the Philippines.

The central idea that the USN thought the archipelago as temporarily indefensible against the Japanese, left the US Army holding the bag till the USN could return in force months later. The logical place for the Army to hold as a bastion was the Bataan Pennisula, as the Marivales Heights there either protect/doomed the bases in Manila Bay and Subic Bay. In 1914, General Hunter Liggett presciently predicted the main thrusts of the Japanese assault plan for 1941-42....
 
MWI 41112103 The French Agents

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 21 November;

The four barges were moored in the river, close to a small jetty, they would begin unloading tomorrow morning when the lorries arrived. A light rain was falling, reducing visibility, and with no moon, only the distant light from a watchman’s brazier, over on the bank, reflected off the nearest oil drums, the Japanese markings warning of aviation fuel, briefly made visible. 1,600 drums, delivered by a Japanese Army transport ship, down by the coast, loaded onto these barges and then a tug had pulled them upstream to the quayside area of Thu Due, a riverside district of Saigon. They were bound for the JAAF occupied airfields around Saigon and further south at Soc Trang, to fuel aircraft of the Japanese 3rd Army Air Division, commanded by Lt Gen M Sugawara.

It was late in the night, or early in the morning, depending on how you viewed 3am. A small fishing boat came down the river, indistinguishable from all the rest you might find, dirty, nondescript, an oarsman, wearing a straw hat at its helm, nets bundled on its deck. It appeared to clumsily bump into the nearest barge, but softly, and a grapple flew out, catching the side of the barge, holding the boat tight to her, figures appeared from beneath the nets, arms reaching out, and two magnetic charges were quickly attached to oil drums. The grapple released, the boat swung out, and then back in, knocking into the side of the second barge, and again magnetic charges were fixed.

A night-watchman called out, carefully picking his way along the third barge by torchlight, to close on the fishing boat, calling out loudly in French, “who are you, what are you doing?” A reply came back, in Vietnamese, apologising. “Speak French” the watchman demanded angrily, a second watchman now appearing on the last barge, asking his companion what was happening. Second Lieutenant Peter Rule, his ‘nom de guerre’, of the Royal Engineers, appeared in the torchlight of the watchman, a ‘Ruby’ pistol in his hand aimed and cocked. He hissed at the watchmen, speaking in his native French tongue, “shut up, and get off these barges before you die”. Oaths of surprise were quickly met with another firm “shut up and start swimming”, with the pistol being waved to help them understand.

The boat swung free, before quickly closing against the third barge, the river’s current propelling her down to it. A grapple made her firm, and Rule was quickly across, onto the barge. Both watchmen stood, hands rising in the air, still not fully comprehending what was taking place. Rule’s free hand grabbed the nearest watchman, and shook him, the pistol waving in his face, “do you understand?” he growled in French, the watchman nodded and Rule pushed him away, sending him stumbling against an oil drum, before coming to the conclusion that taking to the waters was a good idea, the second watchman beating him to it by a couple of seconds.

The grapple released, the fishing boat swung out, away from the barges, heading for mid-stream, the two watchmen angling their swing with the current towards the bank, a hundred yards away. Reaching mid-stream, a small engine started, pushing the fishing boat a little harder, following the rivers course, around a bend, godowns built along the bank hiding the barges from their view as they turned a corner. A small charge blew, a drum ruptured, aviation fuel splashing out, all around, a second charge blew, again a drum split wide opening, a quick flash, and suddenly a fire, the drum exploding, splitting several drums stacked above it, the fire instantly igniting them too. A fireball roared out, climbing high into the air, lighting the river and both banks with its glow, rising above the godowns, for the eyes of Rule and his three companions to see. The low dark clouds above helped to cast an orange canopy over them all, adding to the theatre of the night.

The boat continued on down, another mile before briefly closing with the opposite bank, allowing Rule to jump out onto a rickety wooden jetty, before casting off, the fishing boat continuing down to the sea, heading for where the rest of the fishing boats would be, to collect a catch worth of a night’s fishing. Rule quickly ran up the alley between two godowns, to the road, and climbed into the passenger side of a black Renault Celtaquatre, the driver, a French woman in her mid-twenties, behind the wheel. “Thank god your safe Pierre”, she said in French, affection smiling from her eyes. “Quickly Sylvia, we have no time to lose, we must be away from here”.

Later, once back at their villa, and the car parked in its garage, they had gone to bed, hoping to get some sleep, tomorrow they must be up and acting as if it was just another day. But, in bed, sleep didn’t come easy, sirens could be heard as the French Gendarmerie responded, along with the Fire Brigade to the awful fire, burning out some barges on the Saigon River. The nervousness of the French authorities as they claimed an accidental fire had happened, something the Japanese fundamentally didn’t believe, masked the unreal situation, as the Vichy authorities stepped up their hunt for Free French agents in the city.

Rule and his mistress, Sylvia would lay low now, for the foreseeable future, her estranged husband, a tax inspector for the Finance Ministry, working up in Hanoi, in ignorance, until such time as Rule’s contact in the British Consulate, an underling of Consul General Sir William Meiklereid, would provide him with further work. He lay there reflecting how in the last two months, he’d gone from an engineer working on a Malayan rubber plantation, through an education at the SOE school on using explosives, while Sylvia had undertaken a course as a radio operator, her small transmitter stored in a battered suitcase in the loft. The whole thing seemed surreal, including their return back to Saigon by submarine, on HMS Regulus, climbing into a fishing boat off the coast at night, along with another two, to sneak back home.

The other two were single men in their forties, one a commercial salesman, the other a journalist, both able to travel as part of their everyday activities, but now gathering information. An older couple, husband and wife for nearly thirty years, had also returned at the same time from Bangkok, he worked as a low-level manager in Saigon’s city’s water works, while she was a secretary to an official in the mayor’s office. Supposedly, they had been on a touring holiday in Thailand, but had been in Singapore with the others, trained on basic spy practices, of surveillance, tailing, and the use of dead drops. All six of them were now trained on how to kill by knife or pistol, whether they were capable of it or not was another matter. But whatever their background, age or occupation, and for different motives, the loss of a son fighting the Germans, Patriotic fervour, or money, they were united in supporting the Free French cause, however they could.
 
Hi Butchpfd, did WPO plan on an early movement of stores and supplies to Bataan, at a risk of tipping the Japanese off on American strategy?
Yes, the official WPO, called for a movement of stores and equipment to begin movement toward Bataan, with the issuance of a WarWarning. The November 27, 1941 war warning, that went out to all Pacific commands was supposed to start the supply movements. Hart took that seriously, and serviced and sent his warships South, and picked up movement of supplies from Cavite to Mirivales on Bataan. MacArthur should have had standing orders in place, but he tore them up in August 1941 when he made the decision to defend forward. MacArthur despite having access to all codebreaking including diplomatic code, insisted that there would be no war prior to April, 1942.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
@Fatboy Coxy ,

Sir you and I as gentleman must agree to disagree, as I believe that if MacArthur had concentrated more on doing his job, and less on his political ambitions. Just a few simple actions even in the short time he had before the Japanese invasion, would have made the conditions of the defenders of Bataan much better. And increased the time it managed to hold out significantly, and the longer it holds out, the more opportunities there are for outsiders to resupply, and forces in the rest of the Philippines to cause the Japanese to divert resources away from the siege. As for the resent action in Saigon, providing that the operatives can not be directly traced back to the British, should they be captured, every little helps. The Japanese have a problem, they can either round up all the French citizens and watch the society basically collapse. Or they can try to manage the situation as best they can, which provided the saboteurs remain careful and not to large scale, is going to mean they the saboteurs are very hard to catch. We should always remember that there were some fundamental differences between French and British colonies, in all the major French colonies, it was possible to see the French preforming jobs that you would never see a Brit doing in a British colony. The classic example is the police, in French colonies it was common to see Frenchmen acting as basic constables, even standing point directing traffic. Were as the minimum rank for a British man in the colonial police was as a probationary officer, and then an inspector. Very few British women would have worked except in the medical or education field, and had Sylvia been in a British colony, she would have been a stay at home wife. Secretaries would normally be mixed race, Anglo Indian, Chinese, Malay and predominately male, only the very progressive business would have had female secretaries, and definitely not within the colonial civil service. Things ITTL will from necessity have changed somewhat in Singapore, where the influx of female servicewomen, and the demand of security, will mean that some positions are now filled by women. But outside of the services they will all be married to a man who is himself in the military or colonial civil service.

RR.
 
The Dutch have by cooperating with the British ensured that they as long as the British are successful in defending Malaya and Singapore they will be able to retain control over Sumatra and Java. As the forces that the Japanese require to assault Sumatra and Java, will be tied up in the campaign against the British in Malaya
OTL this was not the case. Why would it be so ATL?
 

Driftless

Donor
1941, Friday 21 November;

The four barges were moored in the river, close to a small jetty, they would begin unloading tomorrow morning when the lorries arrived. A light rain was falling, reducing visibility, and with no moon, only the distant light from a watchman’s brazier, over on the bank, reflected off the nearest oil drums, the Japanese markings warning of aviation fuel, briefly made visible. 1,600 drums, delivered by a Japanese Army transport ship, down by the coast, loaded onto these barges and then a tug had pulled them upstream to the quayside area of Thu Due, a riverside district of Saigon. They were bound for the JAAF occupied airfields around Saigon and further south at Soc Trang, to fuel aircraft of the Japanese 3rd Army Air Division, commanded by Lt Gen M Sugawara.

It was late in the night, or early in the morning, depending on how you viewed 3am. A small fishing boat came down the river, indistinguishable from all the rest you might find, dirty, nondescript, an oarsman, wearing a straw hat at its helm, nets bundled on its deck. It appeared to clumsily bump into the nearest barge, but softly, and a grapple flew out, catching the side of the barge, holding the boat tight to her, figures appeared from beneath the nets, arms reaching out, and two magnetic charges were quickly attached to oil drums. The grapple released, the boat swung out, and then back in, knocking into the side of the second barge, and again magnetic charges were fixed.

A night-watchman called out, carefully picking his way along the third barge by torchlight, to close on the fishing boat, calling out loudly in French, “who are you, what are you doing?” A reply came back, in Vietnamese, apologising. “Speak French” the watchman demanded angrily, a second watchman now appearing on the last barge, asking his companion what was happening. Second Lieutenant Peter Rule, his ‘nom de guerre’, of the Royal Engineers, appeared in the torchlight of the watchman, a ‘Ruby’ pistol in his hand aimed and cocked. He hissed at the watchmen, speaking in his native French tongue, “shut up, and get off these barges before you die”. Oaths of surprise were quickly met with another firm “shut up and start swimming”, with the pistol being waved to help them understand.

The boat swung free, before quickly closing against the third barge, the river’s current propelling her down to it. A grapple made her firm, and Rule was quickly across, onto the barge. Both watchmen stood, hands rising in the air, still not fully comprehending what was taking place. Rule’s free hand grabbed the nearest watchman, and shook him, the pistol waving in his face, “do you understand?” he growled in French, the watchman nodded and Rule pushed him away, sending him stumbling against an oil drum, before coming to the conclusion that taking to the waters was a good idea, the second watchman beating him to it by a couple of seconds.

The grapple released, the fishing boat swung out, away from the barges, heading for mid-stream, the two watchmen angling their swing with the current towards the bank, a hundred yards away. Reaching mid-stream, a small engine started, pushing the fishing boat a little harder, following the rivers course, around a bend, godowns built along the bank hiding the barges from their view as they turned a corner. A small charge blew, a drum ruptured, aviation fuel splashing out, all around, a second charge blew, again a drum split wide opening, a quick flash, and suddenly a fire, the drum exploding, splitting several drums stacked above it, the fire instantly igniting them too. A fireball roared out, climbing high into the air, lighting the river and both banks with its glow, rising above the godowns, for the eyes of Rule and his three companions to see. The low dark clouds above helped to cast an orange canopy over them all, adding to the theatre of the night.

The boat continued on down, another mile before briefly closing with the opposite bank, allowing Rule to jump out onto a rickety wooden jetty, before casting off, the fishing boat continuing down to the sea, heading for where the rest of the fishing boats would be, to collect a catch worth of a night’s fishing. Rule quickly ran up the alley between two godowns, to the road, and climbed into the passenger side of a black Renault Celtaquatre, the driver, a French woman in her mid-twenties, behind the wheel. “Thank god your safe Pierre”, she said in French, affection smiling from her eyes. “Quickly Sylvia, we have no time to lose, we must be away from here”.

Later, once back at their villa, and the car parked in its garage, they had gone to bed, hoping to get some sleep, tomorrow they must be up and acting as if it was just another day. But, in bed, sleep didn’t come easy, sirens could be heard as the French Gendarmerie responded, along with the Fire Brigade to the awful fire, burning out some barges on the Saigon River. The nervousness of the French authorities as they claimed an accidental fire had happened, something the Japanese fundamentally didn’t believe, masked the unreal situation, as the Vichy authorities stepped up their hunt for Free French agents in the city.

Rule and his mistress, Sylvia would lay low now, for the foreseeable future, her estranged husband, a tax inspector for the Finance Ministry, working up in Hanoi, in ignorance, until such time as Rule’s contact in the British Consulate, an underling of Consul General Sir William Meiklereid, would provide him with further work. He lay there reflecting how in the last two months, he’d gone from an engineer working on a Malayan rubber plantation, through an education at the SOE school on using explosives, while Sylvia had undertaken a course as a radio operator, her small transmitter stored in a battered suitcase in the loft. The whole thing seemed surreal, including their return back to Saigon by submarine, on HMS Regulus, climbing into a fishing boat off the coast at night, along with another two, to sneak back home.

The other two were single men in their forties, one a commercial salesman, the other a journalist, both able to travel as part of their everyday activities, but now gathering information. An older couple, husband and wife for nearly thirty years, had also returned at the same time from Bangkok, he worked as a low-level manager in Saigon’s city’s water works, while she was a secretary to an official in the mayor’s office. Supposedly, they had been on a touring holiday in Thailand, but had been in Singapore with the others, trained on basic spy practices, of surveillance, tailing, and the use of dead drops. All six of them were now trained on how to kill by knife or pistol, whether they were capable of it or not was another matter. But whatever their background, age or occupation, and for different motives, the loss of a son fighting the Germans, Patriotic fervour, or money, they were united in supporting the Free French cause, however they could.

Several questions and speculations:
  • How does this operation compare to OTL history?
  • In this operation, approximately how much volume of (constrained supply) fuel burned up ?(If these were 55 gallon/208 liter drums,or thereabouts, that's a lot of aviation gas gone up)
  • With that much high octane fuel in conflagration, how much damage to that portion of the harbor would be expected?
  • If this operation is not OTL, how much of a hinderance is the loss of fuel and damage to planned on port facilities does that pose to the Japanese Air Force, when we're about 2 weeks out from OTL Assault? I'd bet there would have been other piers and such available, but switching to them adds more organizational friction in the supply system.
  • What will the Japanese do in response to the failure of Vichy officialdom to protect valuable supplies, and obvious leaks in bureaucratic security? (How else would the raiders know when and where to strike). Somebody(s) in local Vichy French officialdom are in for a very rough time.
  • How much in-the-know would Lort Gort be? Or would this be a London directed action? By comparison, Auckinleck played a role in getting the SAS started.
 
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<snip>

But whatever their background, age or occupation, and for different motives, the loss of a son fighting the Germans, Patriotic fervour, or money, they were united in supporting the Free French cause, however they could.
Fun little update - but would the Free French really be using scarce agents on sabotage missions against the Japanese (with whom the Free French are not at war) when the #1 priority is the Germans? IIRC that unless the Free French were in a position to take over militarily (e.g. Gabon) they generally left Vichy colonies alone, preferring to persuade them to come over to the Free French side voluntarily. Also, would the British support such operations? The capture of a saboteur who had been working under diplomatic cover in the British consulate would be diplomatically awkward to say the least.

The operation as described really only makes sense if someone in SOE has concluded that war with Japan is imminent and decided to get some hits in first.
 
I don't think the general tenents of the WPO were much of a secret to the Japanese. The core ideas had been in place (in some form) since the US occupied the Philippines.

The central idea that the USN thought the archipelago as temporarily indefensible against the Japanese, left the US Army holding the bag till the USN could return in force months later. The logical place for the Army to hold as a bastion was the Bataan Pennisula, as the Marivales Heights there either protect/doomed the bases in Manila Bay and Subic Bay. In 1914, General Hunter Liggett presciently predicted the main thrusts of the Japanese assault plan for 1941-42....

There are some frustrating, barely decipherable parts of this 1966 USNI Proceedings article.
However, RADM Tolley lays out that the IJA was in the dark about Bataan and WPO. The
prewar OOB for the USAFFE was limited in scope, unlike the OOB for Malaya. One can make
an argument that the IJA, IJN and GEN MacArthur were more interested in proving their
strategy, than conducting a cohesive war.

Another one of the MacArthurism's apparently was the notification of the Asiatic Fleet of the intent
to declare Manila an open city. Decision made December 24. Decision released December 25.
Manila becomes "Open City" on December 26. Not much time to transport to Bataan, what the
Asiatic Fleet needs to conduct their war...Fortunately, what was available had been considerably
reduced at Cavite, after the effective loss of airpower on the first day of the war...
 
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You had lots of colonies that were controlled by Vichy but had Free French groups in them. One thing about the attack in Saigon is the fact that you might be able to make it look like it was some Chinese or Chinese backed factions attacking the Japanese. The Japanese were worried more about the Chinese in areas of Indochina more than they were worried about the French or native Vietnamese/Cambodian/Laotian because of their idea of "Superiority" to them.
 
Several questions and speculations:
  • How does this operation compare to OTL history?
  • In this operation, approximately how much volume of (constrained supply) fuel burned up ?(If these were 55 gallon/208 liter drums,or thereabouts, that's a lot of aviation gas gone up)
  • With that much high octane fuel in conflagration, how much damage to that portion of the harbor would be expected?
  • If this operation is not OTL, how much of a hinderance is the loss of fuel and damage to planned on port facilities does that pose to the Japanese Air Force, when we're about 2 weeks out from OTL Assault? I'd bet there would have been other piers and such available, but switching to them adds more organizational friction in the supply system.
  • What will the Japanese do in response to the failure of Vichy officialdom to protect valuable supplies, and obvious leaks in bureaucratic security? (How else would the raiders know when and where to strike). Somebody(s) in local Vichy French officialdom are in for a very rough time.
  • How much in-the-know would Lort Gort be? Or would this be a London directed action? By comparison, Auckinleck played a role in getting the SAS started.
Not only the Vichy officials. Those watchmen had better keep swimming.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Several questions and speculations:
  • How does this operation compare to OTL history?
  • In this operation, approximately how much volume of (constrained supply) fuel burned up ?(If these were 55 gallon/208 liter drums,or thereabouts, that's a lot of aviation gas gone up)
  • With that much high octane fuel in conflagration, how much damage to that portion of the harbor would be expected?
  • If this operation is not OTL, how much of a hinderance is the loss of fuel and damage to planned on port facilities does that pose to the Japanese Air Force, when we're about 2 weeks out from OTL Assault? I'd bet there would have been other piers and such available, but switching to them adds more organizational friction in the supply system.
  • What will the Japanese do in response to the failure of Vichy officialdom to protect valuable supplies, and obvious leaks in bureaucratic security? (How else would the raiders know when and where to strike). Somebody(s) in local Vichy French officialdom are in for a very rough time.
  • How much in-the-know would Lort Gort be? Or would this be a London directed action? By comparison, Auckinleck played a role in getting the SAS started.
Hi Driftless, blimey mate that's a lot of questions for one post, ok I'll answer them, and then you can answer one for me

This is an example of a mix of bits, that added together, would provide the basis for one of those Hollywood films you get based on true fact!

The actual sabotage act is told in Peter Elphick's book Far Eastern File, a book filled with lots of little facts. On pages 215-216, he writes
"Whether there was a British Secret Service involvement in the destruction of a Japanese oil dump of 1,600 drums stored in barges near Thuduc on 21st November is not known. The British consul-general reported that he had strong indications that the fire was caused by private French persons". his source is HS1/70. SOE. PRO.

So this could have been just ship's bunker fuel, but I know the Japanese were stockpiling fuel, including aviation fuel for their coming enterprise. Re size of drum/barrel, the British/Dutch/US dominated the oil industry pre 1940's and settled on the 55 gallon drum as the standard container. However, the amount of crude oil pumped out of the ground is measured in barrels of 42 gallons!

Onto the fire, and how big an explosion, well on land it would be some spectacle, but on the river barges, some drums may have been blown overboard by the initial explosion, and it may have been less, I confess to being no expert on this.

British SOE operations have been mentioned in https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-23861713, Operations, and https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-24270827 for training of Agents. So this is very much a cloak and dagger mission with Lord Gort's blessing.

The Vichy reaction and the Japanese one, at this present time, is what I would expect being as Japan hasn't really taken Indo-China completely under her control, referring to rule through the Vichy apparatus.

OK, thats about the best I can do for you, now your turn, although I think I've done this one before.

The text mentions our agents ‘nom de guerre’, as Peter Rule. make the connection with that and Charlton Heston in three moves.
 

There are some frustrating, barely decipherable parts of this 1966 USNI Proceedings article.
However, RADM Tolley lays out that the IJA was in the dark about Bataan and WPO. The
prewar OOB for the USAFFE was limited in scope, unlike the OOB for Malaya. One can make
an argument that the IJA, IJN and GEN MacArthur were more interested in proving their
strategy, than conducting a cohesive war.

Another one of the MacArthurism's apparently was the notification of the Asiatic Fleet of the intent
to declare Manila an open city. Decision made December 24. Decision released December 25.
Manila becomes "Open City" on December 26. Not much time to transport to Bataan, what the
Asiatic Fleet needs to conduct their war...Fortunately, what was available had been considerably
reduced at Cavite, after the effective loss of airpower on the first day of the war...
Nice sarcasm on Cavite losses. Hart had 6 months dry food stocks stored in Manila, as well as lumber stocks for construction and damage control. Most abandoned, by the open city declaration. What was at Cavite, Sangley Point, and Olopongo was transfered by truck and barge, or burned by Marines. One of the biggest losses at Cavite and Sangley Point,was the inability to move the dozen fixed 3"/50 calDP guns there.
MacArthur's staff incompetence showed here also not advising him the time needed to move the Army's stores from Fort Stostenberg, and Manila to Bataan. Estimates ranged from 6 to 9 months of supplies abandoned.Also are Stostenberg was the Philippine artillery depot, 2 months ammunition and spare parts for artillery and prime movers.
 
The text mentions our agents ‘nom de guerre’, as Peter Rule. make the connection with that and Charlton Heston in three moves.
Bit hard without knowing which Peter Rule you're thinking of. I'll try:
Squadron Leader Peter Rule met the US Secretary of State for Defense Neil H McElroy in 1959
1696535178879.png

Neil McElroy was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in December 1959 by President Eisenhower.
Charlton Heston was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in July 2003 by President George W Bush.
20080406__20080407_A22_ND07HESTONp1.jpg
 
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