Malaya What If

[ArtosStark]

Hi Butchpfd, thank you for this. I've watched a number of his video's, they are, as you say, extremely informative, but I have to say I struggle to stay with it, as his personal style of delivered frustrates me immensely, I prefer Drachinifel. I can, however, happily drink Irn Bru!

Oh good, it’s not just me.

I enjoy the context presented in his videos, and the insight. But I find he is better in smaller doses. And that his 1.5 hr videos could have been presented in 40 mins or less.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

What hasn't been spoken of much by author yet is what logistical butterflies have taken place in Malaya, Burma, Singapore, India, Middle East, etc. In short, what has been pushed "East" that previously was tied up in Egypt, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, etc.

Per the storyline and the additional units the author has provided for defence, it seems highly counterintuitive that additional ammunition, food, etc. will not only also have followed to the East. Further, that if they warganed an invasion, they would also have wargamed "How to sustain a defense given the units now in-theatre....then reinforce it as quickly as possible."

Given the importance of Singapore, I would contend that although in OTL the UK was accumulating assets for Operation Crusader (offensive to push the Germans back from current positions in Egypt and relieve Seige of Tobruk), in this TL, any delays caused to the Japanese offensive would invariably result in at least some significant reinforcements being pushed hard into Singapore, Penang, Rangoon, etc., at which point it becomes the Japanese who have the more complicated supply train than do the allies.

I'm a huge fan of this timeline and can't wait to see where the author takes it next... 🍻

Hi CB13, an excellent point, and I admit, although in my mind I've tried to take from other fronts, ie Home, Lend Lease to Russia and Dominion output, I've not demonstrated that well enough. There will be, has to be, an impact on the Middle East, just as there was historically, just see all the units and aircraft rushed East that could have been used in North Africa. A successful defence of Malaya will require a heavier drain on the Middle East. And that's why my mind continually turns to the US, and what help can they give. American was production is still building up, as are her forces, but that build up will be delayed by the drawing of resources to Malaya/DEI, slowing the development of US military expansion. And that is why I ask questions on the policy of Germany First. Heavy stuff eh!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

If Pearl goes like OTL, I don't see things changing. However, if Pearl goes differently, then who knows. Remember that things can change.

Hi Nevarinemex, 'if Pearl goes differently'! Oh My God, I'm not going to sleep tonight with the permutations that causes!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

That Division and their tender Black Hawk were enroute from Borneo to Singapore, as per Admiral hart's war diary. they left on the afternoon of 9 December, max speed would have been 15 knots, as that was Black Hawk's max speed. They turned back after the loss of force Z. in this time line they may get to finish their voyage,

Hi Butchpfd, Forgive me if I'm wrong, but I thought they parted ways, Blackhawk sailing to Soerabaja and DesDiv 57 leaving her, and sailing to Singapore. I'm not sure of their speed, but 18-20 knots would seem reasonable to me.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

@Belisarius II

Sir I must completely disagree with you, there was nothing ether IOTL or ITTL, that makes the fall of Malaya and Singapore inevitable. IOTL a combination of a number of factors came together that made the capture of Malaya and Singapore possible. This started with the inter war view that the only threat to Malaya and Singapore was was Naval, hence the construction of the Naval Base, and the emplacement of the big guns to defend it. All was basically well from the outbreak of the war in Europe, as the Japanese were considered to be occupied by their ongoing costly conflict in China, and the British who faced very little surface naval threat from the Germans, could if needed send a substantial fleet to Singapore. Remember up until the deployment of the Bismarck in 1941, the Germans didn’t have a single capital ship that could go toe to toe with any of their British adversaries. The fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war substantially changed things, both in Europe and the Far East. In Europe the availability of the French Atlantic ports meant that the German submarines had an easy route into the Atlantic, as they no longer needed to fight their way through the narrow gaps between Scotland and Iceland. In addition the availability of the French Atlantic ports meant that Germany Naval Raiders had alternative ports to retire too after a mission in to the Atlantic. Which meant that unlike before when the RN wasn’t able to say that they could prevent a German Naval raider from being able to get into the Atlantic, it stood very little chance of getting home again. But the requirement to provide increased coverage to the Atlantic, and the conflict in the Mediterranean, meant that the RN didn’t have the ships to spare to form a significant deterrent force to Singapore.

The situation in the Far East were significantly worsened by a combination of factors, the collapse of France and its occupation by the Germans, permitted the Japanese to steadily occupy more and more of FIC. This meant that the British now faced the possibility of a land invasion of Malaya, while the increased commitments of the RN in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean meant that there were no capital units to spare for the Far East. While the commitments to defend Britain against a possible German invasion and defend British interests in the Mediterranean against the Italians, meant that the Army had very little to spare to improve the defence of Malaya. Whilst the decision of the American President to force the Japanese to stop their invasion of China, without any consultation with Britain or the Free Dutch Governments, which given their present situation were obliged to go along with. And the failure of Winston preoccupied by events at home and in the Mediterranean, to address the situation in the Far East. Meant that the situation was left in a state of limbo, and that sensible measures to address the increasing threat were not taken. The military command structure that even in our time, with modern communications and transport technology, would be ridiculous, was left in place. Wavell whose principle consideration was always going to be India, had in addition the responsibility of of the rest of the Far East added to his already massive plate. And the civil administration in Malaya and Singapore, was along with the civilian population, who thought the singing “ There always be an England” while drinking cocktails at a Red Cross dinner, was a valuable contribution to the war effort. And was always prepared to accommodate the interests of the planters and businessmen of the colony, even when it went against the interests of the military. While the military commander, who was a brilliant staff officer, but afraid to upset the apple cart, and insist that serious preparations were made for what he knew was the inevitable invasion, continued to drift along without challenging ether his juniors or the civil administration.

Now ITTL, Winston has been forced to acknowledge the realities of the situation in 1941, there is absolutely no chance of retaining Hong Kong in the event of a Japanese invasion. Something that was well known and acknowledged by all of the members of the Committee for Imperial Defence. And that the vast expanse of the Far East and India couldn’t be commanded by just one man. The present Governor and civil administration of Malaya and Singapore, were definitely not up to the task, and the military commanders definitely needed shaking up. So reluctantly he decided that Hong Kong was to be stripped of much of its military, and allowed to fall to the Japanese if they decided to invade. He has also taken the advice of both his Colonial Secretary and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and agreed to the appointment of a new Governor, and the division of the Eastern military command, into two separate areas. One based in India with Burma as was traditionally included. And one based in Singapore, which includes Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo. His appointment of a very experienced if somewhat controversial military commander Lord Gort, with the highly experienced if definitely despised, by the old guard RAF establishment, Park as his Air Commander, with the highly experienced in the area Percival as Gorts Chief of Staff and ground commander. Who have in concert with the new Governor, and much to the disgust and dismay of the military, civil and civilian local establishments, seriously shaken up the existing convenient cosy atmosphere. The Governor, Gort and Park have not only stuck a rocket under the colony, they have been prepared to sack or transfer, those that have been found wanting.

As two posts by our author have pointed out this has come a no considerably cost. A young man who thought he was going to sit out the war in comfort, surrounded by luxury and with his wife by his side. Has been forced to take his volunteer commitment seriously, while carrying on his important work with a local business. And now that the threat exceeds his value to the community in his normal job, he has been called up to serve full time. While in the air the realistic training has both exposed a potential leader and see him die in the space of minutes. It should always be remembered just how many young men lost their lives, learning how to fly, as apposed to in combat. The principle problem for the Japanese is that, every small improvement that the British make, requires them to expend significantly greater resources to counter it. And this given the resources available to the British, which are only going to increase, as Britain really gets into its stride, in what will be the third year of the war for them, but is the fifth year of the war for the Japanese. Who are coming under increasing sanctions, especially of the most vital resource of the war oil. The Japanese have a major problem with their plans for Malaya, they have just two weeks to start to induce the collapse of morale and the military civil administration that they were able to IOTL, were note they came very close to losing, or they have lost this campaign. If the British administration civil and military can as I believe they can, given the improvements made to date. All the Japanese will have succeeded in doing is get themselves trapped in another tar baby, the same as they are in China. And with the British holding Malaya and Singapore, while they should given the unpreparedness of the Americans in the Philippines be successful there. Their chances of success other than in Borneo, in the region to the south of Singapore are slim to none. I will say again there was nothing inevitable about the success of the Japanese in Malaya, it was a very close run thing IOTL, and ITTL will be incredibly hard to achieve.

RR.

Hi Ramp-Rat, blimey mate, you are good at this business of appraisal

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Pez Dispenser. Love it!

Yes Butchpfd, as Nevarinemex says, well worked in! didn't have a grandchild on your knee as you was writing that by any chance?

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Some Australian data I picked up around 14 years ago from a now defunct website. I would note that it is not mine, with all spelling left in its original state, and that I don't have the means to attribute the author, whoever it might be.

"Historical Australian Munitions Production June 1942:

Rifles (many would be WW1 stock) 400,977, production 10,000 month
LMG (Bren/Lewis) 7,563, production 385 Bren/Month
MMG (Vickers) 2,968, production 300/month
0.303 Ammo 41,039,000, Production 45,509,000 (seams high...)
SMG Ammo 20,000000, production 66,000 month
2 Pdr AT Guns 788, production 43 month
2 Pdr AT ammo 654,943, production 58,000 month
25 pdr guns 760, production 64 month
25 pdr ammo 1,263,461, production 150,000 month
18 pdr guns 262, no production
4.5" Howitzer 77, no production
3" Mortar 1,330, production 354 month
3" ammo 774,041, production 112,650 month
2" mortar 142, no production (orders issued Dec 1941)
2" ammo 225,645, no production (orders issued Dec 1941)
AT mines 194,195, production 5,931 month
Hand grenades 949,846, production 137,952 month
Rifle grenade 720,000, production 60,000 month
Armoured Carrier ("Bren Gun Carrier) 2612, production 175 month.
Armoured recce vehicle (?) 350, 130 month.

By 1939 Australia had a significant capability to produce small arms, small arms ammunition (Rifles, Brens, Vickers), Mortars and ammunition, 18 pdr ammunition and began tooling for 25pdr production and ammunition, Naval gun ammo to 8". About 50% of machine tools were made in Australia, and 50% imported, with the later number droping.

Early 1940 Australia begins supplying munitions to the Indian Army (who lacked production capabilities?) and to British forces in the SEASIA/Middle east.

By Dec 1941 Austraia had 7 Small Arms Ammunition Factories, 10 Small Arms Factories, 6 Explosive making factories, 5 cartridge case factories, 2 ordonance factories.

In March 1940 they had the capacity to make (but NOT the orders):
400 3.7" AA guns a year
121 40mm Bofors a year
840 Field guns (25 pdr)
1900 AT guns (2 pdr)
24 Naval guns (4-6" by the looks of it)
2000 Mortars
6000 Bren
2500 Vickers
200,000 Rifles
50,000 pistols

10,500,000 "Gun ammo" all natures.
1,950,000 Mortar ammo
240,000 aircraft bombs
730,000,000 small arms ammo.

2,000 carriers
1,000 light tanks

10,000 depth charges
3,000 Naval mines
260,000 AT mines
1,000,000 grenades


In Feb 1942 torpedoes where added to the list at 520 a year.

Some interesting "cost of production" Jun 1942 Pounds:
Carrier, MG LP2.....1500
2 pdr at gun........1750
3.7 AA..............6000
25 pdr..............4500
Vickers MMG.........109
Bren................150
Rifle...............13
1000 rounds303 ammo.9.9
Bomb 250lb anti sub.24
3.7 shell fille.....7.5
25pdr shell filled..3.9
4.5" shell filled...4.7
4" shell filled.....10
6" shell filled.....27

Australian manufactured items were cheaper than UK for small arms and SA ammo but more expensive for AA/arty/Naval shells (largely due to the lack of orders and therefore inability to effectively mass produce).

Actual production figures for period Jun 1940 til March 1942 then Jun 1940-June 1942 (I.e. the second figure INCLUDES the first figure)

25pdr Field Gun...267.......459
25pdr HE..........238,448...608,942
3.7 AA Gun........216.......264
3.7 ammo..........110,439...178975
3" mortar.........1261......1541
3"ammo............514,426....810,389
No Bofors produced until Dec 1942
Vickers...........4,411......5,213
Bren..............2,047......3,267
SMG...............280........1,909
Carriers..........2,264......2,830
Scout Car.........8..........70

Navy Stuff
Mines.............3,105......4,689
depth charges.....10,496.....11,896
4" ammo...........34,808.....39,720

Air
20lb frag.........6514.......24,072
100lb asw.........7,883......7,883 (production run completed a few months prior)
250lb ASW.........3,364......3,364 (production run completed a few months prior)
250lb GP..........22,613.....29,243
250lb SAP.........299........467 (production really ramped up in the next 6 months)"

- For more in depth examination of Australian munitions production in WW2, the key text is Armed & Ready: The Industrial Development & Defence of Australia, 1900-1945 by Andrew T. Ross

Hi Simon Darkshade, thank you for this.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Just realised - that flight instructor is a flipping Battle of Britain ACE! That’s a pretty great flyer…

Hi TheRealDeal, well done, but if you dig a little deeper in that post, you might find more!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

As you point out, Australia is apparently self-sufficient in armaments and ammunition needs.

Why couldn't PM Curtin, instead of throwing Australia to the mercy of an American occupation, not do something else?
If the US is not an occupying power, then the foodstuffs provided to them by Australia, feed Australians and not GI's.
I believe that the Australian food provisions to American's war effort exceed the value of received Lend-Lease.

Does Australia actually require an American presence? Or can the Commonwealth and Soviet Union pick up the
difference? The RN, RAN and RNZN concentrate on SWPA, while the USN concentrates on CENPAC.

Politically speaking, as PM Curtin cut his teeth in the defunct VSP, he might have a natural fondness for the
CommIntern. And as a special bonus, you don't get GEN MacArthur.

Hi Nevarinemax, Historically Australia was thrown into the fear of a Japanese invasion, which although we might say can't happen now, back then it was thought of a s a real theat. The Militia had to be properly armed and equipped, hence the home consumption of most of their production, along with maintaining the New Guinea campaign.

If Malaya/Singapore holds longer, and also the DEI, the home invasion threat lessens but with the return of the AIF, its going to be the Australian Army doing a LOT of the fighting in the DEI. The RN, RAN and RNZN navies, along with the Dutch are very had pressed, American USN help needed.

But how MacArthur fits in I don't know, but I can't see him just returning to the USA.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Oh good, it’s not just me.

I enjoy the context presented in his videos, and the insight. But I find he is better in smaller doses. And that his 1.5 hr videos could have been presented in 40 mins or less.

Hi Artos Stark, spot on, a bit of pre filming planning wouldn't go amiss, rather than spend 5-10 seconds of silent recalling the next bit

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Monday 03 November;

Training, it had become the norm now, everyone did it, the infantry, the artillery, the engineers, the support services, as well as the RAF and Royal Navy. For the Army, it had started at the top, Percival driving it, prompted by the Stewart – Simmons fallout over a training exercise, which had highlighted not only a need to train, but what training was required. And Percival had done it in his own quiet unassuming way, banishing Stewart to some provincial town, well away from Simmons and Singapore society, but running a training camp that taught how to fight in the jungle.

Godwin-Austen had caught the bug, and early, shocked at the poorly training Indian troops of his new command, III Indian Corps. Every week he was out in the field, viewing another training exercise, be it a brigade one or a platoon one, inviting himself along, with little forewarning, ensuring the training was taken seriously. And this wasn’t parade ground square bashing, little of that was done, no it was field exercises, small unit patrols, company size attacks, battalion advances, and brigade manoeuvres, and all manner of other things. Rowell was also an avid supporter of it, all his Australian units heavily trained.

There was a cost to it, money obviously, as more fuel was used, more accidental damages to civilian property, more equipment and vehicles worn, requiring repair, overhaul or replacement. And the human cost, twisted ankles, pulled muscles, broken bones, cuts and bruising, and more worrying, malaria. Yes, try as they might, avoiding malarial areas wasn’t always possible. They had continued the strong British colonial policy of draining the land around military camps and other facilities, the issue of anti-malaria tablets, the extensive use of mosquito nets when sleeping, and a raising of a general awareness of the dangers. But despite this, cases of malaria had risen, and noticeably so. The field hospitals were managing fine, and there was a large stockpile of Quinine, the anti-malarial drug, produced by the Dutch East Indies, from their large cinchona tree plantations in Java.

But there was also some new training being done now, specific to individual units, tailored to needs. Some Indian and Australian infantry battalions worked with trains, as did field engineers. And other Indian and Australian units practiced ship embarking and disembarking from a few purposely allocated ships. Movement control of road convoys was worked on, the military police finding themselves heavily worked. The 8th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regt was doing a lot of long-distance motoring, and both armoured trains, Lancelot and Galahad exercised securing rail bridges.

The troops grumbled, as all troops do, but sensed there was a real purpose to it, although nothing was said about what they were training for. Morale was high, the troops enthusiastic, although the efficiency of some units, mostly Indian, still left a lot to be desired, and would need a lot more training. But some senior commanders, both Divisional and Brigade, were already being briefed on what roles their units might play in any future conflict. If they hadn’t been keen on training before, they became staunch advocates of it now.

 

[Aber]

There will be, has to be, an impact on the Middle East, just as there was historically, just see all the units and aircraft rushed East that could have been used in North Africa. A successful defence of Malaya will require a heavier drain on the Middle East. And that's why my mind continually turns to the US, and what help can they give.

To point out the obvious, the greater focus on Malaya ITTL so far means that policy in London is different and that will impact the balance between Middle East and Far East. Also a better defence of Malaya will pull forward forces that OTTL went to Australia & Ceylon due to concerns about their security.

There would also have been major concerns in London about the Eastern Front with the Germans surrounding Leningrad and about to launch their final assault on Moscow at the end of October 1941.

Looking forward it is difficult to see what extra effort the Navy can make in the Pacific, subject to butterflies caused by more Japanese forces having to be used in Malaya. US ground forces are limited (only 23 divisions formed before 1941), as is shipping. Only 3 divisions were shipped to the UK before mid 1942, leaving little that could be diverted to say Persia to release other British forces. On the other hand the forces involved in some of the early clashes were very small and distribution of regiments or even battalions could make a difference. US air forces are more flexible and building up the 10th Air Force may be possible.

 

[Clermontian]

One has to wonder what the impact this has on the British position in the Far East in the Cold War? No Confrontation, toned down Emergency? Perhaps we do not become so woefully arrogant on the effectiveness of our counterinsurgency LOL.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

To point out the obvious, the greater focus on Malaya ITTL so far means that policy in London is different and that will impact the balance between Middle East and Far East. Also a better defence of Malaya will pull forward forces that OTTL went to Australia & Ceylon due to concerns about their security.

There would also have been major concerns in London about the Eastern Front with the Germans surrounding Leningrad and about to launch their final assault on Moscow at the end of October 1941.

Looking forward it is difficult to see what extra effort the Navy can make in the Pacific, subject to butterflies caused by more Japanese forces having to be used in Malaya. US ground forces are limited (only 23 divisions formed before 1941), as is shipping. Only 3 divisions were shipped to the UK before mid 1942, leaving little that could be diverted to say Persia to release other British forces. On the other hand the forces involved in some of the early clashes were very small and distribution of regiments or even battalions could make a difference. US air forces are more flexible and building up the 10th Air Force may be possible.

Hi Aber, thank you for this, it all helps me form ideas. I have plenty of time to work out the future permutations, and not wishing to provide spoilers, I'm deliberately vague about where things go. However, for Britain to hold Malaya/Singapore until say 1st June, she also needs to help hold the southern Dutch Islands of Java and Sumatra, defeating the Japanese goal of conquering the DEI in 150 days. As a consequence of that I'm looking at the finish of Crusader, and how things progress there onwards. I'd guess this would force a defensive posture on Auchinleck, given how more resources will be drawn into the Far East..

One problem that no one has mentioned (I think) is I brought Reede Godwin-Austen into Malaya to command the Indian III Corps, leaving Heath (Churchill's fighting general) remaining in command of the Indian 5th Division. I've sidestepped the thorny question of who is now going to command XIII Corps in Crusader, Heath being my probable choice. I would welcome debate on this, I thought Godwin-Austen did very well, the debacle with Richie and his resignation was a major loss in NA. I wonder how well would Heath have done, or alternatively, who else commands XIII Corps.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

One has to wonder what the impact this has on the British position in the Far East in the Cold War? No Confrontation, toned down Emergency? Perhaps we do not become so woefully arrogant on the effectiveness of our counterinsurgency LOL.

Hi Clermontian, that's assuming all goes well in my TL, but what if the Allied defences collapse, with even bigger losses, which could quite effectively extend the war.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Hi Ramp-Rat, blimey mate, you are good at this business of appraisal

I thank-you sir for your compliment, and am looking forward to your take on the outbreak of hostilities, both in Malaya and the much wider Far East/Pacific region. As for what to do with His Imperial Majesty the MacArthur, other than having his evacuation mission intercepted by the Japanese and his subsequent death. I for one only have vague ideas of what not to do with him, he is a major headache for the American establishment, but the one thing I am sure of is that once London having read the reports from Gort, Park, Percival, Layton and Caldecott. London along with Singapore would be very reluctant to have Mac anywhere near command over Imperial forces.

RR.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

1941, Monday 03 November;

Training, it had become the norm now, everyone did it, the infantry, the artillery, the engineers, the support services, as well as the RAF and Royal Navy. For the Army, it had started at the top, Percival driving it, prompted by the Stewart – Simmons fallout over a training exercise, which had highlighted not only a need to train, but what training was required. And Percival had done it in his own quiet unassuming way, banishing Stewart to some provincial town, well away from Simmons and Singapore society, but running a training camp that taught how to fight in the jungle.

Godwin-Austen had caught the bug, and early, shocked at the poorly training Indian troops of his new command, III Indian Corps. Every week he was out in the field, viewing another training exercise, be it a brigade one or a platoon one, inviting himself along, with little forewarning, ensuring the training was taken seriously. And this wasn’t parade ground square bashing, little of that was done, no it was field exercises, small unit patrols, company size attacks, battalion advances, and brigade manoeuvres, and all manner of other things. Rowell was also an avid supporter of it, all his Australian units heavily trained.

There was a cost to it, money obviously, as more fuel was used, more accidental damages to civilian property, more equipment and vehicles worn, requiring repair, overhaul or replacement. And the human cost, twisted ankles, pulled muscles, broken bones, cuts and bruising, and more worrying, malaria. Yes, try as they might, avoiding malarial areas wasn’t always possible. They had continued the strong British colonial policy of draining the land around military camps and other facilities, the issue of anti-malaria tablets, the extensive use of mosquito nets when sleeping, and a raising of a general awareness of the dangers. But despite this, cases of malaria had risen, and noticeably so. The field hospitals were managing fine, and there was a large stockpile of Quinine, the anti-malarial drug, produced by the Dutch East Indies, from their large cinchona tree plantations in Java.

But there was also some new training being done now, specific to individual units, tailored to needs. Some Indian and Australian infantry battalions worked with trains, as did field engineers. And other Indian and Australian units practiced ship embarking and disembarking from a few purposely allocated ships. Movement control of road convoys was worked on, the military police finding themselves heavily worked. The 8th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regt was doing a lot of long-distance motoring, and both armoured trains, Lancelot and Galahad exercised securing rail bridges.

The troops grumbled, as all troops do, but sensed there was a real purpose to it, although nothing was said about what they were training for. Morale was high, the troops enthusiastic, although the efficiency of some units, mostly Indian, still left a lot to be desired, and would need a lot more training. But some senior commanders, both Divisional and Brigade, were already being briefed on what roles their units might play in any future conflict. If they hadn’t been keen on training before, they became staunch advocates of it now.

And there we have it - almost more important than the actual Japanese attack and dare I say it effectively the point of arrival for this story from the initial POD

A complete switch in attitude across the entire ‘tribe’ verses that of OTL

Well done

 

[DDM]

I thank-you sir for your compliment, and am looking forward to your take on the outbreak of hostilities, both in Malaya and the much wider Far East/Pacific region. As for what to do with His Imperial Majesty the MacArthur, other than having his evacuation mission intercepted by the Japanese and his subsequent death. I for one only have vague ideas of what not to do with him, he is a major headache for the American establishment, but the one thing I am sure of is that once London having read the reports from Gort, Park, Percival, Layton and Caldecott. London along with Singapore would be very reluctant to have Mac anywhere near command over Imperial forces.

RR.

In regard to MacArthur politics being e
what they are his place is not assured. Even with his control of press in the Philippines he does not have control outside. If the Commonwealth forces are performing better than his star might fade in comparison and he could be sidelined which Roosevelt would have loved to do if not for the bad optics of it. In this tl that might not be the case.

 

[kelgar04]

Good to see the three T‘s are present which is training, training and more training.

 

[Clermontian]

Hi Clermontian, that's assuming all goes well in my TL, but what if the Allied defences collapse, with even bigger losses, which could quite effectively extend the war.

One dreads to think!