Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
FDR’s antipathetic position regarding the British Empire is not something new, nor undocumented, nor really that controversial in the scholarship I have read.

I further haven’t seen it confined to the discredited likes of David Irving; whilst he might subscribe to the same positions as multiple other historians, that is simply his thoroughly broken clock being right twice a day, as it were.


The opening précis to this article puts it pretty plainly.


A few more sources, drawn from a few minutes on Google. Were it the weekend and not jotting on my phone whilst a game loads, I could find several dozen more in fairly short order.

FDR and Churchill had a decent personal relationship, but the former never let that subsume the distinct interests of the USA. I’d further distinguish between ‘the UK’ in its sense as a nation state and the British Empire in terms of focusing the object of Roosevelt’s antipathy; Churchill, like many in the British establishment, did not really conceive of the two as separate entities, whereas the distinction is abundantly clear in American positions, newspapers and discourse of the time.

Whilst it isn’t my place as such, I should hate to see this interesting yarn sidetracked by this particular tangent. Suffice it to say that there is a considerable weight of evidence and source material that in the very least is pointing in the direction that Ramp Rat was indicating.
Hi Simon Darkshade, thank you for the information and your comments. And as you say, I won't let my little yarn get side-tracked, and we'll move on.
 
MWI 41102116 Air Raid Penang

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
MWI 41102116 Air Raid Penang

1941, Tuesday 21 October;


Although the air raid siren wailed with plenty of time, being the military, everything had to be done at the double, and so the crews ran to the half battery of 3-inch guns, dodging around each other as they all headed to their own positions, having been set a new, shorter target time to be ready to fire. The NCOs began turning to the officers, calling out the readiness of their gun crews, while the range finders frantically tried to locate the incoming aircraft.

The call from the Ops Room at Glugor gave the plot, tracked firstly by the TRU up on Kedah Peak, then picked up by the COL station at Bukit Huma, which was in turn relayed to the crews. Single aircraft, height 5000 ft, bearing 41 degrees, speed 120 mph, prepare to engage, commence firing! All four guns fired, a split second between them, but the next volley was less in step, and by the fourth salvo, it sounded like independent firing, as the newly trained Indian gunners of 7th battery, 2nd HAA Regiment IA struggled with their roles.

Declared operational at the beginning of October, the regiment, one of three recently raised from the 1st HAA, which was still in Singapore training more gunners, had been posted to Penang garrison, and had arrived a couple of weeks ago. At the same time the 3rd Regt had been deployed to the state of Kelantan, the 4th Regt was sailing for Rangoon, Burma and the 3rd LAA Regt HKSRA, two batteries of eight 40mm Bofors guns, had also been sent to North-West Malaya, its third battery serving in Aden.

For the 2nd HAA, guns and crew were scattered around Penang, covering coastal guns, the harbour, the airfield and other strategic targets. Officers and men had been driven by the CO, who was determined to make them the best in Malaya. Training, training, and more training was his mantra, and that’s what they were doing. Now it was no more drills, onto real shooting.

Not a single round had got anywhere near the sock the Fairey Battle tug pulled, even keeping it slow and straight. This was the second battery they had flown over this afternoon; they’d flown over the lot once already this morning. The aircraft circled round and made another pass. Frantically the gunners tried to re adjust their aim, further rounds began to close on the sock. Suddenly a round exploded close enough to the Battle as to startle its pilot. “Crickey Sir that was close” a second explosion buffeting the aircraft evoked the cry “Blimey, what are your boys up to” as the pilot tried to keep the aircraft straight and true.

Sitting in the observer seat was recently promote Lt Col George Proes, white faced, desperately trying to swallow down the contents of his stomach stuck in his throat. This wasn’t what he’d expected, what on earth had possessed him to even think this was a good idea. This whole business of trying to be better than his peers Duncan, Temple and even Yale had gotten totally out of hand. It had all seemed so reasonable, the 3 majors and their colonel transferring from the HKSRA when their Hong Kong batteries had been disbanded and having a wager on who would have the best of the newly formed Indian AA regiments. No, this was just madness. Swallowing back down his lunch, he spoke in the microphone, “OK pilot that will be all, I think we’re done here, you may return to Bayan Lepas”. The pilot banked the aircraft, increased revs and dived away, the sock racing after her.
 
MWI 41102116 Air Raid Penang

1941, Tuesday 21 October;


Although the air raid siren wailed with plenty of time, being the military, everything had to be done at the double, and so the crews ran to the half battery of 3-inch guns, dodging around each other as they all headed to their own positions, having been set a new, shorter target time to be ready to fire. The NCOs began turning to the officers, calling out the readiness of their gun crews, while the range finders frantically tried to locate the incoming aircraft.

The call from the Ops Room at Glugor gave the plot, tracked firstly by the TRU up on Kedah Peak, then picked up by the COL station at Bukit Huma, which was in turn relayed to the crews. Single aircraft, height 5000 ft, bearing 41 degrees, speed 120 mph, prepare to engage, commence firing! All four guns fired, a split second between them, but the next volley was less in step, and by the fourth salvo, it sounded like independent firing, as the newly trained Indian gunners of 7th battery, 2nd HAA Regiment IA struggled with their roles.

Declared operational at the beginning of October, the regiment, one of three recently raised from the 1st HAA, which was still in Singapore training more gunners, had been posted to Penang garrison, and had arrived a couple of weeks ago. At the same time the 3rd Regt had been deployed to the state of Kelantan, the 4th Regt was sailing for Rangoon, Burma and the 3rd LAA Regt HKSRA, two batteries of eight 40mm Bofors guns, had also been sent to North-West Malaya, its third battery serving in Aden.

For the 2nd HAA, guns and crew were scattered around Penang, covering coastal guns, the harbour, the airfield and other strategic targets. Officers and men had been driven by the CO, who was determined to make them the best in Malaya. Training, training, and more training was his mantra, and that’s what they were doing. Now it was no more drills, onto real shooting.

Not a single round had got anywhere near the sock the Fairey Battle tug pulled, even keeping it slow and straight. This was the second battery they had flown over this afternoon; they’d flown over the lot once already this morning. The aircraft circled round and made another pass. Frantically the gunners tried to re adjust their aim, further rounds began to close on the sock. Suddenly a round exploded close enough to the Battle as to startle its pilot. “Crickey Sir that was close” a second explosion buffeting the aircraft evoked the cry “Blimey, what are your boys up to” as the pilot tried to keep the aircraft straight and true.

Sitting in the observer seat was recently promote Lt Col George Proes, white faced, desperately trying to swallow down the contents of his stomach stuck in his throat. This wasn’t what he’d expected, what on earth had possessed him to even think this was a good idea. This whole business of trying to be better than his peers Duncan, Temple and even Yale had gotten totally out of hand. It had all seemed so reasonable, the 3 majors and their colonel transferring from the HKSRA when their Hong Kong batteries had been disbanded and having a wager on who would have the best of the newly formed Indian AA regiments. No, this was just madness. Swallowing back down his lunch, he spoke in the microphone, “OK pilot that will be all, I think we’re done here, you may return to Bayan Lepas”. The pilot banked the aircraft, increased revs and dived away, the sock racing after her.
As I told my kids "all is fun and games till someone gets hurt"
 

Ramontxo

Donor
Target towing is a safe non-combat activity........
Somewhere, sometime I read about an (FAA?) Pilot being made to tow an target along the merchant ships of an convoy so as to give their assorted guns operators (anything from old lewis to even older 4 inches) some practice in AA fire (more as moral support initiative than anything else). The pilot, an old veteran with years of experience, said it was the more frightening experience of his live.
 
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Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
So with only 48 days to go before the opening of hostilities in the Far East, given that the attack on Pearl Harbour, will take place on the same day. The preparations in Malaysia are proceeding at a pace, and the majority of the units present, will be fully up to speed, by the commencement of the conflict. The Japanese airforces both Army and Navy are going to be in for a major shock, as up until now they had only faced very minor air defences during their campaigns in China. The planed daylight attack against Singapore, is going to see them for the first time facing a coordinated defence network. Not only will they face Anti Aircraft fire, something that they are not used to, but also a coordinated fighter defence too. Added to this the weakness of their aircraft will be exposed, as lacking both armour protection and self sealing fuel tanks, battle damage that would be survivable by a German aircraft in Europe. Is going to see these far more fragile Japanese aircraft destroyed or rendered combat ineffective. A close detonation of an Anti Aircraft shell, that would only punch holes in a German aircraft, is very likely to render the engines inoperative, or damage the fuel tanks so that so much fuel is lost, the aircraft can not make it home. 303 machine gun bullets that would only seriously damage a German aircraft, stand a good chance of destroying a Japanese one. And while the standard HAA gun, the 3-inch 20 cwt is effectively obsolete in Europe, it will be for a time deadly in Malaysia and Burma. Japanese bombers used to flying at 10,000 feet, are well within its operational range, and the Japanese are going to have to fly above 20,000 feet to be beyond its effective range. And flying higher will reduce the accuracy, and increase the strain on the crews. I would expect that after the first week, the Japanese will only carry out night time attacks on any of the principal strategic targets.

RR.
 
So with only 48 days to go before the opening of hostilities in the Far East, given that the attack on Pearl Harbour, will take place on the same day. The preparations in Malaysia are proceeding at a pace, and the majority of the units present, will be fully up to speed, by the commencement of the conflict. The Japanese airforces both Army and Navy are going to be in for a major shock, as up until now they had only faced very minor air defences during their campaigns in China. The planed daylight attack against Singapore, is going to see them for the first time facing a coordinated defence network. Not only will they face Anti Aircraft fire, something that they are not used to, but also a coordinated fighter defence too. Added to this the weakness of their aircraft will be exposed, as lacking both armour protection and self sealing fuel tanks, battle damage that would be survivable by a German aircraft in Europe. Is going to see these far more fragile Japanese aircraft destroyed or rendered combat ineffective. A close detonation of an Anti Aircraft shell, that would only punch holes in a German aircraft, is very likely to render the engines inoperative, or damage the fuel tanks so that so much fuel is lost, the aircraft can not make it home. 303 machine gun bullets that would only seriously damage a German aircraft, stand a good chance of destroying a Japanese one. And while the standard HAA gun, the 3-inch 20 cwt is effectively obsolete in Europe, it will be for a time deadly in Malaysia and Burma. Japanese bombers used to flying at 10,000 feet, are well within its operational range, and the Japanese are going to have to fly above 20,000 feet to be beyond its effective range. And flying higher will reduce the accuracy, and increase the strain on the crews. I would expect that after the first week, the Japanese will only carry out night time attacks on any of the principal strategic targets.

RR.
In many cases the red-or-white-hot shrapnel and tracers from Flak and fighter machine guns will puncture fuel tanks and set them alight, thus destroying the aircraft. Add in many Japanese pilots flying without chutes...
Then you have the piss-poor capabilities of Japanese ground crews to do extensive repairs at forward air bases in comparison to Allied crews, you have issues when aircraft are damaged past a point, even if they return. In many cases, an aircraft that could be repaired at an Allied field will be a write off in Japanese service, and strangely not even scavenged for parts. Others have to shipped hundreds or even thousands of miles to the rear to be repaired. The Japanese were stunned at how the Cactus Air Force kept putting aircraft in the air that they'd be sure were write offs based on their own reports of damage inflicted. And this despite the American ground crews operating on what would be a shoestring level even by Japanese standards. So yeah, one expecting some serious attrition on Japanese air assets. Though this may still not be enough to save Singapore, it's gonna seriously warp the assets available to the Japanese for other pushes elsewhere.

Note, this also applies to their Navy, as the only fully capable ports available to them to do anything resembling serious repairs beyond the basic level are in Japan. Even Truk lacks any serious repair facilities. A serious logistical and operational oversight on their part. Damage to any ship that seriously impacts it's operational ability in any way and its effectively a mission kill for the Allies, even if not sunk.
 
If memory serves as well the Japanese airframes used in Malay has a poor tank arrangement as well also not sure if they have the same tank sealing arragment as other airforces.
 
If memory serves as well the Japanese airframes used in Malay has a poor tank arrangement as well also not sure if they have the same tank sealing arragment as other airforces.
From what I can remember, it was early 1944 before operational Zeroes had self sealing tanks. That was something the RAF considered an operational requirement in Hurricane and Spitfires in the late 1930s. Not sure on other Japanese models, but I doubt most of them were much earlier than the Zero.
 
If memory serves as well the Japanese airframes used in Malay has a poor tank arrangement as well also not sure if they have the same tank sealing arragment as other airforces.
Japanese design concepts was to make their aircraft as light as possible in order to increase performance and range

And that included no self sealing tanks - which was to be fair a relatively new feature for European and US aircraft - and no armour plate
 
Japanese design concepts was to make their aircraft as light as possible in order to increase performance and range

And that included no self sealing tanks - which was to be fair a relatively new feature for European and US aircraft - and no armour plate
So they will basically go up like a petrol soaked Fawkes on bonfire night.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Ltlconf, in his post points out some of the fundamental differences between the Anglo American forces and those of the Empire of Japan. So starting with the Navy, the Japanese have no substantial bases outside of Japan, and so have to return any damage ships to Japan, which could be a long haul especially if it requires towing. The Americans too have no major overseas bases, having deliberately avoided building one in the Philippines. They would however deploy an extensive number of mobile bases, including floating dry docks, able to support their fleets during their missions in the Central Pacific. And their home shipyards were the most advanced in the world, capable of not only repairing and refitting their own ships, but also of providing these facilities to the British. The British had at the time and in many ways a never repeated, an extensive collection of overseas bases, and could if needed carry out extensive repairs, and limited refits virtually anywhere in the world. In the Far East, excluding Hong Kong which by now has become basically unusable. You have a major fleet base, with one of the largest dry docks in the world, at Singapore, plus substantial bases in Sydney and Auckland, along with the facilities in South Africa, and the various ports in India.

The principal difference between the Japanese and the Anglo American Airforces, is the ability to bodge a repair, using just what is to hand, including parts salvaged from a crashed or damaged aircraft. One of the best examples of this arose in Malta, where the RAF having decided to deploy de Havilland Mosquitoes, failed/forgot to send supplies of suitable wood or skilled carpenters to effective repairs. In the end the RAF found a very skilled local coffin maker, who used wood from cigar boxes, to effect repairs. Until they could send trained and skilled craftsmen, along with their tools and supplies of glue and wood from the UK. In much the same way when the requirement for a far more powerful engine engine for tanks arose, battle damaged and worn out RR Merlin engines were repurposed to become Meteors until factories could be established to produce them. I am sure that once the conflict starts out some really Frankenstein aircraft will eventually take to the skies. Made up of a fuselage from one aircraft and an engine from another with various parts of any number of other aircraft, as the mechanics desperately work to keep them flying.

The mechanics of the Army, especially those from Australia and New Zealand, having been raised on farms during the Depression. Have a unique ability to repair virtually any thing, with just a combination of a lump hammer, screwdriver, pair of pliers and some number 8 bailing wire. And it will not matter to them whether the kit they are working on is British, American, Dutch or Japanese. And while their compatriots in the Airforces, can cobble together an aircraft from bits and pieces of other aircraft, ie using the skin of a written off Hurricane to repair damage in the fuselage of a Kittyhawk. They will be able to take the radiator off an American engine and mate it to a British engine, and place it in a British tuck, until such time as they have the right parts. Equipment that the Japanese regard as scrap, will in the eyes of such skilled bodgers be a fixer up. Any serious look through the various vehicles of the Army repair units, will find them filled with odds and sods of parts, not on their official inventory, squirrelled away, just in case boss you never know when it might be useful.


On a completely separate note, I believe that the odds of the Japanese capturing Singapore, which at the start of TTL, were 90%, are now only 20% at best.

RR.
 
Your not wrong RampRat adding to the point if they can get permission from the local factors of various shipping companies who’s ships are in yardhands in Singapore when the invasion happens in you could potentially use the engineers to perform maintenance on shore side machines and the like.
 
So with only 48 days to go before the opening of hostilities in the Far East, given that the attack on Pearl Harbour, will take place on the same day. The preparations in Malaysia are proceeding at a pace, and the majority of the units present, will be fully up to speed, by the commencement of the conflict. The Japanese airforces both Army and Navy are going to be in for a major shock, as up until now they had only faced very minor air defences during their campaigns in China. The planed daylight attack against Singapore, is going to see them for the first time facing a coordinated defence network. Not only will they face Anti Aircraft fire, something that they are not used to, but also a coordinated fighter defence too. Added to this the weakness of their aircraft will be exposed, as lacking both armour protection and self sealing fuel tanks, battle damage that would be survivable by a German aircraft in Europe. Is going to see these far more fragile Japanese aircraft destroyed or rendered combat ineffective. A close detonation of an Anti Aircraft shell, that would only punch holes in a German aircraft, is very likely to render the engines inoperative, or damage the fuel tanks so that so much fuel is lost, the aircraft can not make it home. 303 machine gun bullets that would only seriously damage a German aircraft, stand a good chance of destroying a Japanese one. And while the standard HAA gun, the 3-inch 20 cwt is effectively obsolete in Europe, it will be for a time deadly in Malaysia and Burma. Japanese bombers used to flying at 10,000 feet, are well within its operational range, and the Japanese are going to have to fly above 20,000 feet to be beyond its effective range. And flying higher will reduce the accuracy, and increase the strain on the crews. I would expect that after the first week, the Japanese will only carry out night time attacks on any of the principal strategic targets.

RR.
The Japanese were quite aware of AAA capabilities. When USN Cavite Naval Base was bombed in the Philippines on 10 December 1941 OTL , the Japanese bombers operated at 15 to 20,000 feet because of the known maximum altitude of the American 3"/50 cal AA guns was 12,000 foot. Leaving the gunners to helplessly watch the base devastated, with only 2 P-40's attempting to unsuccessfully attack the 80 bombers. Ironically the USN's obsolescent 5"/25 Cal Semi-dual purpose gun mounted on Treaty cruisers and Standard Battleships, had a maximum altitude of 28,000.
 
With the list of gross defects of Japanese logistics, and aircraft it's incomprehensible how they so handle won all the opening campaigns of the Pacific War. It must have been a lack of training which has now been corrected in this TL, so an Allied victory is all but assured. The Japanese will destroy themselves attacking at the onset of the war making later victories much easier than in the OTL. I just don't think it was that simple, but we'll see how it goes. I'm sure Fatboy Coxy will present a more balanced view. So were now in late October so it should be interesting. He's done a good job so far in creating a more balanced scenario.
 
Ltlconf, in his post points out some of the fundamental differences between the Anglo American forces and those of the Empire of Japan. So starting with the Navy, the Japanese have no substantial bases outside of Japan, and so have to return any damage ships to Japan, which could be a long haul especially if it requires towing. The Americans too have no major overseas bases, having deliberately avoided building one in the Philippines. They would however deploy an extensive number of mobile bases, including floating dry docks, able to support their fleets during their missions in the Central Pacific. And their home shipyards were the most advanced in the world, capable of not only repairing and refitting their own ships, but also of providing these facilities to the British. The British had at the time and in many ways a never repeated, an extensive collection of overseas bases, and could if needed carry out extensive repairs, and limited refits virtually anywhere in the world. In the Far East, excluding Hong Kong which by now has become basically unusable. You have a major fleet base, with one of the largest dry docks in the world, at Singapore, plus substantial bases in Sydney and Auckland, along with the facilities in South Africa, and the various ports in India.

The principal difference between the Japanese and the Anglo American Airforces, is the ability to bodge a repair, using just what is to hand, including parts salvaged from a crashed or damaged aircraft. One of the best examples of this arose in Malta, where the RAF having decided to deploy de Havilland Mosquitoes, failed/forgot to send supplies of suitable wood or skilled carpenters to effective repairs. In the end the RAF found a very skilled local coffin maker, who used wood from cigar boxes, to effect repairs. Until they could send trained and skilled craftsmen, along with their tools and supplies of glue and wood from the UK. In much the same way when the requirement for a far more powerful engine engine for tanks arose, battle damaged and worn out RR Merlin engines were repurposed to become Meteors until factories could be established to produce them. I am sure that once the conflict starts out some really Frankenstein aircraft will eventually take to the skies. Made up of a fuselage from one aircraft and an engine from another with various parts of any number of other aircraft, as the mechanics desperately work to keep them flying.

The mechanics of the Army, especially those from Australia and New Zealand, having been raised on farms during the Depression. Have a unique ability to repair virtually any thing, with just a combination of a lump hammer, screwdriver, pair of pliers and some number 8 bailing wire. And it will not matter to them whether the kit they are working on is British, American, Dutch or Japanese. And while their compatriots in the Airforces, can cobble together an aircraft from bits and pieces of other aircraft, ie using the skin of a written off Hurricane to repair damage in the fuselage of a Kittyhawk. They will be able to take the radiator off an American engine and mate it to a British engine, and place it in a British tuck, until such time as they have the right parts. Equipment that the Japanese regard as scrap, will in the eyes of such skilled bodgers be a fixer up. Any serious look through the various vehicles of the Army repair units, will find them filled with odds and sods of parts, not on their official inventory, squirrelled away, just in case boss you never know when it might be useful.


On a completely separate note, I believe that the odds of the Japanese capturing Singapore, which at the start of TTL, were 90%, are now only 20% at best.

RR.
There’s another real life instance of this during the Defense of the Philippines. In March of 1942, the mechanics of the 21st Pursuit Squadron on Bataan assembled a “P-40 something” from a combination of P-40B and P-40E airframes, cannibalized parts, and a rebuilt engine, it not only flew missions , it was successfully flown out of Bataan before the surrender before succumbing to mechanical failure in April 1942. The story of the maintenance operations that kept the liaison, P-35, and P-40 fleets in operation during the campaign is a major portion of Bartsch’s “Doomed at the Start”.
 
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Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The Japanese were quite aware of AAA capabilities. When USN Cavite Naval Base was bombed in the Philippines on 10 December 1941 OTL , the Japanese bombers operated at 15 to 20,000 feet because of the known maximum altitude of the American 3"/50 cal AA guns was 12,000 foot. Leaving the gunners to helplessly watch the base devastated, with only 2 P-40's attempting to unsuccessfully attack the 80 bombers. Ironically the USN's obsolescent 5"/25 Cal Semi-dual purpose gun mounted on Treaty cruisers and Standard Battleships, had a maximum altitude of 28,000.
Sir while I fully accept your information, I have one general and one that is specific to this TL, question. The first is was the attack on the US base carried out by Naval or Air aircraft, as while the Navy would definitely have knowledge of AAA, given that their own ships were fitted with such. The Army which admittedly had its own AAA, had not to my knowledge been subjected to AAA fire so far in its operations in China, and the crews might have become somewhat lax. Secondly, do the Japanese know about the improvements made in Malaysia, and has such knowledge been passed down to the bomber squadrons, plus given that the British 3-inch 20 cwt had an effective ceiling of 20,000 feet the Japanese are going to have to approach at 23, 000 feet to be on the safe side. Given that they are using barometric altimeters not radar, and they can and often are inaccurate, which could mean that the indicated altitude is higher than the actual altitude. In addition I am surprised that the American 3’’/50 cal AA guns had such a low maximum altitude, given that the British 3-inch 20cwt were theoretically capable of firing up to 23,000 feet with a lighter shell. Was this due to the fuses fitted to the American ammunition, or just a general failure of the weapon?

RR.
 
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