Bicentennial Man: Ford '76 and Beyond

I’m with you on that. I very strongly doubt that a Palace Faction that has just realized their wildest dreams is letting him anywhere near the reigns of power when they’re trying to reconsolidate a reunified China. They probably wouldn’t even let an anodyne moderate like Lien Chan near the big seat. A Lee Huan/Hau Pei-tsun style old-timer, on the other hand…

Fair enough!
Can easily see a Hau Pei-Tsun presidency happening, the man came dangerously close to seizing power In OTL, late 80s/early 90s in Taiwan is an interesting period that often get overlooked, to say at least.
 
Did the PRC’s swerving around Reform and Opening-up doom it to failure
Potentially. While Hua Guofeng was more open to reform than he gets credit for, he wasn’t Deng, not by a country mile
Can easily see a Hau Pei-Tsun presidency happening, the man came dangerously close to seizing power In OTL, late 80s/early 90s in Taiwan is an interesting period that often get overlooked, to say at least.
Super interesting period. Lee was super lucky he didn’t get coup’d, honestly.

I’ve planned on using Hau Pei-tsun in CdM but he’s kinda hard to ignore in a TL covering 1980s Taiwan
 
Lee Teng hui was very wily, successfully neutralising and carefully removing the KMT's Palace Faction gradually when he became president. Notably Chiang Kai shek's wife attempted to assert her influence to block Lee but failed, returning back to the US. Which is why he didn't get couped.

The most notable example of his wiliness took place when his term was ending. He anointed Lien Chan as his successor knowing that he wasn't popular with the Taiwanese voters and allowing Chen Shui-bian of the DPP to win in 2000. Which is why till this day KMT members consider Lee a traitor to their party and that he was a closet Taiwan independence supporter which was subsequently proven right. But that's another story...
Nevertheless to have Hau Pei tsun as president instead of Lee would take the ROC on a very different path of history.
Lee was super lucky he didn’t get coup’d, honestly.

I’ve planned on using Hau Pei-tsun in CdM but he’s kinda hard to ignore in a TL covering 1980s Taiwan
 
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Lee Teng hui was very wily, successfully neutralising and carefully removing the KMT's Palace Faction gradually when he became president. Notably Chiang Kai shek's wife attempted to assert her influence to block Lee but failed, returning back to the US. Which is why he didn't get couped.

The most notable example of his wiliness took place when his term was ending. He anointed Lien Chan as his successor knowing that he wasn't popular with the Taiwanese voters and allowing Chen Shui-bian of the DPP to win in 2000. Which is why till this day KMT members consider Lee a traitor to their party and that he was a closet Taiwan independence supporter which was subsequently proven right. But that's another story...
Nevertheless to have Hau Pei tsun as president instead of Lee would take the ROC on a very different path of history.
What about Yu Huo-kwa? He was Ching-kuo’s right hand for much of the 80s, after all
 
With Deng's death, Hua's rise and the advanced age of many of the Elders, however, finding a suitable power base opposed to Hua was difficult and had to come from outside of the circle around Yang and Peng. The famine, ironically enough, provided just such a figure - from Sichuan province, where most people would have asked "what famine?" thanks to the efforts of the experimental agricultural management practices of local functionary Zhao Ziyang
Maybe there is a happy ending for China in the horizon...
 
Arnulfismo
Arnulfismo

Since February of 1978, when Huele a Quemado had rendered the Panama Canal effectively inoperable for over two years and thrown the world into an even deeper recession than the 1973-74 oil crisis, the small Isthmian country had been in a state of siege in practical terms and come to be viewed by the resurgent leftists of Latin America as the hingepoint of continent-wide revolution. The severe economic crises that had befallen Mexico, Argentina and Brazil in that time (and would in 1982 befall Chile) came to be viewed not as knock-on consequences of Torrijos decision to destroy his homeland's most valuable asset but rather as natural consequences of capitalism and the successful fall of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and the advances made by the insurgents in El Salvador after the military junta's most unspeakable atrocities against liberationist clergy suggested to many observers that the "Red Tide" was not ebbing but rather flowing; Costa Rica, which had no military, seemed poised to be next, with elections in 1982 potentially bringing a staunchly anti-American government to power if early buzz was to be believed.

For the United States, this series of events starting in the late 1970s had been nothing short of a disaster in her own back yard and carried uncomfortable echoes of both the Banana Wars but also anti-Communist interventions that had begun with Guatemala in 1954, and for a foreign policy establishment that already had a habit of seeing the shadow of Fidel Castro behind every tree in the region as soon as a populist candidate emerged on the scene talking about land reform or nationalization, the "Red Tide" suggested everything they'd ever believed was true. The Ford administration's response, colored by this paranoia, had inarguably made the situation worse, and now the Carey White House was left largely holding the bag.

Similarly to Ford, however, Carey and his advisors viewed Panama and Colombia - like their communist enemies - as the region's "buckle," and thus the capture of Omar Torrijos the previous July had been the first step in a process to end the occupation authority run from the Canal Zone and return Panama to civilian rule. Since Operation Big Stick had recaptured the Canal in a matter of days, the country had been under American direct military occupation with Defense Force officials acting as local collaborators, and a transition plan now that the Canal was back up and running was to have elections held the first week of December 1981, most importantly for a five-year Presidential term. The country had been torn apart by violence between Noriega's paramilitaries, who were increasingly reliant on narcotrafficking from their FARC-ELN allies in Colombia, and the police and right-wing paramilitaries opposed to them, and so the opening was clear for a candidate who could promise not just law and order but peace and reconciliation for a small and somewhat poor land highly dependent on trade that had been starved of it for three years; the four years after Huele a Quemado were some of the most dire economically in Panamanian history, and the stretch 1978-88 in Panama is lumped into the general Latin Decada Perdida even though most of the violence and upheaval there was frontloaded into the first small subset of it.

Only one truly serious candidate emerged out of the 1981 elections and subsequently won in a landslide - Arnulfo Arias, a longstanding Panamanian figure of the populist and nationalist right, a fierce opponent of Torrijos and Noriega but no shrinking violent on throwing red meat to the masses himself. Arias' political philosophy was known as Arnulfismo, a blend of liberal democratic appeals, pseudo-Gaullist developmentalism, and ardent Panamanian nationalism with a new dash of tough on crime conservatism as he suggested that drug dealers be given the death penalty and mused that when Noriega was captured, he should be executed publicly on national television "so Panama knows the devil is dead." He won with 70% of the vote, in part due to being the only candidate with heft and in part because his main opposition was considered too close to Noriegists and thus there were rumors of aggressive intimidation not only by Panamanian Defense Forces but also the CIA and United States military.

Arias was not a clean-cut solution for Washington, however. He had been a President before, twice in fact, with both of his previous terms ended prematurely by military coups less than a year into his terms, and his experience also came with being somewhat yesterday's news, as he had been a towering presence in Panamanian politics, particularly on the right, since the 1930s. The other issue was that the octogenarian President-elect was strong-willed on a good day and, after the unpopular Canal Treaty negotiations that led to Huele a Quemado in the first place, there was little appetite in Panama for a politician who was not willing to stand up for the country's interests. The genie could not be put back in the bottle, in other words, and while the left-wing nationalist Torrijos was in jail in Miami, the right-wing populist Arias had an uncomfortably similar stance on the Canal. While he did not campaign on outright nationalization, being well aware that the US armed forces were if anything going to maintain a much larger presence in the Zone than they had in decades moving forward, he nonetheless was very clear that "the current arrangement" was "not workable," which left him considerable wiggle room on what specifically that meant but nonetheless told Panamanians who regarded Torrijos as a national hero what they wanted to hear. To many Arnulfistas, then, Torrijos had the right idea but wrong execution, and thus that view was now entirely mainstream across Panama.

This created a huge conundrum for the Carey White House. After the Panama Shock and intervention, political appetite in Washington for any kind of Canal Treaty revision and renegotiation had dried up entirely, even compromise positions like a twenty or twenty-five year transition from US to Panamanian control. This was in part revanchist, at least on the right, but even amongst many Democrats who had previously been supportive of a compromise during 1976-77 there was a sense that Panama had shown itself untrustworthy not just as a negotiating partner but also as a custodian of the world's third-most important trade artery behind Suez and the Strait of Malacca. American public opinion on a Canal Treaty had, thanks to the attacks (not helped by being staged literally at the same time that people were watching the Super Bowl at home, an additional affront to US views), also shifted from general ambivalence to outright opposition. To renegotiate now would be to reward the very people who had plunged the world economy into a two-year near-depression and would reward such statist terrorism in the future. Secretary of Defense Jackson went so far as to declare, "1978 bears every risk of becoming the American Suez moment, and it must be the policy of this administration to see to it that it does not." Despite some liberal pressure, Carey quietly concurred, as it now seemed not just political but strategic suicide to hand away the Canal after its importance to the United States had been demonstrated so painfully.

Thus Panama entered a strange fugue as 1981 drew to a close. Direct military governance by the United States and, hopefully, the Panamanian military seemed to have ended, but the country was not yet entirely at peace, especially with Noriega's insurgents still camped out somewhere in the Darien Gap. The Canal was operational again but under tighter security by the United States than ever before, and despite Arias' assurances the idea that the United States would come back to the table, the holy grail of Panamanian domestic politics seemed more distant than it had in February 1978. It also served as something of a microcosm for the Carey administration's foreign policy as well - despite some very tangible successes, such as drawing closer to the UK and other G7 members, capturing Torrijos, creating a blueprint for pressuring South Africa's apartheid government to come to the table, and most importantly supporting Sweden in her three-day conflict with the Soviets, each one of these successes seemed not to answer questions but rather ask new ones, with new challenges around every corner for the young but increasingly confident and assertive administration.
 
A Tale of Two Chinas - Part I

The early 1980s is often marked as a point at which the Republic of China, bunkered away on the island of Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China in the Mainland, started to see broader and broader divergences. Buffeted by a series of labor reforms in the mid-1970s, Taiwan's economic growth began to seriously outpace that of the PRC, helped in large part not only by cheap consumer goods and electronics manufacturing but by increasingly sophisticated logistics and microchip operations, and the authoritarian shell both had sat under since 1949 began to crack east of the Taiwan Straits while in Beijing things were as top-down as ever.

Indeed, in the views of many senior Chinese officials, they probably had to be. The autumn of 1981 brought with it two major challenges that badly strained the Hua Guofeng regime's authority both with the CCP luminaries who surrounded him (known collectively as the "Seven Elders," many of whom were not particularly strong supporters of his) and the Chinese street. The first was the much-awaited trial of the Gang of Four, the group of ultra-Maoist ideologues who had steered much of public discourse during the late Cultural Revolution and sought to run China upon Mao's death, including the late Chairman's wife, Jiang Qing and a genuinely dangerous and ambitious young demagogue in Wang Hongwen. Part of the reason the Gang of Four had fallen from power and grace in 1976 was that, to put it simply, most people with power within the CCP genuinely despised them, as did the military, which by the late 1970s had formed something of its own power base. Hua, who had very powerful allies within the intelligence services on whom he relied to prop up his power within China, had been the leading figure in their arrest and charges of treason.

The actual trial of the Gang of Four, however, split opinion on Hua within the party. Elders such as Yang Shangkun and Peng Yen, who had been allies of the late Deng Xiaopeng and thus had never warmed to Hua to begin with, took the stance that Hua's chosen prosecutors were incompetent, and assumed that it was Hua who had deliberately done so. Setting aside for a fact that in a system such as the PRC's the guilt of the Gang of Four was fairly plainly pre-determined, the trial of the Gang of Four - how it was reported on, what prosecutors discussed before the judge, how party members reacted - became part of a power struggle within the Politburo between Hua's enemies, the military, and the intelligence services. In the end, of course, the Gang of Four were all sentenced; Jiang, the infamous and colorful "Madame Mao" regarded as the most rabid enthusiast of the Cultural Revolution's excesses, defended herself and stood defiant, while Wang and Yao Wenyuan expressed repentance for not only their crimes but, perhaps more gravely in Red China, their "political errors." On December 1st, 1981, they were given sentences of twenty years apiece, which Hua's detractors took as evidence of his being too light. [1] Hua, who had always been careful not to fully repudiate and reject the Cultural Revolution even as it was clearly time for China to move on, made an address flanked by his chief allies Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui and Chen Xilian - now derisively called the "Little Gang of Four" - to declare "justice has been served against the political errancy of these four traitors to China and the memory of Chairman Mao" and suggested, "It is the hour to turn a new leaf." The "New Leaf Policy" became understood to not just mean China moving on from the Four with their sentences but the Cultural Revolution generally, mostly by pretending that it didn't happen, so that its diminishing but still-influential supporters could still tell themselves that it had been the proper implementation of Mao Zedong Thought against the bourgeois and feudal history of China that needed to be purified, and its detractors could persuade themselves that nothing like that would ever happen again. [2] Indeed, the New Leaf Policy could have buffeted Hua tremendously, had he himself not been enamored with Mao's legacy and had the Chinese famine of 1981-82 not struck at approximately the same time.

The early 1980s famine was nowhere near as severe as infamous famines such as 1907 or 1928-30, to say nothing of the Great Chinese Famine of twenty years prior that was associated with Mao's mishandling of the Great Leap Forward, but it nonetheless was a major challenge for the government and estimates range from between four to five million Chinese, primarily children and the elderly, starving to death between the harvest of 1981 and late spring of the following year. While Western media access to China was always haphazard, photographs and footage showed emaciated youths and conditions in some parts of the Chinese countryside that looked more similar to parts of Sub-Saharan Africa than the confident People's Republic that was presenting itself to the world after Mao's death and Nixon's visit a decade earlier. It also was a very dark and grim reminder of the Great Leap Forward at precisely a time when Mao's legacy was being interrogated within the CCP's upper echelons (his legacy was to say the least not up for debate within its middle and lower levels of internal organs) and it was an open question of whether his mistakes should be recognized publicly and rejected a la Khrushchev's policy on Stalinism. The trial and famine together thus served to present the Chinese people and leadership, simultaneously, with potent reminders of the two largest blemishes on Mao's record, blemishes which for most Chinese over the age of thirty were within recent and living memory.

With Deng's death, Hua's rise and the advanced age of many of the Elders, however, finding a suitable power base opposed to Hua was difficult and had to come from outside of the circle around Yang and Peng. The famine, ironically enough, provided just such a figure - from Sichuan province, where most people would have asked "what famine?" thanks to the efforts of the experimental agricultural management practices of local functionary Zhao Ziyang, [3] who had been rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution and had been regarded as having reached the limits of what he could achieve once his sympathizer Deng had passed. Sichuan's weathering of the famine and strong economic growth, especially compared with larger and wealthier provinces in the east, caught people's attention, however, and with that Zhao was invited back to Beijing to be within the Central Committee and help manage the end of the famine response, even if Hua didn't entirely trust the reasons for his enemies in the Politburo wanting the talented young reformer promoted higher...

[1] This is similar, though not exactly, to how the Gang of Four trial played out IOTL, where Deng's consolidated power and his broader support from the other Elders gave him much broader leeway.
[2] Suffice to say this is not how you generally solve problems
[3] Those familiar with Chinese history know why this name is important and why he's not going to click with Hua long-term, to say the least
So, what happened with Deng again? Please remind me.
 
So, what happened with Deng again? Please remind me.
Died of a heart attack in late 1978/early 1979 (or thereabouts), which many people found highly suspicious considering his power struggle with Hua/Hua's connections with the spooks, but which opens the door for a mild rapprochement between Hua and the remaining Eight Elders that keeps Hua in power
 
NGL, this is the the first TL where the PRC collapses similarly to the USSR rather than the result of a nuclear war or a worse Cultural Revolution.

Also I imagine Nixon's legacy will be even worse ITTL, as his policy towards China is going to be an utter failure
 
Arnulfismo
Saw this title and immediately knew what I was in for. I shall now be unpacking this update point by point because I am physically unable stop myself from doing so.
held the first week of December 1981, most importantly for a five-year Presidential term.
This seems to indicate a new constitution, because, beyond the difference in presidential term length between the version of the 1972 that was in place in 1978, there is absolutely no way to keep the 1972 constitution past the dictatorship without the 1983 reforms. But a clean break with a new, 1981 constitution rather than keeping the 1972 constitution like IOTL is probably better for Panama's internal workings.
the police and right-wing paramilitaries opposed to them
I assume these are Colombian police; the particularities of Panamanian politics (the line between the police, the military, and the later Dignity Battalions was always blurry, and they were be united in their hatred of Arias) and Torrijos's ideological vagueness (he was neither a creature of the left or right and worked with both accordingly, but gains an international reputation for leftism due to his allyship with leftist regimes that were borne more out of their common dislike of the US than any ideological congruence) probably mean even right-wing Panamanian policemen would be more Torrijist than Arnulfist.
He had been a President before, twice in fact, with both of his previous terms ended prematurely by military coups less than a year into his terms
*Insert "there's three, actually" meme*. And the second time (1949-1951) he actually got to serve more than a year. But 1941 was just a few months and 1968 he didn't even last two weeks before Boris Martinez decided he had to go.
So you do have the chance to make this end hilariously by having this motherfucker fail to complete a full term for the fourth time (most probably by dying, though a fourth coup, this time because Arias pissed off the Americans (again), is also an option, though Carey doesn't strike me as quite coup-happy enough for this). In any case I seriously wonder who they'll run in 1986, as I'm assuming Arias will be term-limited and one of the things that screwed Arnulfism in the long-term was that IOTL 1989 was the first time since 1936 that party did not run Arnulfo Arias as its candidate (admittedly there's extenuating circumstances in that whenever Arias couldn't run either presidential elections were indirect (as in 1945, 1972, and 1978) or the party was banned (as in 1952, 1956, and 1960), but there remains the fact that Arias has no designated successor, Panamanian politics are and were deeply personalist, and the party is going to have to figure out how to deal with that fast).
The country had been torn apart by violence between Noriega's paramilitaries, who were increasingly reliant on narcotrafficking from their FARC-ELN allies in Colombia,
his main opposition was considered too close to Noriegists
Interesting - so Noriega gains his OTL reputation by drug smuggling and generally pissing on Panama's international reputation (plus, of course, the old memories of when he was Torrijos's intelligence chief) rather than by drug smuggling, generally pissing on Panama's international reputation, and running the country into the ground. Doubt the US population cares much about him (it was his time in leadership that really made him into an international pariah) but if he screws up the PR angle of his resistance movement (and given his generally ham-fisted approach to political repression IOTL, I'd expect he would) he could easily turn off the Panamanian population off Torrijism if the candidates are more associated with him than the actual Torrijos (plus there's the question of whether the Liberal remnants are still in bed with Torrijos's cohorts or if they read the US's room and decided to join the ones who already fucked off to the Arnulfist Party back in '68)
thus there were rumors of aggressive intimidation not only by Panamanian Defense Forces but also the CIA and United States military.
Arias took a very cold shower after this, I presume. And also helps explain his margin (Torrijists will be howling about hypocrisy given how Arias reacted to his 1964 loss).
The Ford administration's response
Minor question here: what was the Ford admin's policy regarding reopening old US military bases in Panama (Rio Hato in particular)? This is one of those things that has the potential to be a huge sticking point that pisses off Panamanians majorly but that, considering the sort of people Cheney and Rummy are and the US military's needs in the post-1978 I imagine they likely forced these. Lots of potential room to play there if and when the US wants an off-ramp regarding the Panama Canal...
This created a huge conundrum for the Carey White House.
Early 80's is probably too early for any movement but perhaps near the end of the Carey presidency, or during his successor's presidency, given their common partisan affiliation to LBJ, you could see them try unearth the old Robles-Johnson "3-in-1" proposal as a potential settlement. Whether Panama accepts is another matter (the National Assembly unanimously rejected it in 1968), but it might perhaps inform the US's starting position on negotiations, though perhaps tougher than the real Robles-Johnson (which may perhaps be regarded as too dovish in the post-Huele A Quemado world).

And of course there's the role this all has on the wider LATAM spectacle (keeping the canal in US hands is probably not great for regional stability, I imagine, which may help bring about the generally bad vibes of TTL's 1980's in LATAM). Overall I quite like the update.
 
NGL, this is the the first TL where the PRC collapses similarly to the USSR rather than the result of a nuclear war or a worse Cultural Revolution.

Also I imagine Nixon's legacy will be even worse ITTL, as his policy towards China is going to be an utter failure
Seems like things could still go any number of ways based on the info we have now. However, it’d be pretty ironic if China moves toward democracy while Taiwan stays mired in autocracy and doesn’t unite with the mainland.
 
NGL, this is the the first TL where the PRC collapses similarly to the USSR rather than the result of a nuclear war or a worse Cultural Revolution.

Also I imagine Nixon's legacy will be even worse ITTL, as his policy towards China is going to be an utter failure
I (think?) this is correct, which at the risk of tipping my hand too much is one reason I wanted to explore it. Both of those other outcomes are a bit tropey so the PRC failing because it simply failed to properly reform and went into a stagnation seems more realistic to me and also more in line with the actual democratic transitions of a number of poor, authoritarian regimes in Asia, Latin America and Africa in the 1980s/1990s (not to mention E. Europe as the obvious example)

I don’t think it’d do too much to harm Nixon’s reputation, though. Maybe it’d even *bolster* it - his efforts to normalize China eventually led to the opening up pressures that caused the PRC’s fall!
Seems like things could still go any number of ways based on the info we have now. However, it’d be pretty ironic if China moves toward democracy while Taiwan stays mired in autocracy and doesn’t unite with the mainland.
This would be a profoundly hilarious outcome
Saw this title and immediately knew what I was in for. I shall now be unpacking this update point by point because I am physically unable stop myself from doing so.

This seems to indicate a new constitution, because, beyond the difference in presidential term length between the version of the 1972 that was in place in 1978, there is absolutely no way to keep the 1972 constitution past the dictatorship without the 1983 reforms. But a clean break with a new, 1981 constitution rather than keeping the 1972 constitution like IOTL is probably better for Panama's internal workings.

I assume these are Colombian police; the particularities of Panamanian politics (the line between the police, the military, and the later Dignity Battalions was always blurry, and they were be united in their hatred of Arias) and Torrijos's ideological vagueness (he was neither a creature of the left or right and worked with both accordingly, but gains an international reputation for leftism due to his allyship with leftist regimes that were borne more out of their common dislike of the US than any ideological congruence) probably mean even right-wing Panamanian policemen would be more Torrijist than Arnulfist.

*Insert "there's three, actually" meme*. And the second time (1949-1951) he actually got to serve more than a year. But 1941 was just a few months and 1968 he didn't even last two weeks before Boris Martinez decided he had to go.
So you do have the chance to make this end hilariously by having this motherfucker fail to complete a full term for the fourth time (most probably by dying, though a fourth coup, this time because Arias pissed off the Americans (again), is also an option, though Carey doesn't strike me as quite coup-happy enough for this). In any case I seriously wonder who they'll run in 1986, as I'm assuming Arias will be term-limited and one of the things that screwed Arnulfism in the long-term was that IOTL 1989 was the first time since 1936 that party did not run Arnulfo Arias as its candidate (admittedly there's extenuating circumstances in that whenever Arias couldn't run either presidential elections were indirect (as in 1945, 1972, and 1978) or the party was banned (as in 1952, 1956, and 1960), but there remains the fact that Arias has no designated successor, Panamanian politics are and were deeply personalist, and the party is going to have to figure out how to deal with that fast).


Interesting - so Noriega gains his OTL reputation by drug smuggling and generally pissing on Panama's international reputation (plus, of course, the old memories of when he was Torrijos's intelligence chief) rather than by drug smuggling, generally pissing on Panama's international reputation, and running the country into the ground. Doubt the US population cares much about him (it was his time in leadership that really made him into an international pariah) but if he screws up the PR angle of his resistance movement (and given his generally ham-fisted approach to political repression IOTL, I'd expect he would) he could easily turn off the Panamanian population off Torrijism if the candidates are more associated with him than the actual Torrijos (plus there's the question of whether the Liberal remnants are still in bed with Torrijos's cohorts or if they read the US's room and decided to join the ones who already fucked off to the Arnulfist Party back in '68)

Arias took a very cold shower after this, I presume. And also helps explain his margin (Torrijists will be howling about hypocrisy given how Arias reacted to his 1964 loss).

Minor question here: what was the Ford admin's policy regarding reopening old US military bases in Panama (Rio Hato in particular)? This is one of those things that has the potential to be a huge sticking point that pisses off Panamanians majorly but that, considering the sort of people Cheney and Rummy are and the US military's needs in the post-1978 I imagine they likely forced these. Lots of potential room to play there if and when the US wants an off-ramp regarding the Panama Canal...

Early 80's is probably too early for any movement but perhaps near the end of the Carey presidency, or during his successor's presidency, given their common partisan affiliation to LBJ, you could see them try unearth the old Robles-Johnson "3-in-1" proposal as a potential settlement. Whether Panama accepts is another matter (the National Assembly unanimously rejected it in 1968), but it might perhaps inform the US's starting position on negotiations, though perhaps tougher than the real Robles-Johnson (which may perhaps be regarded as too dovish in the post-Huele A Quemado world).

And of course there's the role this all has on the wider LATAM spectacle (keeping the canal in US hands is probably not great for regional stability, I imagine, which may help bring about the generally bad vibes of TTL's 1980's in LATAM). Overall I quite like the update.
Glad you liked it - your input helped craft its content!

I’m sure Noriega as a Torrijos henchman would have *some* notoriety in the US but nothing like OTL where he was the direct inspiration for “tinpot Latin dictator” in both License to Kill and Die Hard 2

Id say the Ford admin keeps every base possible open moving forward - there’s simply no trust that Panama won’t try something again.
 
That was a position he didn’t fill until the 1990s IOTL so idk where Carey would slot him. He’d certainly be somewhere in the admin, though.
To be fair for a vast majority of the 80s it wasnt governed by a democrat. He was a trade representative during the carter admin so he did have foreign cache by the late 70s
Something occurred to me- how is Frank Church's continued presence in the Senate being felt?
Definitely keeps the heat on the CIA, I suppose. Other than that I don’t know too much about the man
I was rooting for him to be named director of the CIA just for pure chaos lol. I hope we see William Marvin Watson and Sargent Shriver + other LBJ and Kennedy acolytes involved in the Carey administration
 
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