The Soviet-Swedish War - Part IV
Western leaders of course could not know that the Soviets had elected to wait until dawn to carry out another attack rather than carrying out night bombings, and here was an advantage of Washington being six hours behind London, Paris, Bonn and Rome. President Carey called an emergency press conference, flanked by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones, Secretary of Defense Scoop Jackson, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzenski. In a five-minute free-wheeling address that did not seem to have been prepared (or, at the very least, made light use of notes), Carey condemned "a barbaric act of aggression against a peaceful, free and neutral state" and promised "that the American people support Sweden unilaterally, unequivocally, and unyieldingly, until this grievous
act of war is over." The three men with him would answer questions on the White House's behalf, with Jackson the most blunt, stating off the cuff, "Whatever Sweden needs for support, rest assured that America will provide."
Evening newspaper headlines would focus on the attacks in Sweden and "America: We Stand With Sweden" was a common byline on many, and the next morning the same would be repeated across the pond. The Big Four of NATO made similar public remarks, and West Germany's Strauss went so far as to announce that "we are watching our own border tonight, fear not!" This announcement caught American
and Soviet officials off guard and the Washington-Moscow hotline got a fair bit of use immediately thereafter.
This was probably for the best, because it gave Andropov a chance to communicate via the American backchannel what exactly Moscow wanted - the return of its submarine data and its sailors, nothing more or less. Reading between the lines, Carey's advisors suggested that what Andropov
really wanted more than anything was a face-saving off-ramp; he was a hardliner, yes, but a smart and pragmatic one, and they were quite certain that he was listening to good advice from clear-eyed men like Chebrikov who did not see any situation in which this war could end well for the USSR or achieve any of its strategic goals. CIA and Pentagon officials did their best to quickly relay this to Falldin while the Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin was called to the White House; Dobrynin had served as the chief emissary since the Cuban Missile Crisis and thus was highly concerned about causing a rupture with a President he still did not know well at the height of the worst crisis since 1962 (compared to his chummy relations with Nixon and Ford) through anything he might say without more information from Moscow. After his equivocations, he thus abruptly announced he would return home to Moscow for consultations, but had curious car and plane trouble that badly delayed his departure, thus giving NATO foreign ministries more time to put pressure on his colleagues across Europe well into the night to communicate to Moscow just how infuriated the West was.
Public opinion was also, quite firmly, anti-Soviet across Europe - helped along by ABBA, who appeared on television in Stockholm to make an appeal to their fans around the world, and the sense was that people's love for ABBA had as much to do with their anger at the Soviet Union as what the Soviets had actually done in a surprise attack on Sweden. The tongue-in-cheek term "ABBA diplomacy," in which a country leverages its soft power to appeal to a foreign public, became coined shortly after the conflict as as result. Peaceful demonstrations erupted in major European and North American cities, including tense West Berlin, and people made makeshift Swedish flags and blasted ABBA songs at full volume to show their support.
Such public displays of support for Sweden were important, yes, but the tenseness of the situation was in fact only mounting. Royal Navy vessels arrived late at night off Copenhagen, linked up with the Danish Navy, and thereafter sailed for a position immediately southwest of the island of Bornholm, still in Danish waters but crucially immediately in the potential flight path of Soviet planes coming from East Germany or even fractured Poland. The implication to Soviet military planners was fairly clear: NATO now sat directly inside a potential combat zone. Bornholm itself was a particularly sensitive subject, as the Soviets had long maintained a line that any non-Danish NATO forces
on the island would represent on its own an act of war against the USSR, which every NATO commander knew, and so ships within eyesight of the island was a potentially major escalation of the conflict by NATO even as it was intended purely as a defensive measure on its northernmost flank.
Finland, caught in the cross-stream, got to experience this tenseness even worse. The Soviet request for military consultations led to the dispatching of the fairly pro-Soviet Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen to Vyborg where he could tell his friends from Moscow what they wanted to hear as Koivisto and his core inner circle hunkered down in Helsinki to consider their next move. The official line of Finnish neutrality was to be maintained, but the Finnish Defense Forces would have their planes withdrawn from bases in the north and reservists called up "just in case;" Finland would neither condone nor condemn overflights in Lapland, which they had little ability to stop anyways. That being said, Koivisto approved a proposal to pass along intelligence via backchannels to Sweden to "recompense" for their surrender to Soviet pressure, and one of the most valuable things they could pass along thus was Soviet airplane positions
during said overflights, and also crucially the position of the Baltic Fleet south of the Aland Islands, as the Soviets positioned themselves for a combined air-and-sea attack against the Swedish coast to drive their point home early on the 29th. Finnish airplanes began flying patrols over the Gulf of Bothnia and southern Finland, with their coded broadcasts intercepted by Stockholm and the cipher curiously finding its way into the hands of the
Flygvapnet. Finland may have been consulting with the Soviets as per her treaty obligations, and politicians such as Vayrynen or the hardline Communist chairman Taisto Sinisalo urging a pro-Moscow stance until the dust settled, but Finnish politicians and military brass had by and large picked a side, and it wasn't Andropov's.
Swedish defense officials, working long into the early morning, quickly deduced the likeliest Soviet targets and thus all night long anti-air missiles and guns along with some of Sweden's most elite army units and pilots were flown in to Gotland to harden the island as a fortress in the middle of the Baltic, with the Soviet Baltic Fleet having arrived roughly at the center of a tripoint formed by Gotland, Aland and Saaremaa. As dawn of the 29th approached and both Finnish and British intelligence streaked in announcing Soviet planes in the air over the Baltic and Lapland, the Swedes this time were more than ready to do what Prime Minister Falldin had ordered - hold the border.