As good a website as Combined Fleet is, it doesn't really address the question directly.
So I went and did some digging through relevant books instead. And I found the following passages in 'At Dawn We Slept'.
First, concerning Kondo.
"The task force setup used at the Nagato table maneuvers pleased no one except those responsible for the Southern Operation. And as intended, this
practice session brought to the surface a number of problems, including the urgent question of how to synchronize the Pearl Harbor venture with the
southern campaign. The vast invasion fleet with its convoys transporting thousands of troops and tons of supplies to Malaya would be under way long
before X-Day, impossible to conceal on those well-traveled sea-lanes. If British reconnaissance planes or surface craft spotted and shadowed Kondo's ships,
should the Japanese ignore the scouts or shoot them down?
"Naturally Kondo would prefer to knock out any Allied scouts before they could relay his position to their headquarters, but on this point Nagumo was
adamant. He insisted that there be no hostilities whatsoever until he had begun his Pearl Harbor strike. Yamamoto agreed and cautioned Kondo: 'Do not begin
your operation anywhere in the southern regions until it is clear that the air strike against Hawaii has been launched.' If anyone discovered the Southern
Fleet prematurely, Kondo must change course and 'head back to Japan in adeceptive gesture to throw the British off-balance.'
"Kondo was highly skeptical of the value of the Pearl Harbor operation and intent on the success of the southern campaign. So, when Yamamoto sketched
out the Pearl Harbor picture for him, he immediately asked, 'Where will we get all the ships for such extensive operations? How can Japan afford to divide
her strength over such wide areas?' And he voiced vigorous objections to the Hawaiian venture because 'it extends beyond the capabilities of the Japanese
Navy and depends too much on innumerable factors beyond Japan's control.' But Yamamoto shushed his complaints. 'Don't worry,' he said. 'I will furnish
you with more solid carrier strength as soon as the strike against Pearl Harbor is over.'"
And then, concerning Ozawa:
"The Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Malaya Force) was well under way, commanded by that forceful Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, who had helped organize the First Air Fleet, backed the Pearl Harbor plan, and once nourished hopes of leading the attack. His ships began hoisting anchors in Japan as early as
November 20, in small units to avoid attention."
So both Kondo and Ozawa were not only aware of the Pearl strike, but intimately involved in its planning.
For your reference,
@DDM