The Austrians have problems in giving up Bozen and Triest.
For a sizeable chunk of modern day Libya, and possibly a share of any French colonial holdings if the French crap out, that's not a bad deal.
The Austrians have problems in giving up Bozen and Triest.
You read how a Prine Albert (later identified as the later British monarch) got also killed by the Serbs? That and the absense of Edward Grey tells me that there was a fast and hard shift in British thinking towars a "Entente-phone" and Germanophile stance. What will further happen is still open but that they let the Entnete, France, Russia and Serbia fall like a hot coal is naturally.I don't understand. The british are at war ? Or they just don't want to come in ?
Your link is very absent of any concrete agreements to cooperate in the military or other areas outside of colonial matters. So was it an Alliance or was it an understanding in colonial matters that the British Foraign Office used for more without consent of the gov. and no written (as far as I know) gutantees for more, or was it something more?https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entente_Cordiale
Maybe because the alliance beetween England and France was declared ?
Your link is very absent of any concrete agreements to cooperate in the military or other areas outside of colonial matters. So was it an Alliance or was it an understanding in colonial matters that the British Foraign Office used for more without consent of the gov. and no written (as far as I know) gutantees for more, or was it something more?
For a sizeable chunk of modern day Libya, and possibly a share of any French colonial holdings if the French crap out, that's not a bad deal.
Irrilevant; Austria basically refused to give up Trentinto and some border adjustment in Friuli (with Italy paying for the territory and with border greatly favoring the Hapsburg military) and recognize italian control of Albania (at the moment the italian army occupied half of the nation) plus some other minot things in exchange for italian neutrality favoring the CP...and at the same time fullfilling art.7 of the CP treaty.
Giving up Trieste (the only real port of the Empire) and Trentino plus South Tyrol in exchange of some place that need to be pacified and nobody had a real interest in it, it's so out of the question to be ridicolous.
At max Wien will give up what promised for neutrality in OTL if Italy enter the war (after some pressure from Berlin) but Rome will need to forfeit any other claim towards austrian land and influence in the balkans; the rest of Italy spoil will come from France.
Base on some of the feedback, I've decided to rewrite part V. Part VI will cover some more of the history leading up to the war, and what Operation Ægir was.
That doesn't really make sense. The Germans leave Alsace 'relatively unprotected' and then are surprised by the strength of the French attack? This is their only possible invasion route! Which they have prepared to defend for decades.The Germans gambled by boosting their numbers for the Schlieffen plan and guarding the East a little more heavily leaving a much smaller contingent in Alsace. At the same time, the French gambled by throwing most of their weight at the relatively unprotected region and striking preemptively (August 2-3). Although they would take the region and dig in rather quickly, this proved to be in Germany's favor as they were able to avoid getting Britain involved, and they were able to better control the narrative thus garnering more support in Europe.
Realistically, the Swedish military would be considered spent. They're essentially out of the war. With such losses, even if they received all the time in the world to rebuild, they could not hope to do another offensive for what... two years? This is a steeper hurdle to take than the already dangerously long build-up Britain had to do in order to improve its expeditionary armies into a credible offensive force.I think that if Sweden suffered such losses at this part of the war, it would cause a scandal back home, including demonstrations and calls for resignations for both political and military leaders. Despite taking Turku and the surroundings, and gaining a foothold in Finland, the costs involved would be seen as too heavy back home. Taking part in the war would be called a bloody, scandalous mistake by the political left on the basis of this battle alone.
Realistically, the Swedish military would be considered spent. They're essentially out of the war. With such losses, even if they received all the time in the world to rebuild, they could not hope to do another offensive for what... two years? This is a steeper hurdle to take than the already dangerously long build-up Britain had to do in order to improve its expeditionary armies into a credible offensive force.