Zipang

A Final Countdown / Zipang version i'd like to see or read (hint! hint!) is one where the time-travelling soldiers and sailors are from a country that wouldn't want to change history for the Axis or simply help the Allies do better, but want to make sure the Allies win again, only with different post-war borders. One or several warships from South Korea, Taiwan or Poland for example.
They'd want a changed post-war world and with only a few modern weapons to play with that wouldn't be that easy to achieve.
OOH, you're Giving me an Idea ...

A Present Day Polish Infantry Company is King Arthured(*) from Najaf to a Basement in Warsaw, During The City's 27 September 1939 Capitulation!

They Quickly Realize that a Mere Two Hundred Men don't Stand a Chance Against The German Army, Thus During The Confusion of The Cease Fire they Hide their Weapons Along with Everyone Else ...

However they STILL Possess Intricate Knowledge of Future Developments, So they Use their Radios to Communicate this Information Solely to The Western Allies through The Polish Government in Exile, All while Building up a Powerful Jewi-Pole Insurgency Force Right Under The Germans' Noses ...

All of this Comes Together in Late-1944 as Poland Again Becomes The Place where East meets West, As an Uprising Against Both The Nazis and The Soviets Utilizing All of The Cached Future Weapons Results in Poland Becoming a Founding Member of The Western Bloc!

* A Particular Kind of ISOT wherein a Small Cadre of Soldiers is Brought to The Exact Time and Place that Needs them The Most!
 
Last edited:

Sargon

Donor
Monthly Donor
Well, that certainly is an…interesting interpretation of the Japanese role in World War II. I know every nation is guilty of inflating their role in the conflict, but this is something different entirely. I have to ask, though: is this just an isolated eccentricity, or is this actually a respectable school of thought in modern Japanese society? If it’s the latter, then should we be worried?

As a person who has lived in Japan, you'll find that the 'peace culture' is very strong indeed, especially amongst young Japanese, who often had looks of horror and disgust on their faces when asked what they would do if they had to join the defence forces. Don't forget that in schools, 'peace studies' are part of the curriculum and rams down their throat just how bad and evil war is, and that it leads to suffering. Funnily enough, they rarely go into the details of what Japan did in the war, with the effect that a lot of Japanese have no idea what really happened other than they attacked China and the US and Japan was ruined as a result and 'War is a Bad Thing'.

So, it is no surprise that the defence forces often fail to recruit enough people in their yearly recruitment drives and remain understrength as a result. Indeed, there is a whiff of dishonour and lack of prestige for anyone who joins up. Hence the focus on greater automotation of the armed forces.

If one watches Japanese war movies or goes to a Japanese war museum, one gets a feeling of a victim complex, and such places could be better described as 'defeat movies' and 'peace and defeat museums'. There IS a tendency to over-concentrate on Japanese woes and suffering as opposed to that of other countries'.

Still, things are slowly changing ever since the 1992 decision to allow PKO (Peace Keeping Overseas) forces to participate in various trouble spots around the world under the auspices of the UN. Even at that time, there was a massive uproar and vehement opposition to the very idea of allowing Japanese forces to even enter areas that were already reasonably safe and just to engage in engineering and rebuilding operations. It was insisted that non-combatant troops be sent, and there was even heated debate about whether they should be allowed to be armed or not. It was also seen as anathema that they should fire back even if fired upon. The case often argued that it was too dangerous to allow troops to go overseas where they could end up in trouble and cause a constitutional as well as public relations nightmare.

In the end, they were sent overseas with strict rules regarding their deployment, but there is still always a fair amount of vehement opposition whenever their role in PKO is mentioned, even to this day and STILL a debate about whether they should fire to defend themselves, although the government insists this is covered by the Constitution not disallowing self defence (this whole interpretation being used to allow 'defence' forces in the first place). Support for US operations by allowing US ships to refuel from JMSDF ships in the Indian Ocean only recently managed it through Parliament when the PM used a very rarely used power to force the issue through practically decree-wise, so bad was opposition to it. Heavy pressure had been brought by the US on him in private to ensure that the mandate was renewed, and he himself felt that it was his duty to not let down his ally which of course the US is through the US-Japan Security Treaty - incidentally another bone of contention in Japan. Also bear in mind that the civilian department that oversees the defence forces only very recently became a full government Ministry, having merely been at Agency level for a long time before that. Civilian control of the military is of course guaranteed in Article 66 of the Constitution.

These days, there is not quite the anathema in the past towards the armed forces, primarily motivated by the percieved threat posed by North Corea and to a lesser extent, that of China. Indeed, Japanese people are very worried by all this, yet still far prefer diplomatic solutions to the problems and passive means of defending themselves such as the missile shield they are currently developing and for which they have had several successful test both on land and at sea (which as opposed to the US one in Europe, one hears little controversy about in popular and mainstream media). Talk about deployment of this system as well as Japanese early warning satellites understandably causes concern and criticism in China and North Corea, yet elsewhere doesn't raise as much fuss as the possibly of further Japanese involvement in UN operations and a possible revision of Article 9 of the Constitution which is a very emotive issue.

To put it briefly, although there is growing tolerance of the role and reality of the armed forces in today's Japan, there is still some way to go before they and their average member are perceived like they are here in the UK or in the US for example (in other words, people may disagree with he operations they are on, but usually don't hold it against the troops themselves who are doing these hard and dangerous jobs).

The agonising and desire to avoid violence if at all possible that went on in Zipang is very close to what is going on in Japan today, and is thus entirely plausible. But bear in mind that things ARE slowly changing, and Japan's defence forces would certainly be no slouch if seriously used and had clear instructions from the top.


Sargon
 
Last edited:
As someone once said, the most interesting thing about the Pacific War was that the "weapons" that won the war, weren't generally "weapons" at all:

1. "bushido" - only "fighting" is honorable - no effort should be expended feeding or supplying your troops once you've placed them into conflict so if your initial attacks fail, your troops can't be withdrawn and starve; no ships should be taken from your battle fleet to defend your transports from submarines because "defence" is unmanly -- if your factories can't produce anything due to lack of raw materials, that isn't your concern - factory owners are not "fighters"; your transports should report their locations nightly over the radio to allow your staff officers (and Allied intelligence) to plot them neatly on maps; "fighting spirit will always triumph over superior numbers, superior weapons, superior location, and your own inadequate reconnaissance or planning" so you should always attack the enemy whenever and wherever you encounter him; brutalize civilians whenever possible because you are armed and they are not

2. codebreaking - allows Allies to take advantage of "bushido" inattention
to detail mentioned above (not supplying own troops, giving away troop positions and plans, mounting attacks with inadequate resources, etc)

3. RADAR - Japan's military strategy is totally dependent on suprise attacks - RADAR negates this and allows Allies to see attackers coming and get the jump on them; Since Allies are fighting a war of attrition and are not dependent on suprise, Japanese RADAR is less significant

4. the bulldozer - allows US forces to build airstrips and facilities in days rather than years (Japanese using manual labor) so that once the Allies take a position, it is theirs permanently

5. US fleet train - allows US ships to operate at sea for extended periods time far from bases giving them superior operating range and operational suprise

6. technological obsolescence - the only other major power comparable to
Japan in WWII was ITALY -- their armies were WWI vintage and not that numerous; they lacked heavy artillery and vehicles; their few tanks were 1920s designs; their aircraft were under-armed and under-protected because their engines were not powerful enough to lift heavy planes; only their navies and naval aircraft were modern

Note that I didn't mention specific weapons like "RADAR controlled 5" AA guns" which allowed attacking Japanese planes to be mowed down like wheat because compared with these six, they are not significant.

Note also that simply having a time-travelling modern destroyer like the MIRAI, would not have helped the Japanese as much as correcting these problems, barring some kind of political change-causing miracle ("MIRAI kills FDR with Tomahawk missile and US surrenders").
 
Last edited:
Top