Zero's vs. B-17's

[Zheng He]

As a note, in Rabaul, B-17s did skipbomb there against Japanese ships.

Keep in mind that skip bombing was usually only used against cargo ships and small warships. The tactic required the bombers to get close to the target which made them vulnerable to AA on large combatants.

 

[Andras]

Possibly. But they'd never admit to it.

That said, a successful use at Midway could see the Marines or Navy adopting the B-17 as a land-based patrol bomber

They did OTL, just not until the last year of the war.

During the last year of World War II and shortly thereafter, the United States Navy acquired 48 ex-USAAF B-17s for patrol and air-sea rescue work. The first two ex-USAAF B-17s, a B-17F (later modified to B-17G standard) and a B-17G were obtained by the Navy for various development programs.[130] At first, these aircraft operated under their original USAAF designations but on 31 July 1945, they were assigned the naval aircraft designation PB-1, a designation which had originally been used in 1925 for the Boeing Model 50 experimental flying boat.[137]

Thirty-two B-17Gs[138] were used by the Navy under the designation PB-1W, the suffix -W airborne early warning. A large radome for an S-band AN/APS-20 search radar was fitted underneath the fuselage and additional internal fuel tanks were added for longer range, with the provision for additional underwing fuel tanks. Originally, the B-17 was also chosen because of its heavy defensive armament, but this was later deleted. These aircraft were painted dark blue, a standard Navy paint scheme which had been adopted in late 1944.[130][137] The PB-1W eventually evolved into an early warning aircraft by virtue of its APS-20 search radar.[138] PB-1Ws continued in USN service until 1955, gradually being phased out in favor of the Lockheed WV-2 (known in the USAF as the EC-121, a designation adopted by USN in 1962), a military version of the Lockheed 1049 Constellation commercial airliner.

In July 1945, 16 B-17s were transferred to the Coast Guard via the Navy; these aircraft were initially assigned U.S. Navy Bureau Numbers (BuNo), but were delivered to the Coast Guard designated as PB-1Gs beginning in July 1946.[130][133] Coast Guard PB-1Gs were stationed at a number of bases in the U.S. and Newfoundland, with five at Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City, North Carolina, two at CGAS San Francisco, two at NAS Argentia, Newfoundland, one at CGAS Kodiak, Alaska, and one in Washington state.[133] They were used primarily for air-sea rescue, but were also used for iceberg patrol duties and for photo mapping. Air-sea rescue PB-1Gs usually carried a droppable lifeboat underneath the fuselage and the chin turret was often replaced by a radome.[133][139] The Coast Guard PB-1Gs served throughout the 1950s, the last example not being withdrawn from service until 14 October 1959.[130][139]

 

[phx1138]

What would have happened on the morning of 4 June 1942 if, for whatever reason, (possibly due to the incessant interservice rivalry between the US Navy and the USAAF), the 15 midway based B-17's had been ordered to perform merely as an armed reconnaissance/spotter mission?

Since there were PBYs, & since the fighting would be done by USN CVs, why would this be useful?

 

[Shadow Master]

I still think for this POD to go forward, it has to start with a decision by Nimitz that he wants some level of coordination and communication between the carriers and Midway instead of the OTL where Midway and the carriers more or less fought separate battles against the same target.

Well, it really does not require the carriers to break radio silence by having them listen to midway's radio broadcasting the B-17's information. They can stay silent, and still get the benifit of the intel from the B-17's. The timing here is the real sticky point, however. The Yorktown strike is in the process of launching, and the E & H have already been at it for an hour or so by the time the B-17's arrive over the Japanese formation in OTL.

A much simpler POD in this same lane is to require all US strike squadrons to broadcast sighting reports (time, location, distance, speed, etc.) before going into the attack.

Well, I have to disagree. Getting such a report off is all well and good, but it really does nothing for airgroups that need to have up to date information. I have to believe that garbled broadcasts, plotting errors, and just plain missing single messages will be far less reliable than my proposed POD.

Since there were PBYs, & since the fighting would be done by USN CVs, why would this be useful?

Reading up on the fate of the PBY's in the aleutian campaign, where many PBY's were shot down before they got off their contact reports, or where they were forced away by enemy fighters before they even spotted the
Japanese fleet, or they were so busy trying to escape their contact reports were hurried, incomplete and such, leads me to my conclusion.

PBY's might be able to spot and report on the KB whereabouts, but what they have no possible chance to do is shadow them once they are located, hence the need for a flight of rugged, heavily armed, long range bombers to maintain contact, perhaps for 2-3 hours.

A PBY that tried this would be lost within minutes.

Of the OTL aircraft based upon midway, the B-17's best fit the bill.