Zero's vs. B-17's

[Shadow Master]

Partly inspired by this thread:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=287843

What would have happened on the morning of 4 June 1942 if, for whatever reason, (possibly due to the incessant interservice rivalry between the US Navy and the USAAF), the 15 midway based B-17's had been ordered to perform merely as an armed reconnaissance/spotter mission?

IOTL, these bombers took off carrying bombs, which were expended for no hits. ITTL, the bombers are forbidden to deliver a bombing attack, and so are carrying a maximum fuel load and extra ammunition for their gunners, and are ordered to find, shadow, and continuously transmit the Japanese carrier formations' location.

IIRC, the B-17's OTL attack took place just after 8am. With no bombs and more fuel, could the B-17 have broadcast the KB's location right up until the American carriers air groups arrive? Could the US Navy's air groups have attacked earlier if the need for scouting out the enemies positions had been solved in this fashion? Could the carriers air groups have made a single massed attack?

Also, when I read the most excellent work of Brian Garfield, in his "The Thousand mile war" book about the battle of the Aleutians (Which was the opening diversionary moves of the 'Battle of midway' in the first place), the author made mention of just how rugged the B-17 was, and I was struck by the difficulty the Japanese had in downing them.

So, in addition to helping the US Navy air groups make (possibly) co-ordinated strikes, what effect would the 15 midway based B-17's have had on the dispositions, condition, and capabilities of the KB's CAP to intercept the carriers airgroups?

Some additional 'food for thought':

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/mid-4d.htm
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1350982.The_Thousand_Mile_War



Jay Zeamer
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jay_Zeamer,_Jr.#Medal_of_Honor_mission

 

[HMS Warspite]

The B-17 force at Midway consisted of 17 of the then brand new B-17E type bombers, which was in commission since september 1941 and originally intended for the European war, even in a time the USA was still neutral. The B-17E introduced the longer fuselage and ventral ball turret, tail gunner and a Sperry type dorsal turret just behind ther pilot. In all the B-17E could carry a standard armament of 11 mg's of .50 Cal. (at the cost of a reduced bombload) As such the aircraft had a well placed defensive armament in the back and side, but had a blind spot in the front. (the B-17G corrected this with a forward turret under the bombardeer's posittion)

In theory, the B-17E variant was a tought thing to bring down by mid 1942 model fighters, though not as invulnerable as its seems. The large plexiglass front was a serious week point and quite a lot of B-17's had their noses shot away, often resulting in serious casualties among the crews. (if not crashing the plane as a result) Protection of the bomber was heavy, but mainly against small mg fire and not exploding cannon shells. 20mm shells could quite easily rip off parts of the fuselage and wing, as well as entering the innter part of the plane, while small arms fire could be stopped by the reenforced skin and self sealing fueltanks.

More important was the difficulty of manual air combat, with manually operated and aimed guns, compared to the much more agile single seated fighter, with a fixed armament. The USAAF still had a lot to learn that a bomber cannot protect itself in the air on its own and needs escorting fighters to do that job.

 

[TxCoatl1970]

It would've been interesting to see if the B-17's could quarterback the strikes.
One complication you've already mentioned is the interservice rivalry between USN and USAAC.
Another complication is USAAC tactics.

A lone bomber could get torn apart by enough Zeroes. If the B-17's go in "boxes" where their gunners could assist each other, they'd be a lot more survivable but a lot more obvious and not covering as much airspace.

The good news is if they went "box" style with 4-6 bombers not only could they keep an eye on the Japanese fleet, but they COULD draw the IJN CAP off and lead them on a merry hairball for the Wildcats to bounce some Zeroes along with what the bombers' gunners take down so the torpedo planes don't get massacred by the CAP.

The key is coordination. The USN had very little experience with multi-carrier-group strikes. AIUI every carrier group sort of had its own target list and came in piecemeal. Having Hornet's strike force wandering around meant wasted fuel and effort and two lost American carriers.

YMMV

 

[Andras]

They can use a few of the B-17s as navigation leaders for the Carrier aviators as well. The B-17 has enough range to meet up with the TFs early, wait for a sighting report, and then lead the carrier planes to the shadowing B-17s and enemy carriers.

 

[MattII]

And they're expect to stay the course, with a full bomb-load and not either use or ditch it? Pile of junk.

 

[sharlin]

The other option would be to climb, Zeros were not great at high altitude, stick together and climb.

 

[Simon]

And they're expect to stay the course, with a full bomb-load and not either use or ditch it? Pile of junk.

Huh? The opening post has them operating without a bomb load so that they can carry extra machine gun ammunition and have maximum range.

 

[MattII]

My mistake, I misread the OP slightly.

 

[Shadow Master]

In theory, the B-17E variant was a tought thing to bring down by mid 1942 model fighters, though not as invulnerable as its seems. 20mm shells could quite easily rip off parts of the fuselage and wing, as well as entering the innter part of the plane.

I just checked, and it looks like the Zero A6M2's had 500 rounds for their 7.7mm guns, but just 60 for each of the 20mm cannons. The A6M3's increased to 20mm ammunition to 100 for each cannon. So that means that the defensive fighters of the CAP are going to have very little effect with their 7.7mm ammunition (which I am going to believe they will not spare in their attempts to down the massive bombers) and with such limited cannon ammunition, will be forced to try to land and re-arm for another go.

More important was the difficulty of manual air combat, with manually operated and aimed guns, compared to the much more agile single seated fighter, with a fixed armament.

While manning a machine gun and trying to track an incomming fighter, the gunner does have to muscle the gun around, but then again, the fighter pilot is going to have to make a choice of his own. Fly straight and attempt to maximize the number of hits he can score with his ammunition supply, and thus afford the bomber formations massed gunners with an easy shot, or dodge in at high speed and use short bursts and hope for the best. I would expect that none of the KB's zero pilots at midway had encountered the B-17's in combat yet, and unless they had gotten a 'heads up' from the fellows flying land based zeros during the philipines campaign (who had fought the B-17 IIRC), I would expect them to initially not realize that head on attacks were their best chance. Then too, the bomber formation can attempt to manouver to deny head on attacks, or at least to be able to bring some of their guns to bear.

The USAAF still had a lot to learn that a bomber cannot protect itself in the air on its own and needs escorting fighters to do that job.

Although that is undeniably true, I believe that an attritional battle with carrier based fighters, whose base has to manouver to launch & recover aircraft, and only carries so much fuel and ammo, and so many fighters (some of whom they are going to want to save for escort missions), might well have a magnified effect on their CAP. Unlike attacks on land bases, where the enemy will likely outnumber them badly, this type of a situation has a different feel to me, but who knows?

It would've been interesting to see if the B-17's could quarterback the strikes.
One complication you've already mentioned is the interservice rivalry between USN and USAAC.
Another complication is USAAC tactics.

The good news is if they went "box" style with 4-6 bombers not only could they keep an eye on the Japanese fleet, but they COULD draw the IJN CAP off and so the torpedo planes don't get massacred by the CAP.

Huh? The opening post has them operating without a bomb load so that they can carry extra machine gun ammunition and have maximum range.

I don't think he got that part.

 

[Shadow Master]

Basically, I am just wondering if the interservice rivalry between Admirals and Generals could have led the US forces to discoverying (blundering into) a tatic that might have lead to a strategy that could lead to much harder times of the Japanese fleet latter on.

 

[Zheng He]

Because the Battle of Midway was a situation of Fleet Opposed Invasion the B-17s were under Captain Simard's command to use as he pleased and they were used in a limited scouting role prior to 4 June.

What you are suggesting was done on 3 June but it didn't work. After Jack Reid's PBY sighted the transport force, a B-17 with a USN pilot aboard as an observer was launched to pinpoint and track the enemy. This B-17 then fed updates to a force nine B-17s sent to attack the enemy force although this group still failed to show up and ended up attacking a different group of enemy ships (see Miracle at Midway).

The biggest hurdle in what you are suggestion was US communications procedures at that time. Midway's scout planes did not communicate with the carrier groups. They sent their scouting reports to Midway, Midway sent the scouting reports to Pearl Harbor, and Pearl Harbor forwarded the scouting reports to the carriers. Occasionally the carriers would intercept one of the scouting reports but not always. This was because only a few senior commanders at Midway knew we had carriers in the area everybody else (including Midway's pilots) thought they were on their own.

So what you are suggesting is feasible and a really good idea but the two things you would need to change are US communications procedures and OPSEC procedures which were based on the strict worship of the God of Radio Silence.

A smaller issue is the fact that at that point in the war everybody including Nimitz was still really excited about the strike potential of the B-17s. However, on the morning of 4 June, the Kido Butai was only 180 miles from Midway. The bombers could have gone in and dropped their bombs and then orbited the fleet for a long time.

 

[HMS Warspite]

I just checked, and it looks like the Zero A6M2's had 500 rounds for their 7.7mm guns, but just 60 for each of the 20mm cannons. The A6M3's increased to 20mm ammunition to 100 for each cannon. So that means that the defensive fighters of the CAP are going to have very little effect with their 7.7mm ammunition (which I am going to believe they will not spare in their attempts to down the massive bombers) and with such limited cannon ammunition, will be forced to try to land and re-arm for another go.

The A6M-2 in use by the time in the IJN indeed had only 60rpg for the 20mm wing mounted guns, though that was enough. Most European contemporary fighters had simmilar loadouts, so not much differnece in that part. A few 20mm hits on a B-17 is enough to bring it down, as some OTL guncam photographs and films show, evenin 1944!!. IJN Zero fighterpilots had a custom to use their 7.7mm mg's as tracers, to see, when hits were optained, before switching to cannon fire normally.



While manning a machine gun and trying to track an incomming fighter, the gunner does have to muscle the gun around, but then again, the fighter pilot is going to have to make a choice of his own. Fly straight and attempt to maximize the number of hits he can score with his ammunition supply, and thus afford the bomber formations massed gunners with an easy shot, or dodge in at high speed and use short bursts and hope for the best. I would expect that none of the KB's zero pilots at midway had encountered the B-17's in combat yet, and unless they had gotten a 'heads up' from the fellows flying land based zeros during the philipines campaign (who had fought the B-17 IIRC), I would expect them to initially not realize that head on attacks were their best chance. Then too, the bomber formation can attempt to manouver to deny head on attacks, or at least to be able to bring some of their guns to bear.

The smae Kido Butai alreayd had raided pearl harbor half a year before, with the same pilots doing that mission, as the ones on ther Midway operation. Some had encountered the flight of B-17E's en route to PH, entering the scene, when the secodn strike wwas hitting the base. Some were shot down, but all were hit in one way or another. That means A6M-2 pilots of the 2nd wave at PH had encountered the same aircraft in combat, though these were unarmed ones.

Later in the Dutch East indies, the Kido Butai engaged land based bombers of all sorts on several occasions, including one, or two encounters with the former Philippines Based B-17C's, an older less armed varriant of the B-17. No hits were optained by both sides, as the B-17's flew high in the stratopsphere and lacked numbers to press home a serious attack.


Although that is undeniably true, I believe that an attritional battle with carrier based fighters, whose base has to manouver to launch & recover aircraft, and only carries so much fuel and ammo, and so many fighters (some of whom they are going to want to save for escort missions), might well have a magnified effect on their CAP. Unlike attacks on land bases, where the enemy will likely outnumber them badly, this type of a situation has a different feel to me, but who knows?


I don't think he got that part.

B-17's of the USAAF in mid 1942 hardly had operated in serious combat in numbers, so their theoretical power was yet to be proven. The War in Europe was yet to unleash the 8th Airforce, which at the time was still buildign up mainly to combat strength. Tactics were yet to be formulated and the so called Box Formation was not yet accepted in the USAAF. The Luftwaffe was to prove this failure later in the year, by shooting down B-17's in large numbers, more or less unmoletsted by the defensive gunnters, as the bombers were to prove to be unable to defend themseleves against more agile single seated fighters, with quite experienced pilots flying them agressively in the defence of their own homes. The lack of cannon firepower on the defences, as well as lack of defensive fighters, almost rersulted in one of the heaviest defeats of the USAAF in the early waryears. German aircraft mounted cannons were proven to be of a superior quality, not matched by the large number of .50 cal MG's on the bombers. Note that the 20mm gun on the A6M-2 was a simmilar design of the German 20mm FF of the Bf-109-E. From the Bf-109-F series on the germans shifted to the less bulky 20mm MK-151, which had a higher rate of fire, but slightly lower musclevelocity.

 

[Shadow Master]

I was thinking in two areas here, first that midway would broadcast the (Japanes) carriers positions, and that the navy would then be able to listen to this traffic and get their air groups started in the right direction, and second, that once they arrived in proximity, the carrier air groups would be able to follow the B-17's broadcasts themselves. Neither of these would require the carriers or their air groups to break radio silence, but even then, the airgroups were already using their radios so who knows.

Thanks for the input, and for the thread that got me thinking about this in the first place.

 

[NothingNow]

Basically, I am just wondering if the interservice rivalry between Admirals and Generals could have led the US forces to discoverying (blundering into) a tatic that might have lead to a strategy that could lead to much harder times of the Japanese fleet latter on.

Possibly. But they'd never admit to it.

That said, a successful use at Midway could see the Marines or Navy adopting the B-17 as a land-based patrol bomber (they were actually pretty useful in the East Indies as well,) or prevent the USAAF from removing it from active service in the Pacific theatre, in favor of using just the B-24 and Medium bombers.

That said, level bombing at sea, while warships are maneuvering is definitely not the most effective means to use them.
But, as stated, drawing off the CAP with a number of bombers loaded up for range, and defensive armament, (with maybe four 500lb bombs each, for targets of opportunity, or the carriers themselves,) would be an effective, if somewhat suicidal use, as they present a very serious threat to a carrier, and are durable enough to survive such use. B-24s wouldn't be half as capable, even if they are faster and longer ranged.

They're also large enough, that a version of the B-17 (or in this case, a Boeing PB,) fitted out for a higher MTOW could easily support a search radar, like the APS-2 or APS-3, to make it easier to find a target, which could make them also useful in night operations, when used in conjunction with an APG-4 development. Admittedly, that'd mean dropping the range and effective payload by a bit (I'd guess about a thousand pounds or so?) but they'd be an effective accompaniment for Catalinas in the night attack role, while being durable enough that they can survive an encounter with enemy fighters. The Navy or USAAF could find that pretty tempting.

That might even allow for Rabaul to be shut down, using night bombing to destroy the airfields, and mine Simpson Harbour, with the odd torpedo attack thrown in. With that done, Rabaul could be retaken, and then used as a base from which to harass Japanese operations throughout the Pacific, especially the fleet base at Truk, which is only about 800 miles away, and the Solomon islands, which lie entirely in range for a B-17.

 

[HMS Warspite]

I was thinking in two areas here, first that midway would broadcast the (Japanes) carriers positions, and that the navy would then be able to listen to this traffic and get their air groups started in the right direction, and second, that once they arrived in proximity, the carrier air groups would be able to follow the B-17's broadcasts themselves. Neither of these would require the carriers or their airg groups to break radio silence, but even then, the airgroups were already using their radios so who knows.

Thanks for the input, and for the thread that got me thinking about this in the first place.

If that would be the case, the PBY's already performed quite well in that role, besides being purposely designed for that sort of missions. The B-17 force was there acting as a sort of stopgab, in a time no one in the USA already knew they were of little use in a naval conflict.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Possibly. But they'd never admit to it.

That said, a successful use at Midway could see the Marines or Navy adopting the B-17 as a land-based patrol bomber (they were actually pretty useful in the East Indies as well,) or prevent the USAAF from removing it from active service in the Pacific theatre, in favor of using just the B-24 and Medium bombers.

That said, level bombing at sea, while warships are maneuvering is definitely not the most effective means to use them.
But, as stated, drawing off the CAP with a number of bombers loaded up for range, and defensive armament, (with maybe four 500lb bombs each, for targets of opportunity, or the carriers themselves,) would be an effective, if somewhat suicidal use, as they present a very serious threat to a carrier, and are durable enough to survive such use. B-24s wouldn't be half as capable, even if they are faster and longer ranged.

They're also large enough, that a version of the B-17 (or in this case, a Boeing PB,) fitted out for a higher MTOW could easily support a search radar, like the APS-2 or APS-3, to make it easier to find a target, which could make them also useful in night operations, when used in conjunction with an APG-4 development. Admittedly, that'd mean dropping the range and effective payload by a bit (I'd guess about a thousand pounds or so?) but they'd be an effective accompaniment for Catalinas in the night attack role, while being durable enough that they can survive an encounter with enemy fighters. The Navy or USAAF could find that pretty tempting.

That might even allow for Rabaul to be shut down, using night bombing to destroy the airfields, and mine Simpson Harbour, with the odd torpedo attack thrown in. With that done, Rabaul could be retaken, and then used as a base from which to harass Japanese operations throughout the Pacific, especially the fleet base at Truk, which is only about 800 miles away, and the Solomon islands, which lie entirely in range for a B-17.

A more usefull additition to the USAAF would have been the British build Bristol Beaufighter, which already had seen service in the European battles, but also was available (though in small numbers) in the USA as part of the Lend Lease returns. The Beaufighter was a heavy fighter in origin, but one with a heavy secondary role of tactical ground and anti shipping strike aircraft. It certainly performed well in the Mediteranean Sea, where it had to encounter opposing fighters, often comming out as victor. Just a hand full, possibly replacing the B-17's and eventually the B-26's would have been a better choice afterall. (If the USAAF pilots had learned how to operate this brute beast in the air.)

 

[NothingNow]

A more usefull additition to the USAAF would have been the British build Bristol Beaufighter, which already had seen service in the European battles, but also was available (though in small numbers) in the USA as part of the Lend Lease returns. The Beaufighter was a heavy fighter in origin, but one with a heavy secondary role of tactical ground and anti shipping strike aircraft. It certainly performed well in the Mediteranean Sea, where it had to encounter opposing fighters, often comming out as victor. Just a hand full, possibly replacing the B-17's and eventually the B-26's would have been a better choice afterall. (If the USAAF pilots had learned how to operate this brute beast in the air.)

Considering that the US already had the B-25 and the various DB-7 variants in service, plus the Douglas Invader in the pipeline, adopting the Beaufighter as more than an interim night fighter is a bit odd.

Especially since 6-8 .50cal in a solid nose can legitimately shred any aircraft fielded by the IJNAS or IJAAF, without the severe limitations imposed by early autocannons.

Meanwhile, a radar equipped B-17 used for night attacks, higher-risk bombing missions and maritime patrol ops would actually add a decent amount of capability over any of the aircraft then available in theatre, and would free up Black Cats for missions in the South China Sea, and Philippine sea.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Considering that the US already had the B-25 and the various DB-7 variants in service, plus the Douglas Invader in the pipeline, adopting the Beaufighter as more than an interim night fighter is a bit odd.

Especially since 6-8 .50cal in a solid nose can legitimately shred any aircraft fielded by the IJNAS or IJAAF, without the severe limitations imposed by early autocannons.

Meanwhile, a radar equipped B-17 used for night attacks, higher-risk bombing missions and maritime patrol ops would actually add a decent amount of capability over any of the aircraft then available in theatre, and would free up Black Cats for missions in the South China Sea, and Philippine sea.

By the time the Battle of Midway was fought, none of the mentioned aircraft were in service in those forms, though the Beaufighter was already there since late 1940! Early lend lease Beau's could have increased defences and offences better than the actual deployed B-17's and B-26's on Midway, sicne these proven heavy strike fighters had already shown their worth, while the non proven USAAF bombers had not.

By the way, the B-25 at the time only had a single flexible .50 cal in its nose, originally, later on augmented by a second fixed one, which hardly is sufficient at all. (B25-C model) Sicne the B model a dorsal turret was shipped, though this one could not fire directly ahead. A F4F-3 has more firepower with four fixed .50 cal MG's.

 

[Usili]

As a note, in Rabaul, B-17s did skipbomb there against Japanese ships.

 

[Zheng He]

I was thinking in two areas here, first that midway would broadcast the (Japanes) carriers positions, and that the navy would then be able to listen to this traffic and get their air groups started in the right direction, and second, that once they arrived in proximity, the carrier air groups would be able to follow the B-17's broadcasts themselves. Neither of these would require the carriers or their airg groups to break radio silence, but even then, the airgroups were already using their radios so who knows.

Thanks for the input, and for the thread that got me thinking about this in the first place.

I'm not sure it is that simple, the whole issue of long distance aircraft and ship radio communications and coordination was still pretty primitive at the time both in terms of technology and procedures and these issues bedeviled US naval and air forces throughout 1942. To really pursue this POD you need a pretty extensive technical knowledge of the capabilities of the technology at the time and the capabilities of a lot of relatively inexperienced personnel to employ that technology in a combat situation in June 1942.

I still think for this POD to go forward, it has to start with a decision by Nimitz that he wants some level of coordination and communication between the carriers and Midway instead of the OTL where Midway and the carriers more or less fought separate battles against the same target. That means Nimitz decides the operational advantages of Midway and the carriers coordinating to some extent trump the OPSEC advantages of keeping Midway in the dark.

A much simpler POD in this same lane is to require all US strike squadrons to broadcast sighting reports (time, location, distance, speed, etc.) before going into the attack. They just didn't do that at the time because that was not the SOP in June 1942. The scout missions did it but not the strike missions. There was a whole discussion about this on the Battle of Midway Roundtable awhile back.