Honestly, I wonder how would a longer lasting Andropov deal with the Warsaw Pact ITTL? He couldn't possibly let them go yet wouldn't repeat another 1968 style intervention, especially during the 80's; though he might still continue the whole spiel of having the WP regimes take care of dissents by themselves.
I'm not so sure. The USSR pretty reliably invaded one of its satellites every decade, and it's not like they ever really wanted to, so much as those who argued it was the least bad option persuaded the non-interventionists every time.
So I am doubtful that Andropov (or any other leader) would be able to resist the pressure to intervene if the pressure in one of their border satellites grow large enough. And that pressure could come from surprising places - in OTL, the US (under Bush the 1st) was trying to persuade the Soviets to intervene in Romania during the struggle to overthrow Ceaușescu.
Let's say that Breznev dies in 1974 and for some lucky move Andropov takes over the USSR, what is the best case scenario for the soviets?
Andropov would be highly unlikely to win power this early - he'd only been a full member of the Politburo since the previous year.
The USSR lasts a lot longer
Cracking down on corruption using "checkist methods" may or may not actually improved the economy but it goes a long way to convincing the average person on the street that the government is doing *something* to fix the economy.
Andropov's anticorruption campaign in OTL seems to have added 0.5% to the annual growth rate, if I remember rightly.
So, Brezhnev was a figurehead?
No, Brezhnev's word was always the final word on any important matter. Brezhnev governed as part of a collective leadership, but he was definitely the most powerful (even indispensable) member of the collective, even when he was too senile to be effective.
Brezhnev had done a good job at cracking down on anyone who tried to throw shade on him.
In 1975, IIRC, it would be either Kirilenko or Kulakov. Every single Gen Sec was 2nd secretary before hand (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev). IIRC, Brezhnev split power between Suslov (who never wanted to be Gen Sec) and the Kulakov, and Kirilenko, whom were all 2nd secretaries of the Secretariat at the time. Regardless of my memory, it's whomever, other than Suslov, was 2nd secretary in 1975.
Do you know of any good sources that say Suslov didn't want to be GenSec? I've read different opinions in different places (that he did or did not want the top job), but all of them are little more than academic hearsay.
Kirilenko seems to have been losing his marbles from the mid 70s on, so if he wins power, it's likely that he'd either be a worse version of Brezhnev (he lived until 1990 in OTL) or he'd be a figurehead for someone else.
Kulakov could be more interesting - he was only 60 when he died in '78 and his death seems to be very surprising - indeed it may have been suicide or (less likely IMO) assassination. So if he wins power in '74 and dies as OTL, the Soviets have an unexpected renewal of the power struggle just as Afghanistan is starting to look like an urgent problem. If he lives another 10-15 years... Well... That could get very interesting indeed.
I would also include Nikolai Podgorny in the list of possible successors to Brezhnev in '74. Podgorny being in the running makes things even more interesting since his chief power base - the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet - makes him head of state and pretty much obligates him to push for more power for the Supreme Soviet if he wants to make a play for power himself. Even if Podgorny didn't succeed, the result could still be real strengthening of the power of elected representatives in the Soviet system.
fasquardon