Yuri Andropov Lives 10-15 Years Longer

CaliGuy

Banned
What if, due to him taking better care of his health (let's hope that this is realistic, shall we?), Yuri Andropov would have lived 10-15 years longer than he did in our TL.

Anyway, does he turn out to be the Soviet Deng Xiaoping, an older version of Mikhail Gorbachev, or something else entirely?

Any thoughts on this?
 
What if, due to him taking better care of his health (let's hope that this is realistic, shall we?), Yuri Andropov would have lived 10-15 years longer than he did in our TL.

Anyway, does he turn out to be the Soviet Deng Xiaoping, an older version of Mikhail Gorbachev, or something else entirely?

Any thoughts on this?

He was more of a Vladimir Putin prototype but it's doubtful he would amass the kind of cult following Putin has. The Soviet Union would probably hang on through brute oppression of dissent a few more years.
 
What if, due to him taking better care of his health (let's hope that this is realistic, shall we?), Yuri Andropov would have lived 10-15 years longer than he did in our TL.

In Behind the High Kremlin Walls, Russian emigré journalists Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova claimed that Andropov's health failed due to wounds suffered when he was shot on the staircase of his apartment building by a fellow resident. The attacker was a woman whose husband and son were high-ranking Brezhnevite apparatchiks (which is why she lived in that building), and had been sent to prison or the GULAG for corruption in Andropov's shake-up.

This tale has never been confirmed, but it seems easier for Andropov not to get shot than for him not to develop a chronic kidney condition.

As to his possible lifespan - he was almost 70 when he died; 15 more years seems a lot. Ten years gets him to 1994, which means no glasnost or perestroika until after Reagan. Or maybe not; Gorbachev was his ally and intended successor (the old boys on the Politburo picked Chernenko instead, but when he died too after just a year, Gorbachev was in). So perhaps some of Gorbachev's program starts sooner. His purge of the Party and government elite will surely continue. He may be more inclined than Gorbachev to rely on force to solve the institutional problems of the USSR. Coming from the KGB, he may prefer just purging the corrupt and incompetent by fiat to exposing problems and generating public anger that supports change.
 
. . . Gorbachev was his ally and intended successor (the old boys on the Politburo picked Chernenko instead, but when he died too after just a year, Gorbachev was in). So perhaps some of Gorbachev's program starts sooner. . .
This could be a workable arrangement, Andropov as the steady eddie chairman-of-the-board type. And Gorbachev as the chief-operating-officer or chief-executive-officer type (your pick!) who's the energetic reformer.
 
Anyway, does he turn out to be the Soviet Deng Xiaoping, an older version of Mikhail Gorbachev, or something else entirely?

Something else entirely, but more Deng than Gorbachev.

He was more of a Vladimir Putin prototype but it's doubtful he would amass the kind of cult following Putin has.

I don't think Andropov would look anything like Putin. For one thing, his access to concrete power would be far greater and thus he would have no need to seek informal power with the same aggression Putin has. For another, Andropov wouldn't be building his own patronage system with ex-KGB friends to co-opt the patronage systems of the well-connected men who would (after the fall of Communism) become oligarchs, he was dedicated to the Soviet state and the Communist party through and through.

Andropov would have made plenty of mistakes, but from my reading of Soviet history he seems to have been the best man to do the job that ended up falling to Gorbachev... He wanted to reform the system and believed that the place to start was with his anti-corruption campaign - which ended up being diverted under Gorbachev because of the need of the new leader to secure his position. With Andropov spending more time in office, the anti-corruption campaign might gain real momentum and between that and the generational hand-over from the pre-revolutionary generation to the post-WW2 generation (the intervening generation, of course, were devastated by Stalin's purges and WW2 and so produced few leaders in any field) could mean that the Party and State were prepared to engage in real reforms in the 90s, unlike OTL where they were thrown into the deep-end after the lost time of the Chernenko stasis and then the rush to reform in the wrong ways under the inexperienced Gorbachev. We often forget today, but China's reforms also started with an anti-corruption campaign that (IMO) was vital in preparing the Party in China for the price reform, agricultural reform and finally wider economic reform that followed.

However, much depends on Andropov's state of health for these years. Brezhnev, had he died between 1973 and 1976, would have been remembered as one of the greatest leaders the Soviets produced - as things were, Brezhnev lived past his sell-by-date and his growing senility lead to the USSR steadily drifting out of control. The same could happen to Andropov if he is too healthy to be pushed out of power but too sick to effectively exercise power.

fasquardon
 
Honestly, I wonder how would a longer lasting Andropov deal with the Warsaw Pact ITTL? He couldn't possibly let them go yet wouldn't repeat another 1968 style intervention, especially during the 80's; though he might still continue the whole spiel of having the WP regimes take care of dissents by themselves.
 
However, much depends on Andropov's state of health for these years. Brezhnev, had he died between 1973 and 1976, would have been remembered as one of the greatest leaders the Soviets produced - as things were, Brezhnev lived past his sell-by-date and his growing senility lead to the USSR steadily drifting out of control. The same could happen to Andropov if he is too healthy to be pushed out of power but too sick to effectively exercise power.
Now there's an interesting idea - Brezhnev dies earlier in say 1975 when he had his first heart attack and, assuming that he still takes over, Andropov then succeeds him getting more time at the beginning of his reign and another five or ten years extra in good health at the other end.
 
Andropov would have made plenty of mistakes, but from my reading of Soviet history he seems to have been the best man to do the job that ended up falling to Gorbachev... He wanted to reform the system and believed that the place to start was with his anti-corruption campaign - which ended up being diverted under Gorbachev because of the need of the new leader to secure his position. With Andropov spending more time in office, the anti-corruption campaign might gain real momentum and between that and the generational hand-over from the pre-revolutionary generation to the post-WW2 generation (the intervening generation, of course, were devastated by Stalin's purges and WW2 and so produced few leaders in any field) could mean that the Party and State were prepared to engage in real reforms in the 90s, unlike OTL where they were thrown into the deep-end after the lost time of the Chernenko stasis and then the rush to reform in the wrong ways under the inexperienced Gorbachev. We often forget today, but China's reforms also started with an anti-corruption campaign that (IMO) was vital in preparing the Party in China for the price reform, agricultural reform and finally wider economic reform that followed.

However, much depends on Andropov's state of health for these years. Brezhnev, had he died between 1973 and 1976, would have been remembered as one of the greatest leaders the Soviets produced - as things were, Brezhnev lived past his sell-by-date and his growing senility lead to the USSR steadily drifting out of control. The same could happen to Andropov if he is too healthy to be pushed out of power but too sick to effectively exercise power.

Let's say that Breznev dies in 1974 and for some lucky move Andropov takes over the USSR, what is the best case scenario for the soviets?
 
Let's say that Breznev dies in 1974 and for some lucky move Andropov takes over the USSR, what is the best case scenario for the soviets?
Not getting involved in Afghanistan on OTL's scale; that stuff took a toll on the Soviet economy.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Let's say that Breznev dies in 1974 and for some lucky move Andropov takes over the USSR, what is the best case scenario for the soviets?
The USSR lasts a lot longer

Cracking down on corruption using "checkist methods" may or may not actually improved the economy but it goes a long way to convincing the average person on the street that the government is doing *something* to fix the economy.
 
Now there's an interesting idea - Brezhnev dies earlier in say 1975 when he had his first heart attack and, assuming that he still takes over, Andropov then succeeds him getting more time at the beginning of his reign and another five or ten years extra in good health at the other end.

Andropov could not take over in 1975 as he was head of KGB. The Politiburo would not have done that for fear of giving the KGB too much power - whether real or appearances.
 
Hmm, so who'd be a possible successor?

In 1975, IIRC, it would be either Kirilenko or Kulakov. Every single Gen Sec was 2nd secretary before hand (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev). IIRC, Brezhnev split power between Suslov (who never wanted to be Gen Sec) and the Kulakov, and Kirilenko, whom were all 2nd secretaries of the Secretariat at the time. Regardless of my memory, it's whomever, other than Suslov, was 2nd secretary in 1975.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
In 1975, IIRC, it would be either Kirilenko or Kulakov. Every single Gen Sec was 2nd secretary before hand (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev). IIRC, Brezhnev split power between Suslov (who never wanted to be Gen Sec) and the Kulakov, and Kirilenko, whom were all 2nd secretaries of the Secretariat at the time. Regardless of my memory, it's whomever, other than Suslov, was 2nd secretary in 1975.
So, Brezhnev was a figurehead?
 
Is it possible for Andropov and Gorbachev to fix/reform the USSR's economy during this extended period in power?
 
So, Brezhnev was a figurehead?
No. Brezhnev had a lot of power, but he ruled based on consensus. Due to history the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev wanted a collective leadership where everyone got a say and things were decided by consensus, rather than an individual ruler (like Stalin or Khrushchev) pushing through decisions. That said, Brezhnev did increasingly become a figurehead as the years went on and he suffered a severe mental decline. By the end the other members of the Politburo (namely Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko) took a much greater role in leading the nation.
 
So, Brezhnev was a figurehead?

No. The Second Secretary had the role of leading the operations of the Secretariat. Because of that, they had a huge amount of influence in placing people in key posts and affecting various policies via their implementation. So, they collected a tremendous amount of power as the longer they remained in the role. Brezhnev dispersed the power between Suslov, Kulakov, and Kirilenko to minimize the threat that any one of them could potentially present to him.
 
Honestly, I wonder how would a longer lasting Andropov deal with the Warsaw Pact ITTL? He couldn't possibly let them go yet wouldn't repeat another 1968 style intervention, especially during the 80's; though he might still continue the whole spiel of having the WP regimes take care of dissents by themselves.

I'm not so sure. The USSR pretty reliably invaded one of its satellites every decade, and it's not like they ever really wanted to, so much as those who argued it was the least bad option persuaded the non-interventionists every time.

So I am doubtful that Andropov (or any other leader) would be able to resist the pressure to intervene if the pressure in one of their border satellites grow large enough. And that pressure could come from surprising places - in OTL, the US (under Bush the 1st) was trying to persuade the Soviets to intervene in Romania during the struggle to overthrow Ceaușescu.

Let's say that Breznev dies in 1974 and for some lucky move Andropov takes over the USSR, what is the best case scenario for the soviets?

Andropov would be highly unlikely to win power this early - he'd only been a full member of the Politburo since the previous year.

The USSR lasts a lot longer

Cracking down on corruption using "checkist methods" may or may not actually improved the economy but it goes a long way to convincing the average person on the street that the government is doing *something* to fix the economy.

Andropov's anticorruption campaign in OTL seems to have added 0.5% to the annual growth rate, if I remember rightly.

So, Brezhnev was a figurehead?

No, Brezhnev's word was always the final word on any important matter. Brezhnev governed as part of a collective leadership, but he was definitely the most powerful (even indispensable) member of the collective, even when he was too senile to be effective.

Brezhnev had done a good job at cracking down on anyone who tried to throw shade on him.

In 1975, IIRC, it would be either Kirilenko or Kulakov. Every single Gen Sec was 2nd secretary before hand (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev). IIRC, Brezhnev split power between Suslov (who never wanted to be Gen Sec) and the Kulakov, and Kirilenko, whom were all 2nd secretaries of the Secretariat at the time. Regardless of my memory, it's whomever, other than Suslov, was 2nd secretary in 1975.

Do you know of any good sources that say Suslov didn't want to be GenSec? I've read different opinions in different places (that he did or did not want the top job), but all of them are little more than academic hearsay.

Kirilenko seems to have been losing his marbles from the mid 70s on, so if he wins power, it's likely that he'd either be a worse version of Brezhnev (he lived until 1990 in OTL) or he'd be a figurehead for someone else.

Kulakov could be more interesting - he was only 60 when he died in '78 and his death seems to be very surprising - indeed it may have been suicide or (less likely IMO) assassination. So if he wins power in '74 and dies as OTL, the Soviets have an unexpected renewal of the power struggle just as Afghanistan is starting to look like an urgent problem. If he lives another 10-15 years... Well... That could get very interesting indeed.

I would also include Nikolai Podgorny in the list of possible successors to Brezhnev in '74. Podgorny being in the running makes things even more interesting since his chief power base - the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet - makes him head of state and pretty much obligates him to push for more power for the Supreme Soviet if he wants to make a play for power himself. Even if Podgorny didn't succeed, the result could still be real strengthening of the power of elected representatives in the Soviet system.

fasquardon
 
Do you know of any good sources that say Suslov didn't want to be GenSec? I've read different opinions in different places (that he did or did not want the top job), but all of them are little more than academic hearsay.

Kirilenko seems to have been losing his marbles from the mid 70s on, so if he wins power, it's likely that he'd either be a worse version of Brezhnev (he lived until 1990 in OTL) or he'd be a figurehead for someone else.

Kulakov could be more interesting - he was only 60 when he died in '78 and his death seems to be very surprising - indeed it may have been suicide or (less likely IMO) assassination. So if he wins power in '74 and dies as OTL, the Soviets have an unexpected renewal of the power struggle just as Afghanistan is starting to look like an urgent problem. If he lives another 10-15 years... Well... That could get very interesting indeed.

I would also include Nikolai Podgorny in the list of possible successors to Brezhnev in '74. Podgorny being in the running makes things even more interesting since his chief power base - the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet - makes him head of state and pretty much obligates him to push for more power for the Supreme Soviet if he wants to make a play for power himself. Even if Podgorny didn't succeed, the result could still be real strengthening of the power of elected representatives in the Soviet system.

fasquardon

I'm pretty sure Podgorny had been marginalized by 1970. He was still around - dead man walking type thing - but everyone knew he was no longer in line for succession.

As I recall, by 1981, Kirilenko made Brezhnev look mentally healthy.

As for Suslov, I am pretty sure it is one or more of the sources below. Although each has its own biases, I've seen it suggested in a number of places, and probably beyond these, so I am inclined to believe it at a general level.

Arbatov, Georgi. The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics. Random House, New York 1993.
Coleman, Fred, The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire; Forty Years That Shook the World, From Stalin to Yeltsin. New York: St. Martin’s Press 1996
Dodor, Dusko and Branson, Louise, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin. New York: Viking 1990
Ligachev, Yegor Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev New York: Pantheon Books 1993
 
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