Yugoslavia Lives!

I just went through that comedy thread about Yugoslavia, and I started to wonder if it was possible for Yugoslavia to survive into the 21st century. I admittedly don't know that much about it, but I am a little curious to know if Yugoslavia (by which I mean all 6 republics) could live that long. The only criteria is the POD has to be between the Tito-Stalin Split and Tito's death, along with being perfectly plausible. What do you guys think?
 
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It's unlikely. The 1974 constitution, with its devolution of rights to the Republics, and the lack of a strong successor to Tito make Yugoslavia's survival with that POD rather difficult.

If you could find a strongman like Tito to hold it together, then maybe; still, given the structure of Yugoslavia's government at the time, I doubt that would work either.

That's my opinion, anyway.
 
It's unlikely. The 1974 constitution, with its devolution of rights to the Republics, and the lack of a strong successor to Tito make Yugoslavia's survival with that POD rather difficult.

If you could find a strongman like Tito to hold it together, then maybe; still, given the structure of Yugoslavia's government at the time, I doubt that would work either.

That's my opinion, anyway.

What if the POD could have been earlier?
 
For Yugoslavia to survive would require a much different approach by the Socialists, namely the creation of a stronger "Yugoslav" identity and a lessening of Serbian political and economic dominance. Moving the capital to the multicultural city of Sarajevo and making Kosovo (and possibly Vojvodina) fully independent republics, along with the development of a pan-Yugoslav language might make the country hold together.

Another factor in the collapse, especially the violent nature of the collapse, was the piss-poor economy. If the powers-that-be, namely the IMF, had avoided extreme 'structural adjustment', as well as having somewhat stronger political leadership in Belgrade, the economic crises that made ethno-nationalism so attractive to all sides would have been lessened in severity. The IMF should have allowed the Yugoslavs to reform their economy at a slower pace and keep some form of worker ownership (maybe stock options for workers), as well as forgiving much of Yugoslavia's debt as opposed to just giving loans. In this case, while the country might still have broken up, the region would not have seen anywhere near as much bloodshed (although with Kosovo you never know...) and there would still be strong economic and political ties between the Balkan states, something like former Czechoslovakia.
 
For Yugoslavia to survive would require a much different approach by the Socialists, namely the creation of a stronger "Yugoslav" identity and a lessening of Serbian political and economic dominance. Moving the capital to the multicultural city of Sarajevo and making Kosovo (and possibly Vojvodina) fully independent republics, along with the development of a pan-Yugoslav language might make the country hold together.

Another factor in the collapse, especially the violent nature of the collapse, was the piss-poor economy. If the powers-that-be, namely the IMF, had avoided extreme 'structural adjustment', as well as having somewhat stronger political leadership in Belgrade, the economic crises that made ethno-nationalism so attractive to all sides would have been lessened in severity. The IMF should have allowed the Yugoslavs to reform their economy at a slower pace and keep some form of worker ownership (maybe stock options for workers), as well as forgiving much of Yugoslavia's debt as opposed to just giving loans. In this case, while the country might still have broken up, the region would not have seen anywhere near as much bloodshed (although with Kosovo you never know...) and there would still be strong economic and political ties between the Balkan states, something like former Czechoslovakia.

Interesting. And I almost forgot to ask: what would happen if Yugoslavia manages to survive? What cultural and political differences would there be?
 
It's unlikely. The 1974 constitution, with its devolution of rights to the Republics, and the lack of a strong successor to Tito make Yugoslavia's survival with that POD rather difficult.

If you could find a strongman like Tito to hold it together, then maybe; still, given the structure of Yugoslavia's government at the time, I doubt that would work either.

That's my opinion, anyway.
The real problem was that Tito was very detached from governing. In a single-party state, that means that your only hope for accountability and long-term goals is lost.

Basically, throughout the 70s, the nomenklatura basically lied to Tito about the economic situation in the nation, and floated the country's economy and standard of living with an unhealthy amount of debt. They felt they'd just keep the old man happy, and deal with the problem later.

Well, problem was that when later came, the recessional adjustments that were necessary were now in depression level territory. The government couldn't do anything but allow the country to be picked apart by Western capital while the various republics resorted to ever increasing nationalism to maintain their governments.

The only way to really avoid this is liberalization, in a big way. Strong men aren't going to change the economic factors that were at the root of the breakup.
 
Does it have to be a socialist Yugoslavia? Another thing would be a Royal Yugoslavia that survives WWII as a neutral, albeit an Axis cobelligerent state. Of course, a neutral but Axis leaning Yugoslavia would have to foil the coup of 1941 that was launched by General Simovic, with Prince Paul surviving as the Yugoslav king. Assuming that the Allies still win, Yugoslavia would have joined NATO and still be pro-Western but it would also butterfly the ethnic conflicts that occured. Of course, this may also result in butterflying away Kosovo's independence as well.
 
The real problem was that Tito was very detached from governing. In a single-party state, that means that your only hope for accountability and long-term goals is lost.

Basically, throughout the 70s, the nomenklatura basically lied to Tito about the economic situation in the nation, and floated the country's economy and standard of living with an unhealthy amount of debt. They felt they'd just keep the old man happy, and deal with the problem later.

Well, problem was that when later came, the recessional adjustments that were necessary were now in depression level territory. The government couldn't do anything but allow the country to be picked apart by Western capital while the various republics resorted to ever increasing nationalism to maintain their governments.

The only way to really avoid this is liberalization, in a big way. Strong men aren't going to change the economic factors that were at the root of the breakup.

That's very true. The economic situation was terrible for most of the republics (in fact, correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Slovenia leave because it wanted to maintain its stronger economic ties to Central/Western Europe?). Dictates from the IMF and the World Bank also didn't help anything, in addition to the domestic problems.

I do think a strongman would've helped a bit (a powerful dictator with a relatively strong army can do wondrous things), but even that would fail in the long run as you've said. With an earlier POD and some different policies, it might be able to survive; but then, it'd basically be a completely different Yugoslavia.
 

abc123

Banned
Does it have to be a socialist Yugoslavia? Another thing would be a Royal Yugoslavia that survives WWII as a neutral, albeit an Axis cobelligerent state. Of course, a neutral but Axis leaning Yugoslavia would have to foil the coup of 1941 that was launched by General Simovic, with Prince Paul surviving as the Yugoslav king. Assuming that the Allies still win, Yugoslavia would have joined NATO and still be pro-Western but it would also butterfly the ethnic conflicts that occured. Of course, this may also result in butterflying away Kosovo's independence as well.

Yes, that would been maybe the best and most plausible solution.
;)
 
Avoiding the ethnic strife and civil war that was ww2 would help immensly. Cool down the ideas of "Greater Serbia" too.
 

abc123

Banned
Avoiding the ethnic strife and civil war that was ww2 would help immensly. Cool down the ideas of "Greater Serbia" too.

Yep.

If Cvetković-Maček Agreement survives and if Yugoslavia survives the war as neutral/notbelligerent country, that could be the best solution for just about evreybody in Yugoslavia.

OFC, after the war, Yugoslavia will have to be bit "redecorated" ( something along Sebian plans after C-M Agreement, by founding Slovenian Banovina and Serbian lands Banovina ) but it has fair chance of survival.
 
For Yugoslavia to survive would require a much different approach by the Socialists, namely the creation of a stronger "Yugoslav" identity and a lessening of Serbian political and economic dominance. Moving the capital to the multicultural city of Sarajevo and making Kosovo (and possibly Vojvodina) fully independent republics, along with the development of a pan-Yugoslav language might make the country hold together.

Another factor in the collapse, especially the violent nature of the collapse, was the piss-poor economy. If the powers-that-be, namely the IMF, had avoided extreme 'structural adjustment', as well as having somewhat stronger political leadership in Belgrade, the economic crises that made ethno-nationalism so attractive to all sides would have been lessened in severity. The IMF should have allowed the Yugoslavs to reform their economy at a slower pace and keep some form of worker ownership (maybe stock options for workers), as well as forgiving much of Yugoslavia's debt as opposed to just giving loans. In this case, while the country might still have broken up, the region would not have seen anywhere near as much bloodshed (although with Kosovo you never know...) and there would still be strong economic and political ties between the Balkan states, something like former Czechoslovakia.

1. I agree with your point about creating a stronger 'Yugoslav' identity. This was definetly the biggest mistake on Tito's part and he should be blamed for insisting on some kind of ethno-federal national framework that simply perpetuated the nationality problem in the country. In fact it would have been very easy to simply make what today's is considered Serbo-Croatian the official language of the country and force Slovenians (they speak their own similar Slavic language) to use it. Macedonians before WWII did not even exist as a nationality and were either Serbs or Bulgars during the interwar years. By making Serbo-Croatian the official Yugoslav language and forcing all Serbs, Croats, Slovenes etc. to declare themselves as Yugoslavs, this would have been much more effective in solving the nationality issue

2. I disagree with your idea that in order for Yugoslavia to survive it would need to further de-centralize rule from Belgrade and alledged Serbian domination. The fundamental problem of Yugoslavia and the reason it broke was because it was TOO DECENTRALIZED. Serbs who formed 40% of the population were given only 1 out of 8 votes in the federal presidency (12.5%) and much less represented politically in proportion to their population. When Communism ended in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia was forced to adopt democratic reforms, this finally gave Serbs the opportunity to gain legitimate representation in the country. Serbs championed political reform and their leader Milosevic constantly supported national elections in which the entire country would vote for a single president, as was the case in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and ALL Of Eastern Europe. A truly democratic Yugoslavia would have given Serbs who formed 40% of the popoulation 40% influence in the country. You can't call this Serbian domination, its simply how democracy works. Democracy means majority rule...and Serbs just happened to be the majority.

3. Also there are barely any grounds for granting full republic status to Vojvodina and even Kosovo as a solution to Yugoslavia. A much better way to have solved that problem was to incorporate them fully into Serbia (as Milosevic had done) however at the same time reduce their representation at the federal level by taking away their 2 seats from the 8 member presidency (as Milosevic had not done). What Milosevic did, and I fault him for this, was abolish Kosovo and Vojvodina's autonomy yet keep theri seats at the federal level, which meant that Serbia in effect had 3 votes at the federal presidency as opposed to all the other republics who only had one. This was obviously him being an idiot, and simply re-enforced Croatian and Slovenian claims of serbian domination. Instead the federal presidency should have been reduced to six members and there you go problem solved. six republics = six votes.
 
1. I agree with your point about creating a stronger 'Yugoslav' identity. This was definetly the biggest mistake on Tito's part and he should be blamed for insisting on some kind of ethno-federal national framework that simply perpetuated the nationality problem in the country. In fact it would have been very easy to simply make what today's is considered Serbo-Croatian the official language of the country and force Slovenians (they speak their own similar Slavic language) to use it. Macedonians before WWII did not even exist as a nationality and were either Serbs or Bulgars during the interwar years. By making Serbo-Croatian the official Yugoslav language and forcing all Serbs, Croats, Slovenes etc. to declare themselves as Yugoslavs, this would have been much more effective in solving the nationality issue

2. I disagree with your idea that in order for Yugoslavia to survive it would need to further de-centralize rule from Belgrade and alledged Serbian domination. The fundamental problem of Yugoslavia and the reason it broke was because it was TOO DECENTRALIZED. Serbs who formed 40% of the population were given only 1 out of 8 votes in the federal presidency (12.5%) and much less represented politically in proportion to their population. When Communism ended in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia was forced to adopt democratic reforms, this finally gave Serbs the opportunity to gain legitimate representation in the country. Serbs championed political reform and their leader Milosevic constantly supported national elections in which the entire country would vote for a single president, as was the case in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and ALL Of Eastern Europe. A truly democratic Yugoslavia would have given Serbs who formed 40% of the popoulation 40% influence in the country. You can't call this Serbian domination, its simply how democracy works. Democracy means majority rule...and Serbs just happened to be the majority.

3. Also there are barely any grounds for granting full republic status to Vojvodina and even Kosovo as a solution to Yugoslavia. A much better way to have solved that problem was to incorporate them fully into Serbia (as Milosevic had done) however at the same time reduce their representation at the federal level by taking away their 2 seats from the 8 member presidency (as Milosevic had not done). What Milosevic did, and I fault him for this, was abolish Kosovo and Vojvodina's autonomy yet keep theri seats at the federal level, which meant that Serbia in effect had 3 votes at the federal presidency as opposed to all the other republics who only had one. This was obviously him being an idiot, and simply re-enforced Croatian and Slovenian claims of serbian domination. Instead the federal presidency should have been reduced to six members and there you go problem solved. six republics = six votes.

Forcing people to adopt a language different from their own cherished one is something that has a strong tendency to backfire violently and quickly in modern times, as places like Flanders and Catalonia show. Even more so in Eastern Europe. Slovenians had long fought for their language within the Austrian state against the imposition of either German and Italian. Heck, the use of Slovenian in some local schools was among the hottest political issues of the whole Hapbsurg Monarchy at the turn of the centuries. Slovenian is indisputably close to Serbo-Croatian, but it was an established literary language from before Jugoslavia even formed. Forcing Serbo-Croatian upon Slovenians would only encourage Slovenia to seek independence.
 
Forcing people to adopt a language different from their own cherished one is something that has a strong tendency to backfire violently and quickly in modern times, as places like Flanders and Catalonia show. Even more so in Eastern Europe. Slovenians had long fought for their language within the Austrian state against the imposition of either German and Italian. Heck, the use of Slovenian in some local schools was among the hottest political issues of the whole Hapbsurg Monarchy at the turn of the centuries. Slovenian is indisputably close to Serbo-Croatian, but it was an established literary language from before Jugoslavia even formed. Forcing Serbo-Croatian upon Slovenians would only encourage Slovenia to seek independence.
You would have similar problems in Macedonia, which Tito managed to turn into one of the most loyal republics by enforcing a Macedonian identity which was separate from Serbian. Enforcing the Serbo-Croatian language in Macedonia would repeat the mistake that the First Yugoslavia committed: not only did they not destroy the prevailing Bulgarian identity of the region, but they strengthened it (consider the way the Bulgarian army was greeted in Macedonia in 1941).
And let’s not even mention Kosovo...
 
You would have similar problems in Macedonia, which Tito managed to turn into one of the most loyal republics by enforcing a Macedonian identity which was separate from Serbian. Enforcing the Serbo-Croatian language in Macedonia would repeat the mistake that the First Yugoslavia committed: not only did they not destroy the prevailing Bulgarian identity of the region, but they strengthened it (consider the way the Bulgarian army was greeted in Macedonia in 1941).
And let’s not even mention Kosovo...

To be honest, I actually agree with you and don't think that forcing a language onto on Slovenes would have been smart. I do feel however that Tito could have done more to enforce a Yugoslav identity. He should not have created this ethno-federal like system in which Yugoslavia was a federal state consisting of 6 constituent nations each with their own republics because this simply re-enforced the divisive national identity rather than solved it. Tito did terrible things to get to power, just think about Goli Otok, Bleiburg and the political repression in the immediate post war years...During this time, he could have also forced upon the people a Yugoslav identity. For instance in the censuses, instead of giving the option of listing oneself as Serb, Croat, Slovene etc. he should have simply given everyone one option: Yugoslav. Also dividing the country into republics and provinces was in my opinion a terrible idea. A much better solution for Yugoslavia would have been to centralize the country and have administrative divisions be on the level of oblasts or large districts that did not correspond to national and ethnic boundaries. I really do think that organizing the country similar to the way Romania or Poland were organized, as UNITARY communist states, would have been much better for Yugoslavia.

Now people will argue that excessive centralization and unitarism was the epitome of the first Yugoslavia which also failed, and therefore why expect anything different the second time around? My answer, is that centralism in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia failed because the First Yugoslavia tried to create a unitary state through a DEMOCRATIC system, (atleast until 1929 when dictatorship ensued). However Tito's Yugoslavia began with an authoritarian system which could quite easily crush any revolt against it and repress any opposition.

And finally, the fact that Tito's Yugoslavia broke apart in a bloody ethnic war in the 1990's gives a pretty damning testimony against the way Tito handled the country's national question. If a country that you largely created breaks apart ten years after your death, that cannot be considered a success. and if Tito's method of excessive de-centralization and federalism failed, than maybe centralization and unitarism was the answer in 1945.
 
You would have similar problems in Macedonia, which Tito managed to turn into one of the most loyal republics by enforcing a Macedonian identity which was separate from Serbian. Enforcing the Serbo-Croatian language in Macedonia would repeat the mistake that the First Yugoslavia committed: not only did they not destroy the prevailing Bulgarian identity of the region, but they strengthened it (consider the way the Bulgarian army was greeted in Macedonia in 1941).
And let’s not even mention Kosovo...

I would say that Tito's policy toward Macedonia was successful from a Yugoslav point of view, but from a Serbian point of view it was not. This simply re-enforced Serbian perceptions as victims in the second Yugoslavia. You guys all seem to forget that Tito's system FAILED in Yugoslavia, his country disentrigated into bloody civil war and everything he took decades to create has now been destroyed. Now you can argue that wasn't his fault, but rather the fault of the leaders who came to power after him (Milosevic, Kucan, Tudjman) that abused his system, but if there had been a better system, those very leaders would never have come to power. The fact is that Tito's of policy decentralization in Yugoslavia fundamentally alienated the largest and most important national group in Yugoslavia, the SERBS. It was precisely the Serbs who had invested the most in Yugoslavia's creation and could be counted on most to preserve it. Instead, Tito's de-centralization empowered those national groups that had invested the least in Yugoslavia, and would be most prone to turn against the state in a time of crisis. So you can look at MAcedonia and say Tito's policy there was a success because it created a loyal population favorable toward Yugoslavia and that had finally turned its back on Bulgarian irredentism and designs in the region. However, Macedonian loyalty toward Yugoslavia lasted only in peacetime, during Tito's power, and in the decade after when Yugoslavia's fate was secure. It's easy to be loyal to the state during this time. WHAT's MucH MORE IMPORTANT is the way Macedonians acted in 1991-1992 when the war in Croatia was raging and the country was verging on complete disentigration. Did Macedonians at this time, when the unity of the country was at stake, and when they were needed most, did they choose to defend Yugoslavia or did they themselves take advantage of the country's crisis to break away? THAT's what's important and it was Tito's system that enabled them to do that.

Let's say Tito instead decided to make Macedonia an autonomous province of Serbia in 1945. Sure this would have pissed off a bunch of Macedonians and maybe drove them to declare themselves as Bulgarian rather than Serbian, and it probably would have pissed off other Yugoslavs such as Croats and Slovenes who'd complain that Serbia was too large a republic and that they were being dominated. But look at who chose to defend Yugoslavia when the country needed it most: Serbs. It was precisely those national groups that were empowered by Tito (Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Albanians) as a means to reduce Serbian dominance and ensure their loyalty Yugoslavia which turned their back on the state and sought secession.

And you mention Kosovo. Many will look at the time that Rankovic was in power in Serbia and declare it as the beginnings of Kosovo's problems because of the way he treated and suppressed Albanians. However, the real problems of Kosovo started when Albanians were given a de-facto republic after Rankovic and treat Kosovo as their own country. It is during this time when massive illegal Albanian immigration began by Albanians fleeing Enver Hoxha's tyranical rule and settling in Kosovo. It was the Albanian authorities that refused to secure the border and turned a blind eye secretly favoring a higher and higher Albanian population in the province. As soon as Tito died, they proved they began demands for a republic and again when the 1990's came, they were the last one's to defend the state. Now think about it. Sure Rankovic's policies toward Albanians were harsh and may have contributed toward their desire toward independence, however the solution to such a situation should not be to give that group the means by which to achieve independence. Tito's policy toward all of Yugoslavia was like that.

Take the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslims were identified as a constituent nation in Yugoslavia only in 1969, two years before the scheduled 1971 census, and many believe given such a status out of a fear that the majority of Muslims would declare themselves as Serbs and therefore making them a constituent nation would counteract the creeping perception of Serbian dominance. But think about it? Would Bosnia have declared its indpeendnece from Yugoslavia in 1992 if the Muslims hadn't been recognized as a nation?

I think that in general people somehow believe that it was Serbian hegemony that had always been the problem of Yugoslavia, both in the first and the second, and therefore the only way to have saved Yugoslavia was to further de-centralize and further endorse the wishes of non-Serbs. But when it comes down to it, Serbs were by far the most important national group in Yugoslavia, and it was a fundamental mistake by the Tito regime to operate and organize yugoslavia on the premise: a weak Serbia = a strong Yugoslavia
 
I would say that Tito's policy toward Macedonia was successful from a Yugoslav point of view, but from a Serbian point of view it was not. This simply re-enforced Serbian perceptions as victims in the second Yugoslavia. You guys all seem to forget that Tito's system FAILED in Yugoslavia, his country disentrigated into bloody civil war and everything he took decades to create has now been destroyed. Now you can argue that wasn't his fault, but rather the fault of the leaders who came to power after him (Milosevic, Kucan, Tudjman) that abused his system, but if there had been a better system, those very leaders would never have come to power. The fact is that Tito's of policy decentralization in Yugoslavia fundamentally alienated the largest and most important national group in Yugoslavia, the SERBS. It was precisely the Serbs who had invested the most in Yugoslavia's creation and could be counted on most to preserve it. Instead, Tito's de-centralization empowered those national groups that had invested the least in Yugoslavia, and would be most prone to turn against the state in a time of crisis. So you can look at MAcedonia and say Tito's policy there was a success because it created a loyal population favorable toward Yugoslavia and that had finally turned its back on Bulgarian irredentism and designs in the region. However, Macedonian loyalty toward Yugoslavia lasted only in peacetime, during Tito's power, and in the decade after when Yugoslavia's fate was secure. It's easy to be loyal to the state during this time. WHAT's MucH MORE IMPORTANT is the way Macedonians acted in 1991-1992 when the war in Croatia was raging and the country was verging on complete disentigration. Did Macedonians at this time, when the unity of the country was at stake, and when they were needed most, did they choose to defend Yugoslavia or did they themselves take advantage of the country's crisis to break away? THAT's what's important and it was Tito's system that enabled them to do that.

Let's say Tito instead decided to make Macedonia an autonomous province of Serbia in 1945. Sure this would have pissed off a bunch of Macedonians and maybe drove them to declare themselves as Bulgarian rather than Serbian, and it probably would have pissed off other Yugoslavs such as Croats and Slovenes who'd complain that Serbia was too large a republic and that they were being dominated. But look at who chose to defend Yugoslavia when the country needed it most: Serbs. It was precisely those national groups that were empowered by Tito (Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Albanians) as a means to reduce Serbian dominance and ensure their loyalty Yugoslavia which turned their back on the state and sought secession.

And you mention Kosovo. Many will look at the time that Rankovic was in power in Serbia and declare it as the beginnings of Kosovo's problems because of the way he treated and suppressed Albanians. However, the real problems of Kosovo started when Albanians were given a de-facto republic after Rankovic and treat Kosovo as their own country. It is during this time when massive illegal Albanian immigration began by Albanians fleeing Enver Hoxha's tyranical rule and settling in Kosovo. It was the Albanian authorities that refused to secure the border and turned a blind eye secretly favoring a higher and higher Albanian population in the province. As soon as Tito died, they proved they began demands for a republic and again when the 1990's came, they were the last one's to defend the state. Now think about it. Sure Rankovic's policies toward Albanians were harsh and may have contributed toward their desire toward independence, however the solution to such a situation should not be to give that group the means by which to achieve independence. Tito's policy toward all of Yugoslavia was like that.

Take the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslims were identified as a constituent nation in Yugoslavia only in 1969, two years before the scheduled 1971 census, and many believe given such a status out of a fear that the majority of Muslims would declare themselves as Serbs and therefore making them a constituent nation would counteract the creeping perception of Serbian dominance. But think about it? Would Bosnia have declared its indpeendnece from Yugoslavia in 1992 if the Muslims hadn't been recognized as a nation?

I think that in general people somehow believe that it was Serbian hegemony that had always been the problem of Yugoslavia, both in the first and the second, and therefore the only way to have saved Yugoslavia was to further de-centralize and further endorse the wishes of non-Serbs. But when it comes down to it, Serbs were by far the most important national group in Yugoslavia, and it was a fundamental mistake by the Tito regime to operate and organize yugoslavia on the premise: a weak Serbia = a strong Yugoslavia

I disagree: a stronger Serbia would actually mean a weaker Yugoslavia, exactly because Serbs were the most important nationality. They would see no need to merge into a broader Yogoslavian identity since they already dominate the country as Serbs. The other nationalities would see Yugoslavia as just an uber-greater Serbia and would be even more pissed off. From what I gather, it was basically the case in the interwar period.
On the other hand, I agree that further decentralization, and the very balance of the Republics of OTL were not viable long term solutions since they just encouraged people to identify with the national group, as Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians and Montenegrians (Bosnia was of cours a special case). Encouraging a stronger Yugoslavian identity should indeed be a priority, but this identity cannot be simply a Serbian one in disguise. I am not sure about how to do that.
 
For Yugoslavia to live into the 21st century without massive oppression and divisons between peoples you would need a PoD prior or during WW I or what Sibirskaya said.
 
I disagree: a stronger Serbia would actually mean a weaker Yugoslavia, exactly because Serbs were the most important nationality. They would see no need to merge into a broader Yogoslavian identity since they already dominate the country as Serbs. The other nationalities would see Yugoslavia as just an uber-greater Serbia and would be even more pissed off. From what I gather, it was basically the case in the interwar period.
On the other hand, I agree that further decentralization, and the very balance of the Republics of OTL were not viable long term solutions since they just encouraged people to identify with the national group, as Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians and Montenegrians (Bosnia was of cours a special case). Encouraging a stronger Yugoslavian identity should indeed be a priority, but this identity cannot be simply a Serbian one in disguise. I am not sure about how to do that.

I've toyed with the idea of cutting Slovenia and Macedonia from an alt-Yugoslavia as independent states and promoting a Yugoslav/"Slavonic" identity as a Serbo-Croatophone one... Possibly with a three capital system like South Africa's (Sarajevo - Executive ; Belgrade - Legislative ; Zagreb - Judicial... Or any mix up of that order, really).

That would require a rather different course of event in WWII or even WWI, though.
 
I disagree: a stronger Serbia would actually mean a weaker Yugoslavia, exactly because Serbs were the most important nationality. They would see no need to merge into a broader Yogoslavian identity since they already dominate the country as Serbs. The other nationalities would see Yugoslavia as just an uber-greater Serbia and would be even more pissed off. From what I gather, it was basically the case in the interwar period.
On the other hand, I agree that further decentralization, and the very balance of the Republics of OTL were not viable long term solutions since they just encouraged people to identify with the national group, as Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians and Montenegrians (Bosnia was of cours a special case). Encouraging a stronger Yugoslavian identity should indeed be a priority, but this identity cannot be simply a Serbian one in disguise. I am not sure about how to do that.

Yeah but don't you see the whole point? Tito's political system in WWII was premised on that very same notion that a weak serbia = strong Yugoslavia and guess what? The whole country broke apart in a bloody civil war because those very same nations that he gave republics to (Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians) decided to declare independence and secede. And when it came down to actually fight and defend Yugoslavia's borders, only Serbs were willing to do so.

And the whole argument that increasing Serbia's strength would have pissed of the national groups more is pretty weak, considering that Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks all continue to characterize the second Yugoslavia as Serb-dominated when the truth was exactly the opposite. Serbs who formed 40% of teh population were given 1 out of 8 votes at the federal level (12.5%) and were grossly under representated in the political institutions that mattered. If Yugosalvia was Serbian dominated, why were the richest Yugoslav republics Slovenia and Croatia? If Yugoslavia was Serb dominated why was Serbia the only country to have two autonomous provinces carved out of its territory? Why would a SErbian dominated Yugoslavia create artificial 'Montenegrin' 'MAcedonian' and 'Bosnian Muslim' and reduce their nummbers? And just in case everyone forgot...Tito was CROATIAN not Serbian. Which means that there is a far greater case to be made for Croatian and Slovenian domination in Tito's Yugoslavia than any Serbian domination
 
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