Your favorite reason why Britain would DoW Germany anyway if Berlin went east-first in 1914

[Aphrodite]

But that demand was made by the Germans to be double-edged. Fine if accepted, but the Germans, except for the Kaiser, didn't think it would be accepted. So the other purpose of that demand was to set up the pretext to help justify the strike west first strategy to German and world public opinion.

Not in the least. The offer really is based on the German's fear of France. The offer is consistent with their opinion of leaving a mobilized France in their rear- it is suicide. The plan was kept only for the possibility of France being neutral. When they realized that wasn't likely, they ended all work on it.

This is further evidenced by the Kaiser's letter to King George that if France was neutral he would go East only if French neutrality was guaranteed by Britain.

Moltke thought that guarantee would be worthless and still wanted to go West because the French were likely to break through the German lines and reach the Rhine before Britain could intervene.

East first works around here because people make enormous assumptions (British neutrality, France respecting Belgium neutrality, the Belgians resisting the French, the French and Russians not making a few simple adjustments which are obvious to anyone trained in military matters) which no German could make.

Further, East first thread's assume the Germans achieve feats of arms which far exceeded what they did in our time.

Finally, the East plan assumed Italy was pinning Six divisions in the Alps and providing the Third Italian army on the Rhine.

The Kaiser is serious- only a declaration of French neutrality with guarantees would spare France invasion

The premise of the OP isn't that a last-minute, overly complex set of demands with GB guaranteeing French neutrality and France neutering itself militarily is what makes this war an east-first affair, it's that the Germans deliberately base their planning on east-first offensive or defensive/counter-offensive operations from the beginning of the July Crisis, owing to the Crisis's origins in the blank check to the eastern ally, Austria.

This is not a piece of German war planning

 

[Tibi088]

Does anyone here seriously believe that french neutrality was even remotely a real possibility in 1914 after the russians and germans were at war? That the France that has been a various degree of hostile towards Germany since 1870, a France that has never accepted the germans having Alsace, a France that has paid for Russian rearmament for the very reason to have a strong ally against Germany, a France whose head of state Poincaré actually gave his own blank cheque to Russia will for whatever reason decide in the last minute to ditch Russia, loose the counterweight to Germany she spend incredible amount of money and energy to build up and sit aside as everything they did in the last decades goes to the wind?

I don't believe that for a minute - and if the Germans worked on that assumption as well I wont fault them for that at least.

 

[NoMommsen]

The Kaiser's condition for accepting French neutrality was the occupation of the French fortress line. ...

But that demand was made by the Germans to be double-edged. ...

Well, mainly incorrect at least in timing, assigning and assigning importance to the events IOTL.
At first ... the Kaiser didn't know anything of these ... "demands".

They were 'concluded' and put to paper on 31st July after a heated discussion between Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow, Falkenhayn and Moltke after the Kaiser had signed the declaration of the status of "Imminent Danger of War".
The Kaiser was no part of this discussion.
They served nothing else than ... somewaht soothing and playing to Moltkes at these days wobbly, on at least daily shifting too 'n froo moods (as Falkenhayn complained also almost daily in his diary during July).
They actually were transmitted to v.Schoen in Paris (Telegram No. 180, document Nr. 491, "Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914" compiled at the Foreign Office by Karl Kautsky [leftish SPD]) ... but he never ever mentioned them to his french contact persons. They knew nothing about these demand until the 'house keeping' americans took side and plundered the archives of the german embassy in 1917.

As a further ... evidence how few a role these demands actually played might be found in that neither the Kaiser's telegram to the english King nor the chancellors telegram to Lichnowsky after the Kaisers decision to "turn east" after the ... debatable offer of Grey to Lichnowsky arrived at the Paleace in Berlin on 1st August contained such a 'demand' again.
Both asked only for an englich vouchin/guaranteering for french neutrality aka inactivity on the borders.

According to the remembrances and diaries of Falkenhayn, Admiral v.Müller, Tirpitz, v.Plessen, Jagow, Bethmann-Holwe and - btw - also of Moltke these demands were NOT mentioned at all on 1st August during the discussions around the alleged (?) offer of Sir Edward Grey.

 

[ferdi254]

@Aphrodite let us rehash shortly your positions here.

1) You stated that the 5 French armies would drive 4 German armies to the Rhine. You have been asked repeatedly why a 5:4 French force would do better than the OTL 3:2 without any answer.
2) You then had the French take Metz which you claimed had only had weak fortresses designed by the French. After the fact has been pointed out to you that it was one of the best fortified towns in the world with modern German built fortresses you
3) had the French go via Luxemburg. Fun fact the border region there is called Briey Longwy which the Germans took easily in 1914 and the French could never get back (and not for a lack of trying) so
4) you now have the French army attack via Belgium. Which (even accepting all your political assumptions) would still leave Germany to place 2 against 3 French armies in a terrain well suitable for defense in dug in positions where we know the OTL result, the French get bloodily repulsed.

And on top of this you will have the Russians stay on the defensive so the Germans can move 2 armies back to the West where then 4 German armies will face 3 worn out and reduced and at the end of a bad logistical line French armies. A very predictable result.

What you are doing is that you take all the estimates made by the German staff that have OTL proven(!) to be false and apply them on a scenario.

The Germans did bloodily repulse the French OTL, their fortress line held and they took B-L. All historical facts that needed to be included in a what if scenario if that scenario should fly.

 

[kham_coc]

Does anyone here seriously believe that french neutrality was even remotely a real possibility in 1914 after the russians and germans were at war.

I don't disagree, but that's the wrong question - What could make the Germans believe in French neutrality?

East first works around here because people make enormous assumptions (British neutrality, France respecting Belgium neutrality, the Belgians resisting the French, the French and Russians not making a few simple adjustments which are obvious to anyone trained in military matters) which no German could make.

Did you not read the title of this thread?

France respecting Belgium neutrality

Please look at Belgium - the geography isn't the same, and invading Belgium isn't as good idea as the converse, and doesn't change anything.

the Belgians resisting the French,

The Belgians either resist, or Germany invades them as a French Co-belligerent, that's not in question. Then there is also the question of France ever leaving the French speaking Wallonian parts.

the French and Russians not making a few simple adjustments which are obvious to anyone trained in military matters) which no German could make

Those being what?
France not attacking? (but what about Belgium?)
Russia, who started the war over it's declining prestige, don't try to save the CB, Serbia, and withdraws from Poland to avoid German armies - Yeah that makes sense.

 

[Belisarius II]

But that demand was made by the Germans to be double-edged. Fine if accepted, but the Germans, except for the Kaiser, didn't think it would be accepted. So the other purpose of that demand was to set up the pretext to help justify the strike west first strategy to German and world public opinion.

If the Germans chose and east-first, defend in the west strategy, either because the Kaiser and Chancellor rein in the military and make it happen, or the military bend to the Kaiser's OTL change of mind, Germany will not place that impossible demand and infringement of French sovereignty, abandoning the fortress line, upon France. The Germans, knowing the demand, stated as an ultimatum would not be accepted and would be alarming, would not have made it. They would surely have expected a French attack, but would see no purpose in agitating the French and speeding up their attack, and would not want to do the French PR favors by issuing tough ultimatums.

The premise of the OP isn't that a last-minute, overly complex set of demands with GB guaranteeing French neutrality and France neutering itself militarily is what makes this war an east-first affair, it's that the Germans deliberately base their planning on east-first offensive or defensive/counter-offensive operations from the beginning of the July Crisis, owing to the Crisis's origins in the blank check to the eastern ally, Austria.

Very good points. The German, and Austrian generals were hellbent on going to war, and they were effectively in control of State policy in July 1914.

 

[Belisarius II]

I don't disagree, but that's the wrong question - What could make the Germans believe in French neutrality?

Your right. The Germans had no reason to believe France would abandon its ally of 20 years.

Did you not read the title of this thread?

Please look at Belgium - the geography isn't the same, and invading Belgium isn't as good idea as the converse, and doesn't change anything.

The Belgians either resist, or Germany invades them as a French Co-belligerent, that's not in question. Then there is also the question of France ever leaving the French speaking Wallonian parts.

Can you provide any evidence that the French intended to invade Belgium first? Why do you think the French had any ambition to annex the Frech speaking parts of Belgium?

Those being what?
France not attacking? (but what about Belgium?)
Russia, who started the war over it's declining prestige, don't try to save the CB, Serbia, and withdraws from Poland to avoid German armies - Yeah that makes sense.

The French had every intention of attacking Germany in the event of war. Russia started the war? That assertion rests on Russian mobilization being a declaration of war, when it is not. Germany declared war first, while diplomatic moves were far from being exhausted. Russia was even telling the Serbs to accept whatever demands Austria made, to avoid war. The Germans even rushed the Austrians to start the war sooner then they planned to, because they feared negotiations might head off war. Germany was the first to cross international borders and attacked small neutral countries. The German military was running on a Doomsday Clock, The Russians, French, and British were not. Russian Generals weren't telling the Czar they had no choice but to go to war now. German generals were actually lying to the kaiser to force war on him. Yet you say Russia started the war over its declining prestige?

 

[NoMommsen]

Does anyone here seriously believe that french neutrality was even remotely a real possibility in 1914 after the russians and germans were at war? ...

No one believe or believed back then in 1914 in the possibility of a continous french neutrality/non-belligerance. ... not even Bethmann-Hollweg or Jagow. Though it might be allowed to let them assign them some faint hope on it.

At least it was hoped for a delay - how long however lasting - of french military actions (which when finally occuring would then be countered with the well known and for years/decades known in numerous iterations and configurations for (almost) every possibility by countless exercises, "winterworks", "Schlußaufgaben", staff rides, etc. trained and played through counteroffenses).
The german leaders - civilian as well as militaries - were all well prepared to accept french belligerancy and therewith a war on two fronts at one point or the other. ... though they would have preferred different without a doubt.

But much more important to the chancellor, the foreign sectretary, the naval secretary aaand the Kaiser was the as truly possible and achievable perceived ongoing neutrality/non-belligerance of England. Which was also perceived as only enhanced should the french armies - after said delay - be the first starting operations of war.

... a France whose head of state Poincaré actually gave his own blank cheque to Russia ...

... only too often forgotten or ... concealed/ignored a fact.

 

[marathag]

Mobilization doesn't mean war to anyone except the Germans

Under the context of the secret 1892 Russo-French protocols of Alliance, it does mention that both would attack Germany on both fronts after mobilization, ASAP, with manpower level given

 

[kham_coc]

Can you provide any evidence that the French intended to invade Belgium first?

Eh - I didn't suggest they would. However, Joffre was told not to consider it so there is that.

Why do you think the French had any ambition to annex the Frech speaking parts of Belgium?

My point was that Belgium would have to assume they wanted too - Given that it had been policy only a few decades ago.

The French had every intention of attacking Germany in the event of war. Russia started the war?

My point was that in a scenario where Germany goes east, French and Russian actions are still very likely to remain the same.
France will advance in to German fortifications. Russia will have no choice but to advance into Germany as scheduled, because the alternative is surrendering Poland.

That assertion rests on Russian mobilization being a declaration of war, when it is not.

It wasn't a moral point.

while diplomatic moves were far from being exhausted.

Then it perhaps should have used some of those instead of reaching for Mobilisation, which is the step before declaring war?
Especially when told Germany would treat that as a declaration of war?
As I said I wasn't making a moral point, but it's very weird how Germany isn't allowed to consider mobilisation an act of war when similar ultimatums about actions are routinely accept as a ok when it's someone other than Germany making said ultimatums.

 

[Tibi088]

Very good points. The German, and Austrian generals were hellbent on going to war, and they were effectively in control of State policy in July 1914.

I strongly disagree. Its true that both in Austria and Germany the generals had a huge amount of power and undue influence ower diplomay and policy - after war broke out. Not before that. It was the politicans, ciilians who decided for war - and they could have easily made different decisions. The rein was handed to the militaries only after that.

 

[Simreeve]

If Britain doesn't go to war in 1914 then it's possible that the Irish situation gets resolved peacefully, even with the Ulster Unionist problem: Serious talks about Home Rule had been underway, until the British government put them on hold for the duration, after all. Perhaps they agree on a smaller 'Northern Ireland' (basically just the north-east & east's Protestant-majority areas), so that it contains fewer Catholics to be oppressed, and with a clearer control the Protestants are slightly less oppressive anyway... or perhaps it goes for a larger one instead with an all-of-Ulster solution (the whole nine counties) in which case the sectarian balance in the population is much closer to even so that neither side can oppress the other.

(Edited to put the "s" into "it's" in ifrst line.)

 

[Belisarius II]

I strongly disagree. Its true that both in Austria and Germany the generals had a huge amount of power and undue influence ower diplomay and policy - after war broke out. Not before that. It was the politicans, ciilians who decided for war - and they could have easily made different decisions. The rein was handed to the militaries only after that.

With few exceptions the Austrian Government from the Emperor on down had decided by early July on a war to eliminate the Serbian State. The Kaiser gave the blank check early in the crisis but then had second thoughts. The German generals told the Kaiser that any time wasted on negotiations would put the German Empire in mortal danger. They told the civilian government that when the Czar told the Kaiser Russia was mobilizing that war was the only answer. They lied to the Kaiser and said there was no viable strategy for an Eastern Front deployment. If they stopped the march to the West now the entire German War Machine would break down into chaos, and the Empire could be destroyed.

Putting that kind of pressure on the civilian leaders caused them to ignore the last options for peace that they otherwise might have taken. The Kaiser, and his government entered the war with a feeling of resignation that it was too late to avert the disaster, and they just had to hope the war would work out for the best. That is not what generals should be doing. lying to your civilian masters is never acceptable. A general's job is to give sound military advice, in a dispassionate way, not to panic the Government into war. Yes, the civilian leadership was in charge, but the military was dealing with them in bad faith and deceived them into thinking the alternative to war was national destruction.

 

[Tibi088]

With few exceptions the Austrian Government from the Emperor on down had decided by early July on a war to eliminate the Serbian State. The Kaiser gave the blank check early in the crisis but then had second thoughts. The German generals told the Kaiser that any time wasted on negotiations would put the German Empire in mortal danger. They told the civilian government that when the Czar told the Kaiser Russia was mobilizing that war was the only answer. They lied to the Kaiser and said there was no viable strategy for an Eastern Front deployment. If they stopped the march to the West now the entire German War Machine would break down into chaos, and the Empire could be destroyed.

Putting that kind of pressure on the civilian leaders caused them to ignore the last options for peace that they otherwise might have taken. The Kaiser, and his government entered the war with a feeling of resignation that it was too late to avert the disaster, and they just had to hope the war would work out for the best. That is not what generals should be doing. lying to your civilian masters is never acceptable. A general's job is to give sound military advice, in a dispassionate way, not to panic the Government into war. Yes, the civilian leadership was in charge, but the military was dealing with them in bad faith and deceived them into thinking the alternative to war was national destruction.

Hmmm.... lets start with Austria: Conrad, in evry single crisis strongly advocated for a military solution, either with Serbia or Italy. Yet he had nor power to get one till the civlians decided that THEY also wanted war - actually the hungarian prime minister Tisza, a civilian had to be persuaded - because they needed him on board. And the germans decided to hand a blank cheque to Austria - the civilians and not the military. The german generals only really started to pressure the civilians for war AFTER the russian secret mobilization was started to be discovered and Austria was already in war with Serbia.

 

[Saci]

[...]The German generals told the Kaiser that any time wasted on negotiations would put the German Empire in mortal danger.[...]

But this is objectively true after the russians mobilize. Once the russians mobilize, there's no guarantee they will it stop and if they don't stop, on a military aspect, it means war against both Russia and France.

If the United States were surrounded by both Russia and China, instead of Canada and Mexico, and they had an alliance aimed specifically against the United States with protocols estabilishing joint mobilization, wouldn't you agree that the Unites States is in mortal danger, too?

 

[TDM]

I strongly disagree. Its true that both in Austria and Germany the generals had a huge amount of power and undue influence ower diplomay and policy - after war broke out. Not before that. It was the politicans, ciilians who decided for war - and they could have easily made different decisions. The rein was handed to the militaries only after that.

Wilhelm's sudden change of mind about war enraged Bethmann Hollweg, the military, and the diplomatic service, who proceeded to sabotage Wilhelm's offer.[142] A German general wrote: "unfortunately ... peaceful news. The Kaiser wants peace ... He even wants to influence Austria and to stop continuing further."[143] Bethmann Hollweg sabotaged Wilhelm's proposal by instructing von Tschirschky not to restrain Austria.[note 21] In passing on Wilhelm's message, Bethmann Hollweg excluded the parts wherein the Emperor told the Austrians not to go to war.[143] Jagow told his diplomats to disregard Wilhelm's peace offer, and continue to press for war. General Falkenhayn told Wilhelm he "no longer had control of the affair in his own hands". Falkenhayn went on to imply that the military would stage a coup d'état, and depose Wilhelm in favour of the hawkish Crown Prince Wilhelm if he continued to work for peace.[143]

just one example of one day

However it's not just the military it military working with certain political figure to make this happen

 

[Belisarius II]

But this is objectively true after the russians mobilize. Once the russians mobilize, there's no guarantee they will it stop and if they don't stop, on a military aspect, it means war against both Russia and France.

If the United States were surrounded by both Russia and China, instead of Canada and Mexico, and they had an alliance aimed specifically against the United States with protocols estabilishing joint mobilization, wouldn't you agree that the Unites States is in mortal danger, too?

Every situation is different, but in the nuclear age the threat of annihilation is measured in minutes. If the nuclear powers had the mindset of the 1914 Germans, we wouldn't be on the internet discussing this now. In 1914 Germany was not threatened with annihilation. Germany had the largest economy in Europe, with the strongest, and best equipped army in the world. Its internal transportation system allowed them to quickly move their army to any threatened sector. The French border was well protected by geography, and a strong fortress line. In the East the Russians had a far less capable army that would take weeks to mobilize. This gave the Germans time to counter any aggressive Russian moves.

The fact was that Germany didn't have an army for national defense only national offense. The doctrine of seeking decisive battle, through a strategic offensive blinded the German General Staff from seeing their real mission, which was the protection of the country's territory, and national interests. That rigid thinking made the army a blunt instrument, that was prepared for only one contingency. German strategy in 1914 was completely faulty, because it was based on false assumptions. The Schlieffen Plan was doomed to fail because it was based on the illogical premise that somehow German soldiers could march much faster on the outside of a wheel then French soldiers marching on the inside could.

Politically it predictable drew Britain into the war, and badly damaged German relations with neutral countries, including the United States. It demonstrated that even with most of the army being sent to the West Russia wasn't able to successfully invade German territory. This showed that the obsessive fear of Russia wasn't justified. Fears of Russia after 1916 could have been dealt with by improved capabilities on their own part. The paranoid thinking that they had to destroy their potential enemies before they could destroy them led Germany into a disaster.

 

[Belisarius II]

Under the context of the secret 1892 Russo-French protocols of Alliance, it does mention that both would attack Germany on both fronts after mobilization, ASAP, with manpower level given

Everything depends on context. The Russian French Alliance was a defensive pact. They never agreed to a timetable to start a war, only how they would respond to one of them being attacked.

 

[Belisarius II]

Eh - I didn't suggest they would. However, Joffre was told not to consider it so there is that.

Joffre was told not to consider it because it was against national policy to invade Belgium.

My point was that Belgium would have to assume they wanted too - Given that it had been policy only a few decades ago.

It hadn't been French policy since 1830.

My point was that in a scenario where Germany goes east, French and Russian actions are still very likely to remain the same.
France will advance in to German fortifications. Russia will have no choice but to advance into Germany as scheduled, because the alternative is surrendering Poland.

No, they wouldn't act the same. For the Russians to attack East Prussia with 4 German armies on the Eastern Front would be suicidal. Surrendering most of Western Poland would be far preferable to losing half of their army. Doing that would lose them Poland anyway, and gain them nothing.

It wasn't a moral point.

Then it perhaps should have used some of those instead of reaching for Mobilisation, which is the step before declaring war?
Especially when told Germany would treat that as a declaration of war?
As I said I wasn't making a moral point, but it's very weird how Germany isn't allowed to consider mobilisation an act of war when similar ultimatums about actions are routinely accept as a ok when it's someone other than Germany making said ultimatums.

They had advised the Serbs to accept all of the Austrian demands, no matter how unreasonable they were. Responding to Austria's actions by mobilization was a sensible precaution, only the Germans considered it an act of war. What you are suggesting is the only thing Russia should have done was passively accept Austria's attack on Serbia, and that any action would put the onus of war on Russia. That was not a reasonable expectation. If you're looking for a fight, chances are you will find it. Only the Germans, and Austrians made ultimatums in 1914. Sorry the British did give Germany an ultimatum to stop the invasion of Belgium.

 

[Tibi088]

Everything depends on context. The Russian French Alliance was a defensive pact. They never agreed to a timetable to start a war, only how they would respond to one of them being attacked.

In this and I think in other threads as well it has been pointed out hat both France and Russia agreed to attack germany simultaneously on a predetermined day of mobilization - a day that was as russian railway development continued getting closer and closer to the day the mobilization order went out. This attack they both did carry out OTL. The fact that Germany too had a fixed timetable for war after mobilization and because theirs was faster they declared war first does not erase the fact that the french and russians had the same built in mechanism in their alliance.

After Austria decided that they will attack Serbia even if this could mean a war with Russia and Russia decided that this indeed means war the world war could not be avoided. At that point german and french involvement was guaranteed - not the least because both of them have given blank cheque's to their alliance partners earlier in the conflict. Any discussion about a non existent possibility of - but if the declarations of war between the GP's could have been delayed just a week/month/whatever a diplomatic solution might have been found are the same: bullshit or worse - an attempt to clear the franco-russians of any responsibility of what happened on the summer of 1914. Russia and France were strategically at the weakest position at the beginning of the conflict - because they could mobilize slower than Germany. They still opted for war. Any delay in the beginning of hostilities while mobilization continues weakens the CP's strategic position tremendously. The point is if the Russians decided not to comprimise in a weaker position what does make people believe they will be willing to compromise in a strategically much stronger one?