Yom Kippur War: Arab Victory
- Thread starter Plumber
- Start date
I remember either Mac or Cook mentioning that the Syrians could have pulled it off but stopped their advance or something.
part of that was the Syrians stopping at the border once they took the Heights, for no reason that any one even today understands, their random stopping A saved the northern settlements and B let Israel mount a massive counter-attack that drove the Syrians to the gates of Damascus
But still... an Arab victory sounds like too much of a stretch. I don't want to sound like an IDF nut, and I'm not an expert on this so feel free to disregard my comments. But to me, this WI sounds akin to the Russians taking Berlin in 1942 or something of the sort.
its a matter of what "victory" is in this case, I don't believe they can over run Israel all together, I think the Syrians could have broken into the the north, but Israel would have driven them out I believe, that being said Syrians in Israel its self would be a huge shock and blow to the Israeli mind, in OTL where the Northern Front was an Israeli victory and the Southern front was a tie in Israel's favor, but just the fact they didn't win right off freaked out Israel in a big way and changed the politics of the state radically
Egypt would never get across the Sinai and into Israel its self and I don't think Syria could get to Tel Aviv on their own.
I would think an Arab victory very possible. A friend of mine, now deceased I fear, who commanded an Israeli platoon in that war thought it was very much in the balance. Which might or might not prove anything.
The important open question is Israeli nuclear weapons. Did they really have any in 1973? They certainly wanted everyone to think they did, but hell I would too. Definitely they hadn't tested any.
The important open question is Israeli nuclear weapons. Did they really have any in 1973? They certainly wanted everyone to think they did, but hell I would too. Definitely they hadn't tested any.
I think they did, they opened their nuclear reactor in 1956, and post-1967 really stepped up their game, the CIA reported in 1967 that they had the materials to construct a bomb in six to eight weeks, Shimon Peres in fact wanted to test a bomb before the war to scare the Arabs off.
I dont know if the Syrians stopped their advance or were bled so much that when a small reserve force arrived (7 tanks I think) they broke. It has been shown time and again throughout history that during close fighting the arrival of even a small reserve force will swing the battle. So much so that this was the supreme aim of genralship for the longest time; when to commit the reserve. The Israelis fought so hard and the Syrian lost so much for their advances the arrival of fresh forces just caused them to stop their advance.
Of course this means that the friction of war could change this. Perhaps the 7 tanks get there earlier, before the Syrians had beld enough to break and they keep fighting. Or they arrive too late, when the Israelis run out of ammo and get overrun, when 7 tanks will just be a speedbump.
Of course this means that the friction of war could change this. Perhaps the 7 tanks get there earlier, before the Syrians had beld enough to break and they keep fighting. Or they arrive too late, when the Israelis run out of ammo and get overrun, when 7 tanks will just be a speedbump.
That they had the materials is certain. The question is the design; a plutonium bomb is rather complex and all other countries equipped with them have tested them. Could they assemble a bomb? Absolutely! Would it go off when required? Hard to be sure, unless the French provided them with a proven design. Even then, would you trust the French?
Cook
Banned
Define Victory?
The Egyptians and Syrians attacked simultaneously, the Egyptians crossing the Suez canal and carrying out a brilliant surprise attack on the Bar-Lev Line, pushing forward and securing a defensive perimeter on the eastern side of the Suez canal, nowhere more than 10 miles deep from the canal. For the Egyptians this secured the extent of their war aims; they wanted to secure the Suez Canal and prove that their army could seize and hold ground prior to entering into negotiations. At no time did the Egyptian Command intend to drive across the Sinai and destroy Israel; they were far more realistic of their capabilities and set their sights to more moderate targets.
In the north the Syrians attacked across the Golan Heights cease fire line with the intention of recovering the ground they’d lost in the 1967 Six Day War. They employed a greater density of artillery than the Russians had in their final drive towards Berlin in World War Two! The Syrian attack consisted of 5 divisions and 188 artillery batteries, the Israeli defence consisted of two brigades and 11 artillery batteries. Not only did they attack with an (in theory) overwhelming numerical advantage, they did it on Yom Kippur, when Israeli forces were at their weakest, troops scattered all over the country celebrating the holiest day on the Jewish calendar; the Syrian Command had anticipated that this would mean they would have at least 24 hours before the Israeli reserves started to be deployed, sufficient time to secure their objectives and dig in. In reality the first reserves started arriving in under an hour and the Israelis threw everything they had into the Golan, judging rightly that the Sinai had enough depth to it that even if the Egyptians continued their advance it would take them time to reach anywhere significant and pose a real threat.
The result was that even though they were fighting on two fronts, the Israelis only had to fight one front at a time; destroying one Arab army before turning their attention to the other.
When he Syrians were hard pressed they asked the Egyptians to resume the offensive in the hope that this would take the pressure off them in the north; it didn’t, all it did was simultaneously over extend the Egyptians and expose them to air Israeli air attacks without the protection of Egypt’s static air defences. Consequently when Syria went down, Egypt followed.
In all likelihood the Egyptians would not have been able to hold back the Israelis even if they’d remained dug in close to the Canal; they had a long, static defensive line which the Israelis could attack in concentrated force wherever they chose. But they certainly could have put up a stronger fight or made a fighting withdraw back to the canal.
The Egyptians and Syrians attacked simultaneously, the Egyptians crossing the Suez canal and carrying out a brilliant surprise attack on the Bar-Lev Line, pushing forward and securing a defensive perimeter on the eastern side of the Suez canal, nowhere more than 10 miles deep from the canal. For the Egyptians this secured the extent of their war aims; they wanted to secure the Suez Canal and prove that their army could seize and hold ground prior to entering into negotiations. At no time did the Egyptian Command intend to drive across the Sinai and destroy Israel; they were far more realistic of their capabilities and set their sights to more moderate targets.
In the north the Syrians attacked across the Golan Heights cease fire line with the intention of recovering the ground they’d lost in the 1967 Six Day War. They employed a greater density of artillery than the Russians had in their final drive towards Berlin in World War Two! The Syrian attack consisted of 5 divisions and 188 artillery batteries, the Israeli defence consisted of two brigades and 11 artillery batteries. Not only did they attack with an (in theory) overwhelming numerical advantage, they did it on Yom Kippur, when Israeli forces were at their weakest, troops scattered all over the country celebrating the holiest day on the Jewish calendar; the Syrian Command had anticipated that this would mean they would have at least 24 hours before the Israeli reserves started to be deployed, sufficient time to secure their objectives and dig in. In reality the first reserves started arriving in under an hour and the Israelis threw everything they had into the Golan, judging rightly that the Sinai had enough depth to it that even if the Egyptians continued their advance it would take them time to reach anywhere significant and pose a real threat.
The result was that even though they were fighting on two fronts, the Israelis only had to fight one front at a time; destroying one Arab army before turning their attention to the other.
When he Syrians were hard pressed they asked the Egyptians to resume the offensive in the hope that this would take the pressure off them in the north; it didn’t, all it did was simultaneously over extend the Egyptians and expose them to air Israeli air attacks without the protection of Egypt’s static air defences. Consequently when Syria went down, Egypt followed.
In all likelihood the Egyptians would not have been able to hold back the Israelis even if they’d remained dug in close to the Canal; they had a long, static defensive line which the Israelis could attack in concentrated force wherever they chose. But they certainly could have put up a stronger fight or made a fighting withdraw back to the canal.
For victory, I didn't mean destruction of Israel. That's idiotic and unrealistic.
So Egypt and Syria just wanted the Sinai and Golan Heights? I thought that a Yom Kippur victory would have an emasculated Palestine emerge from the West Bank and/or Gaza, or is that not in the cards? Did the useful distraction of keeping the "free the Palestinians!" card outweigh the benefits of being the liberators of Palestine?
So Egypt and Syria just wanted the Sinai and Golan Heights? I thought that a Yom Kippur victory would have an emasculated Palestine emerge from the West Bank and/or Gaza, or is that not in the cards? Did the useful distraction of keeping the "free the Palestinians!" card outweigh the benefits of being the liberators of Palestine?
No. I think you mean U-235, which requires a very high degree of enrichment. They could not do that then, nor could they do it today without attracting attention.
Read The Sword and the Olive.
Martin Van Creveld has deconstructed the situation pretty well, and showed the Israelis had even more advantages than usually credited.
Martin Van Creveld has deconstructed the situation pretty well, and showed the Israelis had even more advantages than usually credited.
The IAF has been exaggerated in most of Israel's wars. What really did the Egyptians in was that their second attack had not been meticulously planned like the original offensive. So it was a disorganized, confused mess that Israel's tanks tore to bits with ease, with air power or lack thereof being secondary.
Anaxagoras
Banned
The Egyptian objective was to seize and hold sufficient ground on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal to reestablish their hold of the canal itself, while the Syrian objective was to recapture the Golan Heights. This was entirely achievable. Once those two goals were accomplished, the idea was for the Soviets to shove a cease-fire resolution through the UNSC and bring the fighting to a close. There never was any intention of attacking Israel proper.
As for nuclear weapons, I have read from multiple sources that Moshe Dayan asked Golda Meir to permission to arm aircraft with nuclear weapons when it appeared as though the Syrians were about to break through the Israeli lines in the Golan. The strike was ready to go, but delayed to give IDF forces the opportunity to salvage the situation with a counter attack. When the counter attack succeeded in halting the Syrian advance, the nuclear strike was called off.
As for nuclear weapons, I have read from multiple sources that Moshe Dayan asked Golda Meir to permission to arm aircraft with nuclear weapons when it appeared as though the Syrians were about to break through the Israeli lines in the Golan. The strike was ready to go, but delayed to give IDF forces the opportunity to salvage the situation with a counter attack. When the counter attack succeeded in halting the Syrian advance, the nuclear strike was called off.
I recently read a few things about the YKW. Firstly that the Israeli method of directing airstrikes using artilley networks was obsolete, but this didnt show up for some 25 years. Secondly the army was used to clear paths through SAMs, which was a big call for army units to ignore artillery being fired at them in order to destroy SAMs for the airforce, but this was important for the overall war effort.
2 points.
"Israelis didn't really consider on using nukes". This is somewhat idiotic. They had them so they were part of their planning. Unless "didn't really consider using them" means that Syrian advance was halted and later there was no need for it. Agaisnt Egyptians there was no need since they dug in and even had they advanced they'd have to cross Sinai to threaten Israel proper.
"testing the nukes", there are claims about joint Israeli/SAR nuclear test http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vela_Incident That happened after YKW, though.
I think that best chance for Arab victory is that they accept immediate ceasefire as proposed by Soviets. They then negotiate from strength and would be able to achieve more. Syrians could get Golan back but if that happens Israelis are later unlikely to give up WB and Gaza.
"Israelis didn't really consider on using nukes". This is somewhat idiotic. They had them so they were part of their planning. Unless "didn't really consider using them" means that Syrian advance was halted and later there was no need for it. Agaisnt Egyptians there was no need since they dug in and even had they advanced they'd have to cross Sinai to threaten Israel proper.
"testing the nukes", there are claims about joint Israeli/SAR nuclear test http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vela_Incident That happened after YKW, though.
I think that best chance for Arab victory is that they accept immediate ceasefire as proposed by Soviets. They then negotiate from strength and would be able to achieve more. Syrians could get Golan back but if that happens Israelis are later unlikely to give up WB and Gaza.