No effect above the tactical level and that very early on.
The fundamental problem with Barbarossa is the assumption ( with no justification) that the Red Army can be destroyed close to the frontier. It was, it’s the other 5 million men that are not and cannot be that close to the frontier that break Barbarossa from Smolensk on. These are trained men (conscripts) in formed units for the most part but being Soviet of course the workers militia gets the publicity - Given the precarious nature of the lead elements until the infantry divisions close up there may be less anxiety but probably little more success.
Having another under strength panzer group just overloads the roads (or railroads) in that sector as does its supply column, e.g XXXXVII Pz corps is reporting the roadways collapsing into the swamp on 22 June and XXIV Pz Corps is having to double up Divisions on a single road - 18km advance instead of the 80 required.
Sticking another panzer prima donna in will only lead to more arguments about who gets the 12 (really) replacement tank engines available to the army.
The available air force would make a difference but it’s a difference between total air supremacy and total air supremacy close to the borders after that its just more traffic on limited roads.
AGN sector - I think Blair is overstating the case, well Manstein and Hoepner say you are overstating the case - their description is of a Russian army being driven back with a continuous front and tremendous difficulties in getting supplies forward. This is the description in the unit diaries at the time not the post war if only - see Stahel. Its also difficult to see where the other formations would get inserted
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941NW/Baltic/balticmap_june41d.JPG