YET ANOTHER Barbarossa thread...

:rolleyes::rolleyes:

would the tactical/logistical/personnel impact of the Nazis NOT having to conduct Land/Air operations in North Africa have a significant effect on the effectiveness of Barbarossa, or would the effects be so small they would be marginal?

any informed opinion would be gratefully received
 
Rommel was lavishly supplied with trucks compared to the forces for Barbarossa, but I doubt that the truck fleet that was lavish for 3 or 4 divisions would go very far when spread amongst almost 30.
 
IMHO, in 1941 the negative effect could hardly have been appreciable. The Germans deployed one full and one light Panzer division, which by the end of the year increased to two full divisions. They could hardly supply all the divisions deployed on the East front so adding one or two more doesn't give them anything.

Ditto for replacements, I think.

As for personnel, in all likelihood having Rommel on Eastern front might even be more of a detriment than an advantage.

The equation changes rapidly in 1942, though. The troops eventually committed (wasted is probably a more apt description) to the El Alamein and to the occupation of Tunis can only be seen as one of the greatest blunders. Not to mention the Luftwaffe planes and personnel used to transfer and supply those forces. All those forces might have made a real difference to the outcome of Stalingrad or Kursk. On the other hand, while it might slow Red Army down, nothing Germans could do would stop Red Army at this point.

Taking these forces away from West, only allows the Allies to speed up, so in the end it would be robbing Peter to pay Paul, an outcome all too frequent in Nazi Germany. Even if Axis give Africa up in November 1942, it would only allow the Allies to invade Italy sooner, thus drawing them to commit forces to Italy. Provided, of course Italy does not fold as a result of African disaster.

Ultimately, expanding 200.000 soldiers in Tunisia bought Axis two or three more months before Sicily was invaded. Was it worth it?

To conclude, IMHO, Germans could not gain anything substantial by aborting Africa at the inception, in March 1941. For 1942 we can debate, but ultimately, it comes down to picking their poison.
 
What's the PoD? Benny the Moose holds back in NA after being promised German support once Russia's beaten? No operation Sonnenblume? Or does Rommel get beaten earlier than OTL?
 
If the troops, tanks, trucks and planes were sent to the Eastern Front not Africa on paper it doesn't seem like it would be a big deal until one remembers that in the late Summer of 1941 the Soviet's screwed up badly the defense of Leningrad. With those extra German forces on hand I believe it could have been taken at that time which would have freed up massive numbers of Axis forces from the North for operations in the rest of Russia. That could have a major impact on the war in the East in 1942.

Having Rommel on the Eastern Front would be an interesting timeline as well. But, having roaming death squads in his area of operations would not have gone over well at all. Assuming Hitler doesn't give him a wide birth like he received in Africa and he can't keep his mouth closed which are decient assumptions (though not certain) he probably gets into one too many fights with Himmler and Hitler and is replaced or shot by 1942.
 
What's the PoD? Benny the Moose holds back in NA after being promised German support once Russia's beaten? No operation Sonnenblume? Or does Rommel get beaten earlier than OTL?

Il Duce gets his arse kicked most comprehensively, is deposed and the Italian lose all their African territory to the British and the Israelis [its for my ISOT :rolleyes: :D]
 
we are forgetting the aircraft; over 500 were supporting Rommel's ops directly or in Italy which would represent 1/6 reinforcement for the LW in Russia

there are also his replacements to consider that he went through between march and june as well

as I have suggested in other threads, having rommel be sent as an additional panzer corps to the 4th panzer army does have the potential to have the germans completely devastate the leningrad military district and eliminate all forces between them and the city on the fifth day of the campaign by a double envelopement attack against militia forces frantically building a defensive line on the dvina (but without much in the way of weapons or command structure)
 
we are forgetting the aircraft; over 500 were supporting Rommel's ops directly or in Italy which would represent 1/6 reinforcement for the LW in Russia

there are also his replacements to consider that he went through between march and june as well

as I have suggested in other threads, having rommel be sent as an additional panzer corps to the 4th panzer army does have the potential to have the germans completely devastate the leningrad military district and eliminate all forces between them and the city on the fifth day of the campaign by a double envelopement attack against militia forces frantically building a defensive line on the dvina (but without much in the way of weapons or command structure)

I can see the potental for that as well. The question is what would be the effect on the war in the East for the rest of 1941 and into 1942 do you think?

HMMM Winter Fox instead of Desert Fox - that sounds familiar...

Is that an alternate timeline that I haven't read yet?
 
I can see the potental for that as well. The question is what would be the effect on the war in the East for the rest of 1941 and into 1942 do you think?



Is that an alternate timeline that I haven't read yet?

capturing Leningrad by the end of July has considerable effect... ships can now steam into the port with supplies and reduce the stress on the rails and AGN's quartermaster companies. agn's infantry should then try to form a line from volkov to vesyegonsk and not even pretend to drive farther north or east as the terrain sucks and the 4th panzer army should be transferred south to put pressure on moscow from the north
 
No effect above the tactical level and that very early on.

The fundamental problem with Barbarossa is the assumption ( with no justification) that the Red Army can be destroyed close to the frontier. It was, it’s the other 5 million men that are not and cannot be that close to the frontier that break Barbarossa from Smolensk on. These are trained men (conscripts) in formed units for the most part but being Soviet of course the workers militia gets the publicity - Given the precarious nature of the lead elements until the infantry divisions close up there may be less anxiety but probably little more success.

Having another under strength panzer group just overloads the roads (or railroads) in that sector as does its supply column, e.g XXXXVII Pz corps is reporting the roadways collapsing into the swamp on 22 June and XXIV Pz Corps is having to double up Divisions on a single road - 18km advance instead of the 80 required.

Sticking another panzer prima donna in will only lead to more arguments about who gets the 12 (really) replacement tank engines available to the army.

The available air force would make a difference but it’s a difference between total air supremacy and total air supremacy close to the borders after that its just more traffic on limited roads.

AGN sector - I think Blair is overstating the case, well Manstein and Hoepner say you are overstating the case - their description is of a Russian army being driven back with a continuous front and tremendous difficulties in getting supplies forward. This is the description in the unit diaries at the time not the post war if only - see Stahel. Its also difficult to see where the other formations would get inserted

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941NW/Baltic/balticmap_june41d.JPG
 
capturing Leningrad by the end of July has considerable effect... ships can now steam into the port with supplies and reduce the stress on the rails and AGN's quartermaster companies. agn's infantry should then try to form a line from volkov to vesyegonsk and not even pretend to drive farther north or east as the terrain sucks and the 4th panzer army should be transferred south to put pressure on moscow from the north

I could see Stalin send much of the Red Army from the Far East reserved for Japan in case of attack to Europe. Stalin wasn't getting Lend Lease yet so I could see him take the view protecting Moscow would be more important then the port on their East coast at least at that point in time. Maybe.
 
No effect above the tactical level and that very early on.

The fundamental problem with Barbarossa is the assumption ( with no justification) that the Red Army can be destroyed close to the frontier. It was, it’s the other 5 million men that are not and cannot be that close to the frontier that break Barbarossa from Smolensk on. These are trained men (conscripts) in formed units for the most part but being Soviet of course the workers militia gets the publicity - Given the precarious nature of the lead elements until the infantry divisions close up there may be less anxiety but probably little more success.

Having another under strength panzer group just overloads the roads (or railroads) in that sector as does its supply column, e.g XXXXVII Pz corps is reporting the roadways collapsing into the swamp on 22 June and XXIV Pz Corps is having to double up Divisions on a single road - 18km advance instead of the 80 required.

Sticking another panzer prima donna in will only lead to more arguments about who gets the 12 (really) replacement tank engines available to the army.

The available air force would make a difference but it’s a difference between total air supremacy and total air supremacy close to the borders after that its just more traffic on limited roads.

AGN sector - I think Blair is overstating the case, well Manstein and Hoepner say you are overstating the case - their description is of a Russian army being driven back with a continuous front and tremendous difficulties in getting supplies forward. This is the description in the unit diaries at the time not the post war if only - see Stahel. Its also difficult to see where the other formations would get inserted

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/1941NW/Baltic/balticmap_june41d.JPG


it would of course depend where the Rommel corps (assuming that is what it remained, and the forces were not just parceled out amongst the otl formations) was sent of course

Manstein sat on the dvina doing nothing for days when there was just raw militia in front of him that had been sent there in total panic because he had nothing to screen his right flank for a crossing; slide Rommel's corps on his right and they could launch a pincer attack against those forces to try and compel their surrender

If Rommel's tanks were parceled out along the front; it's an extra 15ish runners per panzer division (half being useless panzer II's); effect negligable

the airpower is interesting depending how it is applied as 500 tactical aircraft represents a significant force... something like Brody could be stopped dead in it's tracks right out of the gate or alternatively the lines of retreat from the Smolensk pocket could be much more effectively interdicted trapping more troops inside with interesting possible follow on effects
 
dont work.

The supporting formations OTL were held up by the Belostok encirclement ( 9th army exposing 16 army flank) and the counterattack at Rosseinie (XXXXI PzCorps) by KV1s, so can't be ignored. here is no road net on the left worth the words and Manstein has bypassed, not destroyed the soviet forces on the way - they are (see Heinrici for example) full of fight and the supply route is tenuous at best even if the means to deliver tonnage is available, which is it not.

Only AGC had the remotest chance of delivering enough supplies for two groups and particularly AGN area the road net is hmm, theoretical at best.

Given that Bock, Halder, Hitler were all ( at this time) looking at the Moscow road the chances are that they would be deployed in the AGC sector, with basically the same problems or just maybe AGS where they could have made a little difference but not enough.

The extra a/c at Brody is same result, less wear and tear on the Luftwaffe. The problem all along is not 'destroying' forces on the borders - the Germans did that with ease. which is to say they bypassed corps and army formations and had a series of bloody infantry battles to suppress the various pockets through July August and so on. The problem is the totally inadequate supply net and distance to any strategic objective.

What the Germans really needed was another 30,000 4 wheel drive trucks and trained drivers, and mechanics, and fuel and a decent road system. Oh and an Intelligence service and some planning, any planning, would have helped.
 
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