The Argentine Junta failed to determine long term goals beyond staying in power. The Junta did not devise a coherent long term strategy beyond defense of the state. Lack of funding, caused partially by weak governments, undermining of individual initiative and lack of economic planning, hamstrung any effort to develop an offensive force. The military historically meddled in politics. Politically ambitious officers worried more about defending and expanding their fiefs rather than developing a realistic force structure.
In a perfect 1970 world, Argentina would have axed all larger ships older than 1955. It would have looked at smaller navies such as Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish, Israeli and Japanese for guidance on equipment and doctrine. A force based on DDG's, FFG's, FAC's and subs would have met their needs. Add a squadron or two of near P-3 equivalents and the A-4 force to create a robust defensive navy. Hubris would not allow this strategy.
I agree that hubris wouldn't allow to let go of the opportunity to operate a carrier, and interservice rivalry would also play a role in harming the creation of a competent combined arms doctrine. With that said, the 1976-1983 Juntas happened long after the required POD. We're looking at the strategic military decisions of the 1946-1970 period, which did include long term plans, like the nuclear program or the creation of a domestic military industrial complex (plans which went sideways with the consolidation of democracy post 1983).
The Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish and Israeli navies all operate in constricted waters, which is clearly not the case for the Argentine navy. I believe the Soviet and Japanese navies would work better for doctrine, as (specifically in the Soviet case) they are navies which ought to operate in open seas but in countries which lacked the economic or political will to support a full blown blue water navy.Specifically in the Soviet case, they couldn't count on a larger navy to back them up, as the Japanese did.
The Cold War Argentine Navy wasn't looking at being a defensive force either - there was no genuine threat coming from Britain and the potential wars with Chile or Brazil didn't have to be played defensively. Carriers give such an offensive edge. The short legged skyhawks don't.
This said, a strong naval aviation arm with Bucaneers and P-3s (or equivalent) plus helicopters for ASW would have been more cost effective than a carrier - and when it came to actually use it in the Falklands war, they would have been useful instead of useless. But hubris and interservice rivalry would prevent that.