YEAFT: What can Argentina get instead of Veinticinco de Mayo?

What exactly is the mission(s) of the ARA? If taking the Falkland remains on agenda, than a CVBG would be very useful.

But if defending the EEZ and achieving superiority over neighbours are deemed more important, more modern DDGs and SSs would be more cost effective investment.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
What exactly is the mission(s) of the ARA? If taking the Falkland remains on agenda, than a CVBG would be very useful.

But if defending the EEZ and achieving superiority over neighbours are deemed more important, more modern DDGs and SSs would be more cost effective investment.

The Argentine Junta failed to determine long term goals beyond staying in power. The Junta did not devise a coherent long term strategy beyond defense of the state. Lack of funding, caused partially by weak governments, undermining of individual initiative and lack of economic planning, hamstrung any effort to develop an offensive force. The military historically meddled in politics. Politically ambitious officers worried more about defending and expanding their fiefs rather than developing a realistic force structure.

In a perfect 1970 world, Argentina would have axed all larger ships older than 1955. It would have looked at smaller navies such as Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish, Israeli and Japanese for guidance on equipment and doctrine. A force based on DDG's, FFG's, FAC's and subs would have met their needs. Add a squadron or two of near P-3 equivalents and the A-4 force to create a robust defensive navy. Hubris would not allow this strategy.
 
The Argentine Junta failed to determine long term goals beyond staying in power. The Junta did not devise a coherent long term strategy beyond defense of the state. Lack of funding, caused partially by weak governments, undermining of individual initiative and lack of economic planning, hamstrung any effort to develop an offensive force. The military historically meddled in politics. Politically ambitious officers worried more about defending and expanding their fiefs rather than developing a realistic force structure.

In a perfect 1970 world, Argentina would have axed all larger ships older than 1955. It would have looked at smaller navies such as Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish, Israeli and Japanese for guidance on equipment and doctrine. A force based on DDG's, FFG's, FAC's and subs would have met their needs. Add a squadron or two of near P-3 equivalents and the A-4 force to create a robust defensive navy. Hubris would not allow this strategy.
I agree that hubris wouldn't allow to let go of the opportunity to operate a carrier, and interservice rivalry would also play a role in harming the creation of a competent combined arms doctrine. With that said, the 1976-1983 Juntas happened long after the required POD. We're looking at the strategic military decisions of the 1946-1970 period, which did include long term plans, like the nuclear program or the creation of a domestic military industrial complex (plans which went sideways with the consolidation of democracy post 1983).
The Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish and Israeli navies all operate in constricted waters, which is clearly not the case for the Argentine navy. I believe the Soviet and Japanese navies would work better for doctrine, as (specifically in the Soviet case) they are navies which ought to operate in open seas but in countries which lacked the economic or political will to support a full blown blue water navy.Specifically in the Soviet case, they couldn't count on a larger navy to back them up, as the Japanese did.
The Cold War Argentine Navy wasn't looking at being a defensive force either - there was no genuine threat coming from Britain and the potential wars with Chile or Brazil didn't have to be played defensively. Carriers give such an offensive edge. The short legged skyhawks don't.
This said, a strong naval aviation arm with Bucaneers and P-3s (or equivalent) plus helicopters for ASW would have been more cost effective than a carrier - and when it came to actually use it in the Falklands war, they would have been useful instead of useless. But hubris and interservice rivalry would prevent that.
 
I also note that the HMS Centaur was used an accommodation ship in the late 60's. Wouldn't it be ironic if Argentina acquired her? If Hermes is retired, the UK would be facing one of her own CV's. Probably with A4, Super Entendard and S2. It may be a target for the SSN's, but would cause the Admiralty some concerns.
Actually I don't know why the Argentines didn't buy Centaur instead of the Karel Doorman. She was available and I don't see why HMG would not have sold her. The sale of the 2 Type 42s to Argentina was announced in May 1970.

After the Review of the Fleet in the Clyde in August 1965 she went to Portsmouth where she was paid off and used as an accommodation ship for Victorious which was refitting. Then in September 1966 she was towed to Devonport to act as an accommodation ship for Eagle which was refitting and after Eagle's refit was completed she was towed back to Portsmouth.

Then on 24th December 1970 she was towed from Portsmouth to Devonport to await disposal. On 4th December 1972 she left Devonport for Cairn Ryan, where she arrived on the 8th for breaking up.

Source British Warships Since 1945 by Mike Critchley.


Centaur was faster than Karel Doorman. She had 2 steam catapults (capable of launching Sea Vixens) instead of Karel Doorman's one. Her hangar was 62 feet wide instead of 52 feet, which is important because the Skyhawk's wingspan was 27ft 5in and the Tracker & Tracer's wing spans were 27ft 4in folded. Therefore Centaur's hangar could accommodate twice as many Skyhawks and Trackers as the Karel Doorman.
 
Even more ironic would be if Hermes was available to the RN.
HMG selling Hermes is Argentina is also a very plausible. If Australia, India or a South American country had made an offer for her in the late 1960s it's very likely that HMG would have accepted it. Albion would have been run on as a commando carrier and it would have saved the British taxpayer the (IIRC) £25 million to convert Hermes from a strike carrier to a commando carrier 1971-73.
 
IOTL Argentina ordered its pair of Type 209s at the same time that Brazil ordered the first 2 of its 3 Oberon class and Chile ordered its pair of Oberons.

Would it be an improvement if Argentina followed suit and ordered a pair of Oberons?

Both Type 209s were built in sections in West Germany by Howaldtswerke at Kiel esand assembled in Argentina by AFNE at Rio Santiago. However, I don't see why Vickers wouldn't agree to building the sections at Barrow in the UK and then sending them to Argentina to be assembled by AFNE at Rio Santiago ITTL. After all Vickers built one of the Argentine Type 42s at Barrow IOTL and AFNE, Rio Santiago built the other one IOTL.
 
IOTL Argentina ordered its pair of Type 209s at the same time that Brazil ordered the first 2 of its 3 Oberon class and Chile ordered its pair of Oberons.

Would it be an improvement if Argentina followed suit and ordered a pair of Oberons?
It depends. Are they delivered with working torpedoes? If yes, that would make a rather significant difference with the 209s :p
 
The Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish and Israeli navies all operate in constricted waters, which is clearly not the case for the Argentine navy. I believe the Soviet and Japanese navies would work better for doctrine, as (specifically in the Soviet case) they are navies which ought to operate in open seas but in countries which lacked the economic or political will to support a full blown blue water navy.Specifically in the Soviet case, they couldn't count on a larger navy to back them up, as the Japanese did.
The Cold War Argentine Navy wasn't looking at being a defensive force either - there was no genuine threat coming from Britain and the potential wars with Chile or Brazil didn't have to be played defensively. Carriers give such an offensive edge. The short legged skyhawks don't.

This said, a strong naval aviation arm with Bucaneers and P-3s (or equivalent) plus helicopters for ASW would have been more cost effective than a carrier - and when it came to actually use it in the Falklands war, they would have been useful instead of useless. But hubris and interservice rivalry would prevent that.

The comparison with the USSR navy is problematic, as the Soviets had a strategic nuclear mission that the ARA never had and the Soviet Navy can be considered as operating in "restricted" waters as the Atlantic was blocked the SOSUS and the Danish Sound.
 
Heremes was offered to Australia in 1968 IIRC and rejected due to her high operating costs. However I imagine that the offer was tied into existing alliance arrangements, possibly to ameliorate the British withdrawal from EoS, so might not be made to Argentina.
 
I wonder if temptation to operate older, larger ships such as carriers and cruisers comes from the fact that they were manpower intensive, ie. by manning them the Navy would be larger this would create more officer positions? Thus the end result would be more influence in Army-Navy-Air Force contest?
 
Before ww1 the Russians had 8 gun artillery batteries because the two x 4 gun sections meant it was commanded by a captain rather than a lieutenant with a 4 or 6 gun, single section battery. So that isn't out of the question.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
The desire for cruisers and carriers is from both the need for greater officer posts and from the need to counter the Brazilian and Chilean fleets. Naval knowledge of the time was slowly coming to grips with anti-ship missiles. Many navies came late to the dance in this field, USN included in fielding an operational system. A prescient admiral could have changed the direction of the Argentine Navy by pointing out that more smaller craft allowed for more command positions. The failure to update the submarine force earlier is more disconcerting. A force of 6-8 modern diesel electric subs would have greatly complicated any opposing naval plans. Any plans by Argentina for offensive operations beyond Brazil and Chile are foolish until the British pulled out of the South Atlantic. Even then, the threat of British naval and economic retaliation should have stayed their hand.

Argentine political and economic issues after WW2 are story in good intentions, failed policies and disruptive politics. The decline of the economy in the 60's resulted in a credit and trade deficit and stifling inflation by 1975.

If the economy could support it, Centaur would have been a better choice than Karel Doorman. It was able to handle larger aircraft, steam faster, was newer and had a slightly larger crew. Only the last point is a negative. I would expect the operational cost would be greater also. I do not think a carrier was in Argentina's best interest.
 
Any plans by Argentina for offensive operations beyond Brazil and Chile are foolish until the British pulled out of the South Atlantic. Even then, the threat of British naval and economic retaliation should have stayed their hand.

There is one player, possibly two, who would have been in the area in a hurry that none of the SA nations would have liked.
 
Top