Discussion in 'Alternate History Discussion: After 1900' started by Jukra, Jan 8, 2019.
Thanks McPherson! If France adapted the ASROC launcher to Exocet/Roland, we have a start.
Argentina historically bought Aspide missile, though delivered after the Falklands war. As for heavier missile, Iran mounted SM-1's on their ex-USN destroyers in box launchers, so I'd guess that would be an option for Masurca or Sea Dart as well if there's will, there's a way. A command cruiser equipped with area SAM and heavy helos for ASW as well as ASuW work with Sea Killer / Marte or Sea Skua missiles, might well serve as a nucleus for a SAG.
The POD is late 60's or early 70's. Argentina did not inquire about Aspide until late 70's. The Terrier/Tartar/Sea Dart/Mascura are medium to long range SAMs. Roland/Sea Sparrow/Aspide are short range replacements for Bofors and similar guns. SM-1 appeared in early 80's.
SM-1MR entered US service in 1967. While area SAM would be preferable, a SeaSparrow/Aspide etc. were no SeaCats. Sure, Aspide was not available in late 60's but might become available already for 1982 if installed in a modernization instead of being installed in a newly built vessel.
Until the 80's, yes, util the 90's highly unlikely - if they survive that late it would almost certainly be as hulks awaiting final decommissioning and disposal.
Huh? The F-101C did not have a rotary weapons bay, that was the F-101B/F. Also, the biggest thing that could fit the bays was the AIR-2 Genie - the three options mentioned above don't fit in the bays. Furthermore, the USAF used the F-101C as a nuclear strike platform - I don't see them being sold for anyone, even if the hardware associated with nuclear delivery gets removed before delivery.
Oops. Must have been thinking of something else. Yes, the A/C were nuclear bombers, but had the capability to carry conventional bombs and rockets. Many were converted to RF-101's. Canada and ROC received some.
This thread, and the RN one from last week, has got me thinking about Area Defence SAMs of the era so I broke out my Jane's Fighting ships 1969-70 and found that in 1969-70 these navies had Area Defence SAM ships. This does not count navies who operated the likes of Sea Cat and might miss a ship or two.
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In 1969-70 only the most advanced and professional navies had Area Defence SAM ships, mostly in very small numbers. In that case I think expensive Area Defence SAM upgrades for an Argentine ship procured in about 1968 isn't really on the cards.
I think that is an excellent point. Argentina, if she is going to operate an austere aircraft carrier, needs at least one AAA bodyguard ship and 2 or 3 ASW bodyguard ships, even if the flattop is merely a sortie unit. If the aircraft carrier is at sea as a regular exercise, then double those requirements.
More likely eats three-four Mark 8 Mod 4 fish from HMS Conquer instead of the old Brooklyn class CL General Bergrano and the rank stupidity of constructing a ship the size of a CB without proper underwater protection is exposed for all to see resulting the loss of 1/3 of the Argentine ship's crew.
I haven't checked my reference books but IIRC Colbert could be fitted with an area defence SAM because she was designed with such a conversion in mind and De Grasse wasn't. AFAIK it was the internal layouts of both ships that made one possible and the other impossible.
The next stumbling block is that the USA would be unwilling to sell Standard/Terrier/Tatar to Argentina. As @CalBear wrote the Dutch had to remove the Terrier system from De Zeven Provinciën when she was sold to Peru.
IIRC the Argentines ordered their pair of Type 42 destroyers in 1970 and it would be more cost effective to order a third ship of that class if Argentina had the money for a third Sea Dart system and keep whichever gun cruiser they bought as an all-gun ship.
According to this website the Italian guided missile cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi was withdrawn for financial reasons and not because her hull and machinery were worn out so she is another possible candidate for sale to a South American navy. However, in common with De Zeven Provinciën it's likely that the Americans would demand the removal of her Terrier system (and the 4 Polaris launch tubes).
The Americans still had a few Baltimores and Cleveland class cruisers in 1969-70. That's not counting the 5 Baltimores and 6 Clevelands that had been converted to guided missile ships. AFAIK neither the 6 converted Clevelands or the 3 Baltimores converted to Albany class were for sale. However, Boston and Canberra might be because they had been re-classified as gun cruisers because the USN couldn't get Congress to authorise the modernisation of their obsolete Terrier systems. The US Government might be willing to sell them although the Terriers would have to be removed even if they were obsolete.
When the RAN had the Melbourne we had about 11 escorts, in the mid 60s it was 3 DDGs, 4 DDs, 4 FFs. Australia was heavily committed to the Indonesian Confrontation and the Vietnam war at this time.
Argentina purchased Type 42's in 1970 and Iranian bought Badr with SM-1's in 1971, so I would not think it would be completely outrageous.
This sensible comment brings out a different question, without any significant background knowledge. Could Argentina acquire more modern US gear if it decides to put it's primary effort into ASW, ie. helping out USN against Soviet and possible Soviet allies in South Atlantic? By 1960's onwards ASW capable ships are, after all, many times multi-role combatants, and much of the gear suitable for ASW use, such as LRMPA, is also very useful against Chile or an unnamed European power.
The Babrs are an interesting example as they were ex USN WW2 destroyers with Standard SM1, but these were not in a Mk 11/13/22 launcher with the Tartar Guided Missile Fire Control System coupled to extensive radars. Rather they were in 4 paired elevating box-type launchers, and I am unsure how they were guided. However it does fit the Argentine requirement of wanting a ship and getting it almost immediately like they did with de Mayo.
The Argentine Type 42 were ordered in 1970, but not delivered until 1976 and 1981, similarly the Iranians ordered SM1 armed Spruance based destroyers that were to be delivered in the late 70s and early 80s. However by the mid 70s fully equipped Area Air defence SAM ships were much more common.
The Type 42 is a later and arguably better ship than the Charles Adams Class. I think there is not much to choose between the air defense systems circa 1980, but I certainly think the British ship has a better ASW capability than even the IKARA armed Australian Perth class.
Sea Dart is more than just the missile, it is the entire system of radars and countermeasures and NTDS of which it is but a part. It is claimed that this system as designed was optimized for North Atlantic service against Russian high altitude LRMP anti-ship strike aircraft, with the Type 42 expected to provide anti-ship missile defense for convoys from plunging Russian missiles launched by Bears. There is some truth in this assertion, however this is not the complete picture. Please read the Royal Navy report on Sheffield for a more complete idea of just what a Type 42 was supposed to be able to do in the AAA role, or at least what the RN expected it to do. There is more to air defense than just shooting off SAMs. There are also the host of electronic warfare and countermeasures issues involved and how these systems are used to seduce and decoy off inbounds.
This is more or less what a Type 42 fit was when in British service.
Displacement: Batch 1 & 2: 3,500 long tons (3,600 t) standard, 4,100 long tons (4,200 t) or 4,350 tons full load
...............…….Batch 3: 3,500 long tons (3,600 t) standard, 4,775 long tons (4,852 t) or 5,350 tons full load
Length: Batch 1 & 2: 119.5 m (392 ft) waterline, 125 m (410 ft) or 125.6 m (412 ft) overall
............Batch 3: 132.3 m (434 ft) waterline, 141.1 m (463 ft) overall
Beam: Batch 1 & 2: 14.3 m (47 ft)
..........Batch 3: 14.9 m (49 ft)
Draught: Batch 1, 2 & 3: 4.2 m (14 ft) keel, 5.8 m (19 ft) screws
Installed power: 50,000 shp (37 MW)
Propulsion: 2 shafts COGOG;
…………………2 × Rolls-Royce Olympus TM3B high-speed gas turbines, (50,000 shp (37 MW))
…………………2 × Rolls-Royce Tyne RM1C cruise gas turbines, (5,340 shp (3.98 MW))
Speed: …….30 kn (56 km/h; 35 mph) (2 x Olympus)
…………………24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph) (1 Olympus and 1 Tyne per shaft)
…………………20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph) (1 x Olympus)
…………………18 kn (33 km/h; 21 mph) (2 x Tyne)
…………………13.8 kn (25.6 km/h; 15.9 mph) (1 x Tyne)
Range:……..4,200 nmi (7,800 km; 4,800 mi) single Tyne RM1C/other shaft trailing at 13.8 kn (25.6 km/h; 15.9 mph)
Boats & landing craft carried: 2
Complement: Batch 1 & 2: 253 (inc 24 officers or 274, accommodation for 312
Batch 3: 269 (2013); 301 (inc 26 officers)(1993)
Batch 1, 2 & 3: 24 officers and 229 ratings
Sensors and processing systems:
………………………Radar Type 1022/965P air surveillance,
………………………Radar Type 996/992Q 3-D surveillance,
………………………2× Radar Type 909 GWS-30 fire-control,
………………………Radar Type 1007 &1008 navigation,
………………………Sonar Type 2050 / 2016 search,
………………………Sonar Type 162 bottom profiling,
Electronic warfare & decoys: UAA2/ UAF DLH Decoy system
……………………….1 × twin launcher for GWS-30 Sea Dart missiles
……………………… (22 missiles, space was reserved for an additional 15 in Batch 3)
……………………….1 × 4.5 inch Mark 8 naval gun
……………………….2 × 20 mm Phalanx CIWS (not on Argentine ships), post Falklands on British ships.
……………………….2 × Oerlikon / BMARC 20 mm L/70 KBA guns in GAM-B01 single mounts
……………………….4 × MM38 Exocet anti-ship missile launchers (only on Argentine ships)
……………………….2 × STWS II triple anti-submarine torpedo tubes (not on Argentine ships)
Aircraft carried: 1× Westland Lynx HAS / HMA armed with 4 × anti ship missiles
………………………..2 × anti submarine torpedoes
Aviation facilities: Flight deck and enclosed hangar for embarking one helicopter
Note: The British type in Argentine service was a Batch 1.
Now is the Type 42 comparable to a Ticonderoga? No. Was it a comparable to a Spruance? No. The mission roles are not the same. The best near peer comparison is that it was mission akin to an Oliver Hazard Perry's role. And here I think the Type 42 has a most decided edge. Better balance of GP function with at least equivalent ASW and arguably for the Russian air threat expected and anticipated in the North Atlantic , a much better AAA suite of systems for 1978.
If one thinks the RN was in a hurry to refit Type 42s after Falklands Lessons Learned, one should have seen the USN scurry. In a sense the Argentine air force did NATO a favor and showed its navies in the nick of time what the new Russian cruise missiles just coming into service would do.
More on those curiosities here.
Not a bad lashup for what it is, but hardly the type of vessel to bodyguard an aircraft carrier.
It depends on 2 factors.
Would the US Got approve such a sale; in terms of tech transfer, what they think the country can utilise and if it will upset the strategic balance in the region etc etc etc?
Can the purchasing government pay for it?
There is no Congressional appropriation to buy arms for other countries, although there is a Foreign Military Finance programme that eligible nations can use to finance purchases of US gear. Within the law the US does make efforts to facilitate arms purchases, for example for the RAN DDG buy interest free Deferred payments meant that the first 2 DDGs delivered in 65 were paid for over 8 years until 69, this was new for Australia and we jumped at it. @McPherson info on the Babr also shows the lengths the US will go to to get a customer a capability within their budget by lashing up a system with obsolete/obsolescent components that are legally able to be sold at scrap value.
Given the restriction on Argentina around finance I doubt the US would have many qualms about selling them the sorts of ASW ships they could afford to buy, although I think the US would advise them not to be so specialised.
Firstly, awesome info on the Babr class, in particular the radars etc. Its a very interesting story.
When the RAN Destroyer project was cancelled in 1973 the RAN cast around for a replacement, including the Tromp, Type 42 and Perrys. They settled on the Type 42 but fitted with US 5" gun and Standard SAMs and US radars to ensure commonality with our Adams class, they consider the Perrys a 'second rate escort'. Given the Adams genesis was in the late 50s and the T42 late 60s its not surprising the latter is a better ship, although our Adams were fantastic ships and highly successful over their very long lives. In the end we got lumped with the Perry's but no helicopters.
The answer to the RN's problems was already in service in the form of the Type 1022 STIR radar, fitted to the Invincible and Exeter. Further the cancelled Type 988 3D radar was also a STIR radar and would have been vastly better than the lashup of early 60s Type 965/992 radars on the Bristol and batch 1 Type 42s to create a Target Indicator system on the cheap and nasty.
While the Argentine Navy could (and probably should) have invested more heavily into ASW, replacing a carrier fleet with an escorts only surface fleet wouldn't meet it's expected use unless some war in the late 1950s or early 1960s ends up with carriers sunk by submarines.
The Argentine Navy at that point in time is focusing in war with Chile or Brazil first. ASW capabilities, while needed, don't replace the capacity to strike at either country' surface combatants or coasts.
Well, more focus on ASW in order to curry favor with USN might mean financial support and access to US technologies, not only visible things like ships but also access to intelligence, training, electronics etc. As I mentioned, Adams-class, for example, was a dual purpose combatant and US could even soup up old FRAM destroyers quite much if really willing, as displayed by Babr-class McPherson displayed.
By 1970's any combatant could become ASuW platform by installing Exocets or other SSM's coming into market.
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