thorr97 wrote:
The argument made more sense when Convair used it against Northrop, (and Northrup was on the Secretary of Defense's bad side anyway which doesn't actually apply in this case) because Northrop actually did NOT have the facilities to produce the big wing bombers and it was a known fact that Convair itself was going to be given part of that construction contract. The thing was Convair had an 'agreement' with the politico's in Texas that part of the B-36 contract would include new facilities construction in and around the main Convair plant in Texas. Building the B-58 was only using part of that capacity and they planned a phased turn-over on the B-36-to-B-60 airframe which would not interfere with that construction. Boing on the other hand technically HAD the facilities by converting much of the B-47 production areas but the B-52 was significantly bigger and more complex and there was no getting around the fact they would in fact have to build new facilities as well as re-build the existing ones. And there were concerns that Boeing's work/talk of making a more significant effort towards civilian aircraft was going to interfere with their government work.
(As it turns out no, since their civilian work was directly related to their government work in the form of the 707 being the basis for the KC-135)
Actually at this exact time even the B-70 wasn't THE 'ultimate' bomber either as that spot was reserved for the Atomic Powered Bomber but in LeMay's eyes the B-70 was closer than the B-52 was
But the main deal with the B-52 even as an interim type was that it was going to be procured in large numbers to make up for the fact it was only an 'interim' type in the same manner as the B-47. But that was also a problem because unlike the B-47 which was a medium bomber, (and in general LeMay disliked the type since it carried fewer weapons while requiring almost the same amount of support as a heavy) the B-52 was going to cost more per unit which directly affected the resources available for the REAL bomber when it came along. Makng the case for the 'sunk-costs' falicy over the B-36-to-B-60 is there if one wants to push it but on the other hand the "1940s-tech vs 1950s tech" argument is there as well.
The thing was the mantra of "higher, faster, longer" itself was being questioned at the time since it was becoming clear that none of the criteria listed were capable, alone or together, of guaranteeing that the bomber was going to get through. And LeMay among others was already leaning towards, (unofficially of course but he started the research and development programs as head of ARDC) mixing manned bombers and stand-off weapons as a strategic goal.
Of course officially LeMay and the Air Force were all about "precision" bombing by deep penetrating, (obviously supersonic) bombers with the way cleared by stand-off nuclear bombardment, (and ICBMs because they weren't accurate enough for anything else of course) and range was no longer an issue with aerial refueling becoming standard. But height was no longer safe so even at this point everyone was looking at low altitude penetration and the problem was no US bomber was designed for that mission. The B-52 could do it, eventually, once it had been modified but that applied to the B-60 as well. The B-58 could actually do it at subsonic speeds, (which surprisingly also increased its range which wasn't expected) but it was a "medium" bomber which meant it didn't carry enough weapons for some people and it had to climb for the supersonic dash over the target and exit.
Given enough delays or issues with the B-52 and some could, (did though not very much OTL) argue that a B-60 force used as a standoff weapons truck could help overwhelm Soviet air defenses for supersonic bombers such as the B-58 and B-70 to dash in and back out with minimum losses. In the end despite the upgrades and improvements to the B-52 that was after all the tactics settled on quite early in its lifetime.
Dalekiller wrote:
As far as I'm aware he only "hated" the fact it was a medium bomber. In general he liked the overall capability but wanted a bigger platform. The problem was a lot of folks were taking the idea of a bigger more capable B-58-ish bomber and using to argue against the B-70 program and that he did NOT like. I suspect if the B-70 had been canceled or deferred earlier he would have latched onto the upgraded B-58 concepts fully.
Randy
Boeing could also turn around and use Convair's own arguments against it.
Back in the late 40s Convair argued that Northrop simply didn't have the capacity to produce all the Flying Wing bombers the Air Force needed while Convair definitely did. With the B-60, Boeing could argue that Convair didn't have the capacity to produce that bomber AND also produce the B-58 Hustler. Considering that LeMay viewed even the mighty B-52 as but an "interim" bomber with the B-70 being the ultimate strategic heavy bomber, anything that got in the way of SAC's "higher, faster, longer" mantra would not be well received. And getting the Mach 2 B-58 Hustler online was already going to be a very consuming thing for Convair as it was. Best then to let Boeing have the "interim" bomber contract with the B-52 and thus allow Convair the focus it would need for its B-58.
So, that'd be another point against the B-60.
The argument made more sense when Convair used it against Northrop, (and Northrup was on the Secretary of Defense's bad side anyway which doesn't actually apply in this case) because Northrop actually did NOT have the facilities to produce the big wing bombers and it was a known fact that Convair itself was going to be given part of that construction contract. The thing was Convair had an 'agreement' with the politico's in Texas that part of the B-36 contract would include new facilities construction in and around the main Convair plant in Texas. Building the B-58 was only using part of that capacity and they planned a phased turn-over on the B-36-to-B-60 airframe which would not interfere with that construction. Boing on the other hand technically HAD the facilities by converting much of the B-47 production areas but the B-52 was significantly bigger and more complex and there was no getting around the fact they would in fact have to build new facilities as well as re-build the existing ones. And there were concerns that Boeing's work/talk of making a more significant effort towards civilian aircraft was going to interfere with their government work.
(As it turns out no, since their civilian work was directly related to their government work in the form of the 707 being the basis for the KC-135)
Actually at this exact time even the B-70 wasn't THE 'ultimate' bomber either as that spot was reserved for the Atomic Powered Bomber but in LeMay's eyes the B-70 was closer than the B-52 was
The thing was the mantra of "higher, faster, longer" itself was being questioned at the time since it was becoming clear that none of the criteria listed were capable, alone or together, of guaranteeing that the bomber was going to get through. And LeMay among others was already leaning towards, (unofficially of course but he started the research and development programs as head of ARDC) mixing manned bombers and stand-off weapons as a strategic goal.
Of course officially LeMay and the Air Force were all about "precision" bombing by deep penetrating, (obviously supersonic) bombers with the way cleared by stand-off nuclear bombardment, (and ICBMs because they weren't accurate enough for anything else of course) and range was no longer an issue with aerial refueling becoming standard. But height was no longer safe so even at this point everyone was looking at low altitude penetration and the problem was no US bomber was designed for that mission. The B-52 could do it, eventually, once it had been modified but that applied to the B-60 as well. The B-58 could actually do it at subsonic speeds, (which surprisingly also increased its range which wasn't expected) but it was a "medium" bomber which meant it didn't carry enough weapons for some people and it had to climb for the supersonic dash over the target and exit.
Given enough delays or issues with the B-52 and some could, (did though not very much OTL) argue that a B-60 force used as a standoff weapons truck could help overwhelm Soviet air defenses for supersonic bombers such as the B-58 and B-70 to dash in and back out with minimum losses. In the end despite the upgrades and improvements to the B-52 that was after all the tactics settled on quite early in its lifetime.
Dalekiller wrote:
Considering LeMays hatred of the Hustler he could probably accept it as a interim bomber and accept the loss of the B-58.
As far as I'm aware he only "hated" the fact it was a medium bomber. In general he liked the overall capability but wanted a bigger platform. The problem was a lot of folks were taking the idea of a bigger more capable B-58-ish bomber and using to argue against the B-70 program and that he did NOT like. I suspect if the B-70 had been canceled or deferred earlier he would have latched onto the upgraded B-58 concepts fully.
Randy