Yamato class carrier

I think we all can agree that while Yamato was a epic ship, it was also a white elephant, right?

Well, what if instead of building two super heavy battleships, the IJN had comissioned two super heavy aircraft carriers?
 

Delta Force

Banned
You mean something akin to the Shinano class? The general view from the thread I linked to is that such a massive ship wouldn't have been able to effectively operate its air wing.
 
Yes, but then why not 4 or maybe even 5-6 Shokaku class carriers (less steel, heavy guns etc.) Yamato class needed 10000 tons purpose build turret transporters.

You'll need a reason for having a massive flight deck. Maybe the idea of heavier planes, the vision of the angled flight deck or something similar to make sense of it.
Would have made a major difference early on with 5 Shokaku class carriers.
 
Ok, so they build 6 shokaku class carriers instead of making the Yamato and his sister ship, what happens next?
 
The greater problem for the IJN was that they did not invest in pilot training. They could not replace their early war losses. So unless you change this, more and bigger carriers will just be targets.
 
I've read that the problems with Japanese and German air combat training was that they allowed their best, most veteran combat pilots to remain in combat until they were eventually killed.

"Fly till you die".

The U.S. made a point of rotating veteran pilots back home and using them as instructor so they could pass on their first hand combat knowledge and skills to many more new pilots.
 
Moot, even if Japan put no effort into anything other than its carrier forces from 1937 on its not going to matter. Japan's industry just can't take on the USoA. Best choices for Japan are diplomatic not military industrial ones.

1) Best choice is offer a deal to the UK in 1940, Japan joins the war in exchange for an understanding in East Asia. Japan draws a line in China and UK accepts the line along with joint occupation of Dutch East Indians and French Indo-China. IE raw materials flow to Japan.

1a) HANG any officers up to and including commander of the Kwantung Army that goes across the new line in China.

No clue if UK takes the deal but they were in a corner and IJN in the Med would have put an end to Italian navy in short order. USA would NOT be pleased with the deal of course.

2) Next best choice, roll the die and attack UK and Dutch in East Asia but ignore US. See if FDR can get a declaration of war out of congress. If the gamble pays off Japan has its resources without a war with US. If the gamble fails they are no worse off than historic.

I don't see a play other than the above two that has any real chance. Japan really needed to reign in the Kwantung Army sooner, Manchuria was a resource treasure house but they needed time to develop it. The endless war in the depth of China was an example of classic tar baby problem

Others may disagree.

Michael
 
2) Next best choice, roll the die and attack UK and Dutch in East Asia but ignore US. See if FDR can get a declaration of war out of congress. If the gamble pays off Japan has its resources without a war with US. If the gamble fails they are no worse off than historic.

Maybe not... The US massively reinforces the Philippines, declares a ""Neutrality" Patrol" around them and attacks IJN forces in it on sight, while sending supplies to Singapore. Japan is then confronted by a de facto hostile in a well-defended position sitting across its lines of communications. That's considerably worse than OTL.

There's a good TL in there probably, but I lack the detailed knowledge. :(
 
What would make the IJN to stop building the Yamatos and go for the Shokakus?

The Kantai Kessen concept remained the primary Japanese naval strategy into the Pacific War. It was the disaster of Midway, not Admiral Yamamoto, that changed their minds.
 
What would make the IJN to stop building the Yamatos and go for the Shokakus?

The Kantai Kessen concept remained the primary Japanese naval strategy into the Pacific War. It was the disaster of Midway, not Admiral Yamamoto, that changed their minds.

Split the difference. A pair of smaller BB & put the remainder into more carrier deck. Still does not solve the problem of pilot training, but you get more carrier deck, satisfy the Kantai Kessen doctrine, & leave room for people to discuss 75 years later: WI the Yamoto/Mushai had been built?
 
I've read that the problems with Japanese and German air combat training was that they allowed their best, most veteran combat pilots to remain in combat until they were eventually killed.

"Fly till you die".

The U.S. made a point of rotating veteran pilots back home and using them as instructor so they could pass on their first hand combat knowledge and skills to many more new pilots.

A second problem with the German/Japanese pilot training was they kept their peace time training programs in place too long. In 1940 the RAF had stripped its program to the essentials to produce a good basic fighter pilot in 90 days. The German program that year was still aimed at training a well rounded airman, with lots of engineering, meterology, airodynamics, & other knowledge that would be good to know, if he survived the war. Japans leaders thinking it would be a short war made the same mistake. Both started reorganizing their programs in 1942, but the damage was well along.

As 1942 both found a new problem. Fuel shortages forced flight training hours to be reduced. In latter 1943 the German pilot had 170 hours in the program before reaching a combat unit. The RAF was over 300 hours of basic and advanced instruction & reached 340 hours in mid 1944.
 
Maybe not... The US massively reinforces the Philippines, declares a ""Neutrality" Patrol" around them and attacks IJN forces in it on sight, while sending supplies to Singapore. Japan is then confronted by a de facto hostile in a well-defended position sitting across its lines of communications. That's considerably worse than OTL.

There's a good TL in there probably, but I lack the detailed knowledge. :(

What is the US going to patrol exactly? Dutch East Indies, etc is going to fall well before any major reinforcement occurs. Are you suggesting US is going to attack Japanese ships on the high seas moving between areas of Japanese control without a declaration of war?

All USN war games pre-war assumed a big build up and movement west across the pacific. So you are suggesting a repeat of moving forward the Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii but all the west to the Philippines?

Michael
 
What is the US going to patrol exactly? Dutch East Indies, etc is going to fall well before any major reinforcement occurs. Are you suggesting US is going to attack Japanese ships on the high seas moving between areas of Japanese control without a declaration of war?

Well, that was the US did with German warships when the Exclusion or Nuetrality Zone was establsished in the western Atlantic. The US was hunting and attacking suspected submarines. Look up the "Shoot on Sight" order.

The equivalent was issued with the November 1941 'War Warning' sent to all US Navy, Army, & Coast Guard commands in or bordering the Pacific in November 1941. That included the order to consider any Japanese warship or aircraft approaching a US military installation as hostile and to attack it. There was no refrence in the order about national waters, the three or twelve mile limits. Just any approaching. The local commanders had leeway to defend their installation as they thought best.

All USN war games pre-war assumed a big build up and movement west across the pacific. So you are suggesting a repeat of moving forward the Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii but all the west to the Philippines?

Michael

Correct, but Sec War Stimson argued successfully for the Phillipines to be reinforced & that in fact was underway, contradicting both WP Orange, the Plan Dog Memo, and the Rainbow Plans. While the navy knew better and had no plans to rush off to save PI, there was a assumption acted on by Stimson, Mac & others that the US Army could defend PI for many months, perhaps up to a year.
 
To keep to the ATL, well to get Yamato supercarriers you need something like this scenario, even if improbable: Yamamoto apparently was against building them and was advocating air power, so if say in 1939-1940 he has a fit and says something like "right, i want these beasts as super carriers or i resign", then you could get Yamato and Musashi as supercarriers in 1942.

Not sure why peoples think Shinano would not have been able to effectively operate it's air group (?), it was afterall just one knot slower than Kaga, and probably it had a larger surface flight deck.

I posted in another topic that recent research points that Shinano would have been able to operate as a normal CV 90-95 aircraft typical of 1940 (A6M, D3A, B5N) and 80 typical of 1944 (A7M , B7A). Not sure if spares are included, but such a ship in 1942 would surely be able to operate say a 27 VF, 27 VB and 27 VT airgroup. As for the pilots, if they somehow decide to convert the Yamatos to CVBs, then of course they will plan for the pilots and aircraft for them!
 
Well, that was the US did with German warships when the Exclusion or Nuetrality Zone was establsished in the western Atlantic. The US was hunting and attacking suspected submarines. Look up the "Shoot on Sight" order.

The equivalent was issued with the November 1941 'War Warning' sent to all US Navy, Army, & Coast Guard commands in or bordering the Pacific in November 1941. That included the order to consider any Japanese warship or aircraft approaching a US military installation as hostile and to attack it. There was no refrence in the order about national waters, the three or twelve mile limits. Just any approaching. The local commanders had leeway to defend their installation as they thought best.

The US was escorting convoys to UK at least to the mid Atlantic. It was a very different situation.

By the time the USN can get units to the Philippines to conduct patrols the East Indies will have been over, ditto Hong Kong, etc. What is the US government going to do declare that Japanese ships moving West of Philippines are subject to attack without warning on the high seas? What US lives at risk are being used as a fig leaf to cover this move?


Correct, but Sec War Stimson argued successfully for the Phillipines to be reinforced & that in fact was underway, contradicting both WP Orange, the Plan Dog Memo, and the Rainbow Plans. While the navy knew better and had no plans to rush off to save PI, there was a assumption acted on by Stimson, Mac & others that the US Army could defend PI for many months, perhaps up to a year.

Unless USN deployed major units there is no patrol and the Navy as you noted wanted no part of being forward deployed this far west.

Michael
 
What is the US going to patrol exactly? Dutch East Indies, etc is going to fall well before any major reinforcement occurs. Are you suggesting US is going to attack Japanese ships on the high seas moving between areas of Japanese control without a declaration of war?

All USN war games pre-war assumed a big build up and movement west across the pacific. So you are suggesting a repeat of moving forward the Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii but all the west to the Philippines?

Michael

Yes, I am suggesting that the USN will attack Japanese shipping. I think the orders to do this were issued and it does not require a declaration of war, as demonstrated by the Atlantic "war". It's entirely in keeping with US political strategy and actions.

The patrol area would be designed to result in a confrontation with Japanese forces, just as in the Atlantic. Except with Japan instead of Germany, obviously. It might consist of an exclusion zone around the Philippines and the escort of ship towards Singapore and DEI ports. That works until February, and afterwards they can go to India and Australia. The Asiatic fleet and the aircraft based on the Philippines shoud be sufficient, regardless of any reinforcements.

The old war games are irrelevent because they did not envisage this convoluted situation. There's no need to move the fleet all the way to the Philippines, it just requires some destroyers, cruisers and aircraft.
 
Last edited:
The greater problem for the IJN was that they did not invest in pilot training. They could not replace their early war losses. So unless you change this, more and bigger carriers will just be targets.

Was this true - I once read that the IJN had a pool of 2000 fully trained Deck qualified Pilots at the beginning of Dec 1941?

Even after the disasters of 1942 and other attritional losses they still had plenty of pilots left - just not so many decks.

Once of the things that did impact them earlier in the war was the loss of trained 'hanger' personnel from the lost and badly damaged carriers.

By 1944 however attrition has seriously reduced this pool of pilots
 
Top