Yamamoto's sleeping giant quote

Pangur

Donor
That quote "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve" makes me wonder what other high ranking Axis commanders recognised early in WW2 that they were going to lose. Is any one aware of evidence that others did indeed see that they were going to lose - say a German commander prior to 1941, Japanese prior to 1943 or Italian prior to 1941
 
Uh, you do know that it's almost certain he did NOT say this? And obviously there must have been some commanders aware that the things weren't going too smoothly.
 

Pangur

Donor
Uh, you do know that it's almost certain he did NOT say this? And obviously there must have been some commanders aware that the things weren't going too smoothly.
I was aware of that he may very well have not said that
 
It was blatantly clear to many that Japan couldn't fight the US in an extended war. So the idea was to 'hit them in the nose, and get them to back down'. Clearly that didn't work.

The thought processes of the Japanese High Command seem to have been something on the order of:
1) Given: Japan has a Divine mission to rule (East) Asia
2) Fact: Japan needs more resources, like in SE Asia, to do so.
3) Therefore: Japan needs to go to war with Britain and the Netherlands to get those resources
4) Fact: Divine Providence has distracted those countries with a war in Europe.
5) Probability: if Japan goes to war with Britain, the US (Britain's close ally) is sitting in the Philippines, threatening sea lines of communication.
6) Therefore: we need to get the US out of the way
7) Massive Probability: the US is WAY too strong to beat in a protracted fight.
8) Therefore (by premise 1, above), there has to be some other way to win.
9) Hmmm.... Americans are clearly weak mongrel democrats without proper military fiber.
10) Therefore: a sharp, unexpected blow will cause them to bend over and let us have our way.
 

thorr97

Banned
Dathi,

From what I've read, the Japanese high command knew that they could not win an all out war against the US. Japan simply lacked the economic size, population, and access to raw materials to win such a way. Japan could however, make fighting such a war become so unpalatable that the US, being weak and decadent as were all Westerners, would tire of the endless slaughter and accept a negotiated peace.

The negotiated peace would leave Japan with uncontested control over China and as the recognized dominant power in that region. For this, the Japanese were willing to endure an absolute bloodbath when it came to grabbing all those otherwise worthless little bits of coral atolls that were barely above sea level at high tide. The real prize was China. So, the Japanese militarists figured that the loss of all those garrisons on all those Pacific Islands would be worth it if they wound up with China as being fully theirs after the peace treaty was signed.

The Japanese simply did not understand the implacable determination of the US to gain an Unconditional Surrender over Japan and that we would tolerate only an end to their imperialist desires.
 
It's a good question. Very few people had the experience of extensive travel, and of course no internet, so most people (including leaders) probably didn't know or couldn't grasp the size and the scope of things like production capacity of a nation. They would assume it would be similar to what they've seen or experienced in their own country.
 
Is any one aware of evidence that others did indeed see that they were going to lose - say a German commander prior to 1941

"In order to make our position clear to historians in the future and to keep the reputation of the high command clean, I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible."
-Ludwig Beck's resignation letter, 1938.

Of course, Beck only wound up making his position clear and only kept his reputation (partly) clean. He was hoping his resignation would inspire the rest of Germany's senior strategic and operational military leaders to see reason and follow him in resignation. In the end, he wound up leaving alone.
 

Yun-shuno

Banned
I have read that Yamoto after Pearl Harbor was basically depressed the whole day while the rest of the brass were celebrating.
 
Yamamoto may not of made the sleeping giant comment but he did recognize the degree of difficulty in winning a war with the United States. He wrote, "That should hostilities should break out between the Japan and the United States. It will not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we will have to march into Washington and dictate the term of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American War have confidence to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices." Reading this makes it clear he has serious reservations to Japanese ultimate success he also commented that Japanese victory was limited by time and oil. I believe that as a loyal Japanese officer he was willing to fight the war but he was quite aware of the weakness of Japan and the strength of American.
 

Pangur

Donor
It's a good question. Very few people had the experience of extensive travel, and of course no internet, so most people (including leaders) probably didn't know or couldn't grasp the size and the scope of things like production capacity of a nation. They would assume it would be similar to what they've seen or experienced in their own country.

Good point, Yamamoto had spent time in the US so one assumes that he was aware of both the ability of the US at the time to produce as well as have a decent grasp of what the US could produce

Yamamoto may not of made the sleeping giant comment but he did recognize the degree of difficulty in winning a war with the United States. He wrote, "That should hostilities should break out between the Japan and the United States. It will not be enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we will have to march into Washington and dictate the term of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American War have confidence to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices." Reading this makes it clear he has serious reservations to Japanese ultimate success he also commented that Japanese victory was limited by time and oil. I believe that as a loyal Japanese officer he was willing to fight the war but he was quite aware of the weakness of Japan and the strength of American.

Thanks, I had forgotten about that statement
 
It was blatantly clear to many that Japan couldn't fight the US in an extended war. So the idea was to 'hit them in the nose, and get them to back down'. Clearly that didn't work.

The thought processes of the Japanese High Command seem to have been something on the order of:
1) Given: Japan has a Divine mission to rule (East) Asia
2) Fact: Japan needs more resources, like in SE Asia, to do so.
3) Therefore: Japan needs to go to war with Britain and the Netherlands to get those resources
4) Fact: Divine Providence has distracted those countries with a war in Europe.
5) Probability: if Japan goes to war with Britain, the US (Britain's close ally) is sitting in the Philippines, threatening sea lines of communication.
6) Therefore: we need to get the US out of the way
7) Massive Probability: the US is WAY too strong to beat in a protracted fight.
8) Therefore (by premise 1, above), there has to be some other way to win.
9) Hmmm.... Americans are clearly weak mongrel democrats without proper military fiber.
10) Therefore: a sharp, unexpected blow will cause them to bend over and let us have our way.
Had the Japanese a better understanding of their intended adversary, I wonder what they'd have done without #9 and #10? #s 1 through 8 are still in play, so they have to do something.
 
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