The Japanese realistically are not going to do this. Because they also know war is coming, and leaving all those American planes and subs on the flanks of their vulnerable supply lines to their new conquests in the south is madness. Remember that they do not know how bad our torpedoes are, or that the B-17 cannot hit moving shipping without an ASB's thumb on the scale. The buildup in the Philippines and the coming Two-Ocean Fleet has Japan convinced that their time is running out: its fight the US now and win quickly, or inevitably be defeated.
Of course in reality, they are screwed either way, but that is how they saw things in 1941.
be nice, a squadron of B17s actually sank a destroyer once... with the Japanese after action report stating "even the B17s can get lucky once in a while" (Solomons campaign)
Before Yamamato managed to persuade them otherwise, the original Japanese plan called for whittling the Americans down as they proceeded across the Pacific with submarines, air attacks from land bases (like the Marshals and Carolines), and surface attacks from light units (cruisers and destroyers) before the Combined Fleet met the Americans and defeated them in the Decisive Battle. Which after Pearl Harbor is essentially what they tried (losing of course all three 'decisive battles' at Midway, Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf).
The American warplan called for seizing bases on their way across the Pacific and was expected to take 18 months-2 years, as bases would have to be built along the way. At no point did either side pre-war anticipate operating in the Solomons, or that Australia would be an important base.
Richard Frank, Eric Hammel, Eric Bergerud, and Samuel Eliot Morrison (all of whom wrote excellent, readable and thorough books on the Solomons campaign) agree on this point
The US Navy would not have thrown ships away to defend the Dutch East Indies or Singapore, or even the Philippines. The Asiatic Fleet was deliberately kept small for a reason.. that reason was it was big enough to show the flag, but small enough not to be missed when overwhelmed.
Without Pearl Harbor, in addition to the all ready substantial Japanese (and crushing) superiority in the theater, you throw in 6 carriers and the ABDA force is gone in less than a month, perhaps sooner. The US Navy would not be able to act, nor did it plan to act, in time to prevent this.
At that point we are back to War Plan Orange and the 2 year campaign across the Pacific.
As to American battleships, note that the Solomons campaign, especially Savo Island and Cape Esperance and both Naval Battles of Guadalcanal showed that the surface fleet was not ready in 1942 to beat the Japanese without suffering severe losses. Damage control techniques, battle readiness (Hammel is really good about talking about this one), tactics, and equipment simply were not up to it. We won in the end, but still suffered embarrassment later in the Solomons in 1943 before finally achieving dominance in late 43 and in 1944. The USN had to learn on the job.
One other note... the US doctrine never called for battleships to ever operate alone. Note that the Japanese didn't usually either (2nd Battle of Guadalcanal was a cobbled together force, while the Yamato sortie at Okinawa was an exceptional circumstance). US and Japanese battleships always operate at least in pairs, and preferably in squadrons of 4-5