Yamamoto pushes through his battleship attack on Midway island
- Thread starter BasiloneZaitsev
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nbcman
Donor
For a swag, it is 1668 miles / 1450 nautical miles from Kiska Island to Midway island. Assuming they could sail at Junyo's top speed (25.5 kts) the whole way, that's about 57 hours. And Junyo and Ryujo had a total of 27 Zeros, 15 Vals, and 11 Kates. Add in the 8 obsolete Jean biplane torpedo bombers from Hosho who travelled with the Main Body and that's the entirety of the Japanese carrier arm beyond Shokaku & Zuikaku who are laid up in Japan. Not much for coverage even if they somehow all get together around 9 or 10 June 1942 without some ships running out of fuel first.
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BlackDragon98
Banned
Rick Best leads a flight of SBDs and blows up the Yamato just before he is forced into retirement by his medical condition.
Would be a nice way to end a career, sinking the world's biggest BB as an opus magnus.
SsgtC
Banned
So, here's a couple other things to think about as well. The US was, at least partially, reading Japan's mail prior to the battle. IIRC, they knew that Yamamoto had orders not to risk his battleships unless in the "decisive battle" that the IJN had been dreaming about since Tsushima. So for him to decide to complete the operation using his battleships, he would need to have received different orders specifically allowing him to risk his battleline to force an engagement and seize Midway. The US would have known this.
With that knowledge, might Nimitz have ordered the US battleline off the West Coast to support Fletcher? Any battle off Midway wouldn't require massive tanker support so the fuel issues that kept the US battleline out of action most of 42 wouldn't apply. The US had 7 battleships available in the Pacific prior to Midway (Pennsylvania, Tennessee, all 3 New Mexicos, Colorado and Maryland). It's not inconceivable that all 7 could have been rushed to Pearl Harbor and then on to Midway in short order. Probably not in time to support the carrier battle, but they should reach the area in enough time to help stop the Japanese Main Body.
With that knowledge, might Nimitz have ordered the US battleline off the West Coast to support Fletcher? Any battle off Midway wouldn't require massive tanker support so the fuel issues that kept the US battleline out of action most of 42 wouldn't apply. The US had 7 battleships available in the Pacific prior to Midway (Pennsylvania, Tennessee, all 3 New Mexicos, Colorado and Maryland). It's not inconceivable that all 7 could have been rushed to Pearl Harbor and then on to Midway in short order. Probably not in time to support the carrier battle, but they should reach the area in enough time to help stop the Japanese Main Body.
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RousseauX
Donor
US reinforcements nowwithstanding, the Japnaese carriers were basically built to be death traps owing to incredible poor design and the precense of armed planes in the hangar decks. The flag ship of the Kido Butai, the Akagi, was literally sank by a single direct bomb hit.
Th same isn't true of any of the Japanese battleships. It should be noted that it took considerably -more- effort to sink the Mikuma (a heavy cruiser) than most of the Japanese carriers. The IJN carriers were simply uniquely vulernable capital ships. You shouldn't expect the Main body with its many battleships to be sank so easily even by a the equivalent of 3 dive bomber groups or so.
nbcman
Donor
Colorado was off San Francisco - so she was about 2800 nautical miles away or about twice the distance away from Midway that the Japanese AL force was. Not to mention that the BBs are slower than the IJN (crappy) CVs & CVLs so they would take a minimum of 5.5 days to get there as opposed to the Japanese who would be there in less than 3 days. Nimitz would have had to order them to sail for Midway when they left port on 31 May to 'protect' San Francisco from attack to have a chance for them to get close to Midway in time for the aftermath of the Battle.
SsgtC
Banned
That's what I'm suggesting. Not that they be sent after the carrier battle, but that they be sent as soon as Nimitz learns Midway is the target. Or instead of splitting up the battleline to "defend" the West Coast, he decides that the best defense is a good offense and orders the fleet to concentrate at Pearl and to be ready to act against the Japanese battleline once their intentions become clear.
Read operation Ten-Go on wikipedia. What doomed Yamato was not the dive bomber, but the impact from at least 9 torpedoes. It also took three waves and 400 airplanes to sink Yamato. The pilots were much more experienced in 45 than 42. I am not so sure the remaining dive bombers at Midway would have sunk Yamato or any other ship, damage them perhaps, but not sink them
RousseauX
Donor
In 1945 it took more than 300 US planes, torpedo and dive bombers 3 wave of attacks to sink the Yamoto with a pretty pathetic escort. And US planes were much more advanced in 1945 than 1942. Dive bombers can damage the ship, but without torpedos it's pretty hard to sink battleships. The US of 1942 period was also pretty bad at air operations, and notably, every single US plane trying to bomb a battleship missed at Midway. The US at midway was not capable of pulling off its response to Operation Ten-Go in 1945.
In 1942 the main body had 3 battleships and a far higher number of escort ships. It's entirely possible the US launches a wave, damages a battleship slightly, but loses a dozen planes or so to AA fire. Realistically if the US even with reinforcements were looking at 70 or so SDBs it can only hit the Japanese once or twice before losses make it too hard to mount additional operations.
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marathag
Banned
SB2C was hardly better than the SBD on paper, and worse in operation, other than range
marathag
Banned
IJN AAA was stunningly ineffective. With better 1944 IJN AAA suite, only 3% of USN attacking aircraft were shot down at the Marianas battle
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BlackDragon98
Banned
But as i previous said, its 1942 and the Yamato doesn't have upgraded AA. That means its AA is going to a lot less effective.
However, i do agree that it pretty hard for the USN to sink an IJN BB at Midway. Probably damage them, though its possible to put bomb into the Yamato's funnel.
That's what happened to the USS Yorktown at Midway.
As noted, Japanese AA fire was really ineffective, especially compared to USN AA. Still, I agree that the Americans aren't likely to sink any battleships. But their attacks would probably be spread out over a lot of ships and the damage on cruisers and even destroyers is going to add up and after a while Yamamoto is going to realize he isn't accomplishing anything and retreat.
SsgtC
Banned
They don't have to sink them. Just damage them sufficiently that Yamamoto decides that it's not worth further loses and orders his fleet out to preserve them for the "decisive battle."
Might not be enough to sink Yamato, but some of the other battleships might be a different story.
Aside from the two carriers up near Alaska, Yamamoto had with him the light carrier Zuiho which I believe was assigned to admiral Kondo's invasion force, and the old light carrier Hosho, which had a staggering 8 planes aboard.
Say Yamamoto presses on, and Zuiho and Hosho are sunk, while one or more other battleships and cruisers take damage. In exchange for two additional light carriers sunk, Mikuma lives to fight another day.
Aside from the two carriers up near Alaska, Yamamoto had with him the light carrier Zuiho which I believe was assigned to admiral Kondo's invasion force, and the old light carrier Hosho, which had a staggering 8 planes aboard.
Say Yamamoto presses on, and Zuiho and Hosho are sunk, while one or more other battleships and cruisers take damage. In exchange for two additional light carriers sunk, Mikuma lives to fight another day.