Yamamoto is placed in charge of the attack on Pearl Harbor

[Sargon]

It seems he's not paying attention to any of the points made, and is continuing in his insistence that all will be unicorns and rainbows if Yamamoto was in command, despite evidence to the contrary.

Either address the points made or we'll just assume you don't have a coherent argument.


Sargon

 

[Bill Garvin]

Most of the BBs, and CAs, with the exception of the USS Nevada, were at the bottom of Pearl Harbor

I don't think so. Maryland, Pennsylvania and Tennesee received only limited damage in the attack (hit by converted 16 inch shells but damage was trivial). Of the eight cruisers present, two (Helena and Raleigh) were heavily damaged enough to require dockyard repairs while Honolulu received minor damage and remained in service. Thus, of the eight cruisers, six were either undamaged or had only insignificant hurts.

By the way, Oklahoma was NOT "later towed out about seven or eight miles from Pearl Harbor, and sunk again."

Oklahoma was raised to clear the jetty and stripped. Her hulk was sold to and sold on 12/5/46 to Moore Drydock Company for scrapping. Oklahoma foundered on 5/17/47 540 miles out of Pearl Harbor, while being towed to the scrapyard.

 

[Hannibal.Caesar]

Yes, I did. However, Nagumo, according to Newt Gingrich and William R.
Forstchen, was the wrong man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. Yamamoto could have launched the
third strike against Pearl Harbor and taken out the drydocks and the oil storage tanks. If those were taken out, the Pacific Fleet, what was left of it,
would have been out of commission for six months to a year.

Look, sir. We've talked this thread to death and doomed many of the points you and others have brought up. The Japanese did their damnedest at Pearl, and they got away with a hell of a lot. An attempt at a 3rd strike, going after the USN's carriers, or anything of the sort would have ended in the annihilation of the Japanese fleet. Multiple members of this forum have proved this again and again.

Now, I don't know if you're purposefully being obtuse or not, but I'm beginning to be irked when in thread after thread you provide factually useless resources while disregarding other members' statements. I implore you to research your ideas with more than ATL novels and History Channel specials. Otherwise your threads are just going to be repeatedly shot down by other members until the vast majority of us have you on ignore.

I know I may be called harsh or unhelpful by some for this, but it really felt like it needed to be said.

 

[Bill Garvin]

Yes, I did. However, Nagumo, according to Newt Gingrich and William R. Forstchen, was the wrong man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. Yamamoto could have launched the third strike against Pearl Harbor and taken out the drydocks and the oil storage tanks. If those were taken out, the Pacific Fleet, what was left of it, would have been out of commission for six months to a year.

Constantly repeating something doesn't give it any extra weight.

FYI

A - Gingrich and Forstchen are fiction authors, not historians

B - Your assertion that Yamamoto would have launched a third strike is unfounded and disproven

C - Your assertion that the Pacific Fleet would have been out of action for six months is unfounded and disproven

Do you actually read the responses to your comments here? Frankly its getting very tiresome answering teh comments you make and then see you either reply with something completely irrelevent or just repeat the same baseless assertions.

 

[CalBear]

Yes, I did. However, Nagumo, according to Newt Gingrich and William R.
Forstchen, was the wrong man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. Yamamoto could have launched the
third strike against Pearl Harbor and taken out the drydocks and the oil storage tanks. If those were taken out, the Pacific Fleet, what was left of it,
would have been out of commission for six months to a year.

There is a huge difference between could and would.

We have provided a series of responses to your original question (& I am constrained to point out that the "ASB" term was not an issue, as it was a reasonable POD question), all of which note a variety of reasons that the presence of Yamamoto would be very unlikely to have resulted in a third strike, ranging from Yamamoto's personality to Operational Planning & Goals, to logistics.

You are responding with "according to the writers of this novel" to factual points. Novels are NOT historically accurate, they are not meant to be, they are meant to be entertainment, or to cause the reader to ask questions, as is the case here, or simply to satisify the writer's creative desires. It seems that this critical difference is somehow being missed.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Billy Mitchell, using World War I era Martin MB-2 bombers, showed that the
battleship was obsolete. The battleship was also proven to be obsolete at
Taranto and Pearl Harbor.

Nonsense. He used bombers to demonstrate that WWI BBs rigged to sink were vulnerable when at harbor at anchor with no crews and no countermeasures active.

At sea, very few BBs were sunk by anything but overwhelming airpower.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

It seems he's not paying attention to any of the points made, and is continuing in his insistence that all will be unicorns and rainbows if Yamamoto was in command, despite evidence to the contrary.

Either address the points made or we'll just assume you don't have a coherent argument.


Sargon

Hey! Unicorns and rainbows is MY overly-used phrase, and it is supposed to refer to what Obama shoots out his ass.

 

[Sargon]

Hey! Unicorns and rainbows is MY overly-used phrase, and it is supposed to refer to what Obama shoots out his ass.

What can I say? I've learnt from the master.

You might want to tell Grey Wolf about that ability of Obama. Free unicorns. That'll make his day.


Sargon

 

[ThomasG]

I think the oil storage was a target, but would have been in the next wave, and the commander thought it too risky to land the planes, refuel and rearm and launch another wave.

The Japanese didn't know where the carriers were and didn't have radar in the fleet.

No they weren't. The Japanese were not capable of launching a third wave as they only had 45% of their usual supplies. They had enough for two waves and to defend themselves and thats it.

 

[Riain]

All that said I still think there was a lack of follow-up to the strike on Pearl. Just for my info, at what time was the 2nd strike recovered?

As for follow-up what's the status of the long range subs at the time of the strike? How many subs did the IJN have in commision which could reach Hawaii? How many mines could they lay? What about long range flying boats from the Marshalls or wherever, could they add to the harassment of US forces in the immediate afermath of the Pearl? What about merchant raiders laying mines and attacking shipping in the USN's backyard? I'm looking for stuff which is cheap to mount but not easy to counter, stuff that would take the US a month or 2 to clean up before they can do other things.

 

[bard32]

If Yamamoto is just in charge of the CVs the attack will never happen. Yamamoto was the commander of the whole Combined Fleet and he had to throw all his prestige in the ring to get the permission for this operation from the Naval General Staff. Lower rank=less prestige=no PH attack.

Furthermore a third strike was not possible on Dec.7th. The planes would have arrived after sunset and the pilots were not trained to land in the dark. So the 3rd strike has to be delayed to Dec.8th 08:00 hrs. With three american CVs somewhere and your fuel reserves low that is a no-go.

But what I'm trying to tell you is that Nagumo wasn't aggressive. He came from an entirely different mindset. Yamamoto would have gone after Halsey.

 

[CalBear]

But what I'm trying to tell you is that Nagumo wasn't aggressive. He came from an entirely different mindset. Yamamoto would have gone after Halsey.

First, he had to FIND Halsey. Then he had to find the fuel to keep his ships going. IOTL one of the factors that Nagumo had to consider was fuel; had the Kido Butai remained on station, especially long enough to hunt for the American carriers (Not just Enterprise, but Lexington as well; he didn't know where either ship was) there was a very real chance that the fleet would have to abandon destoyers at sea when they ran out of fuel.

Yamamoto came from a VERY similar mindset to Nagumo. They had both been raised in the same naval tradition.

 

[Dean_the_Young]

But what I'm trying to tell you is that Nagumo wasn't aggressive. He came from an entirely different mindset. Yamamoto would have gone after Halsey.

Golly, I didn't know that Yamamoto could throw the planes that far?

Considering, you know, the lack of supplies, which would have included fuel.

 

[CDurham]

But what I'm trying to tell you is that Nagumo wasn't aggressive. He came from an entirely different mindset. Yamamoto would have gone after Halsey.

...and WHERE would you get the idea that Nagumo wasn't aggressive?

Just because an admiral or general knows when to call it a day does not make them a coward, it makes them smart. Nobody wants to win a pyrric victory.

Besides, they figured they would lose a carrier or two. While I doubt that the 3rd wave wouldn't have been ready to launch before it was practically dark, and I'm pretty sure the IJN brought along enough supplies for it (they did plan for it) the fact is that the IJN didn't know where the US carriers and submarines were. Also, the remaining Pearl Harbor aircraft, as well as the rest of the air wing in the Hawaiian islands, would have been ready and waiting.

To use a Klingon quote I heard in an episode of star trek DS9:

"To destroy an empire to win a battle is no victory, to end a battle to save an empire is no defeat"

 

[Bill Garvin]

But what I'm trying to tell you is that Nagumo wasn't aggressive. He came from an entirely different mindset. Yamamoto would have gone after Halsey.

Have you ignored everything you've been told in this thread?

I'll try and tell you again. Yamamoto couldn't have gone after Halsey. The carriers didn't have the time, they didn't have the fuel, they didn't have the munitions.

An aircraft carrier is a small dot on a big ocean. Actually finding one when one has no idea at all where she is located is by no means as easy as it sounds. And that begs the question of knowing that there is something there to find. Are you suggesting that Yamamoto would have put large numbers of search aircraft out on a 360 degree search pattern on the vague off-chance that there was somebody there to find? Because if you are, that makes Yamamoto criminally incompetent and foolhardy rather than just aggressive.

Are you suggesting that said search should be carried out in addition to the putative third strike at Pearl? Because that's going to leave the carriers empty, the only planes they'll have on board are the cripples from the first two waves.

Now think on this. There's a saying when hunting. Fire one shot, people know you are there, fire two and they know where you are. The Japanese carriers have had their two shots. The US knows where they are within a fine degree of accuracy. They've tracked the aircraft on their way back, they know roughly what the range of carrier-based aircraft is, put those together, they have range and bearing. That's all they need.

Much more to the point, that's all Enterprise needs. Nobody on the Japanese carriers knows where she is or if she is there at all. All the surplus dive bombers are out looking for her but their chance of getting her isn't good. Her chance of getting a strike in is very good. And that strike will hit at dusk; Japanese AAA wasn't too hot at the best of times; at dusk its going to be virtually ineffective. There's a good chance Enterprise will take down two or three carriers so your third strike and scout planes have a drastically reduced number of decks to go to.

Yet another thought for you. The Japanese carriers are five or six hours steaming from Pearl. Remember those six cruisers that escaped the raid? And the 27 surviving, undamaged destroyers in Pearl? That fleet outnumbers the Japanese three to one. If the Japanese carrier group hangs around all night, there could well be a most interesting night gun and torpedo battle with the carriers being raked by gunfire. Carriers burn, remember?

Would Enterprise get a strike in? Would the US cruisers and destroyers sortie? We don't know. BUT NOR DID THE JAPANESE COMMANDER ON THE SPOT NO MATTER WHO HE IS. It doesn't matter how much more aggressive you think Yamamoto is (and you haven't produced a word of evidence to support that claim); the Japanese commander is going to weigh the odds - that's what commanders do. And any professional will come to the same conclusion, the potential gains are not worth the possible losses.

Now, are you going to answer points and arguments made or just keep repeating the same old tired and discredited nonsense?

 

[Grey Wolf]

It seems he's not paying attention to any of the points made, and is continuing in his insistence that all will be unicorns and rainbows if Yamamoto was in command, despite evidence to the contrary.

Sargon

LOL, unicorns and rainbows, that's a very sweet vision...awwww

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[bard32]

It seems he's not paying attention to any of the points made, and is continuing in his insistence that all will be unicorns and rainbows if Yamamoto was in command, despite evidence to the contrary.

Either address the points made or we'll just assume you don't have a coherent argument.


Sargon

For the last time, according to Newt Gingrich, a former history professor, Admiral Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. He was the captain of an aircraft carrier, he was the commander of an aircraft carrier, he was the right
man for the job. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. He was the wrong man for the job. It would be like Admiral Kimmel naming Admiral Spruance to command the Enterprise instead of Halsey. Their tactics were completely and totally different. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. He followed a hit-and-run doctrine. He didn't launch a third strike to take out the oil storage tanks and the drydocks. Yamamoto, if he'd
been in charge of the Pearl Harbor attack, since it was his baby, would have
launched the third wave. Nagumo's junior officers, who were all carrier officers, wanted him to launch the third wave. Instead, he hit Pearl Harbor, then he ran. That's why it's called the raid on Pearl Harbor and not the attack on Pearl Harbor.

 

[MrP]

For the last time,

It's probably not a good idea to say "For the last time," to a load of people who have condemned your core premise as unworkable, old boy . . .

 

[David S Poepoe]

For the last time, according to Newt Gingrich, a former history professor, Admiral Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. He was the captain of an aircraft carrier, he was the commander of an aircraft carrier, he was the right
man for the job. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. He was the wrong man for the job. It would be like Admiral Kimmel naming Admiral Spruance to command the Enterprise instead of Halsey. Their tactics were completely and totally different. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. He followed a hit-and-run doctrine. He didn't launch a third strike to take out the oil storage tanks and the drydocks. Yamamoto, if he'd
been in charge of the Pearl Harbor attack, since it was his baby, would have
launched the third wave. Nagumo's junior officers, who were all carrier officers, wanted him to launch the third wave. Instead, he hit Pearl Harbor, then he ran. That's why it's called the raid on Pearl Harbor and not the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I'm a bit surprised that nobody has pointed out one obvious flaw in your arguement - among others - that being an advocate doesn't mean that you will be fantastically terrific at something. Alfred Thayer Mahan was an advocate of battleships and seapower, but he never commanded a battlefleet nor directed any war effort in the capacity of Nimitz.

Your points are all very hindsight and there is no indication except supposition that anything would work the way you and Gingrich think. I would really broaden my research to include the opinions and writing of other writers - giving particular attention to naval and naval aviation historians - before writing any more if I were you. Heck given the subject it would be good to consult Japanese books also.

Not to split hairs too much, but the attack on Pearl Harbor was an air raid and an air attack. The words are pretty much interchangeable. The Japanese withdrew because they had accomplished their mission to the best of their capability at the time based upon the best information they had at disposal.

 

[Wozza]

For the last time, according to Newt Gingrich, a former history professor, Admiral Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. He was the captain of an aircraft carrier, he was the commander of an aircraft carrier, he was the right
man for the job. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. He was the wrong man for the job. It would be like Admiral Kimmel naming Admiral Spruance to command the Enterprise instead of Halsey. Their tactics were completely and totally different. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. He followed a hit-and-run doctrine. He didn't launch a third strike to take out the oil storage tanks and the drydocks. Yamamoto, if he'd
been in charge of the Pearl Harbor attack, since it was his baby, would have
launched the third wave. Nagumo's junior officers, who were all carrier officers, wanted him to launch the third wave. Instead, he hit Pearl Harbor, then he ran. That's why it's called the raid on Pearl Harbor and not the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Reading something in one book is a very good way of getting some very bad ideas in your head. A you referring to an AH book or a history book? If the latter what are the sources? In particular what are the records from the time not the period afterwards.

This is why our initial impression of history is invariably wrong and laced with too many counterfactuals - we depend on memoir where the author claims he had all the best ideas. Later investigation of records at the time often reveals that this was not the case, and the author was a conformist voice. Were all these junior officers really crying out for the third wave? Or were they actually ambivalent? Divided in their opinions? If they had access to the full facts of a commander would they have made the same decision anyway?