Yamamoto is placed in charge of the attack on Pearl Harbor

I read that if the drydocks and oil storage at Pearl were knocked out it wouldn't have been useful as a foreward fleet base for a year. Others have suggested that anchored tankers and floating docks could be substitued, and I agree, but I don't think this is a substitue for the facilities at Pearl. I think that a oil-less, dock-less Hawaii could support cruisers and destroyers. But the BBs and CVs would have to go back to San Diego after substantial missions, until Pearl was bought back on line for these big ships. That would of course be sooner than anyone estimated.

Knocking these facilities out is a bit iffy in my opinion, even though I have more faith in the ability of the IJN to do this than your average American historian. I don't know if Yamamoto could have minimised the risks and made the 3rd strike successfully happen, although I think he would have had a better chance than Nagumo.
 
I forgot to mention that the Pacific Fleet would have been out of commission for six months if the oil tanks were taken out.

Why? We've already pointed out that oilers could be stationed at Lahaina Roads to replace them and they could be in position within days. The loss of the repair facilities and graving docks would be a worse problem but I doubt if the Japanese carriers had the ability to do serious damage to them. Experience over Germany showed that to take machine tool shops out needed heavy high explosive bombs and lots of them, just what the Japanese carriers didn't have. They had some heavy armor piercing bombs for use on ships but no heavy HE. Mostly their HE load was 550 pound GP bombs, utterly inadequate for destroying large factory-like machine shops. So the likely damage to the machinery shops is holes blown in the roof while the machine tools within are untouched.

As to the Pacific Fleet, the eight battleships in the battle line are in a pretty sad way. However, they can be replaced; the Navy could bring the three New Mexico class battleships back from the Atlantic (there's no real role for them there) Colorado was under refit and would be back within eight weeks. New York and Texas can also be brought in from the Atlantic. That gives a six-battleship line available within a month or so of the Pearl Harbor attack. We already know the carriers are safe and the cruiser/destroyer fleet has hardly been touched.

A quick look through the 1939 Janes Fighting Ships shows the US Navy has 11 seaplane tenders of varying size, 10 destroyer tenders, six submarine tenders, four heavy repair ships, six ammunition ships, eight dry stores and 19 oilers available - just the ones operated by the Navy, That doesn't include merchant ships that could be used as floating warehouses. That's enough assets to turn an anchorage into a naval base - which is just what the US Navy did across the Pacific.

So, say again. Why is the US Pacific Fleet going to be out of action for six months?
 
Billy Mitchell, using World War I era Martin MB-2 bombers, showed that the
battleship was obsolete. The battleship was also proven to be obsolete at
Taranto and Pearl Harbor.

IIRC he sank the Ostfriesland when it was

- unmanned (so no damage control or firing back)
- stationary (so no manoevring)
- bulkheads open (so quicker flooding)

That proves that a bomb can sink a floating hulk, not a warship

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
I read that if the drydocks and oil storage at Pearl were knocked out it wouldn't have been useful as a foreward fleet base for a year. Others have suggested that anchored tankers and floating docks could be substitued, and I agree, but I don't think this is a substitue for the facilities at Pearl. I think that a oil-less, dock-less Hawaii could support cruisers and destroyers. But the BBs and CVs would have to go back to San Diego after substantial missions, until Pearl was bought back on line for these big ships. That would of course be sooner than anyone estimated.

Knocking these facilities out is a bit iffy in my opinion, even though I have more faith in the ability of the IJN to do this than your average American historian. I don't know if Yamamoto could have minimised the risks and made the 3rd strike successfully happen, although I think he would have had a better chance than Nagumo.

I would agree with this

But who am I to know ? This just sounds more reasonable than the 'no change' approach of others

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 

bard32

Banned
I think the oil storage was a target, but would have been in the next wave, and the commander thought it too risky to land the planes, refuel and rearm and launch another wave.

The Japanese didn't know where the carriers were and didn't have radar in the fleet.

The Japanese had the wrong man in command of the Pearl Harbor Striking
Force. Nagumo was a cruiser and destroyer admiral used to hit and run tactics. Yamamoto was a carrier admiral and an advocate of airpower.
 

Markus

Banned
All right, switching gears. WI Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is placed in charge of
the attack on Pearl Harbor instead of Chuichi Nagumo? Why? Because Yamamoto was an advocate of air power, and Nagumo, like Spruance, was
a surface ship commander, in charge of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.

If Yamamoto is just in charge of the CVs the attack will never happen. Yamamoto was the commander of the whole Combined Fleet and he had to throw all his prestige in the ring to get the permission for this operation from the Naval General Staff. Lower rank=less prestige=no PH attack.

Furthermore a third strike was not possible on Dec.7th. The planes would have arrived after sunset and the pilots were not trained to land in the dark. So the 3rd strike has to be delayed to Dec.8th 08:00 hrs. With three american CVs somewhere and your fuel reserves low that is a no-go.
 
The Japanese had the wrong man in command of the Pearl Harbor Striking
Force. Nagumo was a cruiser and destroyer admiral used to hit and run tactics. Yamamoto was a carrier admiral and an advocate of airpower.

Didn't you read Calbear post? I think now it's time to promote a more rigorous atmosphere of research in the forum. History Channel is not what most people called authorized and verified source.
 
Pearl Harbor

What if the IJN had used Naval gunfire in the 3rd attack? how long would it have taken the BB and CA's to get within range ( With the carriers providing Air cover?) Did they have the firepower to wreck the Dry Docks and Oil tank farm? Would the US have had the ability to stop the Japanese surface force? Even if they did sink a BB or 2 the carriers would still get back to Japan? to fight another day. I figure the Japanese really did not do much with their BB and this would be a pretty good use for them.
 

bard32

Banned
Bah, humbug! :p

Billy Mitchell did nothing of the sort. He was a visionary, certainly, but he certainly didn't prove that. Taranto and Pearl Harbour demonstrate the value of bold surprise attacks, and the danger in a fleet in harbour is under when aircraft attack. If the USN carriers had been at Pearl and been sunk, that would no more have proved them obsolete than the events of OTL "proved" the battleship obsolete. The days of the big guns were numbered, but they weren't over. That's a common misconception caused by people going from "Wahey for big guns!" to "Wahey for bombs!" without stopping to think which is appropriate for a particular scenario. Incidentally, the battleship was a viable AA defence platform for carrier groups long after it lost its status as ultimate arbiter of naval combat.

Yes, he did. The U.S. Navy had a false sense of security when it came to the
battleship. Between 1918 and 1941, the battleship was the heart of naval strategy. The aircraft carrier, IIRC, was going to serve the same purpose as the frigates in the late 18th and early 19th centuries----the eyes of the fleet.
That's what the Battleship Admirals, also known as the Gun Club, wanted for the carrier. Billy Mitchell, who was a general in the USAAS, later, USAC, and
an advocate of an independent air force. Mitchell used the MB-2s to sink the
captured German battleship Ost Friesland. Of course, this drove the USN crazy. As for Pearl Harbor, the Navy did a series of what the called Fleet Situations. In one Fleet Situation, Fleet Situation IX, I think, the Navy
launched Curtiss VE-7s. The Japanese were watching. In 1941, they attacked Pearl Harbor. As for Billy Mitchell? He was court-martialed in 1925, stripped of his rank, dishonorably discharged, and had a bomber named after him.
 

bard32

Banned
I read that if the drydocks and oil storage at Pearl were knocked out it wouldn't have been useful as a foreward fleet base for a year. Others have suggested that anchored tankers and floating docks could be substitued, and I agree, but I don't think this is a substitue for the facilities at Pearl. I think that a oil-less, dock-less Hawaii could support cruisers and destroyers. But the BBs and CVs would have to go back to San Diego after substantial missions, until Pearl was bought back on line for these big ships. That would of course be sooner than anyone estimated.

Knocking these facilities out is a bit iffy in my opinion, even though I have more faith in the ability of the IJN to do this than your average American historian. I don't know if Yamamoto could have minimised the risks and made the 3rd strike successfully happen, although I think he would have had a better chance than Nagumo.

Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. Nagumo believed in hit-and-run tactics. Yamamoto believed in
having control over the battlefield. Yamamoto would have launched a third wave against Pearl Harbor and destroyed the oil storage tanks and drydocks. Yamamoto would have also gone after the American carriers.
 

bard32

Banned
Excuse me if I'm wrong, but didn't Nagumo follow Yamamoto's plan? Sure, he didn't launch the 3rd strike, but he didn't believe that they had time for it.

Because he was ill-suited for the job. As I said before, Nagumo commanded
cruisers and destroyers. He believed in hit-and-run tactics. Yamamoto was an
advocate of airpower. He would have launched the third wave and gone after
the American carriers. Saratoga was on the mainland, Lexington was at Wake
Island, delivering planes, and Enterprise was delivering planes to Midway.
When they found out about Pearl Harbor, they turned around.
 
Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. Nagumo commanded cruisers and destroyers. Nagumo believed in hit-and-run tactics. Yamamoto believed in
having control over the battlefield. Yamamoto would have launched a third wave against Pearl Harbor and destroyed the oil storage tanks and drydocks. Yamamoto would have also gone after the American carriers.
Are you being purposely obtuse? Because it's been explained, multiple times, how and why Yamamoto would not have made a different decision had he been on the spot. Yamamoto being at the held will not make the fighter bombers any more accurate, Yamamoto being at the helm will not make the most important considerations (losing the advantage of supply, not knowing when the carrier's would return or even where they were, or the supply situation any better.

And I don't even know where you got the idea that he would go out hunting for the carriers, when the Japanese were already out at the end of their supply line. Certainly he's never suggested that that should have been done after the Pearl Harbor strike.
 
What if the IJN had used Naval gunfire in the 3rd attack? how long would it have taken the BB and CA's to get within range ( With the carriers providing Air cover?) Did they have the firepower to wreck the Dry Docks and Oil tank farm? Would the US have had the ability to stop the Japanese surface force? Even if they did sink a BB or 2 the carriers would still get back to Japan? to fight another day. I figure the Japanese really did not do much with their BB and this would be a pretty good use for them.

There were several shore batteries in Pear Harbor that remained unharmed during the attack. The Japanese BBs would have lots of trouble staying afloat.
 

bard32

Banned
What if the IJN had used Naval gunfire in the 3rd attack? how long would it have taken the BB and CA's to get within range ( With the carriers providing Air cover?) Did they have the firepower to wreck the Dry Docks and Oil tank farm? Would the US have had the ability to stop the Japanese surface force? Even if they did sink a BB or 2 the carriers would still get back to Japan? to fight another day. I figure the Japanese really did not do much with their BB and this would be a pretty good use for them.

Most of the BBs, and CAs, with the exception of the USS Nevada, were at the bottom of Pearl Harbor, and that included the battleships Arizona,
Oklahoma, and Oklahoma andWest Viirgiinia, were raised from the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The same is true of the USS California.
Arizona wasn't raised because it's a war grave. Oklahoma was
later towed out about seven or eight miles from Pearl Harbor, and sunk again. Nevada was one of the battleships shelling German shore positions on D-Day.
 

MrP

Banned
Yes, he did. The U.S. Navy had a false sense of security when it came to the
battleship. Between 1918 and 1941, the battleship was the heart of naval strategy. The aircraft carrier, IIRC, was going to serve the same purpose as the frigates in the late 18th and early 19th centuries----the eyes of the fleet.
That's what the Battleship Admirals, also known as the Gun Club, wanted for the carrier. Billy Mitchell, who was a general in the USAAS, later, USAC, and
an advocate of an independent air force. Mitchell used the MB-2s to sink the
captured German battleship Ost Friesland. Of course, this drove the USN crazy. As for Pearl Harbor, the Navy did a series of what the called Fleet Situations. In one Fleet Situation, Fleet Situation IX, I think, the Navy
launched Curtiss VE-7s. The Japanese were watching. In 1941, they attacked Pearl Harbor. As for Billy Mitchell? He was court-martialed in 1925, stripped of his rank, dishonorably discharged, and had a bomber named after him.

I don't like to be patronising, old man, but Grey Wolf's already pointed out the detail of my previous denunciation of your claim that Mitchell proved the battleship obsolete. There was nobody on the ship. So nobody conducted damage control. Nobody used any defensive weaponry to attempt to drive off the aircraft. So the conditions can hardly de deemed realistic. It was inarguably a pointer in the right direction, but to claim -as you have done repeatedly - that it demonstrated the obsolescence of the battleship is just nonsense. Look, I've said to you before, if you want to be taken seriously, you'll need to get some proper sources. Even Wikipedia will set you straight on your present delusion. Please read it. :)

Sinking of the Ostfriesland

On July 20, 1921 the Navy brought out the ex-German WWI battleship, Ostfriesland, considered unsinkable. One day of scheduled 230, 550 and 600 lb. bomb attacks by Marine, Navy and Army aircraft settled the Ostfriesland three feet by the stern with a five degree list to port; she was taking on water. Further bombing was delayed a day by rough seas.

On the morning of July 21, five NBS-1 bombers each dropped a single 1,100 lb bomb, scoring three direct hits. By noon, Ostfriesland had settled two more feet by the stern and one foot by the bow. At this point, 2,000 lb bombs were loaded and a flight of three Handley-Page O/400 and eight NBS-1 bombers led by Capt. Walter Lawson dropped six in quick succession, aiming for the water near the ship. There were no direct hits but three of the bombs landed close enough to rip hull plates as well as cause the ship to roll over. The ship sank in 21 minutes, with a seventh bomb dropped on the foam rising up from the sinking ship.[4] Nearby the site, observing, were various foreign and domestic officials aboard the USS Henderson. One man present was a representative of the Japanese navy: Captain Osami Nagano. Nagano was quoted in a local paper as saying there was "much to be learned here."[citation needed] Years later, Nagano helped plan the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Although Mitchell had stressed "war-time conditions", the tests were under static conditions and the sinking of the Ostfriesland was accomplished by violating agreed-upon rules that would have allowed Navy engineers to examine the effects of smaller munitions, though the rules were changed right before the 2,000 bombs were to be dropped; Mitchell's airmen disregarded the rule and quickly sank the ship in a coordinated attack. Studies of the wreck of the Ostfriesland show she had suffered little topside damage from bombs and was sunk by progressive flooding that might have been stemmed by a fast-acting damage control party on board the vessel. Mitchell used the sinking for his own publicity purposes, though his results were downplayed in public by General of the Armies John J. Pershing who hoped to smooth Army/Navy relations.

Nevertheless, the test was highly influential at the time, causing budgets to be redrawn for further air development and forcing the Navy to look more closely at the possibilities of naval airpower.[5] Despite the advantages enjoyed by the bombers in the artificial exercise, Mitchell's report stressed facts repeatedly proven later in war:

...sea craft of all kinds, up to and including the most modern battleships, can be destroyed easily by bombs dropped from aircraft, and further, that the most effective means of destruction are bombs. [They] demonstrated beyond a doubt that, given sufficient bombing planes—in short an adequate air force— aircraft constitute a positive defense of our country against hostile invasion.

The fact of the sinkings was indisputable, and Mitchell repeated the performance twice in tests conducted with like results on obsolete U.S. pre-dreadnought battleship Alabama in September, 1921, and the battleships Virginia and New Jersey in September, 1923.[6] The latter two ships were subjected to teargas attacks and hit with specially designed 4,300 lb demolition bombs.

There's a good article on Billy Mitchell in the Spring 1996 edition of MHQ, which is a special issue focusing on air power. I commend the whole to you. :)
 

bard32

Banned
There are two different, very distinct, issues here. The first is, of course, Yamamoto being in actually command of the Kido Butai, with the second, the possibility of a third strike on Pearl Harbor, being an entirely separate matter.

One of the major misconceptions that surround Yamamoto is his "gambler" mentality. This actually is not a proper image of the man. He was a man of considerable earthly pleasures, when off duty, but a reckless gambler he was not. He was a poker player, which, if done well, in not so much gambling as evaluation of the other players. The Admiral was a very good poker player, one trait of successful professional card players (and Yamamoto, who supported a lifestyle far beyond his pay grade with poker winning, certainly qualifies a a pro) is that they actually never gamble; they play percentages. The percentages at Pearl Harbor had already been exceeded, the Kido Butai had suffered very light losses in personnel (although roughly 1 in 4 aircraft available before the battle began had been rendered Hors de Combat (29 actually shot down and around 75 have suffered significant battle damage, most in the second wave). The operational requirements for the mission were fully achieved, surprise was well & truly lost, and there were three American carriers unaccounted for (including Enterprise which was close enough that a flight of her SBD's actually arrived during the attacks, resulting in several being shot down blue-on-blue), it was a good time to cash in and leave the table. While, in hindsight, Yamamoto stated that Nagumo had missed an opportunity, at the time he supported Nagumo's choice. Every good card player knows when to call it a night.

Yamamoto MIGHT have pushed a third strike, but his actions would likely have been the same as Nagumo's. While certainly a planner of some vision, and even more a good listener to his staff, Yamamoto never exercised direct command of the Kido Butai during the war. His actions at Midway, where he initially ordered that the invasion proceed according to the original Plan, even after all four fleet carriers had been sunk; not instructing the amphibious forces to wait for the Combined Fleet to reach direct support positions, or even detaching the heavy escorts that had been shepherding the now lost carriers to support CruDiv 7 in their bombardment tasks shows clearly that he was not incapable of making a poor decision (truthfully, the entire Midway Operation is indicative of this). Moreover, as will be discussed, the decision to retire was NOT as poor as some believe.

The American base, while seriously damaged, was not entirely supine, not even close. While the fighter defenses had been seriously degraded, there were still better than 40 fighters (including 27 P-40) fully operational. The Army AAA batteries, all 31 of them were manned and armed (in the initial waves, only four of these batteries had been able to get into action), while the remaining American vessels in harbor were either fully manned and ready for trouble, or they were about to sortie. In the second wave, the Japanese had lost 20 aircraft and had suffered an additional 60 or so mission kills, this was while the confusion from the initial attack was still at full bellow. The Pearl Harbor defenses would have had several HOURS to have gotten back (or initially) into action, since the Japanese would have had to refuel and rearm the entire strike package before it could be launched. With the edginess of the AAA crews (who shot down a number of AMERICAN aircraft) the fully alerted nature of the surviving fighters (an interesting potential fight would have been the obsolete P-26 vs the equally obsolescent Val & Kate) the third wave would have had a very tough sled.

Had the third wave lost 40 or so aircraft, along with around 80 mission kills (or 120 airframes, just slightly worse than had happened in the second wave), it would have knocked at least one carrier, probably two, out of the war for months, as can been seen in how long it took Zuikaku to reconstitute her wing after Coral Sea. The operational loss of one or two decks could have had some interesting byproducts in the war's opening weeks, starting at Wake, and continuing into the Indian Ocean operations of April 1942.

The Japanese Navy only began to see it as a lost chance when the reversals of May & June of 1942 occurred, until then Pearl Harbor had been seen as an unqualified success (save the poor luck of missing the carriers). Moreover, in the long run, even the total devastation of Pearl Harbor would have altered the end of the Pacific War not a whit.

BTW: Enterprise was on the way back from delivering aircraft to Wake, while Lexington was around 400 miles from Pearl delivering aircraft to Midway.

Don't forget that Enterprise would have been in Pearl Harbor had she not hit
a storm the night before. Before Pearl Harbor, the Gun Club ruled the Navy.
After Pearl Harbor, it was all carriers. Had Yamamoto, and not Nagumo, been in command of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it would have been Yamamoto against Halsey.
 

bard32

Banned
Didn't you read Calbear post? I think now it's time to promote a more rigorous atmosphere of research in the forum. History Channel is not what most people called authorized and verified source.

Yes, I did. However, Nagumo, according to Newt Gingrich and William R.
Forstchen, was the wrong man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Yamamoto was an advocate of airpower. Yamamoto could have launched the
third strike against Pearl Harbor and taken out the drydocks and the oil storage tanks. If those were taken out, the Pacific Fleet, what was left of it,
would have been out of commission for six months to a year.
 
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