XIV/XVth century SE Asia question

Hi everyone,

I'm trying to get some info about South-East Asia prior to European contact and I had something bugging me.

Reading a history colonial textbook of the mid-XXth century, I saw mention of Vietnamese smelting cannons. But from what I understand, smelting cannons was actually a major deal and they didn't have capability before the 1660's with Joan de la Cruz.

I understand they had some form of artillery but more like wooden canons. Is there something I missed? Is the textbook wrong (which is frankly a possibility)?


On another note, I was reading that the reason Europeans were able to insert themselves so fast in the trade is because they were superior soldiers, something that does seem to come up very regularly across sources. I have seen it postulated it was because SE Asia/India was relatively peaceful compared to Europe. Could anybody confirm?

Thanks a lot for your answers!
 
:'(
I already have like 40 books to read on the subject, and my dear partner is already fed up with books piling up everywhere...

Ah well, this does seem interesting anyway, even if slightly expensive.

Thanks for the suggestion! Before I fork out the 35€, would you have a quick answer for me though?
 
Reading a history colonial textbook of the mid-XXth century, I saw mention of Vietnamese smelting cannons. But from what I understand, smelting cannons was actually a major deal and they didn't have capability before the 1660's with Joan de la Cruz.
Maybe they mixed-up different dynastic situations, between Lê, Mac and Champa? (If there wasn't a greater mix-up).
Which book is it? Can you make a scan of the incriminated page?

I understand they had some form of artillery but more like wooden canons. Is there something I missed?
Isn't there a possibility to have seen Ming-era gunpowder artillery in Lê dynasty armies?

On another note, I was reading that the reason Europeans were able to insert themselves so fast in the trade is because they were superior soldiers, something that does seem to come up very regularly across sources.
It's less trough soldiering alone, than a naval and economical projection power.
Portuguese had to deal with Mameluke traders worried about their local monopole being threatened, Indian Sultanates and Hindi princes with weird notions about Europeans traders having to pay taxes, and a defacto Venetian/Ottoman alliance., but while their naval power allowed them to trade and protect their newfounds markets (which some were opened with an equivalent of gunboat diplomacy) and factories (mostly spices, but also cotton and other products) either within their new holdings or further.

Eventually, the demise of Mameluke (partially coming from the loss of their Red Sea trade route monopolyk, partially because of Ottomans) provided a large relief for Portuguese which still had to deal with peninsular powers which didn't had much to envy to Europeans regarding warring capacities (Vijayanagara and Mughal conquests come in mind) during most of Portuguese India history.

Basically, a mix of naval capacities, gunboat diplomacy, local alliances against local big fellas, and good use of larger geopolitical changes.
 
Maybe they mixed-up different dynastic situations, between Lê, Mac and Champa? (If there wasn't a greater mix-up).
Which book is it? Can you make a scan of the incriminated page?


Isn't there a possibility to have seen Ming-era gunpowder artillery in Lê dynasty armies?

Sure, the book is "Cours d'histoire Annamite à l'usage des écoles de Basse-Cochinchine" from 1875, a history book used in classes in Cochinchine. This part tells the reign of Ho Quy Ly, who died in 1407
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hồ_Quý_Ly

Mais quelle que fut l'importance des concessions qu'elle
avait dû faire, la cour d'Annam comprenait très-bien
qu'elle n'avait obtenu par là qu'un délai et que le jour
viendrait fatalement où il faudrait lutter corps à corps avec
les gens du nord. Aussi on se préparait à la guerre, on
fondait des canons
, on fabriquait des armes de toutes
sortes, et pour exciter l'esprit de la population en faveur
du souverain, le roi et son père faisaient de longues
tournées dans le pays (7^ et 6® mois). En même temps
pour ne négliger aucune précaution, deux ambassadeurs
partaient pour la cour impériale, avec la mission de re-
nouer les relations interrompues et d'éviter tout conflit.
L'un d'eux fut retenu en Chine, et l'autre renvoyé sans
avoir rien lait. Plus tard même ce dernier fut accusé
d'être allé saluer à Péking un intrigant qui se donnait
comme descendant des Tran et se posait en prétendant
sous le nom de Thiêm-binh. Hô-hân-thu'omg lit mettre
cet ambassadeur k mort.



It's less trough soldiering alone, than a naval and economical projection power.
Portuguese had to deal with Mameluke traders worried about their local monopole being threatened, Indian Sultanates and Hindi princes with weird notions about Europeans traders having to pay taxes, and a defacto Venetian/Ottoman alliance., but while their naval power allowed them to trade and protect their newfounds markets (which some were opened with an equivalent of gunboat diplomacy) and factories (mostly spices, but also cotton and other products) either within their new holdings or further.

Basically, a mix of naval capacities, gunboat diplomacy, local alliances against local big fellas, and good use of larger geopolitical changes.

So basically superior artillery and the fact they were outsiders who could better navigate through alliances which cemented a good geopolitical position and snowballing from there?

It seems like that's what happened at Diu, massive artillery advantage over everyone else and then pursuit of an ultra-aggressive diplomacy through gunboats and missionaries.

I am asking the better soldier question as it really looks like they were a superior force. For exemple in Vietnam during the Tay Son rebellion (late XVIIIth) you get native armies of 30k people but it's apparently a force of 1500 europeans which can really shift the balance of power or completely turn back the tide. You get a similar impression during the Siam Embassy earlier in the century.

And that's not even counting later campaigns like the conquest of Indochine by the French where it gets simply ridiculous.
 
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Sure, the book is "Cours d'histoire Annamite à l'usage des écoles de Basse-Cochinchine" from 1875, a history book used in classes in Cochinchine. This part tells the reign of Ho Quy Ly, who died in 1407
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hồ_Quý_Ly

I wonder if it's not simply Ming-era gunpowder artiller, giving the mentioned active contacts with China.

I am asking the better soldier question as it really looks like they were a superior force.
That said, it's about the late XVIIIth century : it's less about how Europeans managed to "infiltrate" South-East Asian trade, than how they managed to grow their dominance from this first establishment in the XVIth.

For exemple in Vietnam during the Tay Son rebellion (late XVIIIth) you get native armies of 30k people but it's apparently a force of 1500 europeans which can really shift the balance of power or completely turn back the tide. You get a similar impression during the Siam Embassy earlier in the century.
Modern Vietnam at this point was a collection of autonomous entities on which imperial power wasn't that acknowledged; Tay Son rebellions being mostly peasant revolts.

There, rather than outright better soldiering from Europeans, it highlight how inner division and non-professional armies represent a problem face to a colonial power.

Just look at the Franco-Chinese war, and you'd see that Asians were more than able to hold their ground with a right strategical position.
 
I wonder if it's not simply Ming-era gunpowder artiller, giving the mentioned active contacts with China.

Seems likely, to say Tonkin's and China's history are intertwined is an understatement. The Ming would actually invade 13 years later. Thanks!

Modern Vietnam at this point was a collection of autonomous entities on which imperial power wasn't that acknowledged; Tay Son rebellions being mostly peasant revolts.

Hmm, to me you're understating the stability of the state. Sure there were revolts but there was also a stable state, routinely able to raise armies in the tens of thousand and keep them in the field. The Tay Son for example, despite being newcomers, would be able to subjugate the state and campaign year round against both the legitimate Vua and the Chua in Tonkin.



There, rather than outright better soldiering from Europeans, it highlight how inner division and non-professional armies represent a problem face to a colonial power.

Just look at the Franco-Chinese war, and you'd see that Asians were more than able to hold their ground with a right strategical position.

Hmmm. Not sure the Franco-Chinese war is a good example. Checking the numbers from wikipedia, the French were largely outnumbered (1:1.5 / 1:2), far from their base, operating from a devastated land with the resulting impact on supply chains and in hostile terrain due to disease compared to the Chinese who were fighting next door.

I can't quite find the data but I imagine French army would be mostly conscripts at this point, with the odd Légion thrown in. Since the soldiers were probably sick and conscripts on the French side, maybe it's through superior tactics and officer corps? That would seem likely given what I remember from the Vietnamese and Chinese states at this point.

Sure the Chinese had the occasional success (Bac Le...) but in the end they got their asses handed to them on a silver platter.


However, that's covering three centuries as one period. Did the Europeans consistently have better officer corps? Why would that be?
 
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